Nancy Rhee v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
NANCY RHEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2026-1130
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:24-cv-01835-MBH, Senior Judge Marian Blank
Horn.
______________________
Decided: July 22, 2026
______________________
N ANCY RHEE, Hillsborough, CA, pro se.
K ATHLEEN E. L YON, Tax Litigation Branch, Civil Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by MICHAEL
J. HAUNGS , BRETT SHUMATE, J OSHUA W U.
______________________
Before L OURIE, L INN, and HUGHES , Circuit Judges.
Case: 26-1130 Document: 31 Page: 1 Filed: 07/22/2026

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RHEE v. US 2
P ER CURIAM .
Appellant Nancy W. Rhee appeals the United States
Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of her complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
Because Ms. Rhee has not alleged any claim that falls
within the limited jurisdiction of the trial court and fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we affirm.
I
On November 8, 2024, Ms. Rhee, proceeding pro se,
filed a complaint in the United States Court of Federal
Claims. S.A. 21.1 Ms. Rhee alleged a number of claims
against the government for actions taken by the Internal
Revenue Service in a criminal investigation of a third party
for tax fraud. See S.A. 21–24.
In October 2023, the IRS investigated Stacey Printz, a
professional dance choreographer, for fraudulently report-
ing earnings of a monetized YouTube channel. As a result
of its investigation of Ms. Printz, the government confis-
cated approximately $4.8 million.
Ms. Rhee was a dancer who trained at the studio where
Ms. Printz worked. She claims that Ms. Printz’s videos
used her image without her permission. Based on that,
Ms. Rhee claims that she is the “sole primary owner of the
seized currency” and that she had an immediate right to
the confiscated funds. S.A. 22–24.
On January 3, 2025, the government moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursu-
ant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the of the Rules of the United States
Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), or alternatively for fail-
ure to state a claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). After
Ms. Rhee’s response, the trial court ordered the
1 S.A. refers to the Supplemental Appendix attached
to the Respondent’s Informal Response Brief. ECF No. 22.
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RHEE v. US 3
government to address whether Ms. Rhee’s complaint
could be construed as a Fifth Amendment taking claim
and, if so, whether the trial court would have jurisdiction.
See S.A. 82–83. In its reply, the government argued that it
would not and should be dismissed.
The trial court granted the government’s motion, con-
cluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Rhee’s takings
claim because she did not concede the validity of the gov-
ernment’s seizure and failed to allege a plausible interest
in the allegedly seized funds.2 Rhee v. United States,
No. 24-cv-01835, slip op. at 12–17 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 30, 2025)
(Decision). Ms. Rhee then appealed the trial court’s dismis-
sal to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II
We review the trial court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim de novo.
Waltner v. United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Lesko v. United States, 161 F.4th 1352, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2025) (en banc). A plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2002). The court “take[s] all factual allegations
2 The trial court also dismissed all other claims
Ms. Rhee alleged in her complaint, either for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) or for fail-
ure to state a claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). On appeal,
Ms. Rhee acknowledges certain claims were properly dis-
missed based on errors in her complaint and does not oth-
erwise further address them in her brief. See Appellant
Br. 2–3. Accordingly, we consider any challenge to the trial
court’s judgment with respect to these claims waived. See
Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 8 F.4th 1290, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2021).
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RHEE v. US 4
in the complaint as true and construe[s] the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Jones v.
United States, 846 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Plead-
ings filed by pro se litigants are held to a less stringent
standard and we liberally construe such pleadings in their
favor. Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However,
they must still prove subject matter jurisdiction by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. See Banks v. United States,
741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Reynolds v.
Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
The United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of
limited jurisdiction. The Tucker Act limits jurisdiction to
claims for money damages against the United States. See
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d
1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part). For
the trial court to exercise Tucker Act jurisdiction, a plain-
tiff must “identify a separate source of substantive law that
creates the right to money damages.” Fisher, 402 F.3d
at 1172 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). “[T]he Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a money-mandating
source for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction.” Jan’s Heli-
copter Serv., Inc. v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2008). However, the Court of Federal Claims may only ex-
ercise jurisdiction over a Fifth Amendment takings claim
when a claimant “concede[s] the validity of the government
action which is the basis of the taking claim to bring suit
under the Tucker Act.” Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,
10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
III
We see no error in the trial court’s dismissal of Ms. Col-
lier’s alleged takings claim. As an initial matter, Ms. Rhee
appears to argue that the trial court erroneously consid-
ered the plausibility of her claim under RCFC 12(b)(6) be-
fore determining whether it possessed subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). Though we
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RHEE v. US 5
acknowledge that it addressed the sufficiency of her com-
plaint before explaining that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction, any potential error was harmless. The trial court
expressly found that Ms. Rhee did not meet the require-
ments for establishing a Fifth Amendment takings claim
because she did not concede the validity of the govern-
ment’s action—a requisite inquiry for the trial court to ex-
ercise its jurisdiction. Decision, slip op. at 16.
Ms. Rhee appears to argue that she did concede the va-
lidity of the government’s action in her complaint when she
stated that the funds were seized under 26 U.S.C. § 7302.
Appellant Br. 6 (citing S.A. 22). However, in her complaint,
Ms. Rhee states that the government’s seizure of the funds
“denied [her] right to due process to recover digital stream-
ing income of their defrauded image from Stacey Printz in
a state court of California.” S.A. 22. And in her response to
the motion to dismiss, Ms. Rhee argued that the govern-
ment “fail[ed] to release or return the seized gross income
in a timely manner,” and that the seizure was “in violation
of the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws.” S.A. 78–79.
On appeal before us, she similarly contests the validity of
the government action. See Appellant Br. 6 (“The disposi-
tive jurisdictional question is whether the seized YouTube
income was money legally paid over to the Government,
giving rise to a Fifth Amendment taking, or whether it con-
stituted an illegal exaction . . . .”). Thus, we agree with the
trial court that Ms. Rhee did not concede the validity of the
government’s seizure of the funds, and we see no error in
its dismissal of her Fifth Amendment takings claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Though we do not need to reach the trial court’s
12(b)(6) conclusions, we agree that Ms. Rhee’s complaint
fails to allege facts to establish that she has a legally cog-
nizable Fifth Amendment property interest in the funds
seized. When determining whether a government action
constitutes a taking, courts must (1) “determine[ ] whether
the claimant has identified a cognizable Fifth Amendment
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RHEE v. US 6
property interest that is asserted to be the subject of the
taking,” and (2) if a cognizable property interest exists,
courts “determine[ ] whether that property interest was
taken.” Fishermen’s Finest, Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th
1269, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted).
The complaint alleged that Ms. Rhee is the sole and right-
ful owner of the seized funds but provides no factual sup-
port to substantiate this claim. See S.A. 21–22. And as the
trial court correctly notes, Ms. Rhee’s allegations about her
relationship with Ms. Printz, with no additional infor-
mation, do not establish Ms. Rhee’s ownership over the
seized funds. Decision, slip op. at 16. Accordingly, we agree
with the trial court that Ms. Rhee has failed to demon-
strate that she has a legally cognizable property interest in
the funds seized by the government.
IV
We have considered Ms. Rhee’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Because Ms. Rhee identifies
no other basis for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction
over her claim, the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint
is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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