Dee Monbo v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
DEE MONBO,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1604
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:24-cv-02083-EMR, Judge Eleni M. Roumel.
______________________
Decided: April 15, 2026
______________________
D EE MONBO, Owings Mills, MD, pro se.
K ELLY P ALAMAR , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
ALBERT S. I AROSSI, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY , BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
Before H UGHES , L INN, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
Case: 25-1604 Document: 32 Page: 1 Filed: 04/15/2026

-- 1 of 7 --

MONBO v. US 2
P ER CURIAM .
Dee Monbo appeals the United States Court of Federal
Claims’ order dismissing her pre-award bid protest com-
plaint for failure to prosecute. We affirm.
I
On December 18, 2024, Ms. Monbo1 filed a pre-award
bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims, challenging a
solicitation from the United States Air Force.2 Shortly af-
ter, the trial court received a defective filing in which
Ms. Monbo sought an emergency temporary restraining or-
der and preliminary injunction related to her protest. The
trial court requested the parties’ availability for an initial
status conference, but Ms. Monbo did not respond to the
court’s or opposing counsel’s repeated outreach. See S.A. 3
(noting trial court’s attempts to contact Ms. Monbo on
three separate occasions).3
On January 8, 2025, the trial court set a telephonic in-
itial status conference for January 15, 2025, and ordered
the parties to file a joint status report. The trial court also
granted Ms. Monbo’s motion to amend, ordering her to sep-
arately file her first amended complaint. The same day,
Ms. Monbo “request[ed] leave to secure legal counsel and
1 Ms. Monbo conducts business as a sole proprietor
under her name, Dee Monbo. For simplicity, this opinion
uses Ms. Monbo to refer to both Ms. Monbo and her sole
proprietorship. Ms. Monbo, although proceeding pro se,
was found to be a sophisticated party familiar with pro-
ceedings before the trial court.
2 The solicitation, No. FA301625Q00070001, con-
cerned Advisory and Program Management Support for the
Air Force’s Medical and Education Training Campus in
Texas.
3 S.A. refers to the Supplemental Appendix attached
to the end of the Appellee’s Informal Response Brief.
Case: 25-1604 Document: 32 Page: 2 Filed: 04/15/2026

-- 2 of 7 --

MONBO v. US 3
representation.” S.A. 29. The government later filed its sta-
tus report but explained that Ms. Monbo did not respond to
its communications and did not participate in the creation
of the status report. The initial status conference then took
place as scheduled on January 15, 2025, but Ms. Monbo did
not appear or answer the trial court’s phone calls.
The court then ordered Ms. Monbo to show cause as to
“why she did not appear for the January 15, 2025 Initial
Status Conference, indicating any good faith basis for her
failure to do so.” S.A. 31–32. The order stated that the trial
court had intended to discuss Ms. Monbo’s filings at the
conference and noted her pattern of unresponsiveness. See
S.A. 31–32. It then warned Ms. Monbo “that this action
will be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal
Claims [(RCFC)] should [Ms. Monbo] fail to timely respond
to this Order” and—in the event Ms. Monbo timely re-
sponded to the show cause order—set a joint status confer-
ence for January 23, 2025. S.A. 32.
On January 22, 2025, Ms. Monbo filed her response to
the show cause order. It did not, however, provide a good
faith explanation for her failure to appear at the initial sta-
tus conference. Instead, her response appeared to suggest
that she chose not to, or believed she did not have to, ap-
pear for three reasons. She asserted that: (1) “[t]he Court
of Federal Claims no longer has jurisdiction over this bid
protest case” based on an alleged notice of appeal to the
D.C. Circuit filed on January 17, 2025; (2) she “is not an
attorney” and “has a right to be represented by [c]ounsel at
the Initial [Status] Conference”; and (3) “[t]he Court of
[F]ederal Claims is aware that Plaintiff is in need of legal
representation as the Court of Federal Claims has labeled
several of Plaintiff[’s] filings as ‘Defective.’” S.A. 40–41.
Given Ms. Monbo’s timely response, the joint status confer-
ence took place as scheduled. Ms. Monbo again did not ap-
pear. Instead, 16 minutes before the scheduled start time,
she emailed the court that she could not attend with no
Case: 25-1604 Document: 32 Page: 3 Filed: 04/15/2026

