17-2823 | Omnilex

Testo completo

17Ȭ2823ȱ(L)ȱ
KayheemȱLillyȱv.ȱTheȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱetȱal.ȱ
1
In the 2
United States Court of Appeals 3
For the Second Circuit 4
________ȱ 5
ȱ 6
A UGUSTȱTERM ,ȱ2018ȱ 7
ȱ 8
A RGUED:ȱO CTOBERȱ30,ȱ2018ȱȱ 9
D ECIDED:ȱA UGUSTȱ14,ȱ2019ȱ 10
ȱ 11
Nos.ȱ17Ȭ2823(L)Ȭcv,ȱ17Ȭ3000(XAP)Ȭcvȱ 12
ȱ 13
K AYHEEMȱL ILLY ,ȱ 14
PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant,ȱ 15
ȱ 16
v.ȱ 17
ȱ 18
THEȱC ITYȱOFȱNEWȱYORK;ȱNYPDȱD ETECTIVEȱMALCOLMȱF REEMAN,ȱ 19
S HIELDȱNO .ȱ7049;ȱNYPDȱPOLICEȱO FFICERȱS OULȱK IM ,ȱS HIELDȱNO .ȱ10804,ȱ 20
DefendantsȬAppellantsȬCrossȬAppellees,ȱ 21
ȱ 22
JOHNȱD OEȱS ERGEANT ;ȱJOHNȱDOES ,ȱR ICHARDȱR OES ;ȱANDREWȱH ONG ;ȱ 23
D ONALDȱC AMBRIDGE;ȱJORGEȱTAJEDA;ȱF RANKȱB ATISTA;ȱK EVINȱ 24
W HETSTONE ,ȱ 25
Defendants.*ȱ 26
________ȱ 27
ȱ 28
AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrictȱCourtȱ 29
forȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱNewȱYork.ȱ 30
No.ȱ16ȱCiv.ȱ322ȱ–ȱEdgardoȱRamos,ȱJudge.ȱ 31
________ȱ 32
*ȱConsistentȱwithȱtheȱorderȱenteredȱbyȱthisȱCourtȱonȱOctoberȱ18,ȱ2013,ȱECFȱNo.ȱ118,ȱ
weȱuseȱtheȱshortȬformȱcaptionȱforȱtheȱpurposeȱofȱpublishingȱthisȱopinion.ȱ

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2
ȱ 1
Before:ȱWALKER,ȱL EVAL,ȱANDȱD RONEY ,ȱCircuitȱJudges.ȱ 2
________ȱ 3
Kayheemȱ Lillyȱ (“Lilly”)ȱ filedȱ aȱ §ȱ 1983ȱ complaintȱ againstȱ theȱ 4
Cityȱ ofȱ Newȱ Yorkȱ andȱ individualȱ policeȱ officersȱ forȱ allegedȱ 5
deprivationsȱofȱhisȱconstitutionalȱrights.ȱȱDefendantsȱpresentedȱLillyȱ 6
withȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱpursuantȱtoȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ 7
68ȱ forȱ $10,001ȱ andȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ 8
incurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ[the]ȱoffer.”ȱȱLillyȱacceptedȱtheȱoffer,ȱbutȱtheȱ 9
partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ uponȱ theȱ sumȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ 10
expenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱbeȱpaid.ȱȱLillyȱfiledȱaȱmotionȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱ 11
courtȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcosts,ȱ 12
thatȱ includedȱ theȱ hoursȱ Lilly’sȱ soloȱ practitionerȱ attorneyȱ spentȱ onȱ 13
clericalȱtasksȱandȱincurredȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 14
courtȱgrantedȱtheȱapplicationȱbutȱreducedȱtheȱrequestedȱhourlyȱrateȱ 15
becauseȱofȱtheȱsimple,ȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱnatureȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱ 16
andȱ imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ reductionȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ 17
awardȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasksȱ performedȱ byȱ theȱ attorney.ȱ ȱ Weȱ 18
AFFIRMȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ reduceȱ Lilly’sȱ attorney’sȱ 19
reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱinȱlightȱofȱtheȱsimpleȱnatureȱofȱthisȱcase,ȱasȱwellȱ 20
asȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱthroughȱanȱ 21
acrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱreflectȱtheȱclericalȱworkȱperformed.ȱȱWeȱ 22
REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ however,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ 23
awardȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ incurredȱ preparingȱ theȱ feeȱ 24
applicationȱbecauseȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱ 25
judgmentȱlimitȱtheȱfeesȱrecoverableȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ 26
[the]ȱoffer.”ȱ 27
________ȱ 28
JEFFREYȱ A.ȱ R OTHMAN,ȱ Lawȱ Officeȱ ofȱ Jeffreyȱ A.ȱ 29
Rothman,ȱ Newȱ York,ȱ NY,ȱ forȱ PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬ 30

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3
CrossȬAppellant.ȱ 1
E LINAȱ D RUKER,ȱ Ofȱ Counselȱ (Richardȱ Dearing,ȱ onȱ 2
theȱ brief),ȱ forȱ Zacharyȱ W.ȱ Carter,ȱ Corporationȱ 3
Counsel,ȱNewȱYork,ȱNY,ȱforȱDefendantsȬAppellantsȬ 4
CrossȬAppellees.ȱ 5
________ȱ 6
JOHNȱM.ȱWALKER,ȱJR .,ȱCircuitȱJudge:ȱ 7
Kayheemȱ Lillyȱ (“Lilly”)ȱ filedȱ aȱ §ȱ 1983ȱ complaintȱ againstȱ theȱ 8
Cityȱ ofȱ Newȱ Yorkȱ andȱ individualȱ policeȱ officersȱ forȱ allegedȱ 9
deprivationsȱofȱhisȱconstitutionalȱrights.ȱȱDefendantsȱpresentedȱLillyȱ 10
withȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱpursuantȱtoȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ 11
68ȱ forȱ $10,001ȱ andȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ 12
incurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ[the]ȱoffer.”ȱȱLillyȱacceptedȱtheȱoffer,ȱbutȱtheȱ 13
partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ uponȱ theȱ sumȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ 14
expenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱbeȱpaid.ȱȱLillyȱfiledȱaȱmotionȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱ 15
courtȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcosts,ȱ 16
thatȱ includedȱ theȱ hoursȱ Lilly’sȱ soloȱ practitionerȱ attorneyȱ spentȱ onȱ 17
clericalȱtasksȱandȱincurredȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 18
courtȱgrantedȱtheȱapplicationȱbutȱreducedȱtheȱrequestedȱhourlyȱrateȱ 19
becauseȱofȱtheȱsimple,ȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱnatureȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱ 20
andȱ imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ reductionȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ 21
awardȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasksȱ performedȱ byȱ theȱ attorney.ȱ ȱ Weȱ 22
AFFIRMȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ reduceȱ Lilly’sȱ attorney’sȱ 23
reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱinȱlightȱofȱtheȱsimpleȱnatureȱofȱthisȱcase,ȱasȱwellȱ 24
asȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱthroughȱanȱ 25
acrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱreflectȱtheȱclericalȱworkȱperformed.ȱȱWeȱ 26
REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ however,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ decisionȱ toȱ 27
awardȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ incurredȱ preparingȱ theȱ feeȱ 28
applicationȱbecauseȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱ 29

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judgmentȱlimitȱtheȱfeesȱrecoverableȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ“toȱtheȱdateȱofȱ 1
[the]ȱoffer.”ȱ 2
BACKGROUNDȱ 3
PlaintiffȬAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellantȱ Lillyȱ filedȱ aȱ complaintȱ onȱ 4
Januaryȱ14,ȱ2016,ȱallegingȱthatȱhisȱcivilȱrightsȱwereȱviolatedȱbyȱtheȱCityȱ 5
ofȱNewȱYorkȱandȱseveralȱNewȱYorkȱCityȱpoliceȱofficersȱ(collectively,ȱ 6
theȱ“City”)ȱonȱtwoȱoccasionsȱinȱOctoberȱ2014.ȱȱTheȱfirstȱclaimȱwasȱforȱ 7
useȱofȱexcessiveȱforceȱandȱtheȱsecondȱwasȱforȱimproperȱissuanceȱofȱ 8
threeȱ summonsesȱ forȱ threateningȱ behaviorȱ towardȱ anȱ officer,ȱ 9
possessionȱofȱanȱopenȱcontainer,ȱandȱlittering,ȱallȱofȱwhichȱwereȱlaterȱ 10
dismissed.ȱ 11
LillyȱwasȱrepresentedȱbyȱJeffreyȱRothmanȱ(“Rothman”),ȱaȱcivilȱ 12
rightsȱ attorneyȱ andȱ soloȱ practitioner,ȱ whoȱ filedȱ theȱ complaintȱ onȱ 13
Lilly’sȱbehalf.ȱȱOnȱOctoberȱ26,ȱ2016,ȱtheȱCityȱpresentedȱLillyȱwithȱanȱ 14
offerȱofȱjudgmentȱpursuantȱtoȱRuleȱ68ȱofȱtheȱFederalȱRulesȱofȱCivilȱ 15
Procedure,ȱwhichȱLillyȱaccepted.ȱȱTheȱofferȱstated:ȱ 16
Pursuantȱ toȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ ofȱ theȱ Federalȱ Rulesȱ ofȱ Civilȱ 17
Procedure,ȱ defendantsȱ herebyȱ offerȱ toȱ allowȱ plaintiffȱ 18
[Kayheem]ȱLillyȱtoȱtakeȱaȱjudgmentȱagainstȱtheȱCityȱofȱ 19
Newȱ Yorkȱ inȱ thisȱ actionȱ forȱ theȱ totalȱ sumȱ ofȱ Tenȱ 20
ThousandȱandȱOneȱ($10,001.00)ȱDollars,ȱplusȱreasonableȱ 21
attorneys’ȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ thisȱ 22
offerȱforȱplaintiff’sȱfederalȱclaims.1ȱ 23
ȱ TheȱCityȱandȱLillyȱ(throughȱRothman)ȱattemptedȱtoȱnegotiateȱaȱ 24
settlementȱ regardingȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ expenses,ȱ andȱ costsȱ butȱ wereȱ 25
unsuccessful.ȱ ȱ Rothmanȱ filedȱ aȱ formalȱ motionȱ forȱ anȱ awardȱ ofȱ 26
attorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcostsȱwithȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt,ȱpursuantȱ 27
toȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1988,ȱforȱaȱtotalȱsumȱofȱ$34,527.ȱȱThatȱfigureȱrepresentsȱ 28
50.3ȱ hoursȱ ofȱ workȱ upȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ theȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgmentȱ andȱ 6.5ȱ 29
1ȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45.ȱ

