N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SETH HOOPER,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2026-1269
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 25-6727, Judge Coral Wong Pi-
etsch.
______________________
Decided: April 21, 2026
______________________
SETH HOOPER, Ocean, NJ, pro se.
O LIVER MCD ONALD, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
ERIC P. BRUSKIN, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY , BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before CHEN, HUGHES , and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 2
P ER CURIAM .
Seth A. Hooper, proceeding pro se, appeals from the fi-
nal decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Vet-
erans Claims denying his petition for extraordinary relief
in the form of a writ of mandamus. To the extent that
Mr. Hooper raises a non-frivolous legal question within our
limited jurisdiction, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Hooper served for various periods on active duty
between September 2000 and November 2011. In May
2019, Mr. Hooper filed a claim for benefits for traumatic
brain injury (TBI), in addition to claims for multiple other
conditions that are not relevant to this appeal. In January
2020, Mr. Hooper was awarded benefits for TBI and was
assigned a 70 percent disability rating effective April 9,
2019. Mr. Hooper appealed this effective date to the Board
of Veterans’ Appeals, and the Board denied entitlement to
an earlier effective date in June 2020. Mr. Hooper ap-
pealed the June 2020 Board decision to the Veterans Court.
In November 2021, the Veterans Court vacated the denial
of entitlement to an earlier effective date and remanded
the issue back to the Board because the Board failed to pro-
vide adequate reasons or bases to support its decision. In
July 2022, the Board on remand again denied an earlier
effective date for Mr. Hooper’s benefits for TBI, which
Mr. Hooper appealed. In August 2023, the Veterans Court
again vacated and remanded the Board’s decision for fail-
ure to provide adequate reasons or bases. In October 2024,
the Board denied Mr. Hooper’s request for an earlier effec-
tive date for a third time. Mr. Hooper appealed, and in
May 2025, the Veterans Court vacated and remanded the
issue to the Board for a third time because “the Board in-
correctly applied the law” and “ha[d] not adequately
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 3
discussed and weighed the evidence to permit [c]ourt re-
view.” Appx 46.1
On August 12, 2025, Mr. Hooper filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus with the Veterans Court, asking the
court “to compel the Secretary to immediately adjudicate
his appeal before [the] Board.” Appx 1. On September 9,
2025, before the Veterans Court ruled on Mr. Hooper’s pe-
tition, the Board issued a decision on remand denying
Mr. Hooper an earlier effective date for his benefits for TBI.
Mr. Hooper submitted a motion to revise his petition to ar-
gue “that the Board failed to consider favorable findings
and to comply with the [Veterans] Court’s decision remand-
ing his claim.” Appx 1. Mr. Hooper contended that the ex-
traordinary relief of a writ of mandamus was warranted
because “by not adjudicating his claim in accordance with
the [Veterans] Court’s decision remanding his claim, the
Board is frustrating the [Veterans] Court’s jurisdiction.”
Appx 1–2. While the Veterans Court granted Mr. Hooper’s
motion to revise his petition, the court ultimately denied
his petition for a writ of mandamus. The Veterans Court
explained that “a writ of mandamus is not an appropriate
vehicle to review the merits of a Board decision,” and
“‘[e]xtraordinary writs cannot be used as substitutes for ap-
peals, even though hardship may result from delay and
perhaps unnecessary trial.’” Appx 2 (quoting Lamb
v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The Vet-
erans Court further explained that the “VA is not declining
jurisdiction over his claims or denying him a forum; rather,
the Board is adjudicating his claims as part of the normal
appeals process.” Appx 2. The Veterans Court thus held
that, because Mr. Hooper could appeal the Board’s Septem-
ber 2025 decision to the court, “mandamus relief [wa]s not
warranted.” Appx 2.
1 “Appx” refers to the Appendix filed with the Appel-
lant’s Informal Reply Brief. See ECF No. 13.
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 4
Mr. Hooper appeals.
D ISCUSSION
Mr. Hooper contends that his appeal to this court pre-
sents a “narrow and legal [issue]: whether the Veterans
Court may deny mandamus enforcement of its own man-
date after acknowledging that the Board has repeated the
same error previously vacated in two earlier remands,”
which “concerns the scope of mandamus and the adequacy
of appellate remedies.” Appellant’s Inf. Reply Br. 4. The
Government contends that we lack jurisdiction over
Mr. Hooper’s appeal, or in the alternative, we should affirm
the Veterans Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of man-
damus.
The scope of our review in an appeal from a Veterans
Court decision is limited. Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d
1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We may review a decision by
the Veterans Court concerning whether to grant a manda-
mus petition when the petition raises a non-frivolous legal
question, such as a constitutional issue or the interpreta-
tion of a regulation or statute that was relied on by the Vet-
erans Court. See Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1157–
58 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Lamb, 284 F.3d at 1381–82; see also
38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (d). For example, we have reviewed
whether the Veterans Court applied the correct legal
standard when ruling on a mandamus petition. Mote
v. Wilkie, 976 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2020). We review
a denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus for “abuse[]
[of] discretion or . . . other legal error.” Lamb, 284 F.3d
at 1384. “In conducting such a review, we do not interfere
with the [Veterans Court’s] role as the final appellate arbi-
ter of the facts underlying a veteran’s claim or the applica-
tion of veterans’ benefits law to the particular facts of a
veteran’s case.” Beasley, 709 F.3d at 1158; see 38 U.S.C.
§ 7292(d)(2).
To the extent Mr. Hooper presents a non-frivolous legal
argument over the standard the Veterans Court uses for
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 5
ruling on a mandamus petition, we have jurisdiction.2 See
Mote, 976 F.3d at 1340; Beasley, 709 F.3d at 1157–58.
Mr. Hooper argues that “[t]he Veterans Court committed
legal error by denying mandamus relief to enforce its own
mandate after the Board replicated the same legal error
previously vacated” with such “repeated remand[s] ren-
der[ing] ordinary appellate review inadequate as a matter
of law.” Appellant’s Inf. Reply Br. 9–10. Mr. Hooper ar-
gues that the Veterans Court committed legal error, and
thus abused its discretion, because “[a]n appeal is an ‘ade-
quate alternative means’ only if it is practically capable of
providing relief, [and is] not merely available in form.” Ap-
pellant’s Inf. Br. 4 (citing Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d
1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Mr. Hooper contends the Vet-
erans Court here improperly relied “on the mere existence
of appeal as an ‘adequate alternative means,’” without con-
sidering that the record demonstrated that the normal ap-
peals process, in practical effect, had failed. Appellant’s
Inf. Br. 4–5. Mr. Hooper further contends that the Veter-
ans Court’s denial of his petition implicated his due process
rights through the court’s “failure in the enforcement of ju-
dicial mandates,” which “deprived [him] of meaningful ju-
dicial review.” Appellant’s Inf. Reply Br. 10 (emphases
removed).
Here, the Veterans Court did not abuse its discretion
or commit legal error in denying Mr. Hooper’s petition.
2 Mr. Hooper’s opening brief may be read to present
more issues than this, however, he makes clear in his reply
brief that the issue before us is the “single,” “narrow” issue
stated above. Appellant’s Inf. Reply Br. 1, 4. But to the
extent Mr. Hooper’s appeal presents any challenges “to a
factual determination, or . . . to a law or regulation as ap-
plied to the facts of [his] particular case,” excluding consti-
tutional challenges, we lack jurisdiction over those issues
and decline to address them. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 6
The Veterans Court accurately stated the legal standard
for mandamus: “(1) the petitioner must lack adequate al-
ternative means to attain the desired relief, thus ensuring
that the writ is not used as a substitute for an appeal;
(2) the petitioner must demonstrate a clear and indisputa-
ble right to the writ; and (3) the Court must be convinced,
given the circumstances, that the writ is warranted.”
Appx 2 (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380–
81 (2004)). The Veterans Court then considered the first
condition. The Veterans Court acknowledged “the multiple
remands in [Mr. Hooper’s] case,” and his argument that
“the Board has failed to comply with the [Veterans] Court’s
remand.” Appx 2. However, the Veterans Court explained
that, despite the series of remands, the “VA is not declining
jurisdiction over his claims or denying him a forum; rather,
the Board is adjudicating his claims as part of the normal
appeals process.” Appx 2. The Veterans Court also ex-
plained that “Mr. Hooper may appeal to th[e Veterans]
Court and have the arguments in his revised petition ad-
dressed.” Appx 2 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Veterans
Court held, mandamus relief was not warranted because
the normal appeal process remained open to Mr. Hooper
and “[e]xtraordinary writs cannot be used as substitutes
for appeals, even though hardship may result from delay
and perhaps unnecessary trial.” Appx 2 (citing Lamb,
284 F.3d at 1384).
We see no error or abuse in this analysis. The Veterans
Court used the correct legal precedent. It also did not rely
“on the mere existence of appeal as an ‘adequate alterna-
tive means’” for Mr. Hooper’s challenge to the September
2025 Board decision, Appellant’s Inf. Br. 4–5, and instead
acknowledged the series of remands and explained that the
Board was continuing to adjudicate his claims in the nor-
mal VA appeals process. The Veterans Court further noted
that, should Mr. Hooper timely appeal the September 2025
Board decision, it would address his arguments as to any
alleged continuing Board error, as the court has done
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HOOPER v. COLLINS 7
repeatedly throughout this matter. We cannot say that
this was in error, was outside the Veterans Court’s discre-
tion, or deprived Mr. Hooper of his due process rights.3
Thus, although we have jurisdiction to consider
Mr. Hooper’s non-frivolous legal challenge to the scope of
mandamus review, and we are sympathetic to Mr. Hooper’s
frustration with the series of remands in his case, we con-
clude that the Veterans Court did not abuse its discretion
or otherwise commit legal error in denying his petition for
a writ of mandamus.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Hooper’s remaining argu-
ments but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm the Veterans Court’s decision to deny
Mr. Hooper’s mandamus petition.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
3 Additionally, the legal issue addressed in Martin,
the case relied on by Mr. Hooper, related to whether the
Veterans Court should use the standard in Costanza
v. West, 12 Vet. App. 133 (1999), or the standard in Tele-
communications Research & Action Center v. FCC,
750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984), to analyze whether the VA
has unreasonably delayed in taking action on claims for
disability benefits, which is not on all fours with the legal
issue here. See Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344.
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