In the Matter of Energetic Tank, Inc.

22-1765-cv (L)
In the Matter of Energetic Tank, Inc.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
________
AUGUST TERM 2023
ARGUED: JANUARY 18, 2024
DECIDED: JULY 26, 2024
Nos. 22-1765, 22-2774, 22-2871,
22-2883
IN THE MATTER OF ENERGETIC TANK, INC.
ENERGETIC TANK, INC., as Owner of the M/V ALNIC MC, for
Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability,
Plaintiff–Counter-Defendant–Appellant–Cross-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Claimant–Counter-Claimant–Counter-Defendant–Appellee,
UNKNOWN DEFENDANT,
Defendant–Counter-Defendant–Appellee,
NAVIN RAMDHUN,
Defendant–Counter-Claimant–Appellee,
MARK JOSEPH LIGON, MALACHI SHANNON,
Claimants–Counter-Claimants–Counter-Defendants–Appellees,

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2 No. 22-1765-cv
ANDY ACERET, MICHAEL WUEST, JOSHUA PATAT, ASHANTI MOLTON,
DONNOVAN LAMARCUS JONES, AYAKA JOSEPH, XIOMARO CUEVAS
SOTO, DEVIN MASK, PATRICK JOSEPH, HARUKA RAMDHUN, CHEYSSERR
LUANGCO, CARMELO CASTRO, PHILIP TORIO, PHILLIP FIELDS, JAMES
ANDY WOODS, JOHN B. RAY, RODRIGO OWEN TIONQUIAO, JERRELL
DEAN, CLEMBER MIRANDA, MICHAEL COLLINS, DEDRICK WALKER,
MILTON O. LOVELACE, DAVION REESE, JUAN ROMERO, AKIMWALLE
WINTER, VARES BELONY, TRACEY LOVELACE, DELANDO BECKFORD,
VICTOR GRANADOS, BYRON JAMAL JOHNSON,
Counter-Claimants–Claimants–Appellees–Cross-Appellants,
GILLEON GILLIS, JOHN HOAGLAND, KAREN DOYON, RICHARD LOPEZ,
TAYLOR TROY, KAREN BUSHELL, RACHEL ECKELS, THERESA PALMER,
DARRYL SMITH, AMY WINTERS, JACQUELINE INGRAM, GAO YONG,
DONNEL ROBINSON, MR. DOYLE A EBARB, JOSHUA BRUCE HOOK,
JASON LUANGCO, FRANCESCO SANFILIPPO, ALEXIS SANFILIPPO, NESTOR
CUEVAS SOTO, JOSEPH K ROBBINS,
Counter-Claimants–Claimants–Appellees,
KERRINGTON HARVEY, JASON BALDWIN, BRANDON YORK,
Claimants–Appellees–Cross-Appellants,
MATTHEW MONTGOMERY, JENNIFER SIMON, KAREN TOLLEY, as
personal representative of the Estate of Brandon Tolley,
Claimants–Appellees,
BRANDON TOLLEY,
Claimant.*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
________
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption in this
case to conform with the caption above.

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3 No. 22-1765-cv
Before: WALKER, CARNEY, and PARK, Circuit Judges.
________
Before dawn on August 21, 2017 in the Singapore Strait, the
M/V ALNIC (“ALNIC”), a Liberian-flagged oil-and-chemical tanker,
collided with the U.S.S. JOHN S. MCCAIN (“MCCAIN”), a Navy
destroyer. Ten Navy sailors died and dozens more were injured.
Both vessels, and especially MCCAIN, sustained significant damage.
ALNIC’s owner, Energetic Tank, Inc. (“Energetic”), petitioned
for exoneration from or limitation of liability for the collision. Forty-
one Navy sailors or their representatives (“the Sailor-Claimants”)
filed claims for damages against Energetic. So did the United States,
against which Energetic filed a counterclaim. Subsequently,
Energetic and the United States agreed upon the monetary value of
the damages to ALNIC and to MCCAIN as $442,445 and $185 million,
respectively.
First, the district court (Crotty, J.) concluded that Singapore law
would govern both the determination of liability and the calculation
of the Sailor-Claimants’ damages. Then, after a Phase 1 bench trial
concerning only liability, the district court denied Energetic’s petition
for exoneration from or limitation of liability. It allocated fault for the
collision: 80% to the United States and 20% to Energetic. Based on the
20% of damages apportioned to Energetic, the claim of the United
States against Energetic is $36,646,044, plus interest. The district court
then indicated that it would proceed to a Phase 2 trial, to determine
damages to the Sailor-Claimants. Energetic appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the district court dismissed
Energetic’s claims for contribution or indemnity against the United
States for any damages that might be awarded to the Sailor-Claimants
during the Phase 2 trial as barred by sovereign immunity. Energetic

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4 No. 22-1765-cv
also appealed this order.
Following its decision on sovereign immunity, the district court
retroactively certified that its earlier opinion on the apportionment of
liability was a final judgment as to the United States. Subsequently,
several Sailor-Claimants cross-appealed, challenging the district
court’s earlier decision applying Singapore law to the calculation of
damages. We consolidated the various appeals.
We find no error in either the district court’s apportionment of
liability under Singapore law or its sovereign immunity ruling. We
therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and order on
Energetic’s appeals. The district court’s choice-of-law ruling,
however, is a non-appealable collateral order. We accordingly
DISMISS the Sailor-Claimants’ cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
________
DAVID J. WEINER, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, Washington, DC (Stephen K. Wirth, Arnold
& Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC;
Thomas H. Belknap, Jr., Alan M. Weigel, Blank
Rome LLP, New York, NY, on the brief ), for
Plaintiff–Counter-Defendant–Appellant–Cross-
Appellee Energetic Tank, Inc.
ANNE MURPHY, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, DC (Brian M. Boynton, Stephen
Flynn, Jessica Sullivan, Kyle Fralick, Thomas M.
Brown, on the brief ), for Claimant–Counter-
Claimant–Counter-Defendant–Appellee United States
of America.
PAUL T. HOFMANN, Hofmann & Schweitzer, New
York, NY (Dario A. Chinigo, on the brief ), for
Counter-Claimants–Claimants–Appellees–Cross-

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5 No. 22-1765-cv
Appellants Andy Aceret, et al. and Claimants-
Appellees–Cross-Appellants Kerrington Harvey, et al.
Jacob Shisha, Tabak Mellusi & Shisha LLP, New
York, NY, for Counter-Claimants–Claimants–
Appellees Joshua Bruce Hook, et al.
Roy C. Dripps, Michael T. Blotevogel, Armbruster
Dripps Blotevogel, LLC, Maryville, IL, for Counter-
Claimants–Claimants–Appellees Francesco & Alexis
Sanfilippo
________
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
Before dawn on August 21, 2017 in the Singapore Strait, the
M/V ALNIC (“ALNIC”), a Liberian-flagged oil-and-chemical tanker,
collided with the U.S.S. JOHN S. MCCAIN (“MCCAIN”), a Navy
destroyer. Ten Navy sailors died and dozens more were injured.
Both vessels, and especially MCCAIN, sustained significant damage.
ALNIC’s owner, Energetic Tank, Inc. (“Energetic”), petitioned
for exoneration from or limitation of liability for the collision. Forty-
one Navy sailors or their representatives (“the Sailor-Claimants”)
filed claims for damages against Energetic. So did the United States,
against which Energetic filed a counterclaim. Subsequently,
Energetic and the United States agreed upon the monetary value of
the damages to ALNIC and to MCCAIN as $442,445 and $185 million,
respectively.
First, the district court (Crotty, J.) concluded that Singapore law
would govern both the determination of liability and the calculation
of the Sailor-Claimants’ damages. Then, after a Phase 1 bench trial
concerning only liability, the district court denied Energetic’s petition
for exoneration from or limitation of liability. It allocated fault for the

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6 No. 22-1765-cv
collision: 80% to the United States and 20% to Energetic. Based on the
20% of damages apportioned to Energetic, the claim of the United
States against Energetic is $36,646,044, plus interest. The district court
then indicated that it would proceed to a Phase 2 trial, to determine
damages to the Sailor-Claimants. Energetic appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the district court dismissed
Energetic’s claims for contribution or indemnity against the United
States for any damages that might be awarded to the Sailor-Claimants
during the Phase 2 trial as barred by sovereign immunity. Energetic
also appealed this order.
Following its decision on sovereign immunity, the district court
retroactively certified that its earlier opinion on the apportionment of
liability was a final judgment as to the United States. Subsequently,
several Sailor-Claimants cross-appealed, challenging the district
court’s earlier decision applying Singapore law to the calculation of
damages. We consolidated the various appeals.
We find no error in either the district court’s apportionment of
liability under Singapore law or its sovereign immunity ruling. We
therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and order on
Energetic’s appeals. The district court’s choice-of-law ruling,
however, is a non-appealable collateral order. We accordingly
DISMISS the Sailor-Claimants’ cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

