Ms. Johnnie Marene Thomas v. William R. Ashe

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11439
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
MS. JOHNNIE MARENE THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILLIAM R. ASHE,
In an individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00023-LGW-BWC
USCA11 Case: 23-11439 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/08/2024 Page: 1 of 5

-- 1 of 5 --

2 Opinion of the Court 23-11439
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, N EWSOM, and G RANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Johnnie Marene Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal with prejudice of her complaint against
William Ashe, which alleged that Ashe violated her due process
rights because he, rather than the attorney general, represented
county agents in prior lawsuits that Thomas filed against the agents
in their individual capacities.
The pertinent facts are as follows. Thomas’s mother died
recently, and probate Judge Robert Sweatt, Jr. presided over the
estate proceedings. Judge Sweatt appointed attorney John Myers
to serve as the estate’s administrator. Thomas objected, arguing
that the Georgia probate code required that the lawful heir to the
estate authorize the administrator’s appointment. Thomas
claimed to be the lawful heir to the estate; since Judge Sweatt never
asked Thomas’s authorization in appointing Myers—and she
hadn’t given it—she filed lawsuits against both Sweatt and Myers
in their individual capacities.
Ashe represented both Sweatt and Myers in these actions.
Thomas objected on the ground that Ashe’s representation vio-
lated her due process rights under both the Georgia Constitution
and the United States Constitution. She contended that because
Sweatt and Myers were “state actors” they could be represented
only by the Attorney General. Ashe moved to dismiss that
USCA11 Case: 23-11439 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/08/2024 Page: 2 of 5

-- 2 of 5 --

23-11439 Opinion of the Court 3
complaint, and the district court granted his motion with prejudice.
Thomas appeals that dismissal.
We review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
de novo. American United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043,
1056–57 (11th Cir. 2007). We review a complaint dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all the
plaintiff’s well‑pleaded facts are accepted as true. Henderson v.
McMurray, 987 F.3d 997, 1001 (11th Cir. 2021). “To survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient fac-
tual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausi-
ble on its face.” Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
The plausibility standard, however, requires “more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quo-
tation marks omitted). In considering a complaint under this stand-
ard, “[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are enti-
tled to no assumption of truth.” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148,
1153 (11th Cir. 2011).
We liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a
less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erick-
son v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But, “even in the case of pro se
litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de
facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient plead-
ing in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760
F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
USCA11 Case: 23-11439 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/08/2024 Page: 3 of 5

-- 3 of 5 --

4 Opinion of the Court 23-11439
To this end, “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant
are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874
(11th Cir. 2008). An appellant abandons a claim where she makes
only a passing reference to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner
without authority or argument in support. Sapuppo v. Allstate Flo-
ridian Ins., Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014).
Here, even liberally construing Thomas’s brief, she does not
sufficiently challenge the district court’s reasons for dismissing her
complaint. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Thomas narrowly asserts that
the court’s dismissal of her complaint was improper because she
was not required to provide a detailed factual basis for her claims.
But she fails to address the district court’s determination that “there
is no Georgia law requiring a public official, when sued in his indi-
vidual capacity, to be . . . represented” by a state or county attor-
ney. Thus, the district court’s order is due to be affirmed, as
Thomas failed to (1) plainly dispute the court’s reasoning that her
claims lacked a legal basis or (2) cite any authority to support her
argument that Ashe’s representation of Sweatt or Myers was im-
proper. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.
The district court appropriately determined that Thomas
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because
Thomas does not cite, and research does not reveal, any law that
prohibits county agents from retaining private counsel when they
are sued in an individual capacity. Because Thomas failed to
demonstrate a basis for relief, she failed to state a valid claim, and
USCA11 Case: 23-11439 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/08/2024 Page: 4 of 5

-- 4 of 5 --

23-11439 Opinion of the Court 5
the district court’s dismissal of her complaint must be affirmed.
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1333.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 23-11439 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/08/2024 Page: 5 of 5

-- 5 of 5 --