USA v. John Onimole

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11740
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHN IFEOLUWA ONIMOLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00492-WMR-CCB-8
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11740
Before WILSON, BRANCH , and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Onimole appeals his 36-month sentence for money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2. He argues that
the district court erred in (1) calculating his guideline range by
considering other relevant conduct for which he was not convicted
and which was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) ordering
restitution for losses caused by the overall conspiracy instead of
those caused solely by his conduct; and (3) denying a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. After review, we affirm.
I . Background
In 2020, a federal grand jury issued a 21-count superseding
indictment charging Onimole, among other codefendants, with
one count of conspiracy and one count of money laundering
(Counts 1 and 19). According to the indictment, Onimole,
Ahamefule Aso Odus (“Aso”), Chukwukadibia Ikechukwu
Nnadozie (“Chuka”), and Uchechi Chidimma Odus (“Uche”),
conspired to knowingly engage in a business e-mail compromise
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23-11740 Opinion of the Court 3
(“BEC”) scheme1 and a “romance scam” scheme2 between
approximately February 2017 and September 2018. According to
the indictment, the co-conspirators set up numerous personal and
business bank accounts for sham companies for the purposes of
receiving the ill-gotten gains from the schemes. Once the stolen
funds were received, the conspirators then quickly dispersed the
money through wire transfers to other accounts or by making
check or cash withdrawals in an attempt to conceal the source of
the funds. Count 19 charged Onimole, Aso, and Uche with money
laundering based on one of the BEC schemes.
Onimole entered an open plea of guilty to the money
laundering charge (Count 19). At the change-of-plea hearing, the
government set forth the factual basis for the charge. The
government explained that Count 19 incorporated by reference the
factual allegations of Count 1 (the conspiracy count). Specifically,
1 In a BEC, an e-mail message which appears legitimate—but in fact is not—is
sent to a business and fools an unwitting employee to interact with the
message, which then deploys malware into the employee’s computer system.
From there, the malware collects secured information and monitors
correspondence to determine when a financial transaction is scheduled to take
place. When one is scheduled between legitimate parties, the illegitimate
third party that has been monitoring the company through the malware then
sends a “spoofed” e-mail that again appears legitimate and changes the wiring
instructions thereby sending the money into a bank account controlled by the
conspirators.
2 In a romance scam, the conspirators have fake profiles on dating websites
and engage with users of the site and cultivate a romantic relationship only to
then trick the victim into sending the conspirator money under false pretenses.
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“[t]he defendants named in the first superseding indictment,”
including Onimole, “were all residents of the metro Atlanta area
and they served as money launderers for other conspirators
throughout the country and throughout the world who conducted
[BEC] schemes, romance fraud schemes, and targeted companies
and individuals across the United States.” The defendants set up
numerous bank accounts, including ones for sham companies that
they registered with the State of Georgia for the purpose of
receiving the stolen funds. Once the funds were received, they
quickly disbursed the funds into other accounts through wire
transfers or by making check or cash withdrawals.
On July 26, 2018, as a result of a BEC, company BCL wired
$46,450.85 to a bank account controlled by defendants. At the
direction of defendant Aso, another co-conspirator used the stolen
funds to purchase cashier’s checks payable to others, including
Onimole. Onimole then cashed the $22,230 check.
Onimole agreed with the government’s summary of the
facts. However, he clarified, upon further questioning, that he did
not know that the source of the money was fraudulent, and he only
learned about that after the fact. His counsel then explained that
Onimole’s plea was not based on actual knowledge but on
deliberate ignorance—meaning that he understood the
circumstances were highly suspicious and logically indicated the
funds were “from an inappropriate source,” but he actively
disregarded the circumstances because his co-conspirators gave
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him money for cashing the check.3 The government asserted that
it believed it could prove actual knowledge at trial, but agreed that
Onimole could alternatively be convicted on a deliberate ignorance
theory. The court then asked Onimole whether he “suspect[ed]
that the money was not legitimate, that it was from some illegal or
criminal purpose,” and he stated “Yes, your honor. I had a feeling.
I did have a feeling. I mean, I was told it wasn’t. But I just had a
strong feeling and I still do.” The court further clarified, asking
whether Onimole knew “when [he] got involved in it and started
preparations to receive the money and to withdraw the money and
convert it to cashier’s checks and to otherwise disburse it, did [he]
know then that that money came from criminal activity?”
