Chima Akagbue Nwala v. Department of the Air Force

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CHIMA AKAGBUE NWALA,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Respondent
______________________
2025-1857
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. AT-3330-24-0398-I-1.
______________________
Decided: February 3, 2026
______________________
CHIMA AKAGBUE NWALA, Riverview, FL, pro se.
DANIEL HOFFMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by REGINALD
THOMAS BLADES, JR., PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
Before LOURIE, PROST, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
Case: 25-1857 Document: 36 Page: 1 Filed: 02/03/2026

-- 1 of 4 --

NWALA v. AIR FORCE 2
PER CURIAM.
Chima Akagbue Nwala petitions from a final decision
of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) denying
his request for corrective action. Nwala v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, No. AT-3330-24-0398-I-1, 2025 MSPB LEXIS 1940,
at *2 (Apr. 8, 2025) (adopting the initial decision, Chima v.
Dep’t of the Air Force, No. AT-3330-24-0398-I-1, 2024
MSPB LEXIS 3446 (June 10, 2024), as the Board’s final
decision). For the reasons below, we dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Nwala worked as a program analyst for the De-
partment of the Air Force (“agency”) when he applied for
the agency’s supervisory financial management analyst po-
sition. The agency informed Mr. Nwala that it selected an-
other applicant for the position. Mr. Nwala filed an appeal
with the Board seeking corrective action. He alleged that
the agency improperly utilized direct hiring authority
(“DHA”), resulting in a decision not to select him in viola-
tion of his veteran’s-preference rights under the Veterans
Employment Opportunities Act (“VEOA”).
The administrative judge (“AJ”) denied Mr. Nwala’s re-
quest for corrective action. The AJ noted that the agency
“explicitly stated [DHA] as the hiring authority” and that
VEOA does not apply to DHA appointments. Chima, 2024
MSPB LEXIS 3446, at *5–6. The AJ concluded that be-
cause veteran’s preference did not apply to the position,
Mr. Nwala cannot establish that the agency violated his
rights under VEOA. Id. at *8. The Board denied
Mr. Nwala’s petition for review of the AJ’s decision and
adopted the decision as its final decision. Nwala, 2025
MSPB LEXIS 1940, at *2.
Mr. Nwala petitioned to this court. Our jurisdiction
over appeals from Board decisions is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(9).
Case: 25-1857 Document: 36 Page: 2 Filed: 02/03/2026

-- 2 of 4 --

NWALA v. AIR FORCE 3
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the government asks that we dismiss
Mr. Nwala’s petition as untimely because it was filed more
than sixty days after the Board issued its final decision.
Resp’t’s Informal Br. 7–8. Mr. Nwala does not respond to
this argument. See Informal Reply Br. (addressing only
the merits).
We agree with the government that Mr. Nwala’s peti-
tion is untimely. This court has jurisdiction to review “an
appeal from a final order or final decision of the [Board],
pursuant to sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(d) of title 5.”
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). Under § 7703(b)(1), “any petition
for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board is-
sues notice of the final order or decision of the Board.”
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A petition for
review is considered filed on the date it is received by the
clerk of court. Pinat v. OPM, 931 F.2d 1544, 1546 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also Fed. Cir. R. 25(c)(2).
The court received Mr. Nwala’s petition on June 10,
2025, see ECF No. 1-2 at 1. That is more than sixty days
after the Board issued its decision on April 8, 2025. Ac-
cordingly, Mr. Nwala’s petition is untimely.
The government argues that § 7703(b)(1)(A) is not sub-
ject to equitable tolling. See Resp’t’s Informal Br. 7–8 (cit-
ing Oja v. Dep’t of the Army, 405 F.3d 1349, 1357–60 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)). The Supreme Court has explained that
“§ 7703(b)(1)’s deadline is non-jurisdictional,” and that
“nonjurisdictional [timing rules] are presumptively subject
to equitable tolling,” Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480,
489 (2024) (alteration in original). Mr. Nwala has not ad-
dressed the untimeliness of his petition or supplied any ba-
sis for equitable tolling even if the statute permitted as
much. Because the outcome of this case does not turn on
the availability of equitable tolling in § 7703(b)(1) cases
generally, we express no opinion on that question here.
Case: 25-1857 Document: 36 Page: 3 Filed: 02/03/2026

-- 3 of 4 --

NWALA v. AIR FORCE 4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Mr. Nwala’s pe-
tition as untimely.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 25-1857 Document: 36 Page: 4 Filed: 02/03/2026

-- 4 of 4 --