Maria V. Guzman v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MARIA V. GUZMAN,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2025-1397
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 21-9, Judge Grant Jaquith.
______________________
Decided: August 7, 2026
______________________
HAROLD HAMILTON H OFFMAN, III, Veterans Legal Ad-
vocacy Group, Arlington, VA, for claimant-appellant. Also
represented by J ENNIFER T RACY SHANNON HEALY .
MEREDYTH COHEN HAVASY , Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
sented by ELIZABETH MARIE H OSFORD, P ATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY , BRETT SHUMATE; MATTHEW ALBANESE, D EREK
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GUZMAN v. COLLINS 2
SCADDEN, Office of General Counsel, United States Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, P ROST and CUNNINGHAM ,
Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
Maria V. Guzman, surviving spouse of veteran Cesar
A. Flores-Rivera, appeals a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) af-
firming a Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) denial of en-
titlement to an earlier dependency and indemnity
compensation (DIC) effective date. For the following rea-
sons, we dismiss-in-part and affirm-in-part.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Flores-Rivera served in the Army from 1964 to
1966. J.A. 395. On June 18, 1995, he died from sepsis in a
Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital. J.A. 721–23; J.A. 30.
Though the VA sent Ms. Guzman application forms for DIC
and burial benefits, in the year after her husband passed,
she submitted a claim only for burial benefits. J.A. 772;
J.A. 761–69; see also J.A. 688. In the following years,
Ms. Guzman filed and settled a tort claim against the VA
for Mr. Flores-Rivera’s death. J.A. 717–47.
In May 2012, Ms. Guzman sent a statement to the VA
explaining she had “been waiting for various months for a
reply” regarding her VA benefits claim. J.A. 696. The VA
regional office (RO) accepted this statement as an informal
claim and, after she completed a formal DIC application,
granted Ms. Guzman’s DIC request with a May 2012 effec-
tive date. J.A. 688; J.A. 676–84; J.A. 600. Ms. Guzman
filed a notice of disagreement, arguing the effective date
should be June 18, 1995—the day Mr. Flores-Rivera died.
J.A. 597–98. The RO denied her request and explained the
effective date was the date of receipt under 38 C.F.R.
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GUZMAN v. COLLINS 3
§ 3.400(c) because there were no records showing Ms. Guz-
man filed a DIC claim within one year of Mr. Flores-Ri-
vera’s death. J.A. 583–84; J.A. 533–34.
Ms. Guzman appealed. J.A. 522. The Board denied
her request for an earlier effective date based on the lack
of evidence that she intended to file a DIC claim before
May 2012. J.A. 467–78. Ms. Guzman submitted a motion
for reconsideration, arguing she attempted to file in 1995,
but the VA “verbally” told her she was not entitled to DIC
benefits and refused to file her claim. J.A. 465. The Board
denied this motion. J.A. 462–64.
Ms. Guzman filed a pro se appeal. J.A. 455. In 2016,
the Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision because,
as relevant here, Ms. Guzman failed to identify record evi-
dence showing she filed a DIC claim before 2012 or that the
VA told her she could not file a DIC claim. J.A. 438–40.
After retaining counsel, Ms. Guzman moved to recall the
mandate, arguing for the first time that 38 C.F.R. § 3.153
and 38 U.S.C. § 5105 direct the VA to consider Social Secu-
rity Administration (SSA) applications as DIC claims.
J.A. 775–86. She pointed to an SSA payment she received
in 1995 as evidence she filed for SSA death benefits.
J.A. 788. The Veterans Court denied this motion. J.A. 790.
Ms. Guzman then requested the RO revise its decision
based on clear and unmistakable error (CUE). J.A. 185.
The RO denied this request because the “issue of an earlier
entitlement date” had already been “claimed, denied, and
appealed.” J.A. 132–33. Ms. Guzman appealed, and the
Board dismissed her CUE claim after concluding it lacked
jurisdiction to review it. J.A. 14–17. The Board explained
it was precluded from reviewing whether there was CUE
in the RO’s decision because both the Board and the Veter-
ans Court had already ruled on the relevant entitlement
date issue, thereby “subsum[ing]” the RO’s decision and ef-
fectively causing it to “cease[] to exist as an independent
decision.” J.A. 16.
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GUZMAN v. COLLINS 4
Again, Ms. Guzman appealed. The Veterans Court af-
firmed, concluding it had already reviewed and affirmed a
Board decision on the same issue. J.A. 1–7. The Veterans
Court also rejected Ms. Guzman’s alternative argument
that the government should be equitably estopped from
denying her an earlier effective date. It concluded equita-
ble estoppel was not available because Ms. Guzman did not
point to sufficient evidence of detrimental reliance.
Ms. Guzman appeals.
D ISCUSSION
Our jurisdiction to review Veterans Court decisions is
limited by statute. Goodman v. Shulkin, 870 F.3d 1383,
1385 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Unless a Veterans Court appeal pre-
sents a constitutional issue, we “may not review (A) a chal-
lenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law
or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.”
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). We have jurisdiction to “review and
decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regu-
lation or any interpretation thereof,” “interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and
necessary to a decision,” and “decide all relevant questions
of law.” § 7292(c), (d)(1). We review the Veterans Court’s
legal determinations de novo. Wright v. Collins, 145 F.4th
1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2025).
On appeal, Ms. Guzman raises three challenges to the
Veterans Court’s decision. First, she argues her CUE claim
should not have been dismissed. Second, she argues the
Veterans Court misapplied Taylor v. McDonough, 71 F.4th
909 (Fed. Cir. 2023) by concluding equitable estoppel was
foreclosed. Third, she argues the government obstructed
her constitutional right to access the adjudicatory system.