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hoursȱofȱworkȱpreparingȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeeȱapplicationȱatȱanȱhourlyȱ 1
rateȱofȱ$600,ȱasȱwellȱasȱ11.5ȱhoursȱforȱworkȱafterȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱ 2
andȱthroughȱtheȱfilingȱofȱLilly’sȱreplyȱbriefȱatȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$625.2ȱȱ 3
Theȱ Cityȱ objectedȱ toȱ theȱ feeȱ requestȱ onȱ theȱ groundsȱ that:ȱ (1)ȱ hisȱ 4
requestedȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ wasȱ excessive,ȱ (2)ȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ 5
expendedȱwasȱunreasonable,ȱandȱ(3)ȱfeesȱincurredȱafterȱacceptanceȱofȱ 6
theȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱareȱnotȱrecoverableȱunderȱtheȱtermsȱofȱtheȱoffer.ȱ 7
TheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱRothmanȱreducedȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱ 8
costsȱ inȱ theȱ amountȱ ofȱ $28,128.99.ȱ ȱ Theȱ districtȱ courtȱ agreedȱ thatȱ 9
Rothmanȱhadȱcomparableȱexperienceȱandȱqualificationsȱtoȱotherȱcivilȱ 10
rightsȱattorneysȱwhoȱhaveȱreceivedȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardsȱinȱtheȱlowȱ 11
$600ȱ perȱ hourȱ range,ȱ butȱ believedȱ thatȱ theȱ “simplicityȱ ofȱ thisȱ caseȱ 12
warrant[ed]ȱ aȱ reductionȱ ofȱ hisȱ claimedȱ hourlyȱ rates.”3ȱ ȱ Dueȱ toȱ theȱ 13
“relativelyȱ straightforward”ȱ natureȱ ofȱ theȱ case,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ 14
foundȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450ȱtoȱbeȱreasonable.4ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱalsoȱ 15
imposedȱ aȱ tenȱ percentȱ acrossȬtheȬboardȱ cutȱ toȱ theȱ awardȱ becauseȱ 16
someȱofȱtheȱhoursȱclaimedȱwereȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱthatȱheȱhadȱbilledȱatȱ 17
anȱ attorney’sȱ hourlyȱ rate.ȱ ȱ Lastly,ȱ notwithstandingȱ theȱ factȱ thatȱ theȱ 18
Ruleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱlimitedȱrecoverableȱfeesȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱ 19
priorȱtoȱtheȱoffer,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱLillyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtheȱ 20
timeȱRothmanȱspentȱpreparingȱtheȱfeeȱapplication.ȱȱThisȱappealȱandȱ 21
crossȬappealȱfollowed.ȱȱȱ 22
DISCUSSIONȱ 23
Theȱ Cityȱ appealsȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ orderȱ grantingȱ “feesȱ onȱ 24
fees”ȱ (i.e.,ȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ Rothmanȱ incurredȱ inȱ litigatingȱ theȱ 25
applicationȱforȱanȱawardȱofȱattorney’sȱfees)ȱbecauseȱtheȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ 26
2ȱTheȱincreaseȱreflectsȱaȱ$25ȱincreaseȱinȱRothman’sȱhourlyȱrateȱthatȱbecameȱeffectiveȱ
onȱJanuaryȱ1,ȱ2016.ȱȱ
3ȱJointȱApp’xȱ277–79.ȱ
4ȱId.ȱ

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ofȱ judgmentȱ limitedȱ theȱ recoverableȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ toȱ onlyȱ thoseȱ 1
incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ offer.ȱ ȱ Lillyȱ crossȬappealsȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ 2
orderȱ reducingȱ Rothman’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ $450ȱ andȱ prohibitingȱ 3
Rothmanȱfromȱreceivingȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱforȱclericalȱtasks.ȱ 4
Weȱreviewȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱawardȱforȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱ 5
andȱ costsȱ forȱ abuseȱ ofȱ discretion.5ȱ ȱ “Aȱ districtȱ courtȱ abusesȱ itsȱ 6
discretionȱ ifȱ itȱ (1)ȱ basesȱ itsȱ decisionȱ onȱ anȱ errorȱ ofȱ lawȱ orȱ usesȱ theȱ 7
wrongȱ legalȱ standard;ȱ (2)ȱ basesȱ itsȱ decisionȱ onȱ aȱ clearlyȱ erroneousȱ 8
factualȱ finding;ȱ orȱ (3)ȱ reachesȱ aȱ conclusionȱ that,ȱ thoughȱ notȱ 9
necessarilyȱtheȱproductȱofȱaȱlegalȱerrorȱorȱaȱclearlyȱerroneousȱfactualȱ 10
finding,ȱcannotȱbeȱlocatedȱwithinȱtheȱrangeȱofȱpermissibleȱdecisions.” 6ȱȱ 11
“Givenȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ inherentȱ institutionalȱ advantagesȱ inȱ thisȱ 12
area,ȱourȱreviewȱofȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱfeeȱawardȱisȱhighlyȱdeferential.” 7ȱȱ 13
Thisȱhighȱdegreeȱofȱdeferenceȱisȱappropriateȱbecauseȱ“[w]eȱcanȱhardlyȱ 14
thinkȱ ofȱ aȱ sphereȱ ofȱ judicialȱ decisionmakingȱ inȱ whichȱ appellateȱ 15
micromanagementȱhasȱlessȱtoȱrecommendȱit.”8ȱȱWeȱreviewȱquestionsȱ 16
ofȱlawȱregardingȱtheȱlegalȱstandardȱforȱgrantingȱorȱdenyingȱattorney’sȱ 17
feesȱdeȱnovo.9ȱȱWeȱalsoȱreviewȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱinterpretationȱofȱaȱRuleȱ 18
68ȱofferȱdeȱnovo.10ȱ 19
I. CalculationȱofȱtheȱReasonableȱHourlyȱRateȱ 20
LillyȱarguesȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱerredȱinȱreducingȱRothman’sȱ 21
rateȱ fromȱ $600ȱ andȱ $625ȱ perȱ hourȱ toȱ $450ȱ perȱ hourȱ becauseȱ ofȱ theȱ 22
“durationȱandȱsimplicity”ȱofȱtheȱcase.ȱȱSpecifically,ȱheȱarguesȱthatȱafterȱ 23
5ȱSeeȱMilleaȱv.ȱMetroȬNorthȱR.ȱCo.,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱ154,ȱ166ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2011).ȱ
6ȱId.ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ
7ȱMcDonaldȱexȱrel.ȱPrendergastȱv.ȱPensionȱPlanȱofȱtheȱNYSAȬILAȱPensionȱTrustȱFund,ȱ
450ȱF.3dȱ91,ȱ96ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2006)ȱ(perȱcuriam).ȱ
8ȱFoxȱv.ȱVice,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱ826,ȱ838ȱ(2011).ȱ
9ȱSeeȱScarangellaȱv.ȱGroupȱHealth,ȱInc.,ȱ731ȱF.3dȱ146,ȱ151ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2013).ȱ
10ȱSteinerȱv.ȱLewmar,ȱInc.,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱ26,ȱ31ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2016).ȱ

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theȱ Supremeȱ Court’sȱ decisionȱ inȱ Perdueȱ v.ȱ Kennyȱ A.ȱ exȱ rel.ȱ Winn,11ȱ 1
districtȱcourtsȱcanȱnoȱlongerȱconsiderȱtheȱ“relativelyȱstraightforward”ȱ 2
natureȱ ofȱ anȱ actionȱ inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ beȱ 3
awarded.ȱȱToȱtheȱextentȱourȱdecisionȱinȱArborȱHillȱConcernedȱCitizensȱ 4
NeighborhoodȱAssociationȱv.ȱCountyȱofȱAlbany12ȱpermitsȱconsiderationȱofȱ 5
theȱsimplicityȱofȱlitigationȱinȱdeterminingȱtheȱappropriateȱhourlyȱrate,ȱ 6
LillyȱcontendsȱthatȱPerdueȱoverruledȱArborȱHill.ȱȱLilly’sȱargumentsȱareȱ 7
withoutȱmerit.ȱ 8
A. EarlyȱHistoryȱofȱFeeȬShiftingȱJurisprudenceȱ 9
BeforeȱaddressingȱArborȱHillȱandȱPerdue,ȱweȱthinkȱitȱhelpfulȱtoȱ 10
brieflyȱreviewȱtheȱrelevantȱhistoryȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱjurisprudence.ȱ 11
Inȱ 1976,ȱ Congressȱ enactedȱ theȱ Civilȱ Rightsȱ Attorney’sȱ Feesȱ 12
AwardȱAct,ȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1988ȱ(“FeesȱAct”),ȱwhichȱauthorizedȱdistrictȱ 13
courtsȱ toȱ awardȱ theȱ prevailingȱ partyȱ inȱ civilȱ rightsȱ actionsȱ “aȱ 14
reasonableȱattorney’sȱfee.” 13ȱȱTheȱActȱdidȱnotȱspecifyȱtheȱappropriateȱ 15
methodȱforȱcalculatingȱaȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfee,ȱbutȱtheȱHouseȱandȱ 16
Senateȱ Reportsȱ referredȱ toȱ twoȱ methodsȱ thatȱ hadȱ developedȱ inȱ theȱ 17
circuitȱcourts.14ȱȱ 18
Theȱfirst,ȱknownȱasȱtheȱlodestarȱmethod,ȱwasȱadoptedȱbyȱtheȱ 19
Thirdȱ Circuitȱ inȱ Lindyȱ Bros.ȱ Builders,ȱ Inc.ȱ ofȱ Philadelphiaȱ v.ȱ Americanȱ 20
Radiatorȱ &ȱ Standardȱ Sanitaryȱ Corp.15ȱ ȱ Thisȱ approachȱ calculatesȱ 21
attorney’sȱfeesȱbyȱmultiplyingȱtheȱattorney’sȱusualȱhourlyȱrateȱbyȱtheȱ 22
numberȱofȱhoursȱbilled,ȱtoȱproduceȱaȱfigureȱknownȱasȱtheȱlodestar.16ȱȱ 23
Afterȱdeterminingȱtheȱlodestar,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱthenȱhasȱdiscretionȱ 24
11ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱ542ȱ(2010).ȱ
12ȱ522ȱF.3dȱ182ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2008).ȱ
13ȱSeeȱHensleyȱv.ȱEckerhart,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱ424,ȱ429ȱ(1983).ȱ
14ȱSeeȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ186;ȱseeȱalsoȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ429–30.ȱ
15ȱ487ȱF.2dȱ161ȱ(3dȱCir.ȱ1973).ȱ
16ȱId.ȱatȱ167–68.ȱ

