Yvonne Rough v. Department of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
YVONNE ROUGH,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent
______________________
2025-1479
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DE-1221-21-0078-W-1.
______________________
Decided: November 12, 2025
______________________
YVONNE ROUGH , Cortaro, AZ, pro se.
YARIV S. P IERCE , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH
MARIE HOSFORD, P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY , BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before D YK, REYNA, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
Case: 25-1479 Document: 20 Page: 1 Filed: 11/12/2025

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ROUGH v. DVA 2
Yvonne Rough petitions pro se for review of a final de-
cision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”)
denying her request for corrective action under the Whis-
tleblower Protection Act of 1989 (“WPA”), Pub. L. No. 101-
12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On October 27, 2019, Ms. Rough began work as a Med-
ical Support Assistant at the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs (the “Agency”) Veteran Health Administration in
Tucson, Arizona. Ms. Rough was assigned to a call center,
where she answered calls from veterans and other author-
ized individuals. She was subject to a one-year probation-
ary period. On October 13, 2020, during the probationary
period, Ms. Rough was terminated for unacceptable at-
tendance.
On November 17, 2020, Ms. Rough filed a complaint
with the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) alleging that she
was improperly terminated after making a protected dis-
closure about her supervisor, Celina Quinonez. The OSC
closed its inquiry into Ms. Rough’s complaint on Decem-
ber 17, 2020, and Ms. Rough filed an individual right of ac-
tion (“IRA”) appeal with the Board. The administrative
judge (“AJ”) issued an initial decision denying Ms. Rough’s
request for corrective action because she did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she made a protected
disclosure. In making this finding, the AJ discredited
Ms. Rough’s statements asserting protected disclosures
partly because they were self-serving. On December 23,
2024, the Board denied Ms. Rough’s petition for review and
in relevant part affirmed the initial decision.1 Despite
1 The Board vacated the AJ’s finding that the Agency
established it would have terminated Ms. Rough despite
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ROUGH v. DVA 3
noting that it was improper for the AJ to discount
Ms. Rough’s testimony as self-serving, the Board “carefully
considered the record evidence” and found that Ms. Rough
failed to show that she made a protected disclosure, “even
in the absence of the finding regarding [her] motivation
and the self-serving nature of her testimony.” S. App’x 2–
3, 2 n.2. Ms. Rough now petitions for review of the Board’s
decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(9).2
D ISCUSSION
We set aside the decision of the Board if it is “(1) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c); accord Haebe v. Dep’t of Just., 288 F.3d 1288,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Ms. Rough primarily contends that the Board’s finding
that she did not make a protected disclosure was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. We conclude that the
Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Under the WPA, a protected disclosure consists of “infor-
mation by an employee . . . which the employee . . . reason-
ably believes evidences—(i) any violation of any law, rule,
or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste
of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
her alleged protected disclosure because it was improper to
consider this question without first finding that Ms. Rough
made a prima facie case under the WPA.
2 The government argues that Ms. Rough’s petition
was untimely. Resp’t’s Informal Br. 14–17. We need not
decide this non-jurisdictional issue since we reach
Ms. Rough’s claims on the merits.
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ROUGH v. DVA 4
Ms. Rough alleges that she met with a union representa-
tive, Jose Ortiz, and “told him ‘about everything in [her]
employment,’” including Ms. Quinonez “ha[ving] a conver-
sation with her about her PTSD [(posttraumatic stress dis-
order)]” and “suggest[ing] she might need to fire” her.
S. App’x 19 (first alteration in original). Ms. Rough con-
tends that this constituted a protected disclosure.
The Board did not err in determining that Ms. Rough
did not establish that she made a protected disclosure to
Mr. Ortiz. As the AJ noted, “[t]he record contains no evi-
dence – outside the appellant’s own statements – that she
reported any of these matters.” S. App’x 19. Mr. Ortiz did
not corroborate Ms. Rough’s alleged statements.
Ms. Rough supplied no evidence from any other individual
to corroborate her testimony, and the Board concluded that
Ms. Rough’s statements were not credible. This is substan-
tial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that
Ms. Rough did not prove that she made a protected disclo-
sure.
Ms. Rough additionally argues that the Board failed to
consider a variety of other facts, such as her traumatic
brain injury and PTSD. But none of these facts suggests
that Ms. Rough made a protected disclosure to Mr. Ortiz.
We have considered Ms. Rough’s remaining arguments and
find them unpersuasive. The Board did not err in conclud-
ing that Ms. Rough has not shown by preponderant evi-
dence that the Agency violated the WPA.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 25-1479 Document: 20 Page: 4 Filed: 11/12/2025

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