Onimole stated “[a]t that point, yes, sir.”
The district court then found that there was a factual basis
for the plea, noting that based on the government’s proffer it
believed the government could prove actual knowledge, but
alternatively, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Onimole
deliberately ignorant. Accordingly, it accepted his plea.
Following Onimole’s plea, the United States Probation
Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI
indicated that Onimole’s involvement in the underlying conspiracy
consisted of opening bank accounts used to receive funds obtained
from BEC schemes and withdrawing those funds. Onimole was
linked to a SunTrust bank account, two Bank of America accounts,
and a sham company called “Branagh, Inc.” The PSI also indicated
3 Onimole received $1,000 for his services.
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that Onimole was held accountable for an intended loss of
approximately $1,267,996.06 based on his participation in several
BEC schemes in addition to the one involving BCL that served as
the basis for Count 19, and it detailed his connection with those
schemes. Onimole objected to this information, arguing that he
did not plead guilty to Count 1 and he was not liable for any losses
stemming from Count 1. The probation officer maintained that
even though Onimole did not plead guilty to Count 1, the other
schemes were properly included and considered as relevant
conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
The probation officer determined that Onimole’s base
offense level was 22 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(2) and 2B1.1
because Onimole was responsible for an intended loss amount that
was more than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000. After accounting
for specific offense enhancements and a three-point reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, Onimole’s resulting total offense level
was 20. An offense level of 20 and a criminal history score of I
resulted in a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment.
Onimole objected, arguing that he should be responsible for
only the value of the laundered funds he pleaded guilty to in Count
19, which would result in a total offense level of 11 and a lower
guidelines range. In light of Onimole’s objections to the inclusion
of relevant conduct, the government objected to the three-point
reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Prior to sentencing, Onimole filed a sentencing
memorandum, asserting that he should receive a three-point
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23-11740 Opinion of the Court 7
reduction for his acceptance of responsibility because he pleaded
guilty to Count 19. He then reiterated his argument that he should
only be held responsible for the specific conduct underlying Count
19, which would result in a significantly lower offense level and
guidelines range of zero to six months’ imprisonment. He also filed
a motion in limine to exclude “irrelevant, inadmissible evidence and
issues at his sentencing,” seeking exclusion of any evidence at
sentencing that did not specifically relate to Count 19.
At sentencing, the district court stated that it was not going
to “grant . . . or consider” the motion in limine because such a
motion is designed to prevent evidence from being introduced—
typically when juries are involved. But, in this instance, the court
needed to know about what Onimole did not want the court to
consider in order to resolve the objections to the PSI and determine
whether the objected-to conduct was relevant or not. Onimole
argued that there was “an enormous difference between a
conspiracy and a substantive count.” He argued that he would
have denied the conspiracy allegations at trial because he was not
involved in managing or controlling the bank accounts, his
codefendants had access to his personal information, and his
codefendants exploited him to engage in activities without his
knowledge. Thus, he maintained that the conduct underlying the
money laundering count to which he pleaded guilty was “totally
disassociated from all the other allegations . . . about him being
involved in other [BEC schemes,” and that only the conduct related
to the substantive money laundering count should be considered.
The court noted that the sentencing guidelines direct the district
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11740
court to consider all relevant conduct, and asked Onimole whether
he had any authority to support his position. Onimole admitted
that he did not have any additional authority other than what he
presented in his motion in limine.
The government argued that, under the guidelines and this
Court’s precedent, the district court should consider all relevant
conduct, which includes uncharged conduct. The court overruled
Onimole’s objection and allowed the government to present
evidence on relevant conduct related to other BEC schemes and
money laundering activities that involved Onimole.
The government then called Special Agent Joshua Barnes
who testified at length to Onimole’s involvement in the BEC
schemes. Generally, his testimony established that Onimole
registered the fictious company Branagh, Inc. in his name, with the
State of Georgia in June 2018.4 Onimole also opened several
business bank accounts for the company, but none of the accounts
had any transactions consistent with business activities. In addition
to the conduct to which Onimole pleaded guilty in Count 19
involving company BCL, the investigation connected him with
other BEC schemes involving companies AMM, HZOH, STC,
GWL, Orahealth, and ZTB.
