Patrick Roether, et al. v. State of Georgia, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13731
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
PATRICK ROETHER,
HOLLIE ROETHER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
STATE OF GEORGIA,
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
COUNTY OF MCINTOSH,
MCINTOSH COUNTY DFCS,
COUNTY OF BENTON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13731
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00083-LGW-BWC
____________________
Before NEWSOM , BRANCH , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Proceeding pro se, Patrick and Hollie Roether (“Roethers”)
filed a 759-paragraph complaint against 152 defendants. They
alleged that the defendants had a broad conspiracy to remove
children from the custody of their parents to profit from increased
federal funding, and to illegally arrest parents who protested their
actions. The Roethers’s claims arise from their interactions with
this alleged conspiracy.
On appeal, the Roethers challenge several rulings made by
the district court. They argue that the district court abused its
discretion in (1) dismissing their complaint as a shotgun pleading;
(2) staying discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss;
(3) refusing to let them file electronically; (4) denying their motion
for sanctions against defendant Dr. John Ledwich; and (5) refusing
to transfer their case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, they
argue that the district and magistrate judges should have sua sponte
recused themselves because their rulings indicate they were not
impartial. After review, we affirm on all issues.
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22-13731 Opinion of the Court 3
I. Background
On September 7, 2021, the Roethers filed their initial 93-page
complaint against 40 named defendants and 100 unnamed “Doe”
defendants, asserting a variety of allegations related to numerous
different events. After the named defendants moved to dismiss, the
district court found that the complaint was a shotgun complaint
and ordered the Roethers to replead their claims. Because it
ordered the Roethers to amend their complaint, it denied the
pending motions to dismiss. The court gave the Roethers two
weeks to amend their complaint and provided them with
instructions on how to avoid dismissal.1
On May 23, 2022, one day before the amended complaint
was due, the Roethers moved for an extension. The court granted
the Roethers an extension until May 31, 2022. On May 31, the
Roethers filed an amended complaint, but it was the wrong
version. Thus, on June 6, 2022, the Roethers moved the district
court to allow them to file the correct complaint. The court
granted the motion.
1 The district court advised as follows:
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint 1) must assert only relevant
allegations of fact and law in each count of their complaint and
explain their connection to each defendant, 2) clearly identify
the specific defendants against whom each claim is asserted,
3) avoid vague, generalized, conclusory, and contradictory
assertions, and 4) avoid incorporating prior counts into those
which follow.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13731
The Roethers’s amended complaint asserted 28 claims
against 152 defendants2 over the course of 149 pages and 759
paragraphs. The Roethers alleged that the defendants have a broad
conspiracy to remove children from the custody of their parents
“for a profit and a gain of Federal, State, and County Funding” and
to illegally arrest parents who protest their actions. The Roethers
asserted numerous claims and violations of their rights related to
this alleged conspiracy.3
The defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing that the
amended complaint was a shotgun complaint. The district court
held that, despite instructing the Roethers on how to fix their
complaint and allowing them to file two amended versions of it, it
still contained many “conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts,” set
forth “multiple causes of action in single counts,” and made
“multiple claims against multiple defendants under single counts.”
2 The defendants include several counties—McIntosh County, Brantley
County, Benton County, Houston County, Carroll County, Williamson
County—and their employees; the states of Georgia and Tennessee; South
Georgia Medical Center; Dr. Ledwich; Dr. Daniel Collipp; and 100 unnamed
defendants.
3 Their claims include, for example, allegations of illegal searches and arrests,
claims related to their treatment while detained, claims related to the custody
and medical treatment of their children, claims related to false statements and
procedural irregularities in state court, claims under the False Claims Act, and
claims against Georgia and Tennessee for “deceptive business practices.”
Notably, the Roethers alleged that they were “citizens of the Kingdom of
Y’Israel,” and, therefore, they were not subject to the laws of the United States
or the laws of any state.
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22-13731 Opinion of the Court 5
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the amended complaint
with prejudice as an impermissible shotgun pleading.
Along with dismissing the Roethers’s complaint as a shotgun
pleading, the district court made four procedural rulings that the
Roethers challenge on appeal.
First, after filing their initial motions to dismiss, some
defendants moved to stay discovery pending resolution of the
motions to dismiss. The magistrate judge granted the stay. It
reasoned that some defendants were likely to achieve dismissal for
various reasons, including colorable claims of immunity from suit,
and that discovery would not be necessary to meet the defendants’
non-factual defenses. After the original motions to dismiss were
denied, several defendants refiled their motion to stay discovery
pending the resolution of anticipated renewed motions to dismiss.
By the time the district court considered the motion to stay, the
renewed motions to dismiss had been filed. The district court
ultimately granted the motion to stay over objection by the
Roethers.