-- 3 of 7 --

MONBO v. US 4
explanation. See also S.A. 6–7 (discussing how Ms. Monbo
did not answer the court’s attempts to contact her shortly
after receiving her email).
Ms. Monbo’s case was then dismissed for failure to
prosecute. See Monbo v. United States, No. 24-cv-02083,
2025 WL 704402, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 24, 2025) (Dismissal);
see also Judgment at 1, Monbo v. United States, No. 24-cv-
02083 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 27, 2025), ECF No. 30. In its dismis-
sal, the trial court again stated that the conferences were,
in part, to discuss Ms. Monbo’s filings. The court also re-
jected Ms. Monbo’s statements in her show cause order re-
sponse, finding none constituted good cause for her failure
to appear. See Dismissal, 2025 WL 704402, at *5 & n.8 (re-
jecting her claim that she “has a right to be represented” at
the status conference because the constitutional right to
counsel does not apply in her civil case); see also id. at *5 &
n.9 (explaining that (1) deficient notices of appeal do not
divest the court of jurisdiction to issue a dismissal, and
(2) regardless, Ms. Monbo’s notice was filed two days after
the initial status conference, so it cannot serve as good
cause). The trial court explained that Ms. Monbo’s willful,
repeated failures to follow clear orders supported its deci-
sion to exercise its discretion under Rule 41(b) to dismiss
her case–as the court warned Ms. Monbo it might.
Ms. Monbo timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II
Under Rule 41(b) of the Rules of the United States
Court of Federal Claims, the court may dismiss a case “[i]f
the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules
or a court order.” RCFC 41(b). We apply an abuse of discre-
tion standard in reviewing the court’s decision to dismiss
for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). Claude E. Atkins
Enters., Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1180, 1183
(Fed. Cir. 1990). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court
“made a clear error of judgment . . . or exercised its
Case: 25-1604 Document: 32 Page: 4 Filed: 04/15/2026

-- 4 of 7 --

MONBO v. US 5
discretion based on an error of law or clearly erroneous fact
finding.” Qingdao Taifa Grp. Co. v. United States, 581 F.3d
1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismiss-
ing Ms. Monbo’s case under Rule 41(b). As noted above,
Ms. Monbo repeatedly did not comply with the trial court’s
clear and unambiguous orders. And the court reasonably
found that at no point did Ms. Monbo provide good cause
for her repeated failure to comply with its orders. We can-
not say that the trial court abused its discretion when
Ms. Monbo “repeatedly and without valid justification ig-
nored both court-imposed deadlines and court rules.” Ka-
din Corp. v. United States, 782 F.2d 175, 176 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also Claude E. Atkins, 899 F.2d at 1183–84 (find-
ing no abuse of discretion in Rule 41(b) dismissal after
plaintiff failed to comply with order to file status reports).
Ms. Monbo’s challenges on appeal do not persuade us
otherwise. Ms. Monbo makes several unavailing argu-
ments, many of which concern issues the trial court did not
reach and are unrelated to the basis for dismissal.4 Even if
4 While we construe Ms. Monbo’s filings liberally
given her pro se status, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007), many of the issues she raises cannot be reasonably
construed to relate to the basis for dismissal. Compare Ap-
pellant Br. 2–4 (raising issues related to jurisdiction, her
alleged debarment from bidding on government solicita-
tions, and the merits of her complaint), with Dismissal,
2025 WL 704402, at *7 (dismissing for failure to prosecute
without addressing the merits or determining whether
Ms. Monbo is an interested party for statutory standing
purposes). We do not address these unrelated issues or ar-
guments unreached by the trial court. See, e.g., Arunacha-
lam v. Apple, Inc., 806 F. App’x 977, 982 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (declining to address arguments concerning issues
“not addressed by the [trial] court”).
Case: 25-1604 Document: 32 Page: 5 Filed: 04/15/2026

-- 5 of 7 --

MONBO v. US 6
Ms. Monbo did not attend the conferences because she be-
lieved the trial court had erred in some way, such as by not
first ruling on her other filings, the proper course was to
comply with the court’s orders, and then later appeal once
the court had entered an unfavorable, appealable order or
decision. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458
(1975) (“[A]ll orders . . . of courts must be complied with
promptly. If a person to whom a court directs an order be-
lieves that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but,
absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order
pending appeal.”). A party, even one proceeding pro se, can-
not refuse to comply with an order simply because the
party believes the court erred in some fashion. See id.; see
also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)
(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordi-
nary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse
mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”).
It was clear that the trial court wished to discuss
Ms. Monbo’s filings at the conferences. See S.A. 31. But
“[i]nstead, [Ms. Monbo] made a deliberate choice to defy
[the trial court’s] Order and skip the telephonic Initial Sta-
tus Conference—and then made the same choice a week
later, to defy a second Court Order to appear at a Status
Conference conducted via videoconference.” Dismissal,
2025 WL 704402, at *5. So, although Ms. Monbo proceeded
pro se, the trial court clearly ordered her to show cause for
her failure to appear at the Initial Status Conference, or
else her case would be dismissed. S.A. 32; see also McNeil,
508 U.S. at 113. Under these circumstances, where a party
repeatedly ignores unambiguous court orders, dismissal for
failure to prosecute is well within the trial court’s discre-
tion. See, e.g., Claude E. Atkins, 899 F.2d at 1183–84.
III
We have considered Ms. Monbo’s other remaining ar-
guments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
Case: 25-1604 Document: 32 Page: 6 Filed: 04/15/2026

-- 6 of 7 --

MONBO v. US 7
reasons, the trial court’s dismissal of Ms. Monbo’s protest
is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 25-1604 Document: 32 Page: 7 Filed: 04/15/2026

-- 7 of 7 --