United States of America v. JOE MENSAH, AKA Kwabena Mensah, JOE MENSAH

Honorable Nora Barry Fischer, United States District Judge for the Western District*
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-2921
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOE MENSAH,
AKA Kwabena Mensah,
JOE MENSAH,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 3-02-cr-00455-001)
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 13, 2009
Before: AMBRO and ROTH Circuit Judges and FISCHER , District Judge*
(Opinion filed: July 13, 2009)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction1
under 28 U.S.C § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). “We review the District Court’s
sentence for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir.
2008).
2
In March 2003, Joe Mensah was convicted in the District of New Jersey
of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms
of cocaine (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(ii)) and
conspiracy to export more than five kilograms of cocaine (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 953
and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)). In October 2003, he was sentenced to 240 months’
imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction on appeal, but vacated his sentence and
remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). See United States v. Oppong, 165 F. App’x.
155 (3d Cir. 2006). In May 2008, Mensah was again sentenced to 240 months’
imprisonment. He now appeals that sentence, and we affirm.1
We require a district court to follow a three-step sentencing procedure. United
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). First, the Court must calculate the
defendant’s Guidelines sentence. Next, it must formally rule on both parties’ motions and
indicate whether a departure from the Guidelines is being granted. Finally, the Court
must exercise its discretion by considering the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in
imposing its sentence. A district court’s consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors
must be “rational and meaningful.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir.

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Section 3553(a)(1) instructs a court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the2
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” in imposing a sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
3
2007) (en banc). That is, “[m]erely reciting the § 3553(a) factors, saying that counsel’s
arguments have been considered, and then declaring a sentence, are insufficient to
withstand . . . reasonableness review.” United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 842 (3d
Cir. 2006).
Mensah’s sole argument on appeal is that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable because the District Court failed to give meaningful consideration to
whether he warranted a lower sentence under § 3553(a) based on his “history and
characteristics.” More specifically, he argues that the Court failed to address adequately2
his family circumstances, his lack of prior convictions, and his postconviction
rehabilitative conduct.
We disagree. The record demonstrates that the District Court extensively
addressed each of the potentially mitigating factors raised by Mensah. It noted that his
family situation (three school-aged children being raised by his wife), while poignant,
was “not at all unusual” and was “the common plight of the families of those convicted of
federal crimes,” found that his lack of prior convictions was fully accounted for in the
calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range, and described Mensah’s postconviction
efforts at rehabilitation (in particular, his effort to overcome his alcohol dependency) as
“laudable and to be encouraged,” but not “outside of the heartland of the types of

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responsible behavior that we would hope to see.”
Mensah contends, however, that this was insufficient, as the Court addressed the
factors he raised in the context of his motion for a departure from the Guidelines, not his
request for a variance under § 3553(a). We are not persuaded that this distinction makes
any difference in these circumstances. At his sentencing hearing, Mensah acknowledged
that he was requesting a departure and a variance on exactly the same grounds. The
District Court indicated explicitly that it was going to consider the mitigating factors
raised by Mensah “in both lights” (i.e., as grounds for either a departure or a variance).
Thus, the Court’s later statement that, in imposing the 240 months’ sentence, it had
considered the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” was sufficient, in light of
that prior discussion, to satisfy the Court’s obligation to give meaningful consideration to
the § 3553(a) factors raised by the defendant.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence of the District Court.

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