James Tindall v. United States

25-1845Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit8 gen 2026

Testo completo

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JAMES TINDALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1845
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:25-cv-00122-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
______________________
Decided: January 8, 2026
______________________
J AMES T INDALL , Marietta, GA, pro se.
BRYAN MICHAEL BYRD, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
ELIZABETH M ARIE HOSFORD, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY ,
BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before L OURIE, T ARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Case: 25-1845 Document: 16 Page: 1 Filed: 01/08/2026

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TINDALL v. US 2
L OURIE, Circuit Judge.
James Tindall appeals from the decision of the United
States Court of Federal Claims (“the Claims Court”) dis-
missing his complaint for failure to state a claim on res ju-
dicata grounds. Tindall v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 339
(2025) (“Decision”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Tindall owns shares in a Russian-majority state-owned
bank. Decision at 342. In 2021, then-President Biden is-
sued an executive order purporting to “block property with
respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the govern-
ment of the Russian Federation.” Exec. Order No. 14,024,
31 C.F.R. § 587 App. A (2021). Pursuant to this executive
order, in February 2022, the Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol (“OFAC”) of the United States Department of the
Treasury issued sanctions prohibiting the processing of se-
curities transactions involving certain Russian financial
institutions, including the bank in which Tindall owns
shares. See Publ’n of Fin. Servs. Sectoral Determination &
Directives 1A, 2, 3, & 4 Under Exec. Ord. 14024 of Apr. 15,
2021, 87 Fed. Reg. 32,303, 32,305 (Off. of Foreign Assets
Control May 31, 2022). As a result, Tindall’s shares were
placed into an OFAC-controlled escrow account. See Deci-
sion at 342.
Tindall sent several letters of protest to President
Biden, other government officials, and his broker. See id.
These letters included offers whereby the United States
could buy or rent Tindall’s shares. See id. Tindall con-
strued the government’s silence concerning these offers
and retention of his shares in the escrow account as ac-
ceptance of the offers. See id.
Prior to and apart from the complaint giving rise to this
appeal, Tindall had filed a complaint in May 2023 in the
Claims Court alleging (1) a violation of his Fifth Amend-
ment due process rights, (2) breach of contract, and (3) an
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TINDALL v. US 3
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensa-
tion. See id.
The Claims Court dismissed the claims, determining
that it lacked jurisdiction over the Fifth Amendment claim
because the Fifth Amendment is not money-mandating,
that Tindall failed to state a claim for breach of contract
because no contract was formed, and that Tindall failed to
state a takings claim because he failed to concede the va-
lidity of the government’s actions and, even if he had stated
such a claim, the government’s actions served a substantial
national security interest and were thus exempt from a
takings claim. Tindall v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 440,
443, 445, 446 (2023). We affirmed the subsequent appeal
to this court and the Supreme Court denied Tindall’s peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari. Tindall v. United States, No.
2024-1143, 2024 WL 960452, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 282 (2024).
In January 2025, Tindall filed a new complaint in the
Claims Court again alleging (1) a violation of his Fifth
Amendment due process rights, (2) breach of contract, and
(3) an unconstitutional taking of property without just com-
pensation. See Decision at 342–43; S.A. 10–39.1 The gov-
ernment moved to dismiss, see S.A. 40–48, and Tindall filed
an amended complaint, see S.A. 51–84. The Claims Court
determined that the government’s motion applied to Tin-
dall’s amended complaint and dismissed the amended com-
plaint for failure to state a claim, determining that the
claims were precluded on res judicata grounds. Decision at
342 n.3, 346.
Tindall timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
1 “S.A.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed by
the government.
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TINDALL v. US 4
D ISCUSSION
We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim de novo. B.H. Aircraft Co. v. United States,
89 F.4th 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2024). A complaint must be
dismissed if it fails “to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” RCFC 12(b)(6). Whether a claim is barred by
res judicata, or claim preclusion, is a question of law also
reviewed de novo. Faust v. United States, 101 F.3d 675,
677 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Pro se complaints are held to a less
stringent standard compared with pleadings drafted by
counsel, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per cu-
riam), but pro se litigants still must meet pleading require-
ments, Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1141 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
Tindall argues that (1) claim preclusion does not apply,
(2) the Claims Court improperly construed the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss to apply to Tindall’s amended
complaint, and (3) the Claims Court used the wrong legal
standards. We address each argument in turn.
I
For claim preclusion to apply, three elements must be
met: “(1) the parties [be] identical or in privity; (2) the first
suit proceed[] to a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the
second claim [be] based on the same set of transactional
facts as the first.” Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d
1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Claims
Court determined that all three elements were met and
dismissed Tindall’s amended complaint. Decision at 344–
45. We find no error in its decision.
First, it is undisputed that the parties in the two suits
were identical. See id. at 344; Tindall Op. Br. at 12.
Second, Tindall’s first suit resulted in a final judgment
on the merits. Tindall’s breach of contract and takings
claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim, Tindall,
167 Fed. Cl. at 445–47, which constitutes a final judgment
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TINDALL v. US 5
on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion, see Feder-
ated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). As
for Tindall’s Fifth Amendment due process claim which
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, certain jurisdictional
dismissals may be subject to claim preclusion. See Under-
writers Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident &
Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 706 (1982). Such is
the case here. We have explained that “the determination
that [a] source is money-mandating shall be determinative