Second, the Roethers moved to file electronically. The
magistrate judge denied this motion based on the local
administrative rules. The Roethers later moved to serve the
defendants by e-mail, to receive documents by the e-mail filing
system, and to file with the court via e-mail. Again, the magistrate
judge denied this motion based on the local rules, as well as the
Federal Rules.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13731
Third, after the Roethers first moved to amend their
complaint, defendant Ledwich responded that the motion should
not be granted because an amendment would be futile, the many
extensions and missed deadlines suggested the Roethers were
acting with dilatory motives, and the Roethers had burdened the
court with repetitive motions. The Roethers moved for sanctions
against Ledwich and his counsel for making these arguments. The
magistrate judge denied the motion, reasoning that sanctions were
not appropriate because Ledwich’s statements had a reasonable
factual basis, were based on a reasonable legal theory, and were not
clearly made in bad faith. The district court overruled the
Roethers’s objections.
Fourth, the Roethers moved to transfer their case to the U.S.
Supreme Court. They argued that, because Mr. Roether is
allegedly an “Ambassador for the Kingdom of Y’Israel,”4 the
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over their case. The
district court denied the motion, reasoning that the Kingdom of
Y’Israel is not a nation recognized by the United States.
The Roethers appealed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, the Roethers argue that the district court erred
by (1) dismissing their complaint; (2) granting a discovery stay
4 According to the Roethers, the “Kingdom of Y’Israel is a nation made up of
the men and women which are chos[]en by God to be his people and who
obey his Torah.”
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22-13731 Opinion of the Court 7
pending resolution of the motions to dismiss; (3) denying their
motions to proceed electronically; (4) denying their motion to
sanction Ledwich; and (5) denying their motion to transfer the case
to the U.S. Supreme Court. They also argue that the district and
magistrate judges should have sua sponte recused from the case due
to their perceived lack of impartiality. After careful review, we
affirm on all issues.
A. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss the Roethers’s
complaint as a shotgun pleading.
The Roethers argue that the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing their complaint as a shotgun pleading.
“We review a dismissal on Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of
discretion.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2018). The district court does not abuse its discretion “so long
as [its] choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” In re
Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).
District courts have an inherent power to control their
docket. Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1295. This power includes “the ability to
dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds.” Id. Shotgun
complaints violate Rule 8 by failing to provide a short and plain
statement and by failing to provide defendants with adequate
notice of the claim against them. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). We
have “little tolerance” for shotgun complaints, which “waste scarce
judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery,
wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13731
public’s respect for the courts.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quotation
omitted). “And although we are to give liberal construction to the
pleadings of pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to
conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, 490 F.3d 826, 829
(11th Cir. 2007).
There are four main types of shotgun complaints: (1) “a
complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count
to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination
of the entire complaint”; (2) a complaint that is “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected
to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint that fails to
separate each claim for relief into a different count; and (4) a
complaint that alleges multiple claims against multiple defendants
in each count, without identifying which defendants are
responsible for which claims or which of the defendants the claim
is against. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,
1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015).
If a court identifies that a complaint is a shotgun complaint
and the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must give the
plaintiff one chance to replead, with instructions on the
deficiencies. See Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991),
overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314
F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (overruling Bank as
to counseled plaintiffs, but leaving rule as to pro se plaintiffs intact);
see also Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1295–96. If the amended complaint does
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22-13731 Opinion of the Court 9
not remedy the defects and the plaintiff does not move to amend,
then the court may dismiss the complaint. Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1296.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
Roethers’s amended complaint. As the district court noted, the
Roethers’s amended complaint “commit[ted] three of the four
‘sins’ of shotgun pleadings . . . .”
First, the amended complaint included many “conclusory,
vague, or immaterial facts” that were “not obviously connected to
any particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. For
example, the complaint’s sixteen-page “Introduction” includes
many immaterial facts about the Roethers’s religious beliefs,
marital relationship, and their rejection of government authority.
And despite the district court cautioning the Roethers to trim the
facts from the original complaint, the amended complaint
“ballooned” from 93 to 149 pages, and from 355 to 759 paragraphs.
Second, the Roethers do not separate their “claims for relief”
into separate counts. For instance, their first claim for relief alleges
eight unlawful arrests against both Patrick and Hollie Roether
spanning over nine years in two states, in addition to several
unlawful searches of their dwelling. Their second claim for relief
deals with the custody of their five children over seven years in two
states. And their twenty-fifth claim for relief alleges several
defendants violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Third, the Roethers allege multiple violations by multiple
defendants without identifying which defendant is responsible for
which wrong. For example, their seventeenth claim for relief
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13731
alleges that different combinations of defendants, both named and
unnamed, illegally provided medical examinations and treatment
to Y.R. and L.R.