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7 No. 22-1765-cv
BACKGROUND2
I. ALNIC’s and MCCAIN’s Underlying Staffing and Steering
Problems.
The Singapore Strait is a relatively confined space in one of the
world’s busiest shipping corridors. Both ALNIC’s and MCCAIN’s
crews knew that navigating the Strait required special precautions.
Yet neither vessel was well prepared. These failures, some of which
were months in the making, created conditions ripe for disaster. We
consider conduct aboard ALNIC and MCCAIN in turn.
a. ALNIC’s Staffing and Steering Problems.
ALNIC was by far the larger of the two vessels involved. She is
about 600 feet long. Loaded with fuel oil at the time of the collision,
ALNIC weighed about 39,000 metric tons. When ALNIC was at full
speed ahead, coming to a full stop required 7 minutes and 1.35
nautical miles.
Some of ALNIC’s problems pertained to staffing. ALNIC’s
manager, Stealth Maritime Corporation S.A. (“Stealth”), placed the
vessel under internal regulations called the Safety Management
System, or SMS. The SMS required ships in the Singapore Strait to be
at their greatest possible readiness, what Stealth called “Bridge
Manning Level III.” Bridge Manning Level III called for five mariners
staffing ALNIC’s bridge (her command center), including a fully
dedicated anti-collision officer and a fully dedicated lookout.
ALNIC’s crew did not heed these requirements. On the morning
of the collision on August 21, ALNIC was designated only at Bridge
2 We draw our discussion from the trial record and the district court’s post-
trial opinion. Except as noted otherwise, these facts are undisputed on appeal.

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8 No. 22-1765-cv
Manning Level II. But in fact, with one crew member off duty and
another working in the walled-off chart room when the collision
occurred, the vessel was effectively at Bridge Manning Level I. That
meant there were only three people staffing the bridge, including
ALNIC’s captain, Ritchie Nolasco. There was no anti-collision officer
present and the lookout was serving simultaneously as the helmsman.
Other problems related to steering or, more precisely, the lack
of steering. The SMS required ALNIC to be under manual steering
while in the Singapore Strait. Instead, on August 21 and until after
the collision, the ship remained on autopilot. This issue was
intertwined with the staffing shortfall: had ALNIC been properly off
autopilot she would have been steered by the helmsman. But that
same seaman was also acting that morning as a lookout.
ALNIC’s issues were no secret and no surprise. During a routine
audit in May 2017, Stealth’s Marine Superintendent witnessed ALNIC
improperly transit the Singapore Strait at Bridge Manning Level I.
The Superintendent testified that he instructed ALNIC’s crew on
proper conduct in the Strait, although Captain Nolasco and another
ALNIC officer denied they received such instruction.
The Superintendent also stated more generally that, of the
seventy vessels he had audited for Stealth, ALNIC’s performance was
among the two worst. The Superintendent conveyed his concerns to
Stealth, but the company took no action.
b. MCCAIN’s Staffing and Steering Problems.
MCCAIN is smaller and more agile than ALNIC. She is 505 feet
long and weighs about 9,000 metric tons, as compared to ALNIC’s 600
feet and 39,000 metric tons. MCCAIN can stop “very quickly”
compared to commercial vessels, but “not instantaneous[ly].” Matter

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9 No. 22-1765-cv
of Energetic Tank, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 3d 328, 336, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)
(“Energetic Tank”).
MCCAIN’s problems related primarily to the crew’s use of a
new steering system. Roughly one year before the collision, the Navy
had installed on MCCAIN an Integrated Bridge and Navigation
System, or “IBNS.” The IBNS “look[ed] nothing like a traditional
steering console.” Id. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rather, the IBNS encompassed several steering stations on the bridge
and elsewhere, each of which included both a touchscreen and
physical buttons. Two manual steering wheels remained: one
between the helm and lee helm stations on the bridge and the other at
the aft steering station near the vessel’s stern.
The IBNS allowed those in charge of the controls to transfer
steering from one station to another. Ordinarily, both the station
controlling steering and the station receiving steering would need to
consent to this transfer. But when the IBNS was in “backup manual”
mode, with some of its computer features disabled, one station could
unilaterally seize steering control from another. One physical
component of each IBNS station was the “Emergency Override to
Manual” button, commonly known as the “Big Red Button.” Pressing
the Big Red Button at one station would unilaterally take control of
steering away from any other station on MCCAIN.
MCCAIN’s crew—including the ship’s captain, Commander
Alfredo Sanchez—lacked “basic . . . knowledge” of the IBNS. Id. at
340 (internal quotation marks omitted). This ignorance extended to
the Big Red Button. Commander Sanchez and others mistakenly
believed that pressing the Button would send steering control to the

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10 No. 22-1765-cv
aft steering station. Moreover, the crew did not understand that the
Big Red Button operated unilaterally.
MCCAIN’s IBNS was also unreliable in ways compounded by
the crew’s unfamiliarity with the system. The computer-driven IBNS
had crashed several times, leading Commander Sanchez to complain
to offboard Navy technicians. In fact, one technician was due in
Singapore to repair the IBNS upon MCCAIN’s arrival. In the
meantime, Commander Sanchez’s preferred “workaround” for IBNS
glitches was to switch the destroyer to backup manual mode—“a
system setting which affected steering control in ways that neither he
nor his crew understood.” Id. MCCAIN was in backup manual mode
when the collision occurred.
MCCAIN, like ALNIC, also suffered staffing shortfalls.
MCCAIN’s officers had recommended an extensive “Sea and Anchor
Detail” while navigating the Singapore Strait. Instead, Commander
Sanchez opted for a more limited “Modified Navigation Detail.” That
still meant MCCAIN had fifteen crewmembers on her bridge at the
time of the collision, but the sailors controlling thrust and steering
were both fewer in number and less experienced than the Sea and
Anchor Detail would have required.
II. MCCAIN’s Loss of Steering Control and ALNIC’s Initial
Response.
In the early hours of August 21, 2017, ALNIC and MCCAIN were
heading west in the busy Singapore Strait, both bound for Singapore.
Under the Strait’s Traffic Separation Scheme—essentially a maritime
highway—each ship was in the same “lane.” So, too, were several
other vessels. ALNIC was ahead and to port (i.e., left) of MCCAIN.
Although the seas were calm and the weather clear, the pre-dawn sky

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11 No. 22-1765-cv
was dark and moonless. MCCAIN was moving quickly by Strait
standards, 20 knots, and was in the process of overtaking ALNIC.
Trouble began around 5:20:30 AM local time, which was
3 minutes, 28 seconds before the collision (“bc”). That was when
Commander Sanchez ordered that MCCAIN’s thrust control be
transferred from one IBNS station (the helm) to another adjacent
station (the lee helm). Unbeknownst to all involved, however, the
thrusts were “un-ganged,” which meant the vessel’s two propellers
operated independently instead of in unison. Consequently, when
MCCAIN’s crew carried out Commander Sanchez’s order, only control
of the port thrust shifted to the lee helm, while control of the starboard
(i.e., right) thrust remained with the helm.
Soon after, at 5:20:39 (3:19 bc), MCCAIN’s helmsman reported
that he had lost the ability to steer using the manual wheel between
the helm and the lee helm. A Navy investigation found that the crew
had inadvertently transferred steering control from the helm to the
lee helm when transferring the thrust to the lee helm. See App’x at
4999–5000. Before steering control was transferred, the helmsman
had been steering slightly to starboard to maintain a steady course.
But when steering control was transferred, the rudders reset to a
neutral position. MCCAIN then began turning to port—toward
ALNIC. Within one minute, around 5:21:00 (2:58 bc), MCCAIN’s crew
announced loss of steering to the destroyer’s bridge.
Crewmembers at the IBNS stations both on the bridge and at
the aft steering position responded by pressing the Big Red Button,
mistakenly thinking it would send control to aft steering. Instead,
because pushing the button acquired steering, “control of steering
ping-ponged around the ship, with none of the crew understanding

