USA v. Joaquin Rivero

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10646
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOAQUIN RIVERO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:98-cr-00023-JAL-2,
1:00-cr-00220-JAL-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
____________________
____________________
No. 23-10923
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOAQUIN RIVERO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:00-cr-00220-JAL-1,
1:98-cr-00023-JAL-2
____________________
Before W ILSON, R OSENBAUM , and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 3
Defendant-Appellant Joaquin Rivero appeals his 168-month
sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine,
contempt of court, and failure to appear. Rivero argues that the
government violated a term of his plea agreement. According to
Rivero, the district court also erred in applying a firearms enhance-
ment and denying safety-value relief, and his sentence is unreason-
able. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
In 1998, a federal grand jury charged Rivero with conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1), and possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (Count 2). After pleading not guilty, the court released Rivero
on bond.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Rivero agreed to
plead guilty to Count 1 with the understanding that the govern-
ment would seek dismissal of Count 2 at the time of sentencing. In
the agreement, he agreed to forfeit $37,700 found in his home be-
cause the money “constitute[d] or was derived from proceeds, ob-
tained directly or indirectly, as a result of a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and/or was used or intended to be used to
commit or to facilitate the commission of the said violation.” The
plea agreement also included that the government would recom-
mend safety valve relief if Rivero was found to not “have possessed
a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the of-
fense.” At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court placed
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
Rivero under oath, and Rivero confirmed that (1) he understood
the charge against him, (2) the prosecutor’s facts of the case were
correct, and (3) he did not have any changes to the facts.
Relevant to this appeal, drug task force officers observed
drugs being moved from a Cadillac to another car in a parking lot.1
Officers then identified the address to which the Cadillac was reg-
istered, surveilled the address, and watched Rivero drive away
from the address in the Cadillac. The officers stopped Rivero, and
he consented to the search of his residence. During the search,
agents found additional kilograms of cocaine in a storage shed be-
hind Rivero’s residence. In the storage shed with the cocaine, the
agents found scales, drug packaging materials, drug mixing agents,
and other paraphernalia having to do with drug distribution. The
agents also found $37,700 in his house and four guns in a bedroom
drawer in his house.
Rivero was arrested. He subsequently told the agents that
he possessed the cocaine for about four to five days and that it had
been brought to his house by a person known to Rivero as “Ger-
man” with instructions for Rivero to hold the cocaine until con-
tacted. Rivero confirmed that he gave 14 kilograms of cocaine to
another person. He told the agents that the cocaine paraphernalia
and scales found in the shed on his property belonged to him and
that he had been involved with distributing cocaine for about 1 to
1 The officers continued surveilling the car until two people got into the car
and left. The officers pulled over the vehicle and those in the car consented to
a search of the car, which contained 14 kilograms of cocaine.
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 5
1½ years. He also stated that he had been told he would be given
$300 per kilogram for holding the cocaine at his residence.
After discussing the forfeiture and possible safety-valve re-
lief, Rivero confirmed that: the plea agreement was read to him
before he signed it; he signed it; he fully discussed the agreement
with his attorneys before signing it; he understood all the terms of
the agreement before signing it; and the terms summarized by the
court were the terms of his plea agreement with the government
as he understood them. The government recommended that
Rivero remain on bond pending sentencing, which the court al-
lowed.
A presentence investigation report (1998 PSI) indicated the
application of a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) based on the four firearms found in his house. The
1998 PSI also found Rivero ineligible for safety-valve relief under
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Rivero objected to the two-level enhancement,
saying there was no connection to the offenses that he committed
because all the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in a shed
in the back of his residence that was detached from his house and
that the weapons were found in his bedroom. He stated that, when
he entered into the plea agreement, both parties contemplated that
he would receive the benefits of the safety valve, as shown by the
language in the plea agreement. The government opposed.
At his sentencing hearing in June 1998, Rivero failed to ap-
pear, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. In March 2000, a fed-
eral grand jury charged Rivero in a new indictment with contempt
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
of court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and failure to appear, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146.