Given that the amended complaint was the third complaint
the district court allowed the Roethers to submit, and the district
court gave the Roethers a prior opportunity to amend and specific
instructions on how to avoid dismissal, dismissal was an
appropriate remedy. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.
B. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to stay discovery pending the
resolution of the motions to dismiss.
The Roethers argue that the district court abused its
discretion in staying discovery pending the resolution of the
renewed motions to dismiss because the defendants had not yet
renewed their motions to dismiss when they moved to stay
discovery.
“We review the district court’s discovery rulings . . . for an
abuse of discretion.” Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d
1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2004). Because of the great cost of discovery,
“when faced with a motion to dismiss a claim for relief that
significantly enlarges the scope of discovery, the district court
should rule on the motion before entering discovery orders, if
possible.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368
(11th Cir. 1997). Staying discovery pending the resolution of
renewed motions to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion because
of the likely cost and complexity of discovery on the Roethers’s 28
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22-13731 Opinion of the Court 11
claims for relief. And while the Roethers argue that the defendants
had not yet filed their renewed motions to dismiss when they
moved to stay discovery a second time, the renewed motions to
dismiss had been filed by the time the court granted the motion to
stay discovery.
C. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to prevent the Roethers from
filing electronically.
The Roethers argue that, because of the difficulties they face
with paper filings, the district court abused its discretion by denying
their motions to file electronically.
“We . . . review a district court’s application of local rules for
an abuse of discretion.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302
(11th Cir. 2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 provides that a
pro se litigant “may file electronically only if allowed by court order
or by local rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (5)(d)(3)(B)(i). The Southern
District of Georgia’s local rules prohibit pro se litigants from filing
electronically: “A party proceeding pro se, unless that party is an
attorney in good standing and admitted to practice before the Bar
of this Court, shall not file electronically.” See S.D. Ga. Local R. 5.5
(cross-referencing the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia, Administrative Procedures for Filing, Signing and
Verifying Pleadings and Papers by Electronic Means, which sets
forth the above cited rule). The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Roethers’s motions to file electronically
based on the plain text of local rules which are specifically
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-13731
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P.
5(d)(3)(B)(i).5
D. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny the Roethers’s motion
for sanctions.
The Roethers argue that the district court abused its
discretion in denying their motion for sanctions against Ledwich
because he made various false statements about their litigation
efforts in one of his filings below.
We “review all aspects of a district court’s [sanctions]
determination for abuse of discretion.” Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d
1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1993). Sanctions are to be imposed when a
pleading (1) has “no reasonable factual basis,” (2) “is based on a
legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success” and is not “a
reasonable argument to change existing law,” or (3) is “in bad faith
or for an improper purpose.” Id. at 1104 (quotation omitted). This
test is analyzed under an objective framework; “courts determine
whether a reasonable attorney in like circumstances could believe
his actions were factually and legally justified.” Kaplan v.
DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).
5 The Roethers also argue, for the first time on appeal, that the district and
magistrate judges should have recused themselves because their rulings on
electronic filing suggested the judges were not impartial. But “rulings adverse
to a party” do not “constitute pervasive bias” necessitating recusal. Hamm v.
Members of Bd. of Regents of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, the
district and magistrate judges did not err in failing to recuse themselves.
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22-13731 Opinion of the Court 13
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
Roethers’s motion for sanctions against Ledwich. Ledwich’s
statements that the Roethers were delaying in bad faith and filing
repetitive motions had a reasonable factual basis. For example, the
Roethers filed many motions for e-filing and venue that delayed the
proceedings, and so Ledwich’s motion had some reasonable
chance of success. Finally, the Roethers presented no reason to
think that Ledwich’s statements were made in bad faith or for an
improper purpose.6
6 The Roethers also argue that the district court abused its discretion in failing
to transfer the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. They argue that because
Patrick is allegedly an ambassador of the Kingdom of Y’Israel, and they are
suing, among others, the State of Georgia and the State of Tennessee, they are
entitled to original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. While the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors and cases in which a
state is a party, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, it does not appear Patrick is an
ambassador “accredited to the United States by [a] foreign power[],” as the
Kingdom of Y’Israel is not recognized by the United States. See Independent
States in the World, U.S. Department of State,
https://www.state.gov/independent-states-in-the-world/ (last accessed Jan.
12, 2024) [https://perma.cc/SBN9-72UR] (The State Department list of the
195 independent countries recognized by the United States includes the “State
of Israel” but not the “Kingdom of Y’Israel”); see also Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S.
302, 303 (1925) (Ambassadors are “diplomatic and consular representatives
accredited to the United States by foreign powers[.]”). Nor is this a case
“between” states, as Tennessee and Georgia are both defendants. 28 U.S.C. §
1251(a).
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-13731
III. Conclusion
For all the reasons discussed, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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