For instance, the agent testified that, as a result of a BEC
scheme, company A.M.M. wired $54,918.67 to a SunTrust Bank
4 Branagh was administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State in August
2019.
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account controlled by a co-conspirator. After the money was
received, two cashier’s checks totaling $52,000 were issued—one
of which was for $30,000 payable to Onimole. The same day the
check issued, Onimole’s driver’s license was used to cash the check,
and his personal identifying information was listed on the bank’s
currency transaction report (“CTR”).5 Onimole listed his
occupation on the report as “retail sales.”
This pattern continued with the other BEC schemes. For
example, the agent testified that, after the funds from HZOH, STC,
and ZTB were wired from the respective companies into a
co-conspirator’s account, a portion of those funds would then be
directly issued to Onimole via a cashier’s check or directly
transferred into his personal bank account.6 As for the Orahealth
and GWL scheme, the funds were transferred to a bank account in
the name of Onimole’s sham company Branagh, Inc., and Onimole
was a signer on the account.7
5 Banks are required to complete a CTR for any transaction involving cash
over $10,000.
6 A wire transfer of close to $72,000 of the stolen ZTB funds was attempted
from one co-conspirator’s account to Onimole’s personal Wells Fargo
account, but the wire was returned as a “beneficiary name mismatch” because
the recipient of the money was listed as “Branagh, Inc.,” and that name did
not match the name on the designated account. Once the funds were returned
to the original co-conspirator’s account, they were ultimately withdrawn by
other co-conspirators.
7 On the same day as GWL’s wire, some of the stolen GWL funds were then
used to purchase three airline tickets to California, one of which was in
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Following the agent’s testimony and additional argument
from the parties, the district court concluded that the government
had met its burden to establish the existence of the conspiracy by a
preponderance of the evidence and that the other schemes were
relevant conduct. Accordingly, the district court determined that
the intended loss amount of $1,267.966.068 was the correct amount
even though all of that money did not necessarily “flow[]” to
Onimole.
The district court then sustained the government’s
objection to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, noting
that the court “spent most of the day talking about whether the
defendant did the things the Government says he did and which he
says he did not,” which was not consistent with an acceptance of
responsibility reduction. Nevertheless, the court noted that it
would keep Onimole’s position in mind when considering whether
to depart or vary downward. Thus, the revised total offense level
of 23 and a criminal history category of one resulted in an advisory
guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment.
Following arguments from the parties as to the appropriate
sentence and consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the
district court varied downward and sentenced Onimole to a below-
guidelines sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment to be followed by
Onimole’s name. Onimole was then listed on a CTR from a bank branch in
California withdrawing $15,000 of the stolen funds.
8 The actual loss amount was $1,117,966.06.
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3 years’ supervised release. The district court also imposed
restitution in the amount of $1,117,966.06, jointly and severally,
with Onimole’s co-conspirators. Finally, the district court ordered
forfeiture of $550,000—the minimum amount of funds laundered.
This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Onimole argues that the district court erred in (1) calculating
his base offense level by considering other relevant conduct for
which he was not convicted and which was not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; (2) ordering restitution for losses caused by the
overall conspiracy instead of those caused solely by his conduct;
and (3) denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We
address each argument in turn.
A. Calculation of the base offense level
Onimole argues that the district court erred in increasing his
base offense level based on the total intended loss value of the
laundered funds from the BEC schemes ($1,267,966.06), and that
the court should have limited the value to the actual loss involved
in the substantive money laundering offense to which he pleaded
guilty ($22,230).
“We review a district court’s interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and the determination of the
amount of loss involved in the offense for clear error.” United States
v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1151 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).
“We review only for clear error the application of the relevant
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conduct guideline in § 1B1.3 to the facts of the case.” United States
v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008).
Section 2S1.1 of the Guidelines establishes the base offense
level for money laundering offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. It
provides, as relevant here, that the base offense level is “8 plus the
number of offense levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property
Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the value of the
laundered funds, otherwise.” Id. § 2S1.1(a)(2). Under the relevant
table, if the value of the loss attributable to the defendant is more
than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000, the base offense level is
increased by 14 points. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).
We have held that “[w]hen calculating a defendant’s
sentencing range under the Guidelines, the sentencing court must
consider all ‘relevant conduct’ as defined in [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.3.”
United States v. Siegelman, 786 F.3d 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In
addition, proper calculation of the guidelines requires
consideration of all relevant conduct, not merely charged
conduct.” (quotations omitted)). Section 1B1.3 of the guidelines,
defines relevant conduct as “all acts and omissions committed,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
willfully caused by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
“When an offense involves ‘jointly undertaken criminal activity,’
[whether or not charged as a conspiracy,] relevant conduct includes
‘all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.’” United
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States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). “[R]elevant conduct is broadly defined
to include both uncharged and acquitted conduct that is proven at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Siegelman, 786
F.3d at 1332. “Accordingly, under § 1B1.3(a), when a defendant is
acting in concert with others, the appropriate conduct to consider
for sentencing purposes is far broader than the conduct that drove
the original conviction.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1297.
We have held that, even absent a conspiracy charge, the
district court may hold all participants responsible for the losses
caused by the jointly undertaken scheme when the defendant’s
actions suggested that he was actively involved in the criminal
scheme and that he agreed to jointly undertake in the scheme. See
United States v. Whitman, 887 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2018).
When the defendant challenges the loss amount calculation, “the
government bears the burden of supporting it with reliable and
specific evidence.” See United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1318
(11th Cir. 2015).
Here, as discussed above, the government presented
extensive evidence at the sentencing hearing that directly linked
Onimole to several other BEC money laundering schemes in
addition to the one that served as the basis for Count 19. This
evidence included that after the stolen funds were wired from the
respective companies into a co-conspirator’s account, a portion of
those funds would then be directly issued to Onimole via a
cashier’s check, directly transferred into his personal bank account,
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-11740
or were otherwise connected with his company Branagh, Inc.
Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the district court to
conclude that Onimole agreed to participate in a jointly undertaken
criminal scheme.9 See Whitman, 887 F.3d at 1248–49. Based on this
evidence, the district court did not clearly err in considering the
other BEC schemes as relevant conduct and in concluding that
Onimole was responsible for the losses caused by the jointly
undertaken schemes. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. As a result, the
district court properly determined Onimole’s base offense level.
U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(2), 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).
9 Onimole argues that relevant conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and cannot be based on judicial factfinding, citing Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99 (2013). This argument is foreclosed by our binding precedent. See
United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting an
identical Alleyne-based challenge and holding that “a district court may
continue to make guidelines calculations based upon judicial fact findings and
may enhance a sentence—so long as its findings do not increase the statutory
maximum or minimum authorized by facts determined in a guilty plea or jury
verdict”); United States v. Campbell, 765 F.3d 1291, 1301 n.10 (11th Cir. 2014)
(rejecting argument “that all sentencing enhancements are elements . . . that
a jury must decide” and reaffirming holding in Charles). Although Onimole
contends that our precedent is inconsistent with Alleyne and other related
Supreme Court decisions, under the prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior
panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is
overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th
Cir. 2008).
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B. Calculation of the restitution amount
Onimole argues that, even if he is accountable for the total
intended loss for purposes of his base offense level, the district
court erred in imposing the total actual loss—$1,117,966.06, jointly
and severally—as the restitution amount because a defendant is
responsible “only for the loss caused by the specific conduct” that
is the basis of his conviction, citing Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S.
411, 413 (1990).10
“We review de novo the legality of an order of restitution,
but review for abuse of discretion the determination of the
restitution value of lost or destroyed property. We review for clear
error factual findings underlying a restitution order.” United States
v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations
omitted) (internal citations omitted).
The district court, in imposing a sentence, must order
restitution in accordance with the Mandatory Victim Restitution
Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. “The method for calculating
actual loss, as opposed to intended loss, under the Sentencing
Guidelines is largely the same as the method for establishing actual
loss to identifiable victims under the MVRA. Stein, 846 F.3d at 1153
10 To the extent that Onimole asserts that his financial situation should have
been accounted for when the court ordered restitution or forfeiture, that
argument is without merit. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“The district court is not required, nor does it have the discretion,
to consider the offender’s ability to pay when ordering restitution under the
[Mandatory Victim Restitution Act].”).
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(quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[i]n most cases, the amount
of actual loss under the guidelines will be the same as the
restitution figure.” Id.
The Supreme Court in Hughey v. United States held that
restitution could be authorized under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) “only for the loss caused by the
specific conduct that [was] the basis of the offense of conviction.”
495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990). However, Onimole’s reliance on Hughey
is misplaced. As we have previously explained, post-Hughey,
Congress’s enactment of “the MVRA all but eviscerated Hughey
with respect to crimes involving schemes.” United States v.
Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004)). Congress greatly
expanded the definition of “victim” under the MVRA, and we have
held “that by defining ‘victim’ expansively in scheme-based crimes,
Congress partially overrul[ed] Hughey’s restrictive interpretation of
the VWPA and expand[ed] district courts’ authority to grant
restitution.” Id. at 1293 (quoting Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1338). Thus,
while “[a]n award of restitution must be based on the amount of
loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct,” United States v.
Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1307 (11th Cir. 2018),“[c]ourts have agreed
that, in light of the expanded statutory language, restitution orders
for conduct closely related to the offense of conviction are
appropriate under [the MVRA], in addition to the specific conduct
for which the defendant was convicted.” United States v. Brown, 665
F.3d 1239, 1252 (11th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Valladares,
544 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding a restitution award
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that included losses from uncharged conduct and holding that “the
district court was permitted to consider the losses [to the victim]
incurred from [the uncharged] scheme” because the uncharged
scheme “could be considered relevant conduct”).
Accordingly, as discussed above, because the other BEC
schemes were properly considered relevant conduct, the district
court did not err in including the actual losses from those related
BEC schemes in the restitution award.11 Brown, 665 F.3d at 1252;
Valladares, 544 F.3d at 1269.
C. Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility
Onimole argues that the district court erred in denying him
a two-point reduction under the guidelines for acceptance of
responsibility, which he maintains he should have received because
he pleaded guilty to Count 19.
A defendant is entitled to a two-point reduction of his
offense level if he clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Importantly, “[a] defendant
who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment [for
acceptance of responsibility] as a matter of right.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt.
(n.3). Rather, to determine whether the reduction applies, the
district court must consider, among other factors, the timeliness of
11 Onimole argues that the district court failed to connect him to the total
actual loss of $1,117,966.06. We disagree. As discussed previously, there was
a preponderance of the evidence linking Onimole to the BEC schemes that
made up the actual loss amount involving victims BCL, STC, HZOH, GWL,
Orahealth, ZTB, and AMM.
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the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and whether he
truthfully admitted that he engaged in the conduct comprising the
offenses of conviction and “any additional relevant conduct for
which he is accountable under § 1B1.3.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.1(A),
(H)). “[A] defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively
admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction” in order
to receive a reduction—in other words, the defendant can remain
silent. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.1(A)). However, “[a] defendant who
falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the
court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with
acceptance of responsibility . . . .” Id.; see also United States v.
Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1022–23 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although a
guilty plea can constitute significant evidence of acceptance of
responsibility, it may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant
inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility.”).
“In reviewing a district court’s refusal to grant a reduction
under § 3E1.1, [we] review[] its interpretation of the Guidelines de
novo. We review the factual findings upon which the denial of the
acceptance reduction is based for clear error.” United States v.
Roosevelt Coats, 8 F.4th 1228, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations
omitted) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he determination of
whether a defendant has adequately manifested acceptance of
responsibility is a flexible, fact sensitive inquiry” to which we give
“great deference.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Thus, we will not set
aside a district court’s determination that a defendant is not entitled
to a § 3E1.1 adjustment unless the facts in the record clearly
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establish that the defendant has accepted responsibility.” Moriarty,
429 F.3d at 1022–23.
Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining
that Onimole had not clearly demonstrated acceptance of
responsibility. Although he pleaded guilty to Count 19, he, at the
very least, frivolously contested relevant conduct, which is
inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1
cmt. (n.1(A)). And we have upheld the denial of acceptance of
responsibility under similar circumstances. See United States v.
Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (upholding denial of
reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant “went
beyond mere silence” and affirmatively denied relevant conduct);
United States v. Sammour, 816 F.3d 1328, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016)
(upholding denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility
where defendant “downplay[ed] his culpability at the sentencing”
and “frivolously contested relevant conduct” (alterations
adopted)). In light of the record before us, we cannot say that “the
record clearly establish[es] that [Onimole] has accepted
responsibility.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1022–23. Accordingly, he is
not entitled to relief. Id.; Tejas, 868 F.3d at 1248.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we affirm Onimole’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 23-11740 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 03/22/2024 Page: 19 of 19

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