For over twenty years, Rivero lived in Costa Rica. But in
February 2020, Rivero was arrested while traveling through an air-
port in Panama City, Panama. He was returned to the Southern
District of Florida where he first pled not guilty to the 2000 indict-
ment. But without a plea agreement as to the 2020 charges, Rivero
later agreed to pled guilty to both counts, and the district court ac-
cepted his plea. The cases were consolidated for sentencing pur-
poses.
The new PSI (2020 PSI) described the conduct underlying
the 1998 conviction as detailed above but expanded on where the
money was found in Rivero’s house and clarified that the shed
where the cocaine was found had been unlocked. Additionally, the
2020 PSI said that officers found four handguns: a Smith & Wesson
semi-automatic firearm with a clip and 12 nine-millimeter bullets;
two .38 caliber Smith & Wesson firearms and two brown holsters;
and a .38 caliber long barrel Rossi firearm in a dresser in Rivero’s
master bedroom. The 2020 PSI also detailed Rivero’s fleeing from
Florida, his over twenty years in Costa Rica, and his arrest in the
Panama City airport.
Like the 1998 PSI, the 2020 PSI stated that Rivero was not
eligible for the safety-valve reduction because he was found in pos-
session of four firearms at his residence, which is also where drugs
and paraphernalia were stored. Based on a total offense level of 36
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 7
and a criminal history category of I,2 Rivero’s guideline imprison-
ment range was 188 to 235 months. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6,
if sentencing for the 2000 indictment was imposed on the failure to
appear conviction, it must run consecutively to any other sentence
of imprisonment.
As he had done in 1998, Rivero again objected to the state-
ment that he was not eligible for safety-valve relief. He objected to
the two-level enhancement based on the four firearms. He re-
quested a downward variance and a 26-month term of imprison-
ment because he had a low criminal history score, was raised in an
orphanage in Cuba, was a father to four children, was low risk for
recidivism, was 86 years old, and suffered from multiple serious
health conditions.
The court held three separate sentencing hearings. At the
first one, Rivero sought to correct several alleged factual errors in
his 1998 PSI to which he had agreed in his plea agreement and dur-
ing his 1998 change‑of‑plea hearing. The government argued that
he was precluded from doing so.
At the second hearing, the district court found that prece-
dent precluded it from considering facts conflicting with state-
ments made during the 1998 Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy and con-
tained in the plea agreement. The court found that his objections
2 Starting with a base offense level of 32, the 2020 PSI added a two-level en-
hancement for possession of firearms and two levels for willfully obstructing
justice.
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to the facts previously admitted in the Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy
and contained in the plea agreement lacked merit. The govern-
ment did not need to present evidence because those facts were
admitted by Rivero—the $37,700 recovered in the house was drug
proceeds.
At the third hearing, the district court heard arguments on
Rivero’s objection to the firearms enhancement, again highlighting
the location of both the drugs (the shed) and guns (master bed-
room). The court found that the government met its initial burden
to show that Rivero possessed guns based on the factual proffer at
the 1998 Rule 11 hearing and the undisputed PSI findings that there
were four firearms present at the site of the charged conduct. After
considering Rivero’s arguments, the court found that Rivero did
not meet the burden required to demonstrate that a connection be-
tween the four firearms and the offense was clearly improbable.
The court next heard arguments on the safety-valve objec-
tion. Rivero again argued that his participation in the offense did
not involve guns and that there was no evidence in the record that
the guns were actually possessed in connection with the case or
used during the case. The government argued that it was still prob-
able that the guns were used in connection with the charged con-
duct for protection of the cash and the property generally where
the drugs were stored.
The court admitted that “it [was] a difficult question,” but
found it probable that the guns possessed by Rivero were possessed
in connection with the offense. The district court stated that “[t]he
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 9
drugs were found on the property in the shed. This was his resi-
dence, the total property, and he has admitted that the cash was
from trafficking. I have no choice [but] to say that he does not
qualify for the safety valve.”
After confirming Rivero’s guideline range was 188 to 235
months, the court heard from Rivero where he allocuted and apol-
ogized for absconding. The government recommended a sentence
of 200 months’ imprisonment and emphasized that Rivero chose
to flee rather than accept responsibility for his actions in 1998.