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toȱadjustȱtheȱfinalȱamountȱtoȱensureȱthatȱtheȱfeeȱisȱreasonable. 17ȱ 1
Theȱ secondȱ method,ȱ knownȱ asȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ approach,ȱ wasȱ 2
developedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱCircuitȱinȱJohnsonȱv.ȱGeorgiaȱHighwayȱExpress,ȱ 3
Inc.18ȱ ȱ Insteadȱ ofȱ startingȱ withȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ usualȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ 4
multiplyingȱitȱbyȱtheȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱworked,ȱandȱthenȱdeterminingȱ 5
whetherȱ thatȱ figureȱ (theȱ lodestar)ȱ shouldȱ beȱ adjusted,ȱ theȱ districtȱ 6
courtȱ determinesȱ aȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ feeȱ inȱ oneȱ stepȱ byȱ 7
consideringȱtwelveȱfactors.19ȱȱTheseȱtwelveȱfactorsȱare:ȱ 8
(1)ȱ theȱ timeȱ andȱ laborȱ required;ȱ (2)ȱ theȱ noveltyȱ andȱ 9
difficultyȱofȱtheȱquestions;ȱ(3)ȱtheȱlevelȱofȱskillȱrequiredȱ 10
toȱperformȱtheȱlegalȱserviceȱproperly;ȱ(4)ȱtheȱpreclusionȱ 11
ofȱemploymentȱbyȱtheȱattorneyȱdueȱtoȱacceptanceȱofȱtheȱ 12
case;ȱ (5)ȱ theȱ attorney’sȱ customaryȱ hourlyȱ rate;ȱ (6)ȱ 13
whetherȱ theȱ feeȱ isȱ fixedȱ orȱ contingent;ȱ (7)ȱ theȱ timeȱ 14
limitationsȱ imposedȱ byȱ theȱ clientȱ orȱ theȱ circumstances;ȱ 15
(8)ȱ theȱ amountȱ involvedȱ inȱ theȱ caseȱ andȱ theȱ resultsȱ 16
obtained;ȱ(9)ȱtheȱexperience,ȱreputation,ȱandȱabilityȱofȱtheȱ 17
attorneys;ȱ (10)ȱ theȱ “undesirability”ȱ ofȱ theȱ case;ȱ (11)ȱ theȱ 18
natureȱ andȱ lengthȱ ofȱ theȱ professionalȱ relationshipȱ withȱ 19
theȱclient;ȱandȱ(12)ȱawardsȱinȱsimilarȱcases.20ȱ 20
TheȱSupremeȱCourtȱfirstȱconsideredȱtheȱappropriateȱmethodȱtoȱ 21
calculateȱ aȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ feeȱ inȱ Hensleyȱ v.ȱ Eckerhart. 21ȱ ȱ Theȱ 22
Courtȱ“adoptedȱtheȱlodestarȱmethodȱinȱprinciple,ȱwithout,ȱhowever,ȱ 23
fullyȱ abandoningȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ method.”22ȱ ȱ Insteadȱ ofȱ usingȱ theȱ 24
attorney’sȱ usualȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ theȱ Courtȱ instructedȱ districtȱ courtsȱ toȱ 25
17ȱId.ȱatȱ168–69.ȱ
18ȱ488ȱF.2dȱ714ȱ(5thȱCir.ȱ1974),ȱabrogatedȱonȱotherȱgroundsȱbyȱBlanchardȱv.ȱBergeron,ȱ
489ȱU.S.ȱ87ȱ(1989).ȱ
19ȱSeeȱid.ȱatȱ717–19.ȱ
20ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ186ȱn.3ȱ(citingȱJohnson,ȱ488ȱF.2dȱatȱ717–19).ȱȱ
21ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱ424ȱ(1983).ȱ
22ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ188ȱ(internalȱcitationȱomitted).ȱ

-- 8 of 26 --

9
determineȱaȱ“reasonableȱhourlyȱrate,”ȱandȱspecificallyȱreferredȱtoȱtheȱ 1
Johnsonȱfactorsȱasȱusefulȱtoolsȱforȱdeterminingȱwhatȱisȱreasonable.23ȱȱ 2
TheȱCourtȱdescribedȱthisȱprocessȱofȱdeterminingȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ 3
rateȱ andȱ thenȱ multiplyingȱ itȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ billedȱ asȱ “anȱ 4
objectiveȱbasisȱonȱwhichȱtoȱmakeȱanȱinitialȱestimateȱofȱtheȱvalueȱofȱaȱ 5
lawyer’sȱservices,”ȱ(i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).24ȱȱTheȱCourtȱwentȱonȱtoȱholdȱthatȱ 6
afterȱ calculatingȱ theȱ lodestarȱ inȱ thisȱ manner,ȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ hasȱ 7
discretionȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱtheȱfinalȱfeeȱinȱ“casesȱofȱexceptionalȱ 8
success”ȱorȱ“onlyȱpartialȱorȱlimitedȱsuccess,”ȱrespectively.25ȱȱ 9
Aȱyearȱlater,ȱinȱBlumȱv.ȱStenson,ȱtheȱCourtȱreiteratedȱitsȱholdingȱ 10
inȱ Hensley,ȱ thatȱ theȱ initialȱ feeȱ awardȱ shouldȱ beȱ determinedȱ byȱ 11
multiplyingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ 12
expended,ȱandȱthatȱtheȱfinalȱawardȱcanȱbeȱincreasedȱorȱdecreasedȱinȱ 13
exceptionalȱcasesȱtoȱachieveȱaȱreasonableȱfee.26ȱȱTheȱCourtȱexplainedȱ 14
thatȱtheȱFeesȱAct:ȱ 15
requiresȱ aȱ “reasonableȱ fee,”ȱ andȱ thereȱ mayȱ beȱ 16
circumstancesȱinȱwhichȱtheȱbasicȱstandardȱofȱreasonableȱ 17
ratesȱmultipliedȱbyȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱhoursȱresultsȱinȱ 18
aȱ feeȱ thatȱ isȱ eitherȱ unreasonablyȱ lowȱ orȱ unreasonablyȱ 19
high.ȱȱWhen,ȱhowever,ȱtheȱapplicantȱforȱaȱfeeȱhasȱcarriedȱ 20
hisȱburdenȱofȱshowingȱthatȱtheȱclaimedȱrateȱandȱnumberȱ 21
ofȱ hoursȱ areȱ reasonable,ȱ theȱ resultingȱ productȱ isȱ 22
presumedȱ toȱ beȱ theȱ reasonableȱ feeȱ contemplatedȱ byȱ 23
§ȱ1988.27ȱ 24
ThisȱhybridȱapproachȱwasȱagainȱapprovedȱbyȱtheȱCourtȱinȱtheȱ 25
1986ȱcaseȱofȱPennsylvaniaȱv.ȱDelawareȱValleyȱCitizen’sȱCouncilȱforȱCleanȱ 26
23ȱId.ȱ(citingȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ434ȱn.9).ȱ
24ȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ433.ȱ
25ȱId.ȱatȱ435–37.ȱ
26ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱ886,ȱ896–97ȱ(1984).ȱ
27ȱId.ȱatȱ897.ȱ

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10
Air.28ȱȱInȱbothȱBlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱhowever,ȱtheȱCourtȱclarifiedȱ 1
thatȱ manyȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ “areȱ subsumedȱ withinȱ theȱ initialȱ 2
calculation”ȱofȱtheȱlodestarȱ(reasonableȱhoursȱexpendedȱmultipliedȱbyȱ 3
theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate),ȱ andȱ thereforeȱ “cannotȱ serveȱ asȱ 4
independentȱbasesȱforȱincreasingȱ[orȱdecreasing]ȱtheȱbasicȱfeeȱaward,”ȱ 5
(i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).29ȱȱSpecifically,ȱtheȱCourtȱstatedȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱ 6
complexityȱofȱtheȱissues,ȱtheȱspecialȱskillȱandȱexperienceȱofȱcounsel,ȱ 7
theȱ qualityȱ ofȱ representation,ȱ andȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtainedȱ fromȱ theȱ 8
litigationȱshouldȱbeȱ“fullyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱnumberȱofȱbillableȱhoursȱ 9
recordedȱbyȱcounsel”ȱorȱ“theȱreasonablenessȱofȱtheȱhourlyȱrates.”30ȱȱAsȱ 10
aȱresult,ȱitȱisȱinappropriateȱforȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱ 11
theȱlodestarȱfigureȱonȱaccountȱofȱanyȱofȱtheseȱfactors,ȱbecauseȱtheyȱareȱ 12
alreadyȱ accountedȱ forȱ inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ orȱ 13
reasonableȱhoursȱbilledȱtoȱdetermineȱtheȱlodestar.31ȱ 14
B. ArborȱHillȱ 15
Theȱ Supremeȱ Court’sȱ adoptionȱ ofȱ aȱ hybridȱ approachȱ causedȱ 16
confusionȱamongstȱtheȱlowerȱcourtsȱasȱtoȱhowȱtoȱbalanceȱtheȱbrightȬ 17
lineȱstandardsȱofȱtheȱlodestarȱmodelȱwithȱtheȱnumerousȱevaluationsȱ 18
requiredȱ byȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ andȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ abilityȱ toȱ 19
exerciseȱ itsȱ discretionȱ toȱ enhanceȱ orȱ cutȱ theȱ finalȱ feeȱ awardȱ inȱ 20
exceptionalȱcircumstances.32ȱ 21
InȱArborȱHill,ȱweȱattemptedȱtoȱresolveȱsomeȱofȱthisȱtensionȱandȱ 22
28ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱ546,ȱ563–64ȱ(1986).ȱȱ
29ȱId.ȱatȱ564–65ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)ȱ(citingȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898–
900).ȱ
30ȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898;ȱseeȱalsoȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ564–65.ȱ
31ȱSeeȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898–99,ȱ900;ȱseeȱalsoȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ564–65,ȱ566–
67.ȱ
32ȱSeeȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ188ȱ(“AfterȱHensleyȱandȱBlum,ȱcircuitȱcourtsȱstruggledȱ
withȱ theȱ nettlesomeȱ interplayȱ betweenȱ theȱ lodestarȱ methodȱ andȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ
method.”).ȱ

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11
clarifyȱourȱcircuit’sȱfeeȬsettingȱjurisprudence.ȱȱWeȱinstructedȱdistrictȱ 1
courtsȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱ“presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee”33ȱbyȱdeterminingȱ 2
theȱ appropriateȱ billableȱ hoursȱ expendedȱ andȱ “settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ 3
hourlyȱ rate,ȱ takingȱ accountȱ ofȱ allȱ caseȬspecificȱ variables.”34ȱ ȱ Weȱ 4
explainedȱwithȱrespectȱtoȱtheȱlatter:ȱ 5
[T]heȱ districtȱ court,ȱ inȱ exercisingȱ itsȱ considerableȱ 6
discretion,ȱ[should]ȱbearȱinȱmindȱallȱofȱtheȱcaseȬspecificȱ 7
variablesȱ thatȱ weȱ andȱ otherȱ courtsȱ haveȱ identifiedȱ asȱ 8
relevantȱtoȱtheȱreasonablenessȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱinȱsettingȱ 9
aȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate.ȱȱTheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱisȱ 10
theȱ rateȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ pay.ȱ ȱ Inȱ 11
determiningȱwhatȱrateȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱbeȱwillingȱ 12
toȱpay,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱshouldȱconsider,ȱamongȱothers,ȱ 13
theȱ Johnsonȱ factors;ȱ itȱ shouldȱ alsoȱ bearȱ inȱ mindȱ thatȱ aȱ 14
reasonable,ȱpayingȱclientȱwishesȱtoȱspendȱtheȱminimumȱ 15
necessaryȱ toȱ litigateȱ theȱ caseȱ effectively.ȱ ȱ Theȱ districtȱ 16
courtȱshouldȱalsoȱconsiderȱthatȱsuchȱanȱindividualȱmightȱ 17
beȱableȱtoȱnegotiateȱwithȱhisȱorȱherȱattorneys,ȱusingȱtheirȱ 18
desireȱ toȱ obtainȱ theȱ reputationalȱ benefitsȱ thatȱ mightȱ 19
accrueȱfromȱbeingȱassociatedȱwithȱtheȱcase.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 20
courtȱ shouldȱ thenȱ useȱ thatȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ toȱ 21
calculateȱ whatȱ canȱ properlyȱ beȱ termedȱ theȱ 22
“presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.”35ȱȱ 23
ȱ Inȱ theȱ wakeȱ ofȱ Arborȱ Hill,ȱ weȱ haveȱ consistentlyȱ appliedȱ thisȱ 24
methodȱ ofȱ determiningȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ byȱ consideringȱ allȱ 25
pertinentȱfactors,ȱincludingȱtheȱJohnsonȱfactors,ȱandȱthenȱmultiplyingȱ 26
33ȱWeȱusedȱtheȱtermȱ“presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee”ȱinsteadȱofȱtheȱtraditionalȱtermȱ
“lodestar”ȱbecauseȱtheȱmeaningȱofȱtheȱlatterȱtermȱ“hasȱshiftedȱoverȱtime,ȱandȱitsȱ
valueȱasȱaȱmetaphorȱhasȱdeterioratedȱtoȱtheȱpointȱofȱunhelpfulness.”ȱȱId.ȱatȱ190.ȱȱ
TheȱSupremeȱCourt,ȱhowever,ȱcontinuesȱtoȱuseȱtheȱtermȱaccordingȱtoȱtheȱdefinitionȱ
providedȱ byȱ theȱ Courtȱ inȱ Hensley.ȱ ȱ Forȱ allȱ intentsȱ andȱ purposes,ȱ theȱ twoȱ termsȱ
meanȱtheȱsameȱthing.ȱ
34ȱId.ȱatȱ189–90.ȱ
35ȱId.ȱatȱ190.ȱ