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12 No. 22-1765-cv
where it was at any given time, or how to get it back.” Energetic Tank,
607 F. Supp. 3d at 348.
Twenty-three seconds later, at 5:21:23 (2:35 bc), an
announcement sounded on MCCAIN’s internal and external speakers:
“Loss of steering in the pilot house, loss of steering in the pilot house.
Man aft steering.” Id. Microphones on ALNIC’s bridge wings picked
up this announcement across the water.
At 5:21:25 (2:33 bc), at Commander Sanchez’s order, MCCAIN’s
crew activated “red-over-red” lights on the ship’s masthead. This
configuration indicates to other vessels that a vessel is “not under
command” and, hence, at risk of collision. Energetic denies that
MCCAIN signaled red-over-red properly in all respects. We further
address this issue below.
By 5:21:52 (2:06 bc), MCCAIN’s veering to port was visible on
ALNIC’s X-band radar. Seconds later, Captain Nolasco prompted
ALNIC’s S-band radar to calculate whether ALNIC and MCCAIN were
on a collision course. The calculation would take fifty seconds.
During this time, ALNIC took no other action to avoid colliding with
MCCAIN.
At 5:22:06 (1:52 bc), Commander Sanchez ordered MCCAIN’s
crew to reduce the vessel’s speed from 20 knots to 10. MCCAIN’s lee
helmsman complied, not knowing that because the thrust remained

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13 No. 22-1765-cv
un-ganged, he was reducing only the port thrust, causing MCCAIN to
veer even more to port, toward ALNIC’s path.
The district court found that at 5:22:31 (1:27 bc), “reasonable
mariners could [still] have disagreed [as to] whether MCCAIN would
collide with ALNIC,” given MCCAIN’s apparent trajectory. Id. at 356.
III. ALNIC’s Collision Alarm.
At 5:22:43 (1:15 bc), ALNIC’s S-band radar completed its
collision calculation and triggered a collision alarm on the bridge.
Energetic argues that this alarm signaled only that MCCAIN was on
course to be 0.27 nautical miles away from ALNIC. The district court,
however, found that the alarm signified “an imminent actual
collision, not just a close call.” Id. at 351 n.12.
Two seconds after ALNIC’s alarm began to blare, at 5:22:45 (1:13
bc), Commander Sanchez ordered MCCAIN’s crew to reduce the
destroyer’s speed once more—now from 10 knots to 5. Still,
unbeknownst to all, the thrust remained un-ganged. Trying to carry
out Commander Sanchez’s order, the lee helmsman again reduced
only the port thrust, turning the vessel even more sharply.
At 5:22:58 (1:00 bc), ALNIC’s crew silenced the collision alarm.
ALNIC’s autopilot course and speed remained unchanged.
IV. The Collision.
ALNIC’s crew continued to passively observe MCCAIN as the
destroyer drew near. At 5:23:02 (0:56 bc), someone on ALNIC’s bridge
observed that MCCAIN appeared to be trying to pass between ALNIC
and another vessel. At first, the observer “guess[ed]” the maneuver

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14 No. 22-1765-cv
would work.3 Id. at 352. Then, at 5:23:17 (0:41 bc), the same
crewmember determined that MCCAIN was doing a “wrong
maneuver.” Id. The district court found that by 5:23:20 (0:38 bc),
MCCAIN’s veering was “glaringly apparent” on ALNIC’s X-band
radar. Id. Still, ALNIC kept her course and speed. Neither vessel
signaled danger by sounding its horn or attempted to contact the
other by radio.
At 5:23:27 (0:31 bc), MCCAIN’s crew at aft steering—the IBNS
station near the destroyer’s stern—secured control of MCCAIN’s
steering. That station, however, had retained an earlier “hard left”
order that took effect when aft steering gained rudder control. Thus,
for several seconds, MCCAIN turned still more to port, placing her
almost directly in front of ALNIC.
At 5:23:44 (0:14 bc), MCCAIN finally began correcting course by
turning to starboard. Commander Sanchez testified that he
recognized that a collision was imminent. Yet he hoped that turning
would at least avoid a “T-bone” impact and reduce the damage to
MCCAIN.
That same moment, Captain Nolasco reduced ALNIC’s engine
from full ahead to half ahead—the vessel’s first and only pre-collision
adjustment. Although this slowed the engine from 92 RPM to 73
RPM, it did not appreciably reduce ALNIC’s speed before collision.
At 5:23:58, ALNIC and MCCAIN collided. ALNIC’s bow struck
MCCAIN’s port side at an angle of around 48.5 degrees, piercing the
3 Audio on ALNIC’s bridge was recorded by the tanker’s black box. The
parties stipulated to the accuracy of the transcript cited in litigation and of
any translations into English.

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15 No. 22-1765-cv
destroyer’s hull and entering several crew compartments. For 66
seconds, the vessels remained entangled.
ALNIC’s engine continued running at 73 RPM. Only 42 seconds
after impact did Captain Nolasco order “all stop.” And for another
20 seconds after that, ALNIC remained on autopilot.
ALNIC’s continued propulsion and automatic navigation
exacerbated the collision. While the vessels were entangled, ALNIC’s
computerized navigation system detected that ALNIC had veered to
port and tried to redirect her. However, the combination of the
vessels’ momentum and ALNIC’s automated maneuver caused
ALNIC’s bow to sweep over 45 degrees to starboard, tearing through
more of MCCAIN’s hull.
The damage was terrible. MCCAIN’s Berthing 5, which was
located below the waterline, flooded completely, drowning ten
sailors. Three of MCCAIN’s decks were struck. Still more
destruction—and potential death—was averted only through the
swift and decisive action of MCCAIN’s crew.
V. False Statements by ALNIC’s Crewmembers.
Several post-collision revelations warrant special mention here.
Discovery in this litigation revealed—as Energetic
acknowledges—that ALNIC’s crewmembers falsified entries in the

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16 No. 22-1765-cv
vessel’s logs, obscuring what happened just before the collision.
These lies included:
1. “[T]hat there was a fifth member of ALNIC’s crew serving
as the lookout when, in fact, there was not”;
2. “[T]hat ALNIC was at Bridge Manning Level II before the
collision, when it was really at Bridge Manning Level I
because of the missing crewmembers”;
3. “[T]hat the crew had stopped the engine . . . at 05:22,” before
the collision at 05:23:58, “when in fact it was only put to half
ahead at 05:23:44 and was not stopped until about 05:24:30”;
and
4. “[T]hat steering was switched from autopilot to manual
steering several hours before the collision, at 03:00, when it
actually remained on autopilot until after the collision.”
Id. at 357.
The district court also found that two of ALNIC’s crewmembers
made other false statements not in the logs. First, one ALNIC seaman
told investigators that he saw MCCAIN display regular lights, rather
than red-over-red lights. That same seaman had falsified a log entry
stating he was on ALNIC’S bridge on the morning of the collision. This
led to a further lie that he had been well-positioned to see MCCAIN’s
lights. Second, Captain Nolasco testified in his deposition for this case
that he had not seen MCCAIN display her red-over-red signal, but
only red sidelights. Yet Captain Nolasco had earlier confirmed to

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17 No. 22-1765-cv
Singapore authorities that he had seen and understood MCCAIN’s red-
over-red signal. He failed to explain this discrepancy.
Given these inconsistencies, the district court found that
testimony by ALNIC’s crewmembers that they never observed red-
over-red lights on MCCAIN was not credible.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 15, 2018, Energetic initiated this action under the
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–02, 30521–30.4
That statute permits the owner of a vessel to limit its liability for any
“injury by collision,” including personal injury, to “the value of [that]
vessel and pending freight.” Id. at § 30523(a)-(b); see The 84-H, 296 F.
427, 430 (2d Cir. 1923). “The animating premise of the [Act] is that the
owner of a vessel is generally an absentee who entrusts the vessel to
the command of a captain whom the owner has limited ability to
supervise or control once the vessel is on the sea.” Bensch v. Est. of
Umar, 2 F.4th 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2021). “The Act thus protects the owner
of a vessel from unlimited vicarious liability for damages caused by
the negligence of his captain or crew.” Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina
of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2014).
To benefit from this limitation, the collision must have occurred
“without the privity or knowledge of the owner.” 46 U.S.C.
§ 30523(b). “The phrase ‘privity or knowledge’ is a ’term of art
meaning complicity in the fault that caused the accident.’” In re
Complaint of Messina, 574 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Blackler
v. F. Jacobus Transp. Co., 243 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam)).
Thus, if Energetic could establish that it was not complicit in ALNIC’s
4 Sections 30521–30 correspond to what the district court, relying upon
an earlier version of the Act, cited as §§ 30503–12.