The court sentenced Rivero to 168 months total imprison-
ment, 162 months attributed to the drug trafficking offense and 6
months each for the failure to appear and criminal contempt of
court offense, to run consecutively to the 1998 count and concur-
rently with each other. The court said that it considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the facts and circumstances of Rivero’s
case, as well as Rivero’s history and characteristics, the nature and
circumstances of Rivero’s offense. Rivero timely appealed.
II.
Rivero first argues that the government violated a term of
the plea agreement when it argued that he was not safety-valve el-
igible under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2). Sec-
ond, he argues that the district court erred in determining that
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s firearms enhancement applied to his drug
offense level. Third, he argues that the district court erred in deny-
ing safety‑valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) and
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2). Fourth, he argues that his 168-month total
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
sentence is unreasonable. We will address each of his challenges in
turn.
A.
To begin, the government contends that Rivero’s argument
that the government breached the plea agreement is subject to
plain error review because he failed to object before the district
court. While we ordinarily review the alleged breach of a plea
agreement de novo, the government is correct in that we review
only for plain error if the issue was not raised below. United States
v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022).
Rivero asserts that he properly raised the objection, but a
review of the record belies that argument. Although Rivero argued
against the enhancement and in support of safety-valve relief, he
never argued to the district court that the government breached
the plea agreement or asked to hold the government to its promise.
See United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (ex-
plaining the defendant cannot preserve an argument by raising
facts underlying the argument if the facts were presented under a
different legal theory).
Thus, plain error applies and occurs where there is: “(1) an
error (2) that is plain and (3) that has affected the defendant’s sub-
stantial rights; and if the first three prongs are met, then a court
may exercise its discretion to correct the error if (4) the error seri-
ously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted and alterations adopted). We have
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 11
held that the government’s failure to abide by the plain text of a
plea agreement can satisfy the first two prongs of the plain error
test. See Malone, 51 F.4th at 1321.
Here, we find that no plain error occurred when the govern-
ment refused to recommend that Rivero receive safety-valve relief.
Rivero’s case is similar to our decision in United States v. Mahique.
150 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). There, the government “agreed not
to oppose Mahique’s request to be sentenced under the safety-
valve provision ‘if he is eligible, and the Court makes appropriate
findings regarding the criteria.’” Id. at 1331. But at sentencing, the
government opposed the safety valve relief because Mahique fled
the jurisdiction and retracted several admissions he made during
his prior confession, and we found that “[t]he government did not
breach the plea agreement.” Id. at 1331–32. The government’s
promise in the plea agreement not to oppose Mahique’s request to
be sentenced under the safety-valve provision was conditioned on
him being eligible for the provision and the district court finding
that he met all criteria for application of the provision. Id. at 1332.
Here, the agreement said that the parties would jointly rec-
ommend safety-valve relief provided that Rivero was not found “to
have possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection
with the offense.” Although the language in this plea agreement
differs somewhat from the agreement in Mahique, the recommen-
dation of safety-valve relief was conditional on Rivero not having
been found to possess a firearm in connection with his offense.
And here, both probation via the 2020 PSI and the district court
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
found Rivero possessed a firearm, so the government was not re-
quired to make the recommendation for safety-valve relief.
Thus, it was not plain error for the district court not to find
that the government breached the plea agreement by arguing
against safety-valve relief.
B.
“Whether a defendant possessed a firearm for purposes of
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) is a factual finding that we review under the clear-
error standard.” United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1204 (11th
Cir. 2017). For a finding to be clearly erroneous, we “must be left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted.” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1137 (11th
Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhance-
ment in drug cases “[i]f a dangerous weapon . . . was possessed.”
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The commentary for § 2D1.1(b)(1) pro-
vides3 that “[t]he enhancement should be applied if the weapon
was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was
3 We have held that a sentencing court may consider the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s interpretation of a Guideline as contained in the Commentary to the
extent that a Guideline is “genuinely ambiguous.” United States v. Dupree, 57
F.4th 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Neither Rivero nor the United
States makes any argument about whether the Guideline is ambiguous or
whether the district court properly relied on the commentary in applying this
enhancement. Thus, we leave whether U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) is ambiguous
for another day. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022)
(en banc).