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12
thatȱrateȱbyȱtheȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱtoȱdetermineȱ 1
theȱ presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ fee.36ȱ ȱ Itȱ isȱ onlyȱ afterȱ thisȱ initialȱ 2
calculationȱofȱtheȱpresumptivelyȱreasonableȱfeeȱisȱperformedȱthatȱaȱ 3
districtȱ courtȱ may,ȱ inȱ extraordinaryȱ circumstances,ȱ adjustȱ theȱ 4
presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfeeȱwhenȱitȱ“doesȱnotȱadequatelyȱtakeȱintoȱ 5
accountȱ aȱ factorȱ thatȱ mayȱ properlyȱ beȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ aȱ 6
reasonableȱfee.”37ȱ 7
C. Perdueȱ 8
Afterȱ announcingȱ theȱ hybridȱ approachȱ forȱ calculatingȱ 9
attorney’sȱfeesȱinȱHensley,ȱandȱclarifyingȱwhenȱitȱisȱpermissibleȱforȱaȱ 10
districtȱcourtȱtoȱincreaseȱorȱdecreaseȱtheȱlodestarȱvalueȱinȱexceptionalȱ 11
casesȱinȱBlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱtheȱSupremeȱCourt’sȱrevisitedȱitsȱ 12
feeȬshiftingȱjurisprudenceȱinȱ2010ȱinȱPerdueȱv.ȱKennyȱA.ȱexȱrel.ȱWinn.ȱȱ 13
36ȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱGortatȱv.ȱCapalaȱBros.,ȱInc.,ȱ621ȱF.ȱApp’xȱ19,ȱ22ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2015)ȱ(summaryȱ
order)ȱ (“Inȱ calculatingȱ theȱ ‘presumptivelyȱ reasonableȱ fee,’ȱ whichȱ isȱ generallyȱ
arrivedȱ atȱ byȱ multiplyingȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ reasonablyȱ expendedȱ onȱ theȱ
litigationȱ .ȱ .ȱ .ȱ byȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate,ȱ thisȱ Courtȱ hasȱ recommendedȱ thatȱ aȱ
districtȱ courtȱ takeȱ intoȱ accountȱ whatȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ pay.”ȱ
(internalȱ citationȱ andȱ quotationȱ marksȱ omitted));ȱ Torresȱ v.ȱ Gristede’sȱ Operatingȱ
Corp.,ȱ 519ȱ F.ȱ App’xȱ 1,ȱ 3–4ȱ (2dȱ Cir.ȱ 2013)ȱ (summaryȱ order)ȱ (“[W]eȱ haveȱ directedȱ
considerationȱ ofȱ theȱ caseȬspecificȱ variablesȱ thatȱ weȱ andȱ otherȱ courtsȱ haveȱ
identifiedȱ asȱ relevantȱ toȱ theȱ reasonablenessȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ fees—includingȱ theȱ
Johnsonȱ factors—inȱ settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate.”ȱ (internalȱ quotationȱ marksȱ
omitted));ȱBergersonȱv.ȱN.Y.ȱStateȱOfficeȱofȱMentalȱHealth,ȱCent.ȱN.Y.ȱPsychiatricȱCtr.,ȱ
652ȱF.3dȱ277,ȱ289ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2011)ȱ(“Attorneys’ȱfeesȱareȱawardedȱbyȱdeterminingȱaȱ
presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee,ȱreachedȱbyȱmultiplyingȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱbyȱ
theȱnumberȱofȱreasonablyȱexpendedȱhours.”);ȱMillea,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱatȱ166ȱ(“Bothȱthisȱ
Courtȱ andȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ haveȱ heldȱ thatȱ theȱ lodestar—theȱ productȱ ofȱ aȱ
reasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱandȱtheȱreasonableȱnumberȱofȱhoursȱrequiredȱbyȱtheȱcase—
createsȱaȱ‘presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.’”);ȱKonitsȱv.ȱValleyȱStreamȱCent.ȱHighȱSch.ȱ
Dist.,ȱ 350ȱ F.ȱ App’xȱ 501,ȱ 503ȱ (2dȱ Cir.ȱ 2009)ȱ (summaryȱ order)ȱ (“Inȱ determiningȱ
reasonableȱattorneys’ȱfees,ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmust:ȱ(1)ȱsetȱaȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate,ȱ
bearingȱinȱmindȱallȱofȱtheȱcaseȱspecificȱvariables,ȱandȱ(2)ȱuseȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ
rateȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱ‘presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfee.’”).ȱ
37ȱMillea,ȱ658ȱF.3dȱatȱ167ȱ(quotingȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ554).ȱ

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13
InȱPerdue,ȱtheȱCourtȱwasȱ“askedȱtoȱdecideȱwhetherȱeitherȱtheȱ 1
qualityȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ performanceȱ orȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtainedȱ areȱ 2
factorsȱthatȱmayȱproperlyȱprovideȱaȱbasisȱforȱanȱenhancement”ȱofȱtheȱ 3
lodestarȱvalue.38ȱȱTheȱCourtȱfirstȱaffirmedȱitsȱlongȬstandingȱpositionȱ 4
thatȱ “theȱ lodestarȱ methodȱ yieldsȱ aȱ feeȱ thatȱ isȱ presumptivelyȱ 5
sufficient,”ȱ butȱ “thatȱ presumptionȱ mayȱ beȱ overcomeȱ inȱ thoseȱ rareȱ 6
circumstancesȱ inȱ whichȱ theȱ lodestarȱ doesȱ notȱ adequatelyȱ takeȱ intoȱ 7
accountȱ aȱ factorȱ thatȱ mayȱ properlyȱ beȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ aȱ 8
reasonableȱfee.”39ȱȱFactorsȱthatȱareȱalreadyȱsubsumedȱinȱtheȱlodestarȱ 9
calculationȱcannotȱbeȱusedȱtoȱenhanceȱorȱcutȱtheȱlodestarȱamount.40ȱȱ 10
Theȱ Courtȱ reiteratedȱ thatȱ “theȱ noveltyȱ andȱ complexityȱ ofȱ aȱ caseȱ 11
generallyȱmayȱnotȱbeȱusedȱasȱaȱgroundȱforȱenhancementȱbecauseȱtheseȱ 12
factorsȱ‘presumablyȱareȱfullyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱnumberȱofȱbillableȱhoursȱ 13
recordedȱbyȱcounsel,’”ȱasȱwellȱasȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrate.41ȱȱThus,ȱ 14
Perdueȱ confirmedȱ theȱ longȬstandingȱ approachȱ toȱ calculatingȱ 15
attorney’sȱ feesȱ endorsedȱ byȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ inȱ Hensley,ȱ Blum,ȱ 16
DelawareȱValley,ȱasȱwellȱasȱourȱcircuitȱinȱArborȱHill.ȱ 17
D. Theȱ Districtȱ Court’sȱ Reasonableȱ Hourlyȱ Rateȱ 18
Determinationȱ 19
Inȱhisȱfeeȱapplication,ȱLillyȱrequestedȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱfirstȱatȱ$600ȱ 20
andȱ laterȱatȱ$625ȱ perȱ hourȱ forȱ Rothman’sȱ workȱ onȱ theȱmatter.ȱ ȱ Theȱ 21
Cityȱarguedȱthatȱthisȱrateȱwasȱunreasonableȱbecauseȱtheȱcaseȱwasȱaȱ 22
simple,ȱ“gardenȱvariety”ȱcivilȱrightsȱcase.42ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱagreedȱ 23
withȱtheȱCityȱthatȱtheȱcaseȱwasȱ“relative[ly]ȱsimpl[e]”43ȱand,ȱrelyingȱ 24
38ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ554.ȱ
39ȱId.ȱatȱ552,ȱ553–54.ȱ
40ȱId.ȱatȱ553ȱ(citingȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ566).ȱ
41ȱId.ȱ(quotingȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898ȱ(bracketsȱomitted)).ȱȱ
42ȱLillyȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ16ȱCiv.ȱ322ȱ(ER),ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*2ȱ(S.D.N.Y.ȱ
Aug.ȱ15,ȱ2017).ȱ
43ȱId.ȱatȱ*3–5.ȱ

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14
onȱ Arborȱ Hill,ȱ thatȱ theȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ shouldȱ reflectȱ thisȱ lackȱ ofȱ 1
complexity.44ȱȱThus,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱlookedȱtoȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ 2
ratesȱ forȱ civilȱ rightsȱ attorneysȱ workingȱ onȱ aȱ simple,ȱ gardenȱ varietyȱ 3
civilȱrightsȱcaseȱinȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱNewȱYork.45ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 4
courtȱ foundȱ thatȱ similar,ȱ straightforwardȱ civilȱ rightsȱ casesȱ inȱ theȱ 5
Southernȱ Districtȱ involvingȱ attorneysȱ withȱ similarȱ experienceȱ andȱ 6
qualificationsȱasȱRothmanȱresultedȱinȱhourlyȱratesȱbetweenȱ$350ȱandȱ 7
$450.46ȱȱTherefore,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱawardedȱRothmanȱanȱhourlyȱrateȱ 8
ofȱ$450,ȱatȱtheȱtopȱofȱtheȱrange.ȱ 9
Weȱ findȱ noȱ errorȱ inȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ reasoning.ȱ ȱ Asȱ weȱ 10
emphasizedȱinȱArborȱHill,ȱ“[t]heȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱisȱtheȱrateȱaȱ 11
payingȱ clientȱ wouldȱ beȱ willingȱ toȱ payȱ .ȱ .ȱ .ȱ bear[ing]ȱ inȱ mindȱ thatȱ aȱ 12
reasonable,ȱpayingȱclientȱwishesȱtoȱspendȱtheȱminimumȱnecessaryȱtoȱ 13
litigateȱ theȱ caseȱ effectively.”47ȱ ȱ Itȱ wasȱ entirelyȱ appropriateȱ forȱ theȱ 14
districtȱ courtȱ toȱ considerȱ theȱ complexityȱ ofȱ aȱ matterȱ becauseȱ aȱ 15
reasonableȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱconsiderȱtheȱcomplexityȱofȱhisȱorȱherȱ 16
caseȱ whenȱ decidingȱ whetherȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ proposedȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ isȱ 17
fair,ȱ reasonable,ȱ andȱ commensurateȱ withȱ theȱ proposedȱ action.ȱ ȱ Theȱ 18
districtȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱconsiderȱbothȱRothman’sȱexperienceȱandȱ 19
theȱgardenȬvarietyȱnatureȱofȱtheȱlitigation,ȱwhichȱ“lastedȱlessȱthanȱ10ȱ 20
months,ȱ requiredȱ noȱ depositions,ȱ andȱ involvedȱ noȱ substantialȱ 21
motionsȱorȱbriefings”ȱorȱappearancesȱbeforeȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt,48ȱwasȱ 22
consistentȱwithȱourȱdirectionȱforȱdistrictȱcourts,ȱ“inȱexercisingȱ[their]ȱ 23
considerableȱ discretion,ȱ toȱ bearȱ inȱ mindȱ allȱ ofȱ theȱ caseȬspecificȱ 24
variablesȱthatȱweȱandȱotherȱcourtsȱhaveȱidentifiedȱasȱrelevantȱtoȱtheȱ 25
44ȱId.ȱatȱ*4.ȱ
45ȱId.ȱatȱ*4–5.ȱ
46ȱId.ȱatȱ*5.ȱ
47ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190.ȱ
48ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*5.ȱ

