Mary Agnes Craddock v. Department of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MARY AGNES CRADDOCK,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent
______________________
2025-1867
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. NY-1221-24-0221-W-1.
______________________
Decided: April 21, 2026
______________________
MARY AGNES CRADDOCK, Randolph, NJ, pro se.
COLLIN T. MATHIAS , Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH
MARIE H OSFORD, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY , BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before D YK, CHEN, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 2
Ms. Mary Agnes Craddock, a pro se litigant, appeals
from a Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) Decision
dismissing her Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal.
Craddock v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. NY-1221-24-0221-
W-1, 2025 WL 994269 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 27, 2025) (Decision)
(J.A. 4–20).1 After considering Ms. Craddock’s arguments
alleging retaliatory action by the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) for certain whistleblower-protected disclo-
sures, an administrative judge (AJ) found the VA demon-
strated by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
taken the same actions regardless of Ms. Craddock’s pro-
tected activity. Id. at 9. The Initial Decision was not ap-
pealed and became the final decision of the Board on May
1, 2025. See ECF No. 1. Because the Board’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
From approximately February 2020 to May 3, 2023,
Ms. Craddock worked as a Nurse Practitioner in the car-
diac stress lab at East Orange, New Jersey VA Medical
Center (VAMC). In the cardiac stress lab, which was lo-
cated within the VAMC’s Nuclear Medicine unit,
Ms. Craddock was responsible for administering cardiac
stress tests to VA patients. Part of her responsibilities in-
cluded working with Nuclear Medicine Technologists
(NMTs) who “were responsible for handling and injecting
any radioactive materials needed for patients.” Decision,
2025 WL 994269, at 2.
On May 1, 2023, several NMTs sent a Memorandum to
the VAMC’s director alleging “ongoing harassment and
1 Because the online version of the Initial Decision
lacks pagination, we use the pagination employed in the
Board’s original document. “Decision, 2025 WL 994269, at
1,” for example, corresponds to the first page of the deci-
sion, located at J.A. 4.
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 3
disruptive behavior” by Ms. Craddock. Id. The memo re-
quested that Ms. Craddock “be removed . . . immediately”
from the stress lab. Id.
The next day, May 2, 2023, the VA detailed
Ms. Craddock out of the Nuclear Medicine unit to cardiol-
ogy outpatient services pending an investigation. On May
3, 2023, Ms. Craddock filed complaints to the VA’s inspec-
tor general (OIG) and office of whistleblower protection.
In response, the VA opened a formal investigation; be-
tween May 20, 2023 and June 5, 2023, the agency’s admin-
istrative investigative board (AIB) interviewed
Ms. Craddock and collected her evidence. The AIB issued
a report on September 1, 2023 which substantiated claims
in the NMT memo. See J.A. 185, 189.
After the AIB investigation was completed,
Ms. Craddock filed a complaint with the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC) alleging that the VA’s actions, including de-
tailing her to a new position, constituted retaliation
against her for alleged Whistleblower Protection Act
(WPA) disclosures. Decision, 2025 WL 994269, at 3 & 3 n.1.
On June 20, 2024, the OSC informed Ms. Craddock it had
terminated its inquiry, but she could still file an IRA ap-
peal with the Board under 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3) and 1221.
See J.A. 126.
Thereafter, on August 21, 2024, Ms. Craddock initiated
this IRA appeal. In response to multiple jurisdiction orders
seeking to identify which issues were properly within the
scope of her IRA appeal, Ms. Craddock raised more than 50
allegations of whistleblower disclosures and activities as
well as alleged retaliatory personnel actions. See generally
J.A. 25–43. On October 30, 2024, the AJ issued a jurisdic-
tional finding and procedural order identifying a subset of
Ms. Craddock’s claims over which the Board could exercise
jurisdiction. Id. at 40–41.