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 13
connected with the offense. For example, the enhancement would
not be applied if the defendant, arrested at the defendant’s resi-
dence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.11(A)).
“To justify a firearms enhancement, the government must
either establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm
was present at the site of the charged conduct or prove that the
defendant possessed a firearm during conduct associated with the
offense of conviction.” United States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220
(11th Cir. 2006). We have recognized that close proximity between
weapons and drugs alone is sufficient for the government to meet
its initial burden under § 2D1.1(b)(1). United States v. Carillo-Ayala,
713 F.3d 82, 91–92 (11th Cir. 2013). The presence of the weapon
cannot be merely coincidental, and it must have some purpose or
effect to the offense. George, 872 F.3d at 1204. Evidence that a de-
fendant used or could have used a weapon to protect his criminal
activity is sufficient to show a connection between the weapon and
the offense and will thus satisfy the government’s burden under
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). See Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 92.
If the government meets its initial burden, the burden shifts
to the defendant, who has the opportunity to show that a connec-
tion between the weapon and the offense was “clearly improba-
ble.” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220. Failure to produce such evidence
permits a district court to apply the enhancement. United States v.
Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63–64 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The guidelines
impose a heavy burden to negate the connection and show that it
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
is clearly improbable. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 90; U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.11(A)).
Here, the district court did not err in imposing a firearm en-
hancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1). First, Rivero kept guns at his
house, and he received and stored drugs on the property—in the
shed, based on the search of his property and his objections to the
PSI—on which the house was located. The guns were also found
near the money that Rivero admitted was drug proceeds. Rivero
also said that he received several kilograms of cocaine at his prop-
erty from German. Then on the day of his arrest, Rivero, at the
direction of German, removed 14 kilograms of cocaine from his
property and delivered it to German.
The record shows that Rivero kept both drugs and drug
money on the same premises as his guns. This evidence alone was
sufficient for the government to meet its burden under
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) by showing the guns were located at the site of the
offense conduct. Although Rivero argues that the house and the
shed are distinct locations, this argument is unavailing because he
could have used the firearms in his house to protect the drugs or
the drug money on his property, regardless of whether they were
located in the house. Carillo–Ayala, 713 F.3d at 94–95. We have
also rejected a similar argument and affirmed the same enhance-
ment (1) where a firearm found in the office area of a warehouse
was present at the site of the conduct, (2) when cocaine was found
“nearby in and around the warehouse” and (3) where drug
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 15
transactions took place on warehouse premises. United States v.
Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 847 (11th Cir. 1998).
Next, the district court did not err in finding that Rivero
failed to show that a connection between the guns and the cocaine
was clearly improbable. Again, despite the drugs being kept in the
shed, Rivero admitted that the cash was drug proceeds which was
kept near the guns. So it is not clearly improbable that the guns
were kept to protect the drug proceeds. And although Rivero as-
serts that he possessed the guns before his involvement in drug traf-
ficking, he still failed to show why he would not also keep them to
protect the drugs or drug money on his property.4 See id.
Thus, the district court did not err in applying the two-level
firearm enhancement.
C.
A district court’s factual findings and subsequent denial of
safety-valve relief are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Cruz,
106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997).
For an offense violating 21 U.S.C. § 841, the safety-valve pro-
visions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 enable a district
court to disregard the statutory minimum sentence if five require-
ments are met. Relevant here, the second requirement for
4 Rivero also argues that the government’s return of the firearms to him shows
that it did not think the guns had a connection to Rivero’s drug trafficking.
But as the government notes, it was hard to verify the accuracy of this state-
ment twenty-five years later.
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
safety-valve relief is that the defendant did not possess a gun “in
connection with the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2); U.S.S.G.
§ 5C1.2(a)(2). Rivero has the burden of showing that he meets the
five factors for relief by a preponderance of the evidence, and that
it is more likely than not that he did not possess a firearm in con-
nection with the offense. See Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 90.