I
Ms. Guzman contends the Veterans Court incorrectly
upheld the Board’s dismissal of her CUE challenge. Spe-
cifically, she claims her CUE claim was based on a different
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GUZMAN v. COLLINS 5
issue than decided in the Veterans Court’s 2016 decision,
and thus was not precluded by it. We do not agree.
RO decisions can be reversed or revised based on CUE.
38 U.S.C. § 5109A(a). “A [CUE] challenge to an RO deter-
mination may not be raised before the RO, however, if the
Board . . . has sustained the RO determination on the same
issue.” Brown v. West, 203 F.3d 1378, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104(b)). In such cases, “the RO
determination is regarded as subsumed by the Board’s de-
cision,” precluding the RO from revisiting its determina-
tion because doing so would improperly amount to the RO
reviewing the decision of a higher tribunal (i.e., the Board).
Id. at 1381 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 20.1104).
Ms. Guzman does not appear to dispute that the
Board’s original decision subsumed the RO’s decision and
the Veterans Court’s 2016 decision subsequently subsumed
the Board decision. Instead, her position turns on whether
her CUE claim against the RO raised a new issue that the
Board and Veterans Court never decided. But even assum-
ing, without deciding, a CUE claim based on a new issue
can be raised against a subsumed RO decision, Ms. Guz-
man did not raise a new issue. Ms. Guzman merely raised
two different theories regarding the same underlying issue:
the effective date. Under Ms. Guzman’s own framing, her
“first argument was about the VA blocking her from filing”
and “second argument was about the VA not following its
procedures.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 12. Both arguments re-
late to the same effective date issue and are based on the
same law and facts the Veterans Court considered when
deciding whether to recall its mandate. “[CUE statutory
provisions] do not . . . authorize a regional office to review
collaterally an earlier . . . decision [of a higher tribunal] on
the same operative facts.” Dittrich v. West, 163 F.3d 1349,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we see no error in the
Veterans Court’s conclusion that Ms. Guzman’s CUE claim
was precluded by the court’s prior 2016 decision.
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GUZMAN v. COLLINS 6
II
Ms. Guzman also argues the Veterans Court incor-
rectly concluded that Taylor foreclosed equitable estoppel
in this case. According to Ms. Guzman, by declining to ap-
ply equitable relief, the Veterans Court misunderstood
Taylor and ignored 38 U.S.C. § 5105.
As an initial matter, Ms. Guzman’s assertion that
there was no majority opinion in Taylor is incorrect. A ma-
jority of sitting judges joined Parts I–IV of Judge Taranto’s
opinion, and those parts “constitute[d] an opinion for the
court.” Taylor, 71 F.4th at 915. Even the concurrence re-
ferred to those sections as “a majority opinion.” Id. at 946
n.1 (Dyk, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, Part III of the
opinion, which addressed equitable estoppel, is binding.
Even so, the Veterans Court did not base its decision
that equitable estoppel was unavailable on Taylor. The
Veterans Court noted that, under Taylor, equitable estop-
pel cannot be used to grant benefits with an effective date
earlier than statutorily authorized. J.A. 5. However, it ex-
plained Taylor’s holding does not limit Ms. Guzman’s ap-
plication because she relied on 38 U.S.C. § 5105 to support
an earlier effective date. J.A. 6. The Veterans Court con-
cluded equitable estoppel was unavailable based on settled
law that the veteran must demonstrate detrimental reli-
ance and that oral advice is insufficient to support estoppel
against the government. J.A. 6–7 (citing Heckler v. Cmty.
Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59–61
(1984)). We lack jurisdiction to decide whether the Veter-
ans Court erred in applying law to the facts of this case and
therefore dismiss the appeal as to this issue. 38 U.S.C.
§ 7292(d)(2).
III
Finally, Ms. Guzman argues the VA and Veterans
Court obstructed her constitutional right to access the ad-
judicatory system. She contends the VA blocked her access
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GUZMAN v. COLLINS 7
to a 1995 effective date by refusing to consider her SSA
claim and thus she is no longer able to litigate her entitle-
ment to an earlier effective date. Further, Ms. Guzman
claims the Veterans Court actively interfered with her ac-
cess by declining to apply equitable estoppel and relying on
subsumption.
Ms. Guzman forfeited her argument that the VA inter-
fered with her access. Morgan v. Principi, 327 F.3d 1357,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This question was neither presented
to nor considered by the Board or Veterans Court. In fact,
though Ms. Guzman based her equitable estoppel argu-
ment on Taylor before the Veterans Court, she relied on
Taylor’s right of access discussion for the first time in her
briefing before us.
Moreover, Ms. Guzman has not shown “the govern-
ment has, by affirmative conduct, unduly interfered with
[her] access to the adjudication offered by the forum.” Tay-
lor, 71 F.4th at 935. Ms. Guzman was able to participate
in the VA benefits adjudication system, as evidenced by the
procedural history preceding this appeal. The VA did not
block her access by rejecting her request for an earlier ef-
fective date. Likewise, the Veterans Court’s choice to reject
her equitable estoppel and subsumption arguments, based
on binding precedent, does not qualify as active interfer-
ence. Additionally, Ms. Guzman cannot establish a back-
ward-looking right-of-access violation because she can still
request the VA Secretary grant her an earlier effective date
using his equitable powers under 38 U.S.C. § 503(a). See
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (“[W]hen
the access claim (like this one) looks backward, the com-
plaint must identify a remedy that may be awarded as rec-
ompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may
yet be brought.”).
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GUZMAN v. COLLINS 8
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ms. Guzman’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we dismiss-in-part and affirm-in-part.
DISMISSED-IN-PART AND AFFIRMED-IN-
PART
COSTS
No costs.
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