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15
reasonablenessȱ ofȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ inȱ settingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ 1
rate.”49ȱ 2
Lilly’sȱ argumentȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ considerationȱ ofȱ theȱ 3
simpleȱ natureȱ ofȱ thisȱ caseȱ andȱ ourȱ opinionȱ inȱ Arborȱ Hillȱ permittingȱ 4
suchȱ considerationȱ areȱ inȱ conflictȱ withȱ Perdueȱ isȱ misplaced.ȱ ȱ Perdueȱ 5
addressedȱ whetherȱ aȱ districtȱ court,ȱ afterȱ calculatingȱ aȱ reasonableȱ 6
hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ multiplyingȱ itȱ byȱ theȱ reasonableȱ numberȱ ofȱ hoursȱ 7
workedȱtoȱproduceȱtheȱlodestar,ȱcouldȱgrantȱaȱfeeȱenhancementȱorȱcutȱ 8
toȱ theȱ lodestarȱ amountȱ inȱ recognitionȱ ofȱ theȱ qualityȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ 9
performanceȱ orȱ theȱ resultsȱ obtained.50ȱ ȱ Perdueȱ didȱ notȱ involveȱ aȱ 10
challengeȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱcomputationȱofȱtheȱreasonableȱhourlyȱ 11
rateȱatȱall—itȱonlyȱconcernedȱtheȱproprietyȱofȱtheȱfeeȱenhancement.ȱȱItȱ 12
wasȱinȱthisȱcontextȱthatȱtheȱCourtȱreiteratedȱitsȱpriorȱstatementsȱfromȱ 13
BlumȱandȱDelawareȱValley,ȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱaȱcaseȱ 14
generallyȱ mayȱ notȱ beȱ usedȱ asȱ aȱ groundȱ forȱ anȱ enhancementȱ orȱ 15
reductionȱbecauseȱthoseȱfactorsȱareȱalreadyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱreasonableȱ 16
hourlyȱrateȱandȱreasonableȱhoursȱbilledȱ(i.e.,ȱtheȱlodestar).51ȱȱȱ 17
Perdue,ȱ therefore,ȱ didȱ notȱ overruleȱ Arborȱ Hillȱ orȱ otherwiseȱ 18
prohibitȱdistrictȱcourtsȱfromȱconsideringȱtheȱnoveltyȱorȱcomplexityȱofȱ 19
aȱ caseȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ orȱ hoursȱ billed.ȱȱ 20
PerdueȱisȱconsistentȱwithȱpriorȱSupremeȱCourtȱopinionsȱthatȱindicateȱ 21
thatȱcaseȬspecificȱfactorsȱlikeȱtheȱnoveltyȱorȱcomplexityȱofȱtheȱmatterȱ 22
areȱ appropriatelyȱ consideredȱ inȱ determiningȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ 23
rateȱorȱhoursȱbilled.ȱȱImportantly,ȱtheȱPerdueȱCourtȱstatedȱthatȱ“theȱ 24
49ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190.ȱȱ
50ȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ548ȱ(describingȱhowȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdeterminedȱaȱreasonableȱ
hourlyȱrateȱandȱreasonableȱhoursȱbilled,ȱmultipliedȱthemȱtoȱcalculateȱaȱlodestarȱofȱ
approximatelyȱ$6ȱmillion,ȱandȱ“thenȱenhancedȱthisȱawardȱbyȱ75%,ȱconcludingȱthatȱ
theȱlodestarȱcalculationȱdidȱnotȱtakeȱintoȱaccount”ȱvariousȱfactorsȱwarrantingȱanȱ
increase).ȱ
51ȱId.ȱatȱ553.ȱ

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16
lodestarȱmethodȱproducesȱanȱawardȱthatȱroughlyȱapproximatesȱtheȱ 1
feeȱthatȱtheȱprevailingȱattorneyȱwouldȱhaveȱreceivedȱifȱheȱorȱsheȱhadȱ 2
beenȱ representingȱ aȱ payingȱ clientȱ whoȱ wasȱ billedȱ byȱ theȱ hourȱ inȱ aȱ 3
comparableȱ case.” 52ȱ ȱ Andȱ asȱ inȱ Delawareȱ Valleyȱ andȱ Blum,ȱ theȱ Perdueȱ 4
Courtȱspecificallyȱstatedȱthatȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱaȱcaseȱareȱ 5
presumablyȱreflectedȱinȱtheȱlodestarȱamount.53ȱ 6
Finally,ȱ Lillyȱ pointsȱ toȱ aȱ quoteȱ fromȱ theȱ Perdueȱ opinion,ȱ inȱ 7
whichȱtheȱCourtȱcriticizesȱtheȱoldȱJohnsonȱmethodȱcreatedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱ 8
Circuitȱbecauseȱitȱ“gaveȱveryȱlittleȱactualȱguidanceȱtoȱdistrictȱcourts”ȱ 9
andȱ “placedȱ unlimitedȱ discretionȱ inȱ trialȱ judgesȱ andȱ producedȱ 10
disparateȱ results.”54ȱ ȱ This,ȱ Lillyȱ says,ȱ isȱ evidenceȱ thatȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ 11
factors,ȱincludingȱtheȱnoveltyȱandȱcomplexityȱofȱtheȱcase,ȱcannotȱbeȱ 12
usedȱ byȱ districtȱ courtsȱ toȱ determineȱ aȱ reasonableȱ fee.ȱ ȱ Butȱ Lillyȱ 13
confusesȱ theȱ Court’sȱ criticismȱ ofȱ theȱ “Johnsonȱ approach”55ȱ withȱ theȱ 14
permissiveȱuseȱofȱtheȱJohnsonȱfactorsȱinȱdeterminingȱtheȱreasonableȱ 15
hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ billedȱ toȱ determineȱ theȱ 16
presumptivelyȱreasonableȱfeeȱorȱlodestar.56ȱȱHensleyȱandȱitsȱprogenyȱ 17
makeȱ clearȱ thatȱ whileȱ aȱ strictȱ applicationȱ ofȱ theȱ Johnsonȱ methodȱ ofȱ 18
calculatingȱattorney’sȱfeesȱusedȱbyȱtheȱFifthȱCircuitȱisȱtooȱimpreciseȱ 19
andȱ variableȱ toȱ beȱ reliable,ȱ theȱ twelveȱ Johnsonȱ factorsȱ remainȱ 20
importantȱtoolsȱforȱhelpingȱdistrictȱcourtsȱcalculateȱtheȱlodestarȱand,ȱ 21
inȱexceptionalȱcases,ȱdeterminingȱwhetherȱanȱenhancementȱorȱcutȱtoȱ 22
52ȱId.ȱatȱ551ȱ(emphasisȱomitted)ȱ(emphasisȱadded).ȱ
53ȱId.ȱatȱ553;ȱDelawareȱValley,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱatȱ565;ȱBlum,ȱ465ȱU.S.ȱatȱ898.ȱ
54ȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ550–51ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ
55ȱId.ȱatȱ551–52.ȱ
56ȱSeeȱJinȱv.ȱPacificȱBuffetȱHouse,ȱInc.,ȱNo.ȱ06ȬCVȬ579ȱ(VVP),ȱ2010ȱWLȱ2653334,ȱatȱ*2ȱ
n.2ȱ (E.D.N.Y.ȱ Juneȱ 25,ȱ 2010)ȱ (Perdueȱ “cautionsȱ againstȱ usingȱ aȱ strictȱ Johnsonȱ
approachȱ asȱ theȱ primaryȱ basisȱ forȱ determiningȱ reasonableȱ attorneys’ȱ fees,ȱ butȱ
nowhereȱcallsȱintoȱquestionȱtheȱideaȱofȱusingȱrelevantȱJohnsonȱfactorsȱinȱhelpingȱtoȱ
comeȱtoȱaȱreasonableȱfee”).ȱ

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17
theȱlodestarȱisȱwarranted.57ȱȱȱ 1
Findingȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ correctlyȱ appliedȱ theȱ law,ȱ 2
reachedȱaȱconclusionȱwithinȱtheȱrangeȱofȱpermissibleȱdecisions,ȱandȱ 3
didȱnotȱabuseȱitsȱdiscretionȱonȱaȱclearlyȱerroneousȱfactualȱfinding,ȱweȱ 4
haveȱnoȱbasisȱtoȱvacateȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱawardȱRothmanȱ 5
anȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450.ȱȱWeȱthereforeȱaffirmȱthisȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱ 6
court’sȱorder.ȱ 7
II. ReductionȱofȱtheȱFeeȱforȱClericalȱTasksȱ 8
Lillyȱ alsoȱ assertsȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ erredȱ byȱ prohibitingȱ 9
Rothmanȱfromȱreceivingȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450ȱforȱclericalȱtasks,ȱ 10
suchȱ asȱ sendingȱ faxes,ȱ printingȱ documents,ȱ etc.ȱ ȱ Lillyȱ arguesȱ thatȱ aȱ 11
districtȱ courtȱ shouldȱ notȱ “reduceȱ theȱ hourlyȱ billingȱ rateȱ ofȱ aȱ soloȱ 12
practitionerȱ attorneyȱ whoȱ doesȱ notȱ operateȱ withȱ theȱ assistanceȱ ofȱ 13
associates,ȱparalegals,ȱorȱotherȱsupportȱstaffȱconcerningȱtimeȱheȱorȱsheȱ 14
reasonablyȱspendsȱonȱclericalȱtasksȱinȱadvancingȱtheȱlitigation.” 58ȱȱȱ 15
Weȱhaveȱnotȱaddressedȱwhetherȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱdiscountȱ 16
theȱ reasonableȱ hoursȱ expendedȱ orȱ theȱ reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ anȱ 17
attorneyȱspendsȱonȱtasksȱthatȱareȱclericalȱorȱadministrativeȱinȱnature.ȱȱ 18
Butȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ providedȱ guidanceȱ onȱ thisȱ questionȱ inȱ 19
Missouriȱv.ȱJenkinsȱbyȱAgyei.59ȱȱInȱthatȱcase,ȱtheȱCourtȱheldȱthatȱplaintiffsȱ 20
couldȱrecoverȱattorney’sȱfeesȱunderȱtheȱFeesȱActȱforȱworkȱperformedȱ 21
byȱparalegalsȱandȱlawȱclerksȱunderȱtheȱsupervisionȱofȱanȱattorneyȱatȱ 22
57ȱSeeȱHensley,ȱ461ȱU.S.ȱatȱ434ȱn.9ȱ(“Theȱdistrictȱcourtȱalsoȱmayȱconsiderȱ[the]ȱfactorsȱ
identifiedȱinȱJohnsonȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ,ȱthoughȱitȱshouldȱnoteȱthatȱmanyȱofȱtheseȱfactorsȱusuallyȱ
areȱ subsumedȱ withinȱ theȱ initialȱ calculationȱ ofȱ hoursȱ reasonablyȱ expendedȱ atȱ aȱ
reasonableȱ hourlyȱ rate.”);ȱ Delawareȱ Valley,ȱ 478ȱ U.S.ȱ atȱ 563–64ȱ (“[Inȱ Hensley,ȱ we]ȱ
adoptedȱaȱhybridȱapproachȱthatȱsharedȱelementsȱofȱbothȱJohnsonȱandȱtheȱlodestarȱ
methodȱofȱcalculation.”).ȱ
58ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ7.ȱ
59ȱ491ȱU.S.ȱ274ȱ(1989).ȱ