both as to the question of the court’s jurisdiction and there-
after as to the question of whether, on the merits, plaintiff
has a money-mandating source on which to base his cause
of action.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Claims
Court’s dismissal of Tindall’s Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess claim for failing to identify a money-mandating source
is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of claim pre-
clusion.
Third, the instant amended complaint was based on
the same set of transactional facts as Tindall’s 2023 com-
plaint. Both concern Tindall’s shares in a Russian bank
being placed into an OFAC-controlled escrow account and
allege the same three claims stemming from that conduct:
a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights,
breach of contract, and an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty without just compensation. See S.A. 58; Tindall, 167
Fed. Cl. at 444. Tindall argues that the transactional facts
are not the same because his instant amended complaint
includes allegations of wrongdoing by the government that
occurred after his first lawsuit was dismissed, namely, that
the government continued to hold Tindall’s shares after his
2023 complaint was dismissed. See Tindall Op. Br. at 11,
13. But underlying those allegations is the same set of
transactional facts: that the United States government
seized Tindall’s shares in a Russian bank.
Tindall then points to three specific facts that he ar-
gues were alleged in his instant amended complaint but
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TINDALL v. US 6
were not alleged in his 2023 complaint, thereby rendering
the two complaints not based on the same set of transac-
tional facts.
Tindall first points to his allegation that the govern-
ment validly took his property, Tindall Op. Br. at 14 &
n.26, an element necessary to state a takings claim under
the Tucker Act, see Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,
10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But the Claims Court
previously determined that Tindall’s claim failed even if he
had implicitly conceded the validity of the government’s ac-
tion, and we affirmed that determination. Tindall,
167 Fed. Cl. at 446–47, aff’d, 2024 WL 960452, at *3. Re-
gardless, that allegation does not change the fact that the
nature of the underlying transactional facts alleged in the
two complaints was the same.
Tindall next points to his allegation that the govern-
ment accepted Tindall’s offer to buy or rent the shares by
taking and continuing to hold his property. Tindall Op. Br.
at 14–15; S.A. 63, 65–67. Again, Tindall’s allegations are
based on the same set of transactional facts: that the
United States government seized his shares in a Russian
bank. Further, the Claims Court considered this allegation
and determined that the government’s “blocking the shares
would have happened with or without Mr. Tindall’s ‘of-
fers.’” Decision at 345. That finding was not clearly erro-
neous: Tindall learned that his shares would be blocked,
sent letters of protest, and then the shares were placed in
escrow. Id. The government’s actions, which had been pre-
determined, did not constitute an acceptance; and, regard-
less, Tindall offers no new facts of government action not
alleged in his 2023 complaint.
Tindall finally points to his allegation that he seeks
payment for the government’s possession, control, and use
of his property, not payment for any decline in value. Tin-
dall Op. Br. at 15. That is a remedy sought, not additional
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TINDALL v. US 7
facts that render the two lawsuits based on different sets
of transactional facts.
In sum, underlying Tindall’s amended complaint is the
same set of transactional facts underlying his 2023 com-
plaint: that the United States government seized his
shares in a Russian bank. Accordingly, even to the extent
that Tindall alleged later-dated facts, reframed the legal
significance of the government’s conduct, or sought differ-
ent relief, those differences do not alter the operative trans-
actional facts or make the amended complaint
meaningfully distinct for purposes of claim preclusion.
II
Tindall next argues that the Claims Court violated his
due process rights by granting the government’s motion to
dismiss with respect to his amended complaint, even
though he filed his amended complaint after the govern-
ment filed its motion to dismiss. Tindall Op. Br. at 6–8.
We do not agree.
The Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in con-
struing the motion to dismiss to apply to Tindall’s amended
complaint, because the amended complaint contained sub-
stantially the same factual allegations as the original. See
Mitsui Foods, Inc. v. Unites States, 867 F.2d 1401, 1404
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (a trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a motion for leave to amend complaint when
amendment would be futile); Kalos v. United States, 368 F.
App’x 127, 131–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he trial court did
not abuse its discretion by construing the government’s mo-
tion to dismiss as applying to the amended complaint,
given that the amended complaint contained the same
claims and substantially the same factual allegations as
the original.”). The Claims Court considered the new alle-
gations in Tindall’s amended complaint and determined
that the allegations did “not cure the defects contained in
his original pleading.” Decision at 346. Indeed, the main
difference between the originally-filed complaint and the
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TINDALL v. US 8
amended complaint seems to be that Tindall emphasizes in
his amended complaint that the government continues to
violate Tindall’s rights by keeping his shares in escrow.
Compare, e.g., S.A. 12, with S.A. 55. For the reasons ex-
plained above, those allegations do not render Tindall’s
amended complaint based on a set of transactional facts
different from the 2023 complaint. Tindall points to no
other allegedly new facts included in his amended com-
plaint that would change that analysis.
III
Tindall finally argues that the Claims Court failed to
consider the proper standard for dismissal. See Tindall Op.
Br. at 23–27. He argues that the Claims Court ignored the
requirements to assume that all facts in the amended com-
plaint are true, and to construe those facts liberally and in
Tindall’s favor. Id. at 23. We do not agree. The Claims
Court properly identified the standard for dismissal: A
complaint must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Decision at 343–44 (ci-
tation omitted). The Claims Court then correctly identified
that a complaint can be dismissed on res judicata grounds.
Id. at 344. For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the
Claims Court’s determination that the claims are pre-
cluded. The Claims Court thus identified and applied the
correct standard for dismissal.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Tindall’s remaining arguments
but find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons, the
Claims Court properly dismissed Tindall’s amended com-
plaint. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED
Case: 25-1845 Document: 16 Page: 8 Filed: 01/08/2026

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