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18 No. 22-1765-cv
collision with MCCAIN, Energetic’s liability would be limited to the
value of ALNIC and her freight.
Since the goal of the limitation action is to cap the owner’s
liability, the Act also channels claims. A liability cap is valuable only
when potential liabilities would otherwise exceed the cap. So when
claims exceed the value of the ship and her freight, the Act provides
that “all claimants shall be paid in proportion to their respective
losses.” 46 U.S.C. § 30525(1). To calculate the proportion to which
each claimant is entitled and to ensure an equitable distribution, all
claims against a shipowner arising from the collision must be brought
within the limitation action; any preexisting actions are enjoined. See
id. at § 30529(c); Rule F(3) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or
Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Following
Energetic’s petition for limitation or exoneration, forty-two parties
filed claims against Energetic. Of these, forty-one were Navy sailors
or their representatives, who filed claims for death or injury; the other
was the United States, which filed a claim for MCCAIN’s damages.
Energetic also counterclaimed for contribution or indemnity from the
United States, invoking the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30903,
and the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31102.
The district court bifurcated proceedings. In Phase 1, the court
would determine apportionment of fault between ALNIC and
MCCAIN. In Phase 2, the court would adjudicate the wrongful death
and personal injury claims.
On January 10, 2020, the district court granted Energetic’s
motion to apply Singapore law both to determine liability and to
calculate damages. Three groups of Sailor-Claimants—the
“Sanfilippo Claimants,” the “Hofmann & Schweitzer Claimants,” and

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19 No. 22-1765-cv
the “Tabak Claimants”—sought reconsideration of this decision. The
district court denied reconsideration.
Before trial, the United States and Energetic stipulated that,
excluding interest, MCCAIN’s damages were $185,000,000 and
ALNIC’s were $442,445.
In November 2021, the district court conducted a five-day,
Phase 1 bench trial to apportion liability. On June 15, 2022, the district
court issued a post-trial opinion and order allocating 80% of fault for
the collision to MCCAIN and 20% to ALNIC. The district court, finding
privity or knowledge on the part of Energetic, declined to limit
Energetic’s liability. This resulted in Energetic’s responsibility for
around $37 million in vessel damages, plus interest—20% of
MCCAIN’s damages less 80% of ALNIC’s damages.
In brief, the district court concluded that ALNIC’s negligence
proximately caused the collision and resulting damage in three
respects. First, her bridge was “understaff[ed]” “in the heavily
trafficked Singapore Strait.” Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 363.
Second, ALNIC failed to turn or significantly slow down starting at
5:23:17 (0:41 bc), at which time “it should have been clear to everyone
that MCCAIN could no longer avoid the collision by her actions
alone.” Id. at 367. And third, ALNIC “left her engines running for 42
seconds after the collision and left her autopilot on for over a minute,”
which exacerbated the damage to MCCAIN. Id. at 368. The district
court also determined that ALNIC’s fault was compounded by her
crew’s false statements after the collision. See id. at 368–69.
Energetic and the United States both filed interlocutory
appeals.5 On October 5, 2022, we remanded the case at the district
5 The United States withdrew its cross-appeal with prejudice before
briefing was complete.

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20 No. 22-1765-cv
court’s request so that, among other things, the district court could
certify its post-trial order as a final judgment. The next day, the
district court ordered that its June 15 order “was intended to be a final
judgment regarding the United States” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),
and that there was “no just reason for delay” in issuing that judgment.
Special App’x at 73.
On October 12, 2022, the district court issued an opinion and
order addressing the United States’s defense of sovereign immunity.
The district court concluded that, although the United States had
waived its sovereign immunity against Energetic’s counterclaim for
vessel damages, it had not done so against Energetic’s counterclaims for
contribution for or indemnification against potential personal damages.
The district court therefore dismissed Energetic’s contribution and
indemnification claims. In the same opinion, the district court
declined to stay the case pending appeal.
On October 13, 2022, we reinstated the appeal without a new
notice of appeal under United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir.
1994).
On November 4, 2022, the Hofmann & Schweitzer and the
Tabak Claimants (together, the “Cross-Appellants”) filed cross-

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21 No. 22-1765-cv
appeals to contest the district court’s decision to calculate damages
using Singapore law.6
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction.
We begin, as we must, by “assur[ing] ourselves” of our
appellate jurisdiction. Maye v. City of New Haven, 89 F.4th 403, 406 (2d
Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider Energetic’s appeals of
the district court’s Phase 1 order and of the district court’s order
dismissing Energetic’s contribution and indemnification claims. By
contrast, we lack jurisdiction over the cross-appeals challenging the
district court’s choice-of-law decision. We therefore dismiss the
cross-appeals.
A. General Principles of Appellate Jurisdiction.
“The jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals to entertain
appeals from decisions of the district court[s] is circumscribed by
statute.” Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2008). In this case,
we look primarily to two provisions of the federal Judicial Code,
§ 1291 and § 1292, and to the judicial rules and doctrines
implementing those sections.
Section 1291 establishes the baseline rule. That provision
permits us to hear appeals from “final decisions of the district courts.”
28 U.S.C. § 1291.7 Final decisions are “embodied” in final judgments.
6 The Sanfilippo Claimants also filed a cross-appeal, which they, too,
withdrew with prejudice while this appeal was pending.
7 Section 1291 provides, in relevant part: “The courts of appeals . . . shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of

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22 No. 22-1765-cv
Transp. Workers Union of Am., Loc. 100 v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 505 F.3d
226, 230 (2d Cir. 2007). Ordinarily, such judgments “conclusively
determine[] all pending claims of all the parties to the litigation,
leaving nothing for the court to do but execute its decision.” Petrello,
533 F.3d at 113. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and our
precedent, however, embrace a “practical construction” of § 1291,
permitting appeals from a limited class of other orders we consider
“final,” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006), even though they do
not “resolve all claims of all parties,” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 88
F.4th 369, 376 (2d Cir. 2023).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) authorizes appeals from
certain “partial final judgment[s]” addressing “fewer than all parties”
or resolving fewer than “all claims.”8 Scottsdale, 88 F.4th at 376. Such
judgments must be expressly designated for appeal by the district
court, as we discuss below. This procedure was “designed to permit
acceleration of appeals in multiple-claim cases,” Gelboim v. Bank of Am.
Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 416 (2015), while leaving “unimpaired the
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
8 Rule 54(b) provides: “When an action presents more than one claim for
relief--whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--
or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the
court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise,
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties
does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised
at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and
all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

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23 No. 22-1765-cv
statutory concept of finality prescribed by [§] 1291,” Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434 (1956).
Another rule, the “collateral order doctrine,” permits appeals
from a “small class” of rulings that do not resolve the merits of any
claim. Will, 546 U.S. at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). Like
Rule 54(b), the collateral-order doctrine is not “an exception to”
§ 1291’s “final decision rule,” but an application of it. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). This doctrine has a “modest scope”: it
permits appeals only of those rare decisions “too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Finally for our purposes, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 gives us jurisdiction
over appeals from some interlocutory—that is, non-final—orders,
including those pertaining to injunctions, the appointment of
receivers, and other limited matters. Relevant here is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(3), which establishes our jurisdiction over some
“[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of
the parties to admiralty cases.”9 That such appeals are available in
admiralty, but not in other areas, reflects “the once common
admiralty practice of referring the determination of damages to a
master or commissioner after resolving the issue of liability.” Chem
9 Section 1292(a)(3) provides, in relevant part: “[T]he courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from . . . (3) Interlocutory decrees of such
district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of
the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are
allowed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).

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24 No. 22-1765-cv
One, Ltd. v. M/V RICKMERS GENOA, 660 F.3d 626, 638 (2d Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
For us to decide the various appeals now before us, we must
have jurisdiction either under § 1291 (as implemented by Rule 54(b)
or the collateral-order doctrine) or under § 1292(a)(3).
B. The District Court’s Phase 1 Order Was Appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Rule 54(b) as a Partial Final
Judgment Pertaining to Damage to the Vessels and
Apportionment of Liability.
We first consider whether the district court’s Phase 1 order was
an appealable “final decision[]” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Phase 1
order did not “resolve all claims of all parties.” Scottsdale, 88 F.4th at
376. Rather, it left for a Phase 2 trial the Sailor-Claimants’ claims for
personal damages. Nonetheless, the parties invoke our jurisdiction
over appeals from partial final judgments under Rule 54(b).10
Rule 54(b) does not automatically permit appeal of every
partial final judgment. Rather, the district court must exercise its
discretion to invoke the Rule and certify the appeal. See Harriscom
Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1991).
Certification is appropriate only to serve the “interests of sound
judicial administration” or to avoid “some danger of hardship or
injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate
appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted and
alteration incorporated). Consistent with this requirement, the
district court must (1) “expressly determine[] that there is no just
10 The district court observed in a letter to this court that we would likely
have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), even absent
a Rule 54(b) certification. Because we conclude that our jurisdiction is
secure under § 1291, we need not address that theory.

-- 24 of 47 --

25 No. 22-1765-cv
reason for delay,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and (2) provide “a brief,
reasoned explanation” for that determination, Scottsdale, 88 F.4th at
378 (internal quotation marks omitted). This explanation must
ordinarily offer “well-reasoned conclusions” rather than “mere
boiler-plate approval.” Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, 642 F.3d 304, 310
(2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, we may “excuse[] a failure to state reasons ‘[w]here the
reasons . . . are obvious . . . and a remand to the district court would
result only in unnecessary delay in the appeal process.’” Brown v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 355 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fletcher v. Marino,
882 F.2d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Rule 54(b)’s application is limited in two-phase proceedings
such as this one. An order “limited to the issue of liability, which
reserves the issue of damages and other relief is not final within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314,
323 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Such an order is therefore “not certifiable pursuant to Rule 54(b).” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That said, Rule 54(b)
does authorize certification where the district court has both
determined liability and “fixed the damages.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying its
June 15, 2022 Phase 1 order as a partial final judgment. The Phase 1
opinion and order resolved the United States’s liability in its claim for
damages against Energetic. Moreover, here, as in Linde, the damages
were “fixed”: the parties had agreed upon the monetary damages to
MCCAIN and to ALNIC. Finally, the district court concluded that “the
Phase I Opinion presents one judgment, neatly bundled” for appellate
review; that certification would avoid “unnecessary delay in the
appeal process;” and that there was little risk of “piecemeal appeals.”
Special App’x 74. The district court provided little justification for

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26 No. 22-1765-cv
these conclusions. Nonetheless, and especially in view of our
previous remand for the purpose of certification, the district court’s
explanation was adequate. See Brown, 654 F.3d at 355. We therefore
have jurisdiction under § 1291 to review the Phase 1 opinion.
C. The District Court’s Order Dismissing Energetic’s
Contribution and Indemnity Claims Was Appealable as
an Interlocutory Admiralty Order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(3).
The district court’s October 12, 2022 order concerning
sovereign immunity implicates a different provision: § 1292(a)(3).
Contrary to Energetic’s suggestion, § 1291 is inapplicable to the
sovereign-immunity order. In general, orders that “allow the
litigation to continue are not final for purposes of § 1291 and therefore
are not immediately appealable.” Ashmore v. CGI Grp., Inc., 860 F.3d
80, 84 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted and alteration incorporated). That includes orders
that dismiss some but not all claims. Here, the district court dismissed
Energetic’s contribution and indemnity claims against the United
States as barred by sovereign immunity but left other issues for later
resolution. And unlike its earlier Phase 1 order, the district court did
not certify its dismissal order under Rule 54(b). No other exception
relevant to § 1291 applies. Thus, the dismissal order was not a “final”
order under § 1291 and is not appealable under that statute.
Even so, we may review certain interlocutory orders in
admiralty cases under a different provision. Federal courts of appeals
generally “have jurisdiction of appeals from: . . . (3) Interlocutory
decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the
rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals
from final decrees are allowed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). This rule

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27 No. 22-1765-cv
broadens our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction beyond its ordinary
bounds. See generally 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3927 (3d ed. 2023).
Section 1292(a)(3) establishes our jurisdiction here. Because the
order dismissing Energetic’s contribution and indemnification claims
was not final, it was “[i]nterlocutory.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3); see
Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir. 1998). Nor
is there any question that this “case . . . includes an admiralty or
maritime claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h)(2), such that it is an “admiralty
case[],” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3); see Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 335
n.1. That leaves the “crucial inquiry” of “whether the district court’s
judgment . . . determined the rights and liabilities of the parties”—
that is, whether it “decid[ed] the merits” of the parties’
“controversies.” Chem One, 660 F.3d at 638 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted and alterations incorporated). It did. We have
previously held that an order dismissing a cause of action in an
admiralty case on sovereign-immunity grounds is appealable under
§ 1292(a)(3). See Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. Pres. of India, 446 F.2d 1198,
1199 n.1 (2d Cir. 1971). This case is similar. We therefore have
jurisdiction to review the district court’s October 12, 2022 order.
D. The District Court’s Order on Choice of Law Was Not
Appealable as a Collateral Order.
The same cannot be said of the district court’s January 10, 2020
order that Singapore law would apply to the calculation of damages.
Cross-Appellants offer two theories supporting our jurisdiction.
Neither succeeds.
First, Cross-Appellants argue that the district court’s Rule 54(b)
certification rendered appealable its earlier choice-of-law ruling. This
argument implicitly invokes our usual rule that “prior interlocutory

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28 No. 22-1765-cv
orders merge with the final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory
orders (to the extent that they affect the final judgment) may be
reviewed on appeal from the final order.” Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.3d
104, 109 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The merger rule does not support Cross-Appellants’ position.
In considering an appeal of a partial final judgment, we must construe
strictly the requirement that an interlocutory order “affect the final
judgment,” lest we nullify Rule 54(b)’s limitations. Id.; see also Black
Ass'n of New Orleans Fire Fighters (BANOFF) v. City of New Orleans, 911
F.2d 1063, 1065–66 (5th Cir. 1990). In this case, the district court stated
that its Phase 1 order “was intended to be a final judgment regarding
the United States” and its “liability and damages for the collision.”
Special App’x at 73. Thus, only earlier orders that affect the United
States’s liability merge on appeal into the Phase 1 order. The district
court’s choice of law for calculating Sailor-Claimants’ personal
damages did no such thing. Accordingly, Rule 54(b) does not give us
jurisdiction over the cross-appeals.
Second, the Hofmann & Schweitzer Claimants suggest that the
district court’s choice-of-law ruling is an appealable collateral order.
Non-final orders are reviewable under the “collateral order doctrine”
only when they “(1) are ‘conclusive’; (2) ‘resolve important questions
separate from the merits’; and (3) ‘are effectively unreviewable on
appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.’” Belya v.
Kapral, 45 F.4th 621, 629 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty.
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)).
The collateral-order doctrine does not apply here. We have
warned that this exceptional doctrine should “‘never be allowed to
swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal’
after ‘final judgment has been entered.’” Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868

-- 28 of 47 --

29 No. 22-1765-cv
(1994)). Here, we see no reason why the district court’s choice-of-law
order would be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final
judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, we
believe permitting Cross-Appellants’ “piecemeal, prejudgment
appeals” would “undermine[] ‘efficient judicial administration.’”
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)). Thus,
the choice-of-law ruling on damages, as distinct from the
apportionment of liability, is not yet appealable.
Cross-Appellants have identified no basis for our jurisdiction
over their appeals.11 We therefore must dismiss the cross-appeals.
II. Applicable Substantive Law.
The district court applied Singapore law in determining the
United States’ and Energetic’s liability for the collision. No party
contests that decision. Although we retain discretion to reach this
“purely legal issue,” we decline to do so here.12 Booking v. Gen. Star
11 The Hofmann & Schweitzer Claimants also invoke in passing
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) as an alternative basis for our jurisdiction. That
“perfunctor[y]” reference failed to preserve any argument as to that
provision’s application to the cross-appeals. Meyer v. Seidel, 89 F.4th 117,
129 (2d Cir. 2023). In any event, the district court’s choice-of-law ruling did
not “determin[e] the rights and liabilities of the parties,” as § 1292(a)(3)
requires.
12 Unlike the district court’s choice of law for calculating damages, its
choice of law for determining liability “affect[ed]” the appealable partial
final judgment. Selletti, 173 F.3d at 109 n.5. To that extent, we have
jurisdiction to review the January 10, 2020 order. Because we decline to
undertake that review, we need not—and do not—decide whether we have
pendent jurisdiction over the cross-appeal, as the Tabak Claimants argue in
their reply brief. Tabak Reply Br. at 9–11.

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30 No. 22-1765-cv
Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 2001). Instead, we join the district
court in applying Singapore law.
In this case, the standards for determining liability for the
collision are clear. That is because “[t]he elements of negligence
under Singapore law are substantially the same as those under United
States admiralty law: ‘Typically, claimants have to establish breach of
duty (that a vessel owes a duty of care to other vessels is well-
established) that caused or contributed to the collision and damage.’”
Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 358–59 (quoting The Dream
Star [2018] 4 SLR 473 at [47]).13 The relevant duty is “the exercise of
‘good seamanship’”—that is, “the exercise of reasonable skill or care
expected of a competent/prudent seaman to prevent the vessel from
doing injury.” Id. (citation omitted).
In evaluating negligence under this standard, we follow
Singapore courts in treating decisions of “common law courts around
the world”—and especially of English courts—as persuasive
authority. App’x at 1366; see, e.g., The Dream Star at [89]–[93]; The
Mount Apo and Hanjin Ras Laffan [2019] 4 SLR 909 at [95]; see also App’x
at 2781. As expert testimony indicated, this reflects that “Singapore’s
legal system is built on a two hundred years of the English common
law tradition” and “Singapore law on maritime collisions [remains]
closely similar to English law” in relevant respects. App’x at 1359; see
id. at 2781.
Consistent with Singapore law, we also look to the universally
accepted International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
13 When citing foreign cases, we follow the conventions of the Singapore
Academy of Law’s Style Guide for the Singapore Law Reports. “SLR”
refers to the Singapore Law Reports. Pinpoint citations in brackets refer to
paragraph numbers. Each of the Singapore cases we cite was decided by
the High Court of the Republic of Singapore.

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31 No. 22-1765-cv
or “COLREGs.” The COLREGs “provide a ‘universal system of sea
traffic rules’ applicable to vessels in international waters.” Crowley
Marine Servs., Inc. v. Maritrans, Inc., 530 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting William Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law
237 (2002)). Singapore has incorporated the COLREGs into its
domestic law and its courts consider them when evaluating maritime
negligence.14 See The Dream Star at [2], [47]–[50]. Accordingly, the
COLREGs are central to our analysis.
III. Standards of Review.
Although we look to Singapore law for the relevant substantive
negligence rules, federal law supplies the applicable standards of
appellate review. See Otal Invs. Ltd. v. M.V. Clary, 494 F.3d 40, 50 (2d
Cir. 2007) (“Otal II”); Alkmeon Naviera, S.A. v. M/V Marina L, 633 F.2d
789, 796 n.11 (9th Cir. 1980). These standards generally track those
applicable in other areas of federal law. See Tandon, 752 F.3d at 240
n.1.
In reviewing a judgment entered after a bench trial, we review
the district court’s factual findings only for clear error. See Vasquez v.
GMD Shipyard Corp., 582 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009). The causes of a
maritime collision are factual findings, see Otal II, 494 F.3d at 59, as is
a district court’s apportionment of liability for such a collision, see Otal
Invs. Ltd. v. M/V CLARY, 673 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Otal IV”)
(per curiam). Thus, we must set aside the district court’s conclusions
on these issues only if, upon reviewing the entire record, we are “left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Siemens Energy, Inc. v. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 82
14 The same is true for the United States and “every [other] shipping
nation in the world.” Crowley Marine Servs., 530 F.3d at 1172 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

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32 No. 22-1765-cv
F.4th 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Questions of law are different. In this context, as elsewhere,
“[w]e review conclusions of law, and the application of the law to the
facts, de novo.” Vasquez, 582 F.3d at 297. “[A] court’s determination of
foreign law ‘must be treated as a ruling on a question of law’” subject
to de novo review. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co.,
585 U.S. 33, 42 (2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1). This principle
extends to a court’s interpretation of the COLREGs.15 See, e.g., Otal II,
494 F.3d at 53. We are therefore unconstrained by the district court’s
interpretations either of Singapore law in general or of the COLREGs
in particular.
Review of a district court’s determination of negligence is more
complicated. “[T]he rule in this circuit has long been to consider
[rulings on negligence] de novo.” In re M/V MSC Flaminia, 72 F.4th 430,
446 (2d Cir. 2023). We adhere to that rule here. We acknowledge that
we are alone among our sister circuits in embracing this standard and
that some on our court have thoughtfully suggested in dicta that we
should embrace the majority rule. See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 359
15 Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, we do not read Ching Sheng
Fishery Co. v. United States, 124 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 1997), as mandating that we
treat “[a] district court’s determination that a ship violated the COLREGs”
as “a finding of fact.” U.S. Br. at 24. In Ching Sheng, the COLREGs questions
were predominantly factual, not legal. For example, we observed that
“[t]he question of what constitutes a ‘safe speed’ is relative to the situation
confronting the vessel at any given moment” and accordingly analyzed the
“situation” of the vessel involved. Ching Sheng, 124 F.3d. at 159 (quoting
COLREG 6). Thus, Ching Sheng indicates only that, in some cases, a district
court’s finding concerning COLREGs violations may effectively be subject
to clear-error review because the interpretation of the COLREGs is not at
issue. It does not support the Government’s proposed broader rule that
such findings are always subject to clear-error review.

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33 No. 22-1765-cv
F.3d 132, 135–137 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2004). At any rate, “in practice,” our
rule is “‘not so different’ from the other circuits’ more deferential
standard of review.” M/V MSC Flaminia, 72 F.4th at 446 (quoting In re
City of New York, 522 F.3d 279, 282 (2d Cir. 2008)). In most cases,
negligence determinations turn upon factual findings subject to clear-
error review. See id. Thus, when a district court makes no error
interpreting applicable law and no clear error in finding material
facts, we ordinarily will sustain that court’s negligence determination.
IV. Fault.
We now turn to the merits. Energetic claims that 100% of the
fault rests with MCCAIN and that, in attributing 20% of the fault to
ALNIC, the district court erred. Energetic advances two principal
arguments in support of its position: (1) the district court erred in
concluding that ALNIC was “free to maneuver” when MCCAIN
activated her red-over-red lights; and (2) the district court erred in
finding that ALNIC negligently failed to mitigate the damage to
MCCAIN either before or after the moment of the collision. Energetic
also contends that the district court improperly considered the
dishonesty of ALNIC’s crewmembers following the collision when
allocating fault.
Energetic leaves unchallenged one of the district court’s central
conclusions: that ALNIC was negligent in her failure to properly staff
her bridge and to assess the risk of collision in the “heavily trafficked
Singapore Strait.” Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 363–64.
COLREGs Rule 5 requires vessels to “maintain a proper look-out” “at
all times.”16 Rule 7(a) requires vessels to “use all available means
appropriate” to determine the risk of collision. ALNIC violated both
16 In discussing the parties’ fault, we cite provisions of the COLREGs
simply as “Rule [Number].”

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34 No. 22-1765-cv
rules. Her short-staffed crew relied inappropriately on autopilot and
missed crucial signs of collision risk, including MCCAIN’s audio
announcement of “loss of steering.” Id. at 364. The district court
concluded that these COLREGs violations by ALNIC were proximate
causes of the collision, which enhanced the tanker’s overall fault. The
district court did not err in doing so.
We will briefly set forth the key provisions of the COLREGs
governing the arguments Energetic does raise. We then consider—
and reject—each argument in turn, ultimately concluding that the
district court did not err in concluding that ALNIC was negligent
under Singapore law. We also hold that the district court did not
clearly err in allocating 20% of the fault for the collision to ALNIC and
80% to MCCAIN.
a. Rule 17’s Three-Tier Framework for the Obligations of
Stand-On Vessels.
Among much else, the COLREGs establish a “three-tier
framework” governing when vessels may not, may, or must take
affirmative action to avoid collision. Id. at 366.
1. Rule 17(a)(i) requires that a stand-on vessel—that is, a vessel
being overtaken—generally “shall keep her course and
speed.”
2. Rule 17(a)(ii) provides that a stand-on vessel “may . . . take
action to avoid collision by her maneuver alone, as soon as
it becomes apparent to her that the [give-way] vessel”—that
is, a vessel overtaking another—“is not taking appropriate
action in compliance with these Rules.”
3. Rule 17(b) mandates that “[w]hen, from any cause, the
[stand-on] vessel . . . finds herself so close that collision
cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel

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35 No. 22-1765-cv
alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid
collision.”
Because the COLREGs will inform our negligence analysis, we must
examine which Rule applied to stand-on vessel ALNIC at each relevant
period on August 21, 2017. See The Dream Star at [47].
b. The District Court’s Finding that ALNIC Was “Free to
Maneuver” after MCCAIN Activated Her Red-Over-Red
Lights Was Not Material to the Allocation of Fault.
Energetic first challenges the district court’s analysis of when
Rule 17(a)(i) ceased to apply and Rule 17(a)(ii) became operative.
The district court concluded that Rule 17(a)(ii) took effect once
MCCAIN energized her red-over-red lights at 5:21:25 (2:33 bc). ALNIC
was therefore “free to maneuver” to reduce the risk of collision.
Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 366. The district court determined
that Rule 17(b) took effect 112 seconds later, at 5:23:17 (0:41 bc). That
was when an ALNIC crewmember concluded that MCCAIN was doing
a “wrong maneuver” and when “it should have been clear to
everyone that MCCAIN could no longer avoid the collision by her
actions alone.” Id. at 367. At that point, ALNIC was “required” to act.
Id.
Energetic disagrees. It argues that Rule 17(a)(ii) never
controlled. Rather, Rule 17(a)(i) prohibited ALNIC from changing her
course or speed until 5:23:17 (0:41 bc). Energetic primarily adverts to
(1) MCCAIN’s putative failure to de-activate her masthead lights upon
activating her red-over-red lights; and (2) the difficulty of
determining what action was appropriate for ALNIC given the
available information. Energetic does not challenge the district
court’s conclusion concerning Rule 17(b)—that once MCCAIN was

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36 No. 22-1765-cv
plainly making the “wrong maneuver,” ALNIC was obligated to “take
such action as [would] best aid to avoid collision.” Rule 17(b).
Energetic’s argument is misdirected. Under Singapore law,
liability in maritime-collision cases must be apportioned “to the
degree in which each ship was in fault.” Maritime Conventions Act
1911 § 1(1); accord The Mount Apo at [94]–[96]; The Dream Star at [124]–
[127]. The Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910, which
Singapore has ratified, imposes a similar framework. See Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 14:5 (6th ed. 2023).
Singapore courts have made clear that “the determinative factor for
apportionment is . . . the comparative appreciation of the degree in
which the respective faults of the vessels have contributed to the
result of the collision.” The Dream Star at [125]. Although allocation
of liability requires considering “the nature and quality of a ship’s
faults,” id. at [126] (citation omitted), “[i]t is not a question of
distributing moral blame,” id. at [125]. Thus, only legal fault—here,
negligence—is relevant.
The district court nowhere concluded that ALNIC’s failure to act
between 5:21:25 and 5:23:17 (when Rule 17(a)(ii) authorized ALNIC to
maneuver to avoid collision) was negligent. Rather, as relevant here,
the district court concluded only that “Rule 17(b) required ALNIC to
act by 5:23:17.” Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 367 (emphasis
omitted). Later, it elaborated that after ALNIC’s crew observed
MCCAIN’s “wrong maneuver,” “ALNIC dallied in autopilot and failed
to take any action at all; that choice was negligent.” Id. (emphasis
added). To be sure, the district court criticized ALNIC for “forfeit[ing]
valuable time and sea space” after Rule 17(a)(ii) took effect. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). But the district court also
recognized that Rule 17(a)(ii) created a “grey area” that might
deceptively seem clear in “hindsight.” Id. (internal quotation marks

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37 No. 22-1765-cv
omitted). We do not read the district court’s Rule 17(a)(ii) analysis as
encompassing a negligence determination.
Nor did the district court rely on that analysis to allocate fault.
The district court correctly stated Singapore law governing
apportionment of liability: “Under the Brussels Convention, courts
consider both ‘the relative culpability of each vessel and the relative
extent to which the culpability of each caused the collision.’” Id. at
359–60 (quoting Otal II, 494 F.3d at 63). True, the district court may
have “distribut[ed]” some “moral blame.” The Dream Star at [125].
But what matters is whether those moral judgments improperly
influenced the court’s legal conclusions. We perceive no such
influence here.
The district court allocated no fault to ALNIC for her actions in
the 112 seconds after MCCAIN signaled red-over-red. We find neither
clear error in this apportionment nor error in the district court’s
underlying legal analysis.
c. The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding that
ALNIC Negligently Failed to Mitigate the Collision
Damage Both Before and After Striking MCCAIN.
Energetic next contests the district court’s analysis of ALNIC’s
duty to mitigate collision damage under Rule 17(b). The district court
concluded that ALNIC was negligent both in the 41 seconds preceding
the collision (after ascertaining MCCAIN’s “wrong maneuver”) and in

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38 No. 22-1765-cv
the 42 seconds following the moment of impact. Energetic challenges
both conclusions. We consider them in sequence.
1. The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding that
ALNIC Negligently Failed to Mitigate the Collision
Damage Before Striking MCCAIN.
The district court identified two maneuvers available to ALNIC
in the 41 seconds before the collision, starting at 5:23:17. First, by
slowing down, ALNIC would have “reduc[ed] the force of impact.”
Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 367. Second, by turning hard to
port—the same direction in which MCCAIN was veering—ALNIC
would have struck MCCAIN with a “glancing blow” rather than a “T-
bone.” Id. at 367 & n.22. Expert testimony confirmed that together,
these maneuvers would have “meaningfully mitigated the collision.”
Id. at 367; see id. at 356. The district court accordingly concluded that
ALNIC’s choice not “to take any action at all” during this period was
negligent. Id. at 367.
Energetic asserts that “no evidence” supported the district
court’s finding that a hard turn to port would have reduced the
collision damage. Energetic Br. at 56. “On this record,” Energetic
insists, “it is just as probable that a glancing blow would have opened
more of MCCAIN’s compartments and caused more flooding, or
flooded MCCAIN’s engine room, or ruptured ALNIC’s tanks
containing explosive pyrolysis fuel oil.” Id. at 58.
We find Energetic’s assertion unpersuasive. First, Energetic
effectively ignores ALNIC’s failure to slow down. ALNIC’s duty to
reduce her speed was clear. Cf. Rule 8(e). When it is “impracticable”
for a vessel “to avoid collision,” it may well be “imperative for her to
reverse full speed astern.” The Etruria, 147 F. 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1906);

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39 No. 22-1765-cv
cf. The Umbria, 166 U.S. 404, 414 (1897); The Persian, 224 F. 441, 443 (2d
Cir. 1915). That principle of prudent seamanship applied here.
ALNIC’s imprudent conduct almost certainly caused greater
collision damage. In the ordinary course, a collision at higher speed
will be more destructive than one at lower speed. No expert
testimony was needed to establish this common-sense precept. Cf.
Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004) Thus, the
district court did not clearly err in finding that ALNIC’s failure to slow
down before the collision had “causative potency.” The Mount Apo at
[95] (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). Nor
did the district court err in concluding that ALNIC’s actions in this
regard amounted to negligence.
Second, Energetic does not seriously contest the district court’s
finding that ALNIC should have turned to port. Here again, ALNIC’s
duty was apparent. We determine the demands of good seamanship
by looking to the conduct of a prudent mariner under the
circumstances. See The Iran Torab [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 38, 43 RHC.17
From this perspective, good seamanship required doing what would
likely reduce collision damage. See Rules 2(a), 6, 7. That every option
involved some risk did not change ALNIC’s obligation to act
reasonably. In this case, witness testimony sufficiently supported the
district court’s conclusion that reducing ALNIC’s angle of collision
was a reasonable option. See App’x at 1562–63; 1755–56.
Energetic’s contentions concerning causation are merely
speculative. Evidence showed that because ALNIC struck MCCAIN at
48.5 degrees and not some smaller angle, she pierced MCCAIN’s hull
and the two vessels became entangled. See App’x at 2026–27.
17 Consistent with the conventions of the Singapore Academy of Law,
“LHC” and “RHC” refer to the left-hand and right-hand columns of pages
in Lloyd’s Law Reports.

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40 No. 22-1765-cv
Energetic has not established that the district court’s finding to this
effect was clearly erroneous. See Vasquez, 582 F.3d at 297.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that ALNIC’s
failure to turn was a “causative fault” amounting to negligence. The
Mount Apo at [95].
2. The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding that
ALNIC Negligently Failed to Mitigate the Collision
Damage After Striking MCCAIN.
The district court also faulted ALNIC for “le[aving] her engines
running for 42 seconds after the collision and le[aving] her autopilot
on for over a minute.” Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 368. Because
“[t]hese two oversights substantially worsened the collision,” the
district court concluded that they increased ALNIC’s liability. Id.
Indeed, the district court deemed ALNIC’s failure to mitigate the
damage after the collision “ALNIC’s most inexcusable fault.” Id.
Energetic claims once more that the district court’s causation
finding was clearly erroneous, arguing that “nothing in the record
support[ed] the [district] court’s finding that . . . ALNIC’s crew could
have done anything to stop the sweep, halt the massive tanker’s
forward momentum, or otherwise mitigate the damage to MCCAIN”
after the collision. Energetic Br. 59.
We disagree. To start, ALNIC’s crew was obliged to exercise the
“reasonable skill or care expected of a competent/prudent seaman to
prevent the vessel from doing injury.” The Mount Apo at [97] (citation
omitted). This obligation applied when ALNIC entered the Singapore
Strait without taking the steering off autopilot, as required by ALNIC’s
manager’s own internal regulations, and without operating at Bridge
Manning Level III, which required a dedicated anti-collision officer
and a dedicated lookout. The obligation continued when ALNIC

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41 No. 22-1765-cv
failed first to slow down after she recognized MCCAIN’s “wrong
maneuver,” and then to turn to port to reduce the angle of impact.
After the vessels collided, ALNIC’s duty to exercise the “skill or
care expected of a competent/prudent seaman” continued. Id. At that
point, no reasonable mariner would have kept ALNIC’s engine
running or her autopilot engaged. To the contrary, mariners “cannot
make a greater mistake” than to suppose that automatic steering
alone will extricate them from danger. The Fogo [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
208, 221 RHC. For ALNIC to “dall[y] in autopilot” after the collision
was a breach of her duty. Energetic Tank, 607 F. Supp. 3d at 367.
These faults, too, were causative. Energetic observes that the
United States’s expert did not opine upon what might have happened
if ALNIC’s post-collision conduct had been different. But as the
district court noted, that same expert testified that (1) ALNIC’s rotation
after the collision was caused in part by her autopilot and her running
engine; and (2) that rotation exacerbated the gash in MCCAIN’s hull.
On this basis, the district court’s finding that ALNIC’s inaction
exacerbated the collision damage was plainly “permissible.” Vasquez,
582 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, we
find no error in the district court’s conclusion that ALNIC’s conduct
shortly before and immediately after impact was negligent.
d. When Allocating Fault, the District Court Properly
Considered ALNIC’s Crewmembers’ False Statements.
Finally, the district court considered the false log entries and
other misrepresentations by ALNIC’s crew when allocating liability.
As noted above, ALNIC’s log misrepresented her staffing, engine
speed, and steering mode, and her crewmembers misrepresented that
they had not seen MCCAIN’s red-over-red lights. The district court
concluded that although these lies were not “causative,” they

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42 No. 22-1765-cv
“underscore[d] the culpability of [ALNIC’s] crew.” Energetic Tank, 607
F. Supp. 3d at 369.
Energetic resists this conclusion. It claims that the district court
erroneously drew upon the false statements of ALNIC’s crewmembers
to define the proper standard of care, rather than merely to support
factual findings.
We see no such error. Under Singapore law, “only causative
fault is relevant” to the apportionment of liability. The Mount Apo at
[95]. But we must consider both “blameworthiness and causative
potency.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis
omitted). Thus, once we have determined that a fault is “causative,”
we must consider that fault’s “nature and quality.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted). We may presume that logs
falsified by a vessel’s crew place her “in the best possible light.” The
Lok Vivek [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 230, 236 LHC; see also id. at 239–40; cf.
Otal II, 494 F.3d at 59. This presumption, in turn, can inform our
assessment of the “nature and quality” of the vessel’s faults. The
Mount Apo at [95]. The false statements of ALNIC’s crewmembers bore
upon the same faults that the district court found causative. That
ALNIC’s crew thought those faults were important to hide
underscores their gravity. The district court properly considered this
concealment.
***
We find no clear error in the district court’s factual findings and
no error in its legal conclusions. We therefore must affirm the district
court’s judgment rejecting Energetic’s counterclaim against the
United States for vessel damages. In so doing, we also must affirm

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43 No. 22-1765-cv
the district court’s apportionment of fault: 20% to ALNIC and 80% to
MCCAIN.
V. Sovereign Immunity.
Energetic also sought contribution and indemnification from
the United States for damages that Energetic might later be found to
owe the Sailor-Claimants.
To proceed, Energetic’s claims must first overcome the United
States’s sovereign immunity. “[T]he United States, as sovereign, is
generally immune from suits seeking money damages.” Dep’t of
Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 48 (2024). Such
suits therefore may not proceed without the United States’s
“consent.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Indeed,
“the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Id.
“Congress may choose to waive” the United States’s immunity, but it
must do so “unmistakably.” Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 48 (internal quotation
marks omitted and alterations incorporated). And the Supreme Court
has held that to waive sovereign immunity against suits by members
of the armed forces for damages relating to their service, Congress
must speak even more clearly. Thus, for example, the broad-brush
immunity waiver in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) does not
apply to such service-related suits.18 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 146 (1950); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987). The
same is true when a party seeks indemnification from the United
States based on such claims. See Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United
States, 431 U.S. 666, 673–74 (1977); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United
18 The FTCA provides: “The United States shall be liable, respecting the
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .”
28 U.S.C. § 2674.

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44 No. 22-1765-cv
States, 460 U.S. 190, 197 n.8 (1983). This principle primarily reflects
Congress’s interests in preventing “civilian court[s]” from “second-
guess[ing] military decisions” and in preserving “essential military
discipline.” United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
The district court concluded that Feres and its successors barred
Energetic’s contribution and indemnification claims. Energetic
challenges that conclusion.
Energetic does not contest that the Sailor-Claimants are
members of the armed forces (or their representatives) bringing suits
for damages relating to their service. Still, Energetic notes that this
case, unlike Feres and Stencel, arises under not the FTCA but the Suits
in Admiralty Act (“SIAA”) and the Public Vessels Act (“PVA”).19
Energetic further observes that its claims concern not direct damages
but contribution or indemnification following the United States’s own
invocation of federal jurisdiction. These procedural differences
matter, Energetic insists, because the Government has already
produced evidence of its own fault in the Phase 1 trial, thereby
disclaiming any further interest in military discipline. Finally,
Energetic notes some potential unfairness: to the extent that joint-and-
several liability is available here, Energetic may have to pay the full
19 The SIAA provides: “In a civil action in admiralty brought by the
United States . . . an admiralty claim in personam may be filed or a setoff
claimed against the United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a).
The PVA states: “If the United States brings a civil action in admiralty
for damages caused by a privately owned vessel, the owner of the vessel,
or the successor in interest, may file a counterclaim in personam, or claim a
setoff, against the United States for damages arising out of the same subject
matter.” 46 U.S.C. § 31102(b).

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45 No. 22-1765-cv
value of the Sailor-Claimants’ damages claims, even though ALNIC
was only 20% at fault for the collision.
We agree with the district court that the United States’
sovereign immunity bars Energetic’s contribution and
indemnification claims. We have held that the “Feres doctrine” bars
direct claims against the United States under the PVA and the SIAA,
despite those statutes’ immunity waivers. Cusanelli v. Klaver, 698 F.2d
82, 85 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807, 809 (2d
Cir. 1928).20 The alternative would create an “artificial
distinction . . . between accidents to servicemen on land and at sea.”
Hillier v. S. Towing Co., 714 F.2d 714, 724 (7th Cir. 1983). Thus, the
statutory differences between Feres and this case referenced by
Energetic do not support Energetic’s position.
Neither are the procedural differences significant. The
Supreme Court has instructed that the reasons for barring “third-
party indemnity action[s]” by servicemembers are “essentially the
same” as those for barring “direct action[s].” Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673;
see also Vulcan Materials Co. v. Massiah, 645 F.3d 249, 267 (4th Cir. 2011).
We believe the same is true for contribution claims. See In re
McAllister Towing & Transp. Co., 432 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2005). And
as a general matter, “jurisdictional limitations based on sovereign
immunity apply equally to counterclaims against the Government,”
where the United States has invoked federal jurisdiction for other
purposes. United States v. Forma, 42 F.3d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).21 In this case, we
20 It appears that each of our sister circuits to have considered the
question has agreed. See Blakey v. U.S.S. Iowa, 991 F.2d 148, 151–52 (4th Cir.
1993) (collecting cases).
21 Our precedents recognize a “recoupment-counterclaim” exception to
this rule, under which a party sued by the United States may subtract the

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46 No. 22-1765-cv
need do little more than combine these principles to hold that
sovereign immunity bars Energetic’s contribution and
indemnification claims. Not to do so would create an aberrant
exception to Feres’s ordinary sweep.
We reject as well Energetic’s suggestion that the Feres doctrine
does not apply because the Government participated in the Phase 1
trial. It is true that Feres reflects the judiciary’s reluctance to “second-
guess[] military orders” or to “require members of the Armed
Services to testify in court as to each other’s decisions and actions,”
and that these scenarios have already materialized here. Stencel, 431
U.S. at 673. But we do not “inquire into ‘the extent to which
particular’” proceedings, such as the Phase 2 trial, “would call into
question military discipline and decisionmaking.” Doe v. Hagenbeck,
870 F.3d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 (1987)). Feres
reflects our reading of Congress’s enactments. See 340 U.S. at 140, 146.
Nothing in either the SIAA or the PVA permits case-by-case
consideration of military needs.
We recognize that MCCAIN, not ALNIC, was overwhelmingly
responsible for the collision. We recognize, too, that several jurists—
including some on this court—have criticized the Feres doctrine. See,
e.g., Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1038–42 (2d Cir. 1995). Even so, what
Energetic would call that doctrine’s extension, we view as only its
amount it is owed by the United States from any damages it must pay. See
Forma, 42 F.3d at 764–65. The PVA and SIAA also allow parties to claim a
“setoff” that accomplishes largely the same thing. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31102(b),
30903(a). While these options might have been available to Energetic at the
outset of this action, it failed to timely raise them in the district court.
Accordingly, we decline its request to remand for the district court to
consider them now.

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47 No. 22-1765-cv
ordinary application to new facts. It is not for us to say that the United
States’s assertion of immunity here goes too far.
CONCLUSION
We DISMISS the Sailor-Claimants’ cross-appeals (Nos. 22-2871
and 22-2883). We AFFIRM the judgments of the district court
(1) apportioning liability and (2) dismissing Energetic’s contribution
and indemnification claims in both Energetic’s appeals (Nos. 22-1765
and 22-2774).

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