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 4
The AJ determined Ms. Craddock non-frivolously al-
leged she engaged in whistleblowing activity in (1) filing
her May 3, 2023 OIG complaint “alleging unnecessary de-
lays in scheduling or rescheduling patients of 30 days or
more” and (2) filing her June 27, 2023 OSC complaint “al-
leging retaliatory action against her based on prior disclo-
sures regarding unnecessary delays in scheduling [or]
rescheduling patients.” Decision, 2025 WL 994269, at 5;
see also J.A. 36–38.
The AJ further determined that Ms. Craddock had also
sufficiently pled her protected activity contributed to the
VA’s decisions to: extend her involuntary detail to cardiol-
ogy outpatient services on September 6, 2023; remove her
ergonomic desk topper and computer from her office after
an extended sick leave; issue a proposed admonishment for
her alleged conduct; withhold her clinical credentialing for
the period between October 13, 2023 and December 18,
2023; and permanently transfer her to cardiac outpatient
clinics on June 17, 2024. J.A. 40.
In the Initial Decision, the AJ analyzed the record in
view of the Carr factors. Decision, 2025 WL 994269, at 5–
9 (citing Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). The AJ ultimately concluded that the
VA’s “exceptionally strong justification for its actions”
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have taken the same personnel action regardless of
Ms. Craddock’s disclosures. Id. at 9.
On May 1, 2025, the AJ’s Initial Decision became final.
Ms. Craddock timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
Our review of Board decisions is limited by statute.
Holmes v. United States Postal Serv., 987 F.3d 1042, 1046
(Fed. Cir. 2021). “We are permitted to set aside Board de-
cisions only if we find that they are: (1) arbitrary,
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 5
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)).
On appeal, Ms. Craddock argues that the AJ improp-
erly excluded from review certain disclosures and activities
that, in her view, were protected under the WPA and cer-
tain VA actions that, also in her view, were retaliatory.
Ms. Craddock also argues that the AJ erred in analyzing
the Carr factors. We address each argument in turn.
I. Jurisdictional Findings
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation for whis-
tleblowing activity, an employee must show both that she
engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a disclosure
protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and that the pro-
tected disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel
action.” Briley v. Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin., 236 F.3d
1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
A. Protected Disclosures and Activity
In the AJ’s jurisdictional finding order, the AJ first nar-
rowed down Ms. Craddock’s allegations of whistleblowing
disclosures and protected activity. J.A. 26–30. The AJ
noted that certain allegations of VA wrongdoing by
Ms. Craddock did not include assertions that Ms. Craddock
herself made a protected disclosure or otherwise engaged
in protected activity. See id. at 26. The AJ further deter-
mined that several of Ms. Craddock’s other allegations did
not describe “action reasonably characterized as whistle-
blowing,” because Ms. Craddock failed to show she “reason-
ably believed” those disclosures “evidence[] (i) any violation
of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanage-
ment, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”
Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 6
Ms. Craddock’s dismissed allegations included, e.g.,
her November 2022 report that an NMT “slammed” a sy-
ringe box onto her desk, see J.A. 27 n.2, her February 2023
report that an NMT left a nuclear box unmonitored, see id.
at 29 n.4f, her July 2023 report about errors in document-
ing community care imaging consultations, see id. at 33
n.10, and several others. For each allegation, the AJ thor-
oughly explained that the AJ could not find Ms. Craddock
“reasonably believed” her complaints rose to the level of
whistleblowing. See id. at 26–36.
Ms. Craddock argues that many of her allegations were
erroneously dismissed because she identified radioactive
waste management violations. See Appellant Br. 24–25.
She also argues that her July 2023 disclosure identified
public health and safety violations which should not have
been dismissed. These arguments must fail.
On appeal, Ms. Craddock raises, for the first time, an
argument that the subject of several of her disclosures con-
cerned violations of certain health codes. Id. at 8–10 (citing
10 C.F.R. §§ 20.2001, 20.2006, and 20.2008). However, be-
cause Ms. Craddock did not present this argument to the
Board, see generally J.A. 52–54, we find it waived. Bosley
v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“A party in an MSPB proceeding must raise an issue be-
fore the administrative judge if the issue is to be preserved
for review in this court.”).
Regarding Ms. Craddock’s July 2023 disclosures of per-
ceived documentation errors for community care imaging
consultations, the AJ dismissed this allegation because the
AJ found Ms. Craddock “could not have reasonably be-
lieved [her] email was whistleblowing when she sent it.”
J.A. 33. As the AJ noted, the WPA “is reserved for disclo-
sures of significance.” Id. at 27; see also Herman v. Dep’t of
Just., 193 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Ms. Craddock’s
July 2023 email discussing minor procedural errors does
not amount to a disclosure “of significance.” Thus, this does
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 7
not disturb the AJ’s findings, which are supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
B. Agency Personnel Actions
In the AJ’s jurisdictional finding order, the AJ dis-
missed several of Ms. Craddock’s allegations regarding VA
personnel actions. J.A. 38–40. The AJ explained that cer-
tain alleged reprisals did not qualify as personnel actions
under the WPA. Id. at 38–39 (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(a)(2)(A)). The AJ also disqualified an allegation be-
cause the personnel action occurred on May 2, 2023, the
day before Ms. Craddock’s non-frivolously alleged pro-
tected activity. Id. at 39.
Ms. Craddock’s arguments consist of assertions that
certain allegations should not have been excluded. See Ap-
pellant Br. 28–30. First, she asserts that the AJ should
have determined that the initiation of the VA investigation
was a personnel action, because it was in response to
Ms. Craddock’s May 2023 OIG complaint. She also asserts
that the AJ erred in excluding the removal of
Ms. Craddock’s ergonomic desk topper and computer from
her office. These arguments are unpersuasive.
The AJ dismissed Ms. Craddock’s allegations regard-
ing the initiation of the AIB investigation because “[a]n
agency investigation is not generally a personnel action.”
J.A. 38–39. The dismissed allegation concerned solely the
opening of the AIB investigation, which under our prece-
dent does not qualify as a personnel action. See Sistek v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 955 F.3d 948, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(determining that an allegedly retaliatory agency investi-
gation “may qualify as a personnel action” only if it results
in “a significant change in . . . working conditions”) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Craddock contends that the AJ failed to address
her argument regarding her allegation of reprisal when her
ergonomic desk topper and computer were removed after
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 8
an extended absence. Compare J.A. 40 (list of personnel
action allegations the Board had jurisdiction over), with
Decision, 2025 WL 994269, at 5 (list of personnel actions
analyzed using the Carr factors in which Ms. Craddock’s
ergonomic desk allegation is omitted). However, the AJ’s
failure to address this allegation is harmless error. See Sis-
tek, 955 F.3d at 955–56 (finding it was harmless error for
the Board to fail to address the plaintiff’s allegation of re-
taliatory action by the agency because the allegation did
not amount to a personnel action).
In a statement to the Board, Ms. Craddock claimed
that, after returning from an extended sick leave, she dis-
covered her ergonomic desk and computer “were removed
from the room.” J.A. 59. Ms. Craddock does not allege that
the VA removed the desk and computer, but merely asserts
that the items “were removed.” She later admitted that the
ergonomic desk topper was underneath a different desk in
the same office. J.A. 219–20 [108:23–109:17]. Further, she
testified that she was given a computer “within a couple
hours” after notifying the agency’s information technology
staff of the missing items. Id. at 223 [112:8–13]. In sum,
no evidence supports a finding that the AIB investigation
amounted to a “personnel action” resulting in a “significant
change” to Ms. Craddock’s working conditions, rendering
any error by the AJ in connection with this allegation
harmless.
II. Carr Analysis
If an employee “establishes a prima facie case of re-
prisal for whistleblowing, the burden of persuasion shifts
to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that
it would have taken ‘the same personnel action in the ab-
sence of such disclosure.’” Whitmore v. Dep’t of Lab., 680
F.3d 1353, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e)(1)). The Board evaluates the following three fac-
tors to determine if the agency has made this showing:
(1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 9
personnel action; (2) the existence and strength of any mo-
tive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were
involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the
agency takes similar action against employees who are not
whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.
Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323.
In the Initial Decision, under Carr factor (1), the AJ
reasonably found that the strength of VA’s proffered evi-
dence was sufficiently strong to support a conclusion that
it would have taken the same personnel actions notwith-
standing the protected activity. Decision, 2025 WL 994269,
at 6–8. Relying on a sworn declaration from Ms. Kimberly
Beckerman, a VA Human Resources specialist, the AJ
noted that “when allegations of harassment are raised, the
agency routinely separates the accused harasser from the
party that lodged the complaint.” Id. at 6. The AJ also
highlighted evidence from the VA that Ms. Craddock’s sus-
pension was made permanent “because an investigation
substantiated the complaints about her filed by five subor-
dinates.” Id. at 8. The AJ also noted that the VA presented
evidence that Ms. Craddock’s credentialing process was
not impeded, and that it did not actually issue the proposed
admonishment. See id. at 6–7, 6 n.3.
For Carr factor (2), the AJ determined that VA officials
lacked motive to retaliate because those who were involved
in detailing Ms. Craddock out of the cardiac stress lab were
unaware of Ms. Craddock’s protected activity at the time
they made the decision. See id. at 8. Finally, the AJ did
not assess Carr factor (3) because the VA did not present
evidence of a comparator since Ms. Craddock was the only
nurse in the cardiac stress lab. See id. at 9.
Before this Court, Ms. Craddock argues that the AJ’s
credibility analysis of Ms. Beckerman was in error because
of a discrepancy in her testimony. Appellant Br. 26.
Ms. Craddock highlights Ms. Beckerman’s statement that
the September 6, 2023 extension of Ms. Craddock’s
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 10
involuntary detail was due to the ongoing AIB investiga-
tion, but the AIB report was published on September 1,
2023. Ms. Craddock also disputes the AJ’s findings related
to her credentialing process allegation. Id. at 29–30.
These arguments are insufficient. First, the AJ’s cred-
ibility evaluation of Ms. Beckerman is “virtually unreview-
able” on appeal. King v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 133
F.3d 1450, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Second, VA policy allows
30 days after the publication of an investigative report for
the authorities to review and certify the investigation as
complete. See SAppx 52.2 Thus, even though the investi-
gative report was dated September 1, 2023, the investiga-
tion was still open at the time of Ms. Craddock’s detailing
extension. See J.A. 185. We therefore see no grounds for
overturning the AJ’s assessment of Ms. Beckerman’s cred-
ibility.
Ms. Craddock’s credentialing argument suffers a simi-
lar fate. In the Initial Decision, the AJ determined that,
contrary to Ms. Craddock’s allegations that the VA “with-
held her clinical credentialing,” see J.A. 40, there was no
lapse in Ms. Craddock’s credentialing from October 13,
2023 to December 18, 2023. Decision, 2025 WL 994269, at
7. The AJ relied on declarations from the VA stating
Ms. Craddock’s credentialing process during the relevant
period “occurred as expected” and that there was no dis-
turbance in Ms. Craddock’s “current credentialing, nor her
duties, responsibilities or work conditions.” Id. Further,
the AJ relied on testimony from Ms. Craddock that she
does not know how the credentialing process works beyond
replying to emails regarding submitting for re-credential-
ing. Id. We agree with the AJ’s reasoning and determine
2 “SAppx” refers to the supplemental appendix filed
with the government’s brief.
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CRADDOCK v. DVA 11
that the AJ’s findings are supported by substantial evi-
dence.
CONCLUSION
We have considered the remainder of Ms. Craddock’s
arguments and find them unavailing. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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