United States of America v. Farren James Mason, Sr

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-3176
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FARREN JAