William Paul DeBoskey v. Statebridge Company, LLC, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11898
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
WILLIAM PAUL DEBOSKEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATEBRIDGE COMPANY, LLC,
RED STICK ACQUISITIONS, LLC,
SOKOLOF REMTULLA, PLLC,
OWEN HARVEY SOKOLOF,
SHAFIN A. REMTULLA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11898
DONALD ST. JOHN,
Defendant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-02427-WFJ-AAS
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant William DeBoskey appeals from the district
court’s order granting the appellees/defendants’ (collectively the
“appellees”) motion to dismiss his pro se second amended com-
plaint, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
(“FCCPA”), and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. DeBos-
key argues on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint because the claims within it were not time-barred and it
stated sufficiently specific facts to state a claim. Having read the
parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we affirm the district
court’s order of dismissal.
I.
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23-11898 Opinion of the Court 3
We review a district court’s application of the statute of lim-
itations de novo. NE 32nd Street, LLC v. United States, 896 F.3d 1240,
1243 (11th Cir. 2018). We “give liberal construction to the plead-
ings of pro se litigants, [but] ‘nevertheless [require] them to conform
to procedural rules.’” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir.
2002)).
II.
DeBoskey is a Florida resident who owns a homestead prop-
erty in Hernando County. In 2005, DeBoskey refinanced the prop-
erty through a mortgage and promissory note that was assigned to
Goshen Mortgage. Goshen Mortgage filed a foreclosure action
against the property in the state circuit court, and later, Red Stick
Acquisitions, LLC was substituted for Goshen Mortgage in the
foreclosure action. Red Stick filed an amended complaint in the
state court foreclosure action in 2018. At this point, DeBoskey al-
leges that Red Stick began directing its agents to make false claims
about his debt and make threats to foreclose on the property.
These agents allegedly include Statebridge Company, a current ap-
pellee in this appeal, which serviced the mortgage, and two attor-
neys who represent Red Stick in the pending foreclosure action and
are also named appellees.
In 2021, after amending and filing four answers in the fore-
closure action, DeBoskey moved for leave to amend his answer to
include a counterclaim against the appellees for violations of the
FDCPA and the FCCPA. The state circuit court denied his motion
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11898
for leave to amend, explaining that DeBoskey failed to show suffi-
cient cause to permit the filing of a fifth answer and new counter-
claim in an action that had been pending for over five years.
While the foreclosure action remained pending, DeBoskey
filed the federal suit, raising the same FDCPA claim against appel-
lees that the state court had prohibited him from raising in the fore-
closure action. On January 5, 2023, approximately three months
after DeBoskey filed the federal action, the state circuit court en-
tered an order setting the foreclosure action for trial on February 8,
2023. Six days later, DeBoskey filed an amended complaint in the
federal court action, raising three claims that were all related to the
foreclosure proceedings: (1) an FDCPA claim; (2) an FCCPA claim;
and (3) a declaratory judgment action. The district court granted
the appellees’ first motion to dismiss but allowed DeBoskey to file
a second amended complaint. Upon the appellees’ request for dis-
missal of the second amended complaint, the district court ordered
that it be granted and dismissed the case with prejudice.
III.
“A statute of limitations bar is ‘an affirmative defense, and
. . . plaintiff[s] [are] not required to negate an affirmative defense in
[their] complaint.’” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840,
845 (11th Cir. 2004) (omission and alterations in original) (quoting
Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993)),
abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). “[O]ur cases say that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent from the
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23-11898 Opinion of the Court 5
face of the complaint’ that the claim is time-barred.” Id. (quoting
Omar v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003)).
An action alleging a violation of the FDCPA must be filed
“within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(d). “The FDCPA limitations period begins to run
on the date the alleged FDCPA violation actually happened.” Rot-
kiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360 (2019). An action
alleging a violation of the FCCPA must be filed “within 2 years af-
ter the date the alleged violation occurred.” Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 559.77(4).
“A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim
if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920 (2007). A
complaint need not have “‘detailed factual allegations,” but it must
have “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclu-
sions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked as-
sertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966).
IV.
The record demonstrates that the district court did not err
in dismissing DeBoskey’s complaint with prejudice. The district
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11898
court explained that DeBoskey’s claims were untimely because he
received service of the complaint in the foreclosure action in 2018
and filed the federal suit four years later. The district court noted
that DeBoskey’s second amended complaint was almost identical
to the first amended complaint, and that DeBoskey’s attempts to
skirt the statute of limitations in the FDCPA and FCCPA actions
were unavailing. The district court further stated that DeBoskey
failed to provide any facts to support his vague allegations, which
amounted to nothing more than the appellees’ participation and
maintenance of the foreclosure action. Thus, the district court dis-
missed the second amended complaint with prejudice.
We conclude, from the record, that the district court did not
err by dismissing DeBoskey’s second amended complaint because
it was either time-barred by the statute of limitations or failed to
state a claim. The complaint could be interpreted two ways: the
first is that the complaint alleges that the appellees violated the
FDCPA and the FCCPA in relation to the state court foreclosure
proceedings. Although DeBoskey states on appeal that he did not
allege that the filing of the foreclosure action itself was a violation
of the FDCPA and the FCCPA, he alleges that the appellees filed
papers and announced the false claims to third parties. This ap-
pears to refer to that foreclosure action. Further, DeBoskey alleges
that the appellees also made threats to foreclose his property, as-
serted rights to enforce a lien on his property, and asserted rights
to hold some interest in or against his property. These allegations
refer to the foreclosure action and are time-barred because DeBos-
key received service of the foreclosure action in 2018, which is
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23-11898 Opinion of the Court 7
more than two years before the filing of the second amended com-
plaint.
The second way that the complaint can be construed is that
it alleges violations of the FDCPA and the FCCPA unrelated to the
foreclosure action, as DeBoskey argues is the correct assertion in
his complaint. However, if we construe the complaint this way, the
district court’s order of dismissal would still be correct because the
complaint failed to state a claim based on factual specificity. See
Jones, 549 U.S. at 215, 127 S. Ct. at 920; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949. DeBoskey did not reference in his complaint any spe-
cific actions of the appellees other than the foreclosure suit and
those actions within his general accusations relating to the mort-
gage. As such, the district court properly dismissed his complaint
because it contained “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 215; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
firm the district court’s order dismissing DeBoskey’s complaint
with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
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