In considering the safety-valve, this court has held that “[a]
firearm found in close proximity to drugs or drug-related items
simply ‘has’—without any requirement for additional evidence—
the potential to facilitate the drug offense.” Id. at 92. “A defendant
seeking relief under the safety valve, despite his possession of a
weapon found in proximity to drug-related items, will have a diffi-
cult task in showing that, even so, there is no connection with the
drug offense so the safety valve applies.” Id. We also explained
that:
[w]hile other facts, such as whether the firearm is
loaded, or inside a locked container, might be relevant
to negate a connection, there is a strong presumption
that a defendant aware of the weapon’s presence will
think of using it if his illegal activities are threatened.
The firearm’s potential use is critical. The Sentencing
Commission gives special status to guns found in
proximity to drugs.
Id.
“[N]ot all defendants who receive the enhancement under
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) are precluded from” safety-valve relief. Id. at 91. If
the enhancement applies but the defendant also seeks safety-valve
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 17
relief, “the district court must determine whether the facts of the
case show that a connection between the firearm and the offense,
though possible, is not probable.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
But “[t]he number of defendants who meet both guidelines will un-
doubtedly be rare.” Id.
Here, the district court correctly made individual findings
and addressed the different standards for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) en-
hancement and § 5C1.2(a)(2)’s safety-valve relief. The district
court also noted that the question of whether safety-valve relief ap-
plied was a difficult one.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
Rivero failed to meet this burden. In attempting to establish that
he did not possess a firearm “in connection with” the charged drug
offenses, Rivero largely repeats the arguments used in opposition
to the firearm enhancement. Rivero points to the guns being inside
his bedroom away from where the drugs were found (in the shed)
and that he had possessed the firearms for years before he began
his drug activities. Although the burden is lower, these arguments
still fall short for reasons explained above. Even though Rivero has
pointed to some evidence that might call into question the presence
or purpose of his firearm, he has not shown that it is “more likely
than not” that firearms found in his bedroom near the money from
his drug proceeds was not possessed “in connection with” his drug
sales.
The district court reiterated Rivero’s admission that the
money found in his bedroom was the proceeds of drug trafficking.
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18 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
It is a permissible view of the evidence that Rivero possessed the
gun in part to protect himself and his drug proceeds and that the
gun was thus possessed in connection with the offense. See United
States v. Smith, 821 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Where there
are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks and
alteration omitted)).
Because the guns were found in a house where drugs and
money were also found on the property, the record does not leave
us with “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed” by the district court in denying Rivero safety-valve re-
lief. See Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d at 1137.
D.
When reviewing the procedural and substantive reasonable-
ness of a sentence, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion stand-
ard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
To determine whether a sentence is procedurally reasona-
ble, we ask whether “the district court: (1) properly calculated the
Guidelines range; (2) treated the Guidelines as advisory; (3) consid-
ered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (4) did not select a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts; and (5) adequately explained the
chosen sentence.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1353
(11th Cir. 2010).
We will consider a sentence substantively unreasonable
only if “we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the dis-
trict court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
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23-10646 Opinion of the Court 19
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quota-
tion marks omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when it
“(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due
significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or
irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in con-
sidering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (quotation marks omitted).
“A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty
is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Dougherty,
754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014).
As discussed above, the district court did not err in calculat-
ing Rivero’s sentence. The court also treated the guidelines as ad-
visory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, did not select a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and adequately ex-
plained the chosen sentence. Therefore, Rivero’s sentence is not
procedurally unreasonable.
Rivero fails to meet his burden to show that his 168-month
total sentence is substantively unreasonable as the district court did
not abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, including
the relevant offense conduct and conduct surrounding his obstruc-
tion of justice enhancement. Further, Rivero’s sentence was below
the Guidelines range and the statutory maximum penalty.
III.
As a result, the government did not breach Rivero’s plea
agreement. Under the plain error standard, Rivero cannot show
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20 Opinion of the Court 23-10646
that the government failed to abide by the plain text of the agree-
ment regarding the safety-valve recommendation. Next, the dis-
trict court did not clearly err in applying the two-level firearm en-
hancement because the guns were found in the house with the
money that Rivero admitted constituted drug proceeds and illegal
drugs were found on the same property. Additionally, the court
did not clearly err in finding that Rivero did not qualify for safety-
valve relief because it was probable that Rivero possessed guns in
connection with his offense conduct. Lastly, Rivero’s total sen-
tence is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.
Thus, we affirm Rivero’s convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.
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