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18
theȱmarketȱrateȱforȱtheirȱservices,ȱratherȱthanȱatȱcostȱtoȱtheȱattorney.60ȱȱ 1
However,ȱtheȱCourtȱcautionedȱthatȱ“purelyȱclericalȱorȱsecretarialȱtasksȱ 2
shouldȱnotȱbeȱbilledȱatȱaȱparalegalȱrate”ȱbyȱeitherȱaȱparalegalȱorȱanȱ 3
attorneyȱperformingȱsuchȱtasks.61ȱȱTheȱCourtȱexplained:ȱ 4
Itȱisȱappropriateȱtoȱdistinguishȱbetweenȱlegalȱwork,ȱinȱtheȱ 5
strictȱsense,ȱandȱinvestigation,ȱclericalȱwork,ȱcompilationȱ 6
ofȱfactsȱandȱstatisticsȱandȱotherȱworkȱwhichȱcanȱoftenȱbeȱ 7
accomplishedȱ byȱ nonȬlawyersȱ butȱ whichȱ aȱ lawyerȱ [orȱ 8
paralegal]ȱmayȱdoȱbecauseȱheȱhasȱnoȱotherȱhelpȱavailable.ȱȱ 9
Suchȱ nonȬlegalȱ workȱ mayȱ commandȱ aȱ lesserȱ rate.ȱ ȱ Itsȱ 10
dollarȱ valueȱ isȱ notȱ enhancedȱ justȱ becauseȱ aȱ lawyerȱ [orȱ 11
paralegal]ȱdoesȱit.62ȱ 12
Weȱ thereforeȱ concludeȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ didȱ notȱ commitȱ 13
legalȱerrorȱinȱreducingȱLilly’sȱfeeȱawardȱtoȱaccountȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱ 14
performedȱ byȱ Rothman.ȱ ȱ Asȱ weȱ haveȱ stated,ȱ theȱ keyȱ inquiryȱ inȱ 15
determiningȱ theȱ reasonablenessȱ ofȱ anȱ attorney’sȱ hourlyȱ rateȱ andȱ 16
hoursȱbilledȱisȱwhetherȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱbeȱwillingȱtoȱpayȱtheȱ 17
fee.63ȱȱTheȱanswerȱtoȱthisȱquestion,ȱofȱcourse,ȱwillȱvaryȱdependingȱonȱ 18
theȱ circumstancesȱ ofȱ theȱ case,ȱ theȱ attorney,ȱ andȱ theȱ customsȱ inȱ theȱ 19
relevantȱlegalȱmarket.ȱȱTherefore,ȱwhileȱdistrictȱcourtsȱhaveȱtheȱlegalȱ 20
authorityȱandȱdiscretionȱtoȱeitherȱreduceȱanȱattorney’sȱhourlyȱrateȱforȱ 21
timeȱspentȱonȱclericalȱtasksȱorȱapplyȱanȱacrossȬtheȬboardȱreductionȱtoȱ 22
theȱhoursȱbilledȱorȱtotalȱfeeȱawardȱtoȱaccountȱforȱtimeȱspentȱonȱclericalȱ 23
tasksȱ(orȱblockȬbilledȱtimeȱentriesȱreflectingȱaȱmixȱofȱclericalȱandȱlegalȱ 24
work),ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱnotȱrequiredȱtoȱmakeȱsuchȱreductions.ȱȱAsȱ 25
60ȱId.ȱ286–87.ȱ
61ȱId.ȱatȱ288ȱn.10.ȱ
62ȱId.ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ
63ȱArborȱHill,ȱ522ȱF.3dȱatȱ190;ȱseeȱalsoȱPerdue,ȱ559ȱU.S.ȱatȱ551ȱ(“[T]heȱlodestarȱmethodȱ
producesȱanȱawardȱthatȱroughlyȱapproximatesȱtheȱfeeȱthatȱtheȱprevailingȱattorneyȱ
wouldȱhaveȱreceivedȱifȱheȱorȱsheȱhadȱbeenȱrepresentingȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwhoȱwasȱ
billedȱbyȱtheȱhourȱinȱaȱcomparableȱcase.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ.”ȱ(emphasisȱinȱoriginal)).ȱ

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19
withȱ allȱ aspectsȱ ofȱourȱ feeȬshiftingȱ jurisprudence,ȱ weȱaffordȱdistrictȱ 1
courtsȱbroadȱdiscretionȱinȱawardingȱattorneys’ȱfeesȱbecauseȱtheyȱareȱ 2
muchȱ closerȱ toȱ theȱ detailsȱ ofȱ eachȱ individualȱ caseȱ andȱ canȱ betterȱ 3
determineȱwhatȱisȱreasonableȱandȱappropriateȱinȱtheȱfeeȱcalculusȱforȱ 4
theȱparticularȱcase.64ȱ 5
Here,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱreviewedȱtheȱtimeȱsheetsȱsubmittedȱbyȱ 6
Rothmanȱandȱfoundȱaȱvarietyȱofȱobviouslyȱclericalȱtasks,ȱasȱwellȱasȱ 7
entriesȱthatȱ“blendȱclericalȱtasksȱwithȱlegalȱtasks.”65ȱȱAȱreviewȱofȱtheȱ 8
timeȱsheetsȱconfirmsȱthatȱmanyȱentriesȱdescribeȱclericalȱtasksȱthatȱareȱ 9
notȱappropriatelyȱbilledȱatȱRothman’sȱreasonableȱhourlyȱrateȱofȱ$450,ȱ 10
suchȱasȱsendingȱandȱreceivingȱfaxes,ȱrequestingȱandȱreceivingȱmedicalȱ 11
records,ȱ servingȱ papers,ȱ andȱ handȬdeliveringȱ courtesyȱ copiesȱ ofȱ 12
filingsȱtoȱtheȱcourthouse.66ȱȱTheȱfactȱthatȱRothmanȱisȱaȱsoloȱpractitionerȱ 13
doesȱnotȱentitleȱhimȱtoȱhisȱfullȱhourlyȱrateȱasȱanȱattorneyȱforȱpurelyȱ 14
clericalȱwork.ȱȱIndeed,ȱitȱisȱhighlyȱunlikelyȱthatȱaȱpayingȱclientȱwouldȱ 15
agreeȱtoȱpayȱanyȱpersonȱ$450ȱforȱanȱhourȱofȱsendingȱandȱreceivingȱ 16
faxes,ȱ callingȱ medicalȱ offices,ȱ andȱ deliveringȱ papers.ȱ ȱ Weȱ findȱ theȱ 17
districtȱcourt’sȱimpositionȱofȱaȱtenȱpercentȱreductionȱtoȱtheȱfeeȱawardȱ 18
onȱaccountȱofȱclericalȱworkȱappropriate,ȱandȱcertainlyȱnotȱanȱabuseȱofȱ 19
discretion,ȱbecauseȱtheȱtimeȱentriesȱreflectingȱ50.3ȱhoursȱofȱworkȱshowȱ 20
atȱ leastȱ 5ȱ hoursȱ ofȱ purelyȱ clericalȱ work.67ȱ ȱ Inȱ reducingȱ Rothman’sȱ 21
hoursȱ byȱ tenȱ percentȱ toȱ accountȱ forȱ clericalȱ tasks,ȱ weȱ areȱ confidentȱ 22
thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ achievedȱ “roughȱ justice,”ȱ ifȱ notȱ “auditingȱ 23
perfection,”ȱ inȱ itsȱ calculationȱ ofȱ theȱ appropriateȱ feeȱ award.68ȱ ȱ Weȱ 24
64ȱSeeȱFox,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱatȱ838.ȱ
65ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*6.ȱ
66ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ78,ȱ89–92,ȱ247.ȱ
67ȱSeeȱMcDonald,ȱ450ȱF.3dȱatȱ96ȱ(“Aȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱexerciseȱitsȱdiscretionȱandȱ
useȱ aȱ percentageȱ deductionȱ asȱ aȱ practicalȱ meansȱ ofȱ trimmingȱ fatȱ fromȱ aȱ feeȱ
application.”ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)).ȱ
68ȱSeeȱFox,ȱ563ȱU.S.ȱatȱ838.ȱ

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20
thereforeȱupholdȱthisȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱorder.ȱ 1
III. AwardȱofȱFeesȱonȱFeesȱ 2
Finally,ȱtheȱCityȱchallengesȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱgrantȱ 3
attorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtimeȱRothmanȱspentȱworkingȱonȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱ 4
andȱreplyȱbriefȱinȱsupportȱofȱthatȱapplication.ȱȱTheȱCityȱassertsȱthatȱ 5
theȱ districtȱ courtȱ didȱ notȱ haveȱ theȱ authorityȱ toȱ awardȱ thoseȱ feesȱ 6
becauseȱtheyȱwereȱincurredȱafterȱtheȱCityȱmade,ȱandȱLillyȱaccepted,ȱ 7
theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ offerȱ ofȱ judgment,ȱ whichȱ explicitlyȱ contemplatedȱ theȱ 8
paymentȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱonlyȱ“upȱuntilȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer.”69ȱȱȱ 9
Ordinarily,ȱ aȱ districtȱ courtȱ hasȱ authorityȱ andȱ discretionȱ toȱ 10
awardȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱhoursȱexpendedȱonȱaȱfeeȱapplicationȱmadeȱ 11
underȱ theȱ Feesȱ Act,ȱ soȬcalledȱ feesȱ onȱ fees.70ȱ ȱ Theȱ questionȱ hereȱ isȱ 12
whetherȱtheȱparties’ȱagreementȱtoȱsettleȱtheȱcaseȱandȱcutȱoffȱattorney’sȱ 13
feesȱ asȱ ofȱ theȱ timeȱ ofȱ theȱ offerȱ circumscribesȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ 14
authorityȱ toȱ awardȱ feesȱ accruedȱ afterȱ theȱ offerȱ date.ȱ ȱ Weȱ believeȱ itȱ 15
does.ȱ 16
FederalȱRuleȱofȱCivilȱProcedureȱ68ȱpermitsȱaȱpartyȱdefendingȱaȱ 17
claimȱtoȱserveȱanȱopposingȱpartyȱwithȱ“anȱofferȱtoȱallowȱjudgmentȱonȱ 18
specifiedȱterms.”71ȱȱIfȱtheȱopposingȱpartyȱacceptsȱtheȱoffer,ȱthenȱeitherȱ 19
partyȱmayȱfileȱtheȱofferȱandȱnoticeȱofȱacceptanceȱwithȱtheȱcourt,ȱandȱ 20
theȱ “clerkȱ mustȱ thenȱ enterȱ [the]ȱ judgment”ȱ specifiedȱ inȱ theȱ 21
agreement.72ȱ ȱ Ifȱ theȱ opposingȱ partyȱ rejectsȱ theȱ offerȱ andȱ thatȱ partyȱ 22
eventuallyȱ obtainsȱ aȱ judgmentȱ thatȱ isȱ notȱ asȱ favorableȱ asȱ theȱ 23
69ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45.ȱ
70ȱSeeȱGagneȱv.ȱMaher,ȱ594ȱF.2dȱ336,ȱ343–44ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ1979),ȱaff’d,ȱ448ȱU.S.ȱ122ȱ(1980);ȱ
seeȱalsoȱHinesȱv.ȱCityȱofȱAlbany,ȱ862ȱF.3dȱ215,ȱ223ȱ(2dȱCir.ȱ2017)ȱ(“Prevailingȱpartiesȱ
underȱSectionȱ1988ȱareȱthereforeȱentitledȱtoȱrecoverȱaȱreasonableȱfeeȱforȱpreparingȱ
andȱdefendingȱaȱfeeȱapplication.”).ȱ
71ȱFed.ȱR.ȱCiv.ȱP.ȱ68(a).ȱ
72ȱId.ȱ

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21
unacceptedȱoffer,ȱtheȱopposingȱpartyȱmustȱpayȱtheȱcostsȱincurredȱbyȱ 1
theȱdefendantȱafterȱtheȱofferȱwasȱmade,73ȱwhichȱincludesȱattorney’sȱ 2
fees.74ȱ ȱ Theȱ purposeȱ ofȱ thisȱ mechanismȱ isȱ toȱ “encourageȱ settlementȱ 3
andȱ avoidȱ litigation”ȱ byȱ “prompt[ing]ȱ bothȱ partiesȱ toȱ aȱ suitȱ toȱ 4
evaluateȱtheȱrisksȱandȱcostsȱofȱlitigation,ȱandȱtoȱbalanceȱthemȱagainstȱ 5
theȱlikelihoodȱofȱsuccessȱuponȱtrialȱonȱtheȱmerits.”75ȱ 6
Likeȱaȱtypicalȱsettlementȱagreement,ȱanȱacceptedȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ 7
ofȱ judgmentȱ isȱ aȱ contract,ȱ andȱ itȱ mustȱ beȱ interpretedȱ accordingȱ toȱ 8
ordinaryȱcontractȱprinciples.76ȱȱCritically,ȱ“[i]fȱtheȱtermsȱofȱaȱcontractȱ 9
areȱclear,ȱcourtsȱmustȱtakeȱcareȱnotȱtoȱalterȱorȱgoȱbeyondȱtheȱexpressȱ 10
termsȱofȱtheȱagreement,ȱorȱtoȱimposeȱobligationsȱonȱtheȱpartiesȱthatȱ 11
areȱ notȱ mandatedȱ byȱ theȱ unambiguousȱ termsȱ ofȱ theȱ agreementȱ 12
itself.”77ȱȱ 13
Theȱ acceptedȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ offerȱ atȱ issueȱ hereȱ (i.e.,ȱ theȱ contract)ȱ 14
unambiguouslyȱstatesȱthatȱtheȱrecoverableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱ 15
andȱcostsȱareȱlimitedȱtoȱthoseȱincurredȱbyȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer,ȱwhichȱ 16
wasȱOctoberȱ26,ȱ2016.78ȱȱTheȱfeesȱRothmanȱchargedȱforȱworkȱonȱtheȱ 17
feeȱ applicationȱ andȱ replyȱ briefȱ inȱ supportȱ ofȱ thatȱ applicationȱ wereȱ 18
incurredȱbetweenȱNovemberȱ30,ȱ2016,ȱandȱJanuaryȱ20,ȱ2017,ȱafterȱtheȱ 19
cutȬoffȱ dateȱ forȱ feesȱ inȱ theȱ agreement.79ȱ ȱ Therefore,ȱ theyȱ cannotȱ beȱ 20
recoveredȱbyȱLilly,ȱandȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱhadȱnoȱauthorityȱtoȱawardȱ 21
them.ȱ 22
Nonetheless,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ determinedȱ thatȱ becauseȱ theȱ 23
73ȱFed.ȱR.ȱCiv.ȱP.ȱ68(d).ȱ
74ȱMarekȱv.ȱChesny,ȱ473ȱU.S.ȱ1,ȱ9ȱ(1985).ȱ
75ȱId.ȱatȱ5.ȱ
76ȱSteiner,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱatȱ31.ȱ
77ȱId.ȱatȱ32ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted).ȱ
78ȱSeeȱJointȱApp’xȱatȱ45–47.ȱ
79ȱSeeȱid.ȱatȱ247.ȱ

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22
partiesȱactedȱinȱgoodȱfaithȱinȱnegotiatingȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeesȱtoȱbeȱpaidȱ 1
toȱ Lilly,ȱ butȱ wereȱ simplyȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ onȱ aȱ reasonableȱ amount,ȱ 2
equityȱcounseledȱinȱfavorȱofȱgrantingȱLillyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱtheȱtimeȱ 3
spentȱworkingȱonȱtheȱfeeȱapplicationȱandȱreplyȱbrief.80ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱ 4
courtȱisȱnotȱaloneȱinȱgrantingȱtheseȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequityȱ 5
despiteȱ theȱ clearȱ termsȱ ofȱ theȱ parties’ȱ agreementsȱ barringȱ suchȱ 6
awards.81ȱ ȱ Asȱ nobleȱ asȱ thisȱ practiceȱ mayȱ be,ȱ itȱ violatesȱ theȱ firstȱ 7
principleȱ ofȱ contractȱ interpretation:ȱ “whereȱ theȱ languageȱ ofȱ theȱ 8
contractȱisȱclearȱandȱunambiguous,ȱtheȱcontractȱisȱtoȱbeȱgivenȱeffectȱ 9
accordingȱ toȱ itsȱ terms.”82ȱ ȱ Byȱ awardingȱ Lillyȱ feesȱ beyondȱ whatȱ theȱ 10
partiesȱ agreedȱ to,ȱ theȱ districtȱ courtȱ effectivelyȱ rewroteȱ theȱ contract.ȱȱ 11
Thisȱitȱcannotȱdo.ȱ 12
Lillyȱmakesȱthreeȱargumentsȱforȱwhyȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdidȱnotȱ 13
err,ȱ noneȱ ofȱ whichȱ isȱ persuasive.ȱ ȱ First,ȱ heȱ assertsȱ thatȱ theȱ offerȱ ofȱ 14
judgment’sȱinclusionȱofȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfeesȱupȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱ 15
theȱofferȱ“necessarilyȱincludesȱfeesȱforȱtheȱtimeȱthatȱanȱattorneyȱmustȱ 16
spendȱtoȱmoveȱtoȱobtainȱthoseȱunderlyingȱfeesȱifȱDefendantsȱwillȱnotȱ 17
enterȱintoȱaȱreasonableȱsettlementȱconcerningȱtheȱunderlyingȱfees.”83ȱȱ 18
Thisȱinterpretationȱofȱtheȱcontractȱisȱnotȱsupportedȱbyȱitsȱclearȱterms,ȱ 19
80ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*8.ȱ
81ȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱRosadoȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ11ȱCiv.ȱ4285ȱ(SAS),ȱ2012ȱWLȱ955510,ȱatȱ*6ȱ
(S.D.N.Y.ȱMar.ȱ15,ȱ2012)ȱ(“Plaintiffȱalsoȱseeksȱfeesȱincurredȱbyȱcounselȱinȱpreparingȱ
theȱ instantȱ feeȱ application.ȱ ȱ However,ȱ bothȱ theȱ Ruleȱ 68ȱ Offerȱ ofȱ Judgmentȱ andȱ
plaintiff’sȱ Noticeȱ ofȱ Acceptanceȱ specificallyȱ limitedȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ
expensesȱandȱcostsȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱthisȱoffer.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱNonetheless,ȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequity,ȱ
plaintiffȱ shouldȱ beȱ awardedȱ someȱ amountȱ forȱ theȱ timeȱ hisȱ counselȱ spentȱ inȱ
preparingȱtheȱinstantȱfeeȱapplication.”ȱ(internalȱquotationȱmarksȱomitted)).ȱȱButȱseeȱ
Schoolcraftȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ10ȱCiv.ȱ6005ȱ(RWS),ȱ2016ȱWLȱ4626568,ȱatȱ*13ȱ
(S.D.N.Y.ȱSept.ȱ6,ȱ2016)ȱ(“TheȱRuleȱ68ȱJudgmentȱprovidesȱ‘plaintiffȱshallȱbeȱentitledȱ
toȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱfees,ȱexpenses,ȱandȱcostsȱtoȱtheȱdateȱofȱthisȱoffer.’ȱȱOnȱtheȱ
termsȱofȱtheȱagreementȱalone,ȱfeesȬonȬfeesȱareȱdenied.”ȱ(internalȱcitationȱomitted)).ȱ
82ȱ Steiner,ȱ 816ȱ F.3dȱ atȱ 31ȱ (modificationsȱ omitted)ȱ (internalȱ quotationȱ marksȱ
omitted).ȱ
83ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ28.ȱ

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23
norȱisȱitȱaȱnecessaryȱassumption.ȱȱThereȱisȱnothingȱinȱtheȱagreement’sȱ 1
termsȱ toȱ indicateȱ that,ȱ inȱ theȱ eventȱ aȱ feeȱ applicationȱ toȱ theȱ courtȱ isȱ 2
neededȱ toȱ determineȱ whatȱ constitutesȱ “reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,”ȱ 3
theȱpartiesȱintendedȱforȱanyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱincurredȱbyȱLillyȱinȱthatȱ 4
processȱ toȱ beȱ includedȱ inȱ theȱ amountȱ theȱ Cityȱ agreedȱ toȱ payȱ asȱ 5
reasonableȱattorney’sȱfees.ȱȱToȱtheȱcontrary,ȱtheȱexpressȱtermsȱofȱtheȱ 6
contractȱstateȱthatȱtheȱCityȱwillȱonlyȱbeȱliableȱforȱreasonableȱattorney’sȱ 7
feesȱincurredȱonȱorȱbeforeȱtheȱdateȱofȱtheȱoffer,ȱandȱnotȱsubsequentȱ 8
thereto.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱacknowledgedȱthatȱtheȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱ 9
containsȱ“languageȱexpresslyȱlimitingȱrecoverableȱfeesȱandȱexpensesȱ 10
toȱ thoseȱ incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ Ruleȱ68ȱOffer”ȱ beforeȱ itȱ thenȱ grantedȱ 11
feesȱonȱfeesȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequity.84ȱ 12
Second,ȱLillyȱinvokesȱtheȱdoctrineȱofȱcontraȱproferentemȱtoȱassertȱ 13
thatȱtheȱ ambiguousȱ languageȱ inȱ theȱ agreementȱ“mustȱ beȱ construedȱ 14
againstȱDefendantsȱsinceȱtheyȱdraftedȱitȱunilaterallyȱinȱtheȱcontextȱofȱ 15
makingȱaȱRuleȱ68ȱoffer.”85ȱȱLilly’sȱstatementȱofȱtheȱruleȱisȱcorrect:ȱthatȱ 16
ambiguitiesȱinȱtheȱlanguageȱofȱaȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱareȱtoȱbeȱ 17
“construedȱagainstȱtheȱpartyȱmakingȱtheȱoffer.”86ȱȱBut,ȱasȱdiscussed,ȱ 18
theȱofferȱisȱnotȱambiguous.ȱȱLillyȱcannotȱreadȱambiguityȱintoȱtheȱclearȱ 19
termsȱ ofȱ theȱ contractȱ inȱ orderȱ toȱ invokeȱ theȱ doctrineȱ ofȱ contraȱ 20
proferentem.ȱ 21
Finally,ȱLillyȱurgesȱthatȱevenȱifȱtheȱofferȱofȱjudgment’sȱtermsȱdoȱ 22
inȱ factȱ precludeȱ feesȱ onȱ fees,ȱ thenȱ theyȱ shouldȱ beȱ heldȱ “voidȱ asȱ aȱ 23
matterȱofȱpublicȱpolicy.”87ȱȱWeȱareȱsympatheticȱtoȱtheȱfactȱthatȱbecauseȱ 24
theȱ partiesȱ wereȱ unableȱ toȱ agreeȱ onȱ reasonableȱ attorney’sȱ fees,ȱ 25
Rothmanȱwasȱforcedȱtoȱprepare,ȱfile,ȱandȱargueȱaȱfeeȱapplicationȱtoȱ 26
84ȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*7.ȱ
85ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ31–32.ȱ
86ȱSteiner,ȱ816ȱF.3dȱatȱ31.ȱ
87ȱAppelleeȬCrossȬAppellant’sȱBr.ȱatȱ36.ȱ

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24
seekȱhisȱfee,ȱandȱthatȱdueȱtoȱtheȱtermsȱofȱtheȱparties’ȱagreement,ȱheȱisȱ 1
notȱ ableȱ toȱ beȱ compensatedȱ forȱ thatȱ extraȱ work.ȱ ȱ Nonetheless,ȱ theȱ 2
argumentȱthatȱanȱofferȱofȱjudgmentȱorȱsettlementȱagreementȱthatȱcutsȱ 3
offȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱisȱvoidȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱpublicȱpolicyȱisȱcontradictedȱbyȱ 4
controllingȱSupremeȱCourtȱprecedent.ȱȱȱ 5
Inȱ Evansȱ v.ȱ Jeffȱ D.,ȱ theȱ Courtȱ heldȱ thatȱ becauseȱ theȱ Feesȱ Actȱ 6
bestowedȱtheȱrightȱtoȱanȱawardȱofȱattorney’sȱfeesȱinȱcivilȱrightsȱactionsȱ 7
toȱtheȱprevailingȱparty,ȱandȱnotȱtheȱattorney,ȱpartiesȱwereȱfreeȱtoȱwaiveȱ 8
theirȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱasȱpartȱofȱaȱsettlementȱagreementȱonȱtheȱ 9
merits.88ȱ ȱ Specificallyȱ theȱ Courtȱ statedȱ thatȱ Congressȱ neitherȱ 10
“bestowedȱ feeȱ awardsȱ uponȱ attorneysȱ norȱ renderedȱ themȱ 11
nonwaivableȱorȱnonnegotiable;ȱinstead,ȱitȱaddedȱthemȱtoȱtheȱarsenalȱ 12
ofȱremediesȱavailableȱtoȱcombatȱviolationsȱofȱcivilȱrights,ȱaȱgoalȱnotȱ 13
invariablyȱinconsistentȱwithȱconditioningȱsettlementȱonȱtheȱmeritsȱonȱ 14
aȱ waiverȱofȱ statutoryȱ attorney’sȱ fees.”89ȱ ȱ Theȱ Courtȱ reasonedȱ thatȱ itȱ 15
wouldȱ beȱ poorȱ policyȱ toȱ prohibitȱ litigantsȱ fromȱ waivingȱ theirȱ 16
statutoryȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱasȱpartȱofȱaȱcompromiseȱonȱtheȱmeritsȱ 17
becauseȱitȱwouldȱ“impedeȱvindicationȱofȱcivilȱrights,ȱatȱleastȱinȱsomeȱ 18
cases,ȱbyȱreducingȱtheȱattractivenessȱofȱsettlement.”90ȱȱIndeed,ȱbecauseȱ 19
theȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardȱisȱoftenȱsimilarȱtoȱorȱgreaterȱthanȱtheȱamountȱ 20
ofȱ damagesȱ receivedȱ onȱ theȱ merits,91ȱ itȱ isȱ “notȱ implausibleȱ toȱ 21
anticipateȱthatȱpartiesȱtoȱaȱsignificantȱnumberȱofȱcivilȱrightsȱcasesȱwillȱ 22
refuseȱ toȱ settleȱ ifȱ liabilityȱ forȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ remainsȱ open,ȱ therebyȱ 23
forcingȱ moreȱ casesȱ toȱ trial,ȱ unnecessarilyȱ burdeningȱ theȱ judicialȱ 24
88ȱ475ȱU.S.ȱ717,ȱ730–32ȱ(1986);ȱseeȱalsoȱVenegasȱv.ȱMitchell,ȱ495ȱU.S.ȱ82,ȱ87–88ȱ(1990)ȱ
(holdingȱ thatȱ itȱ isȱ theȱ party’sȱ rightȱ toȱ waive,ȱ settle,ȱ orȱ negotiateȱ theȱ party’sȱ
entitlementȱtoȱreceiveȱattorney’sȱfees).ȱȱ
89ȱEvans,ȱ475ȱU.S.ȱatȱ731–32.ȱ
90ȱId.ȱatȱ732.ȱ
91ȱId.ȱatȱ734–35ȱ&ȱn.24ȱ(collectingȱexamplesȱofȱattorney’sȱfeeȱawardsȱgreaterȱthanȱ
theȱmeritsȱaward).ȱȱInȱfact,ȱthisȱcaseȱisȱoneȱsuchȱexample.ȱ

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25
system,ȱ andȱ disservingȱ civilȱ rightsȱ litigants.”92ȱ ȱ Theseȱ 1
pronouncementsȱfromȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱillustrateȱthat,ȱcontraryȱtoȱ 2
Lilly’sȱarguments,ȱitȱisȱnotȱagainstȱpublicȱpolicyȱforȱlitigantsȱtoȱwaiveȱ 3
theirȱstatutoryȱrightȱtoȱattorney’sȱfees—letȱaloneȱfeesȱonȱfees.ȱ 4
Thus,ȱweȱconcludeȱthatȱwhenȱaȱsettlementȱcutsȱoffȱaȱplaintiff’sȱ 5
entitlementȱtoȱattorney’sȱfeesȱonȱaȱspecificȱdate,ȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱmayȱ 6
notȱawardȱaȱpartyȱattorney’sȱfeesȱforȱworkȱincurredȱafterȱthatȱcutȬoffȱ 7
date.ȱ ȱ Thisȱ includesȱ feesȱ forȱ workȱ performedȱ preparingȱ aȱ feeȱ 8
applicationȱsubmittedȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱinȱtheȱeventȱtheȱpartiesȱareȱ 9
unableȱtoȱagreeȱonȱtheȱattorney’sȱfeesȱtoȱbeȱawardedȱdespiteȱaȱgoodȱ 10
faithȱeffortȱtoȱnegotiate.93ȱȱIfȱaȱplaintiffȱdesiresȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱinȱtheȱeventȱ 11
aȱfeeȱapplicationȱtoȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱrequired,ȱtheȱplaintiffȱshouldȱ 12
ensureȱthatȱtheȱsettlementȱtermsȱdoȱnotȱforecloseȱtheȱavailabilityȱofȱ 13
suchȱfees.ȱȱAccordingly,ȱtheȱportionȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱandȱ 14
orderȱ grantingȱ Lillyȱ attorney’sȱ feesȱ forȱ allȱ workȱ performedȱ afterȱ 15
Octoberȱ26,ȱ2016,ȱcannotȱstand.ȱ 16
CONCLUSIONȱ 17
Weȱhaveȱconsideredȱtheȱparties’ȱotherȱargumentsȱandȱfindȱthemȱ 18
toȱbeȱwithoutȱmerit.ȱȱWeȱthereforeȱAFFIRM,ȱinȱpart,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱ 19
orderȱsettingȱRothman’sȱhourlyȱrateȱatȱ$450ȱperȱhourȱandȱreducingȱ 20
Lilly’sȱfeeȱawardȱbyȱtenȱpercentȱtoȱaccountȱforȱclericalȱtasksȱbilledȱbyȱ 21
92ȱId.ȱatȱ736–37.ȱ
93ȱBecauseȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱfoundȱthatȱtheȱpartiesȱinȱthisȱcaseȱnegotiatedȱinȱgoodȱ
faith,ȱseeȱLilly,ȱ2017ȱWLȱ3493249,ȱatȱ*8,ȱweȱdeclineȱtoȱconsiderȱwhetherȱaȱdistrictȱ
courtȱmay,ȱasȱaȱmatterȱofȱequityȱorȱotherwise,ȱawardȱfeesȱonȱfeesȱwhenȱaȱpartyȱ
negotiatesȱinȱbadȱfaith,ȱdespiteȱtheȱpresenceȱofȱaȱcutȬoffȱclauseȱinȱtheȱRuleȱ68ȱofferȱ
orȱsettlementȱagreement.ȱȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱLongȱv.ȱCityȱofȱNewȱYork,ȱNo.ȱ09ȱCiv.ȱ6099ȱ(AKH),ȱ
2010ȱU.S.ȱDist.ȱLEXISȱ81020,ȱatȱ*5–6ȱ(S.D.N.Y.ȱAug.ȱ6,ȱ2010)ȱ(“TheȱRuleȱ68ȱjudgmentȱ
limitedȱ recoverableȱ feesȱ andȱ expensesȱ toȱ thoseȱ incurredȱ priorȱ toȱ theȱ dateȱ ofȱ theȱ
offer.ȱ ȱ Ifȱ theȱ City’sȱ disputeȱ overȱ recoverableȱ feesȱ wereȱ inȱ badȱ faith,ȱ th[e]nȱ
compensationȱ forȱ theȱ workȱ necessaryȱ forȱ plaintiff[’]sȱ feeȱ applicationȱ mayȱ beȱ
justified.”).ȱ

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Rothman,ȱ andȱ REVERSEȱ andȱ VACATE,ȱ inȱ part,ȱ theȱ districtȱ court’sȱ 1
decisionȱandȱorderȱawardingȱLillyȱ$7,290.00ȱforȱRothman’sȱworkȱonȱ 2
theȱfeeȱapplicationȱandȱreplyȱbriefȱinȱsupportȱofȱthatȱapplication.ȱ 3

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