Tramec Sloan LLC v. Tarun N. Surti

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TRAMEC SLOAN LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
TARUN N. SURTI,
Defendant-Appellant
______________________
2026-1117
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan in No. 1:25-cv-00374-PLM-
MV, Judge Paul L. Maloney.
______________________
Decided: July 13, 2026
______________________
G EORGE T HOMAS WILLIAMS , III, McGarry Bair PC,
Grand Rapids, MI, for plaintiff-appellee.
T ARUN N. SURTI, Brentwood, TN, pro se.
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, L OURIE and H UGHES , Circuit
Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
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TRAMEC SLOAN LLC v. SURTI 2
Tarun N. Surti appeals a decision of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan to the
extent it denied his motion to dismiss or transfer venue.
Because the decision of the district court is neither a final
judgment nor otherwise properly before us, we dismiss.
I
Plaintiff-Appellee Tramec Sloan LLC (Tramec) manu-
factures the AeroFlap mudflap. The AeroFlap is part of the
Fleet Engineers, Inc. (Fleet) brand, which Tramec acquired
as part of a 2018 asset sale that also resulted in Fleet
changing its name.
Prior to this suit, certain AeroFlap designs offered by
Fleet were the subject of infringement litigation between
Fleet and Defendant-Appellant Mr. Surti, who owns U.S.
Patent No. 8,146,949, reissued as Patent No. RE44,755. As
part of those proceedings, the district court determined
that Fleet did not prove the invalidity of the ’755 patent. At
trial, however, the jury found that a subset of Fleet’s prod-
ucts did not infringe the asserted claims of the ’755 patent.
After the parties filed cross-appeals, this court affirmed.
Fleet Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mudguard Techs., LLC, No. 2022-2001,
2023 WL 5219773, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 2023).
After that prior litigation, Tramec created a new Aero-
Flap design in an attempt to avoid the ’755 patent. Despite
this redesign, Mr. Surti filed a second infringement suit in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, naming the now nonexistent entity Fleet as the
defendant. Tramec then filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan seeking judgments of noninfringement
and invalidity regarding the ’755 patent. Mr. Surti filed a
motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, or in
the alternative, transfer venue to the Middle District of
Tennessee. Mr. Surti’s motion argued that the declaratory
judgment action was barred under the doctrines of res ju-
dicata and collateral estoppel; that venue was improper in
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TRAMEC SLOAN LLC v. SURTI 3
the Western District of Michigan and that the action
should be dismissed or transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a); and that, even if venue were proper in the West-
ern District of Michigan, transfer was warranted to the
Middle District of Tennessee under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The district court denied Mr. Surti’s motion. Tramec
Sloan, LLC v. Surti, No. 25-CV-374, 2025 WL 3126104,
at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2025) (Decision). It first rea-
soned that because the present action concerns a rede-
signed AeroFlap product, distinct from the products for
which infringement was previously litigated, the defense of
res judicata did not bar Tramec’s claim for declaratory
judgment of noninfringement. Id. at *2–3. The district
court then determined that venue was proper in the West-
ern District of Michigan under either the general venue
statute or the patent venue statute because Tramec makes
the AeroFlap product, sells it, and distributes it in the dis-
trict. Id. at *3. Finally, the court rejected Mr. Surti’s trans-
fer arguments under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), reasoning that
the private and public factors did not favor transfer to the
Middle District of Tennessee. Id. at *3–4.
Mr. Surti appealed to this court.
II
On appeal, Mr. Surti argues that the district court
erred by failing to apply claim preclusion to the declaratory
judgment action and by failing to transfer the action.
Tramec responds that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal
and must dismiss.
A
“We apply our own law, rather than regional circuit
law, to questions relating to our own appellate jurisdic-
tion.” Int’l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
476 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Generally, “[o]ur ju-
risdiction is limited to review of final decisions of district
courts.” Connaught Lab’ys, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham
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TRAMEC SLOAN LLC v. SURTI 4
P.L.C., 165 F.3d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (cleaned up);
see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1295(a)(1). A final decision is “one
which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment.” View Eng’g,
Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945)).
There are limited exceptions to the final judgment rule.
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides that if a district
judge certifies in writing that an order, not otherwise ap-
pealable, “involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” an ap-
pellate court may, “in its discretion,” permit an appeal to
be taken from that order. Separately, under the collateral
order doctrine, a “narrow exception” to the final judgment
rule, “trial court orders affecting rights that will be irre-
trievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal” are
afforded a chance at appellate review. Uniloc 2017 LLC v.
Apple, Inc., 964 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430–31
(1985)); see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
B
Mr. Surti fails to establish our jurisdiction over his ap-
peal under any relevant statute or legal doctrine.
First, despite Mr. Surti’s contention, we lack jurisdic-
tion under § 1295(a)(1). An appeal from a denial of a motion
to dismiss is “interlocutory and is not an appeal from a final
decision.” Aleut Tribe v. United States, 702 F.2d 1015, 1019
(Fed. Cir. 1983). Likewise, because the denial of a motion
to transfer does not end the litigation on the merits, ap-
peals from such denials are also interlocutory. See F.D.I.C.
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TRAMEC SLOAN LLC v. SURTI 5
v. Maco Bancorp, Inc., 125 F.3d 1446, 1447 (Fed. Cir.
1997).1
Second, Mr. Surti’s assertion of jurisdiction under
§ 1292(b) also lacks merit because that statute requires the
district court to certify its order for interlocutory review,
which the court did not do. See Decision, 2025 WL 3126104,
at *1–5. We therefore do not find jurisdiction over
Mr. Surti’s appeal under § 1292(b).
Finally, although Mr. Surti is correct that review of the
denial of a transfer motion can be sought through manda-
mus, see In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1352 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (collecting cases), Mr. Surti has failed to
petition for this relief. And even if we were to liberally con-
strue his briefing as seeking mandamus, he has failed to
meet the high burden for such relief. In particular, a peti-
tioner for mandamus relief must show, among other things,
that “his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisput-
able.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381
(2004) (cleaned up). Mr. Surti falls far short of this hur-
dle: Here, the district court correctly analyzed venue under
both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1400 to conclude that venue
was proper in the Western District of Michigan. Decision,
2025 WL 3126104, at *3. And the district court reasonably
weighed the relevant factors under § 1404(a) and consid-
ered Mr. Surti’s arguments before concluding that transfer
to the Middle District of Tennessee was unjustified. Id.
at *3–4. We see no error sufficient to warrant mandamus
in these conclusions.
1 A denial of a transfer motion also does not qualify
for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
Accord In re Carefirst of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 256
(4th Cir. 2002); cf. Maco Bancorp, 125 F.3d at 1447.
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TRAMEC SLOAN LLC v. SURTI 6
III
We have considered Mr. Surti’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Because Mr. Surti’s appeal is
not from a final judgment, and because the district court’s
order does not otherwise qualify as appealable, we dismiss
Mr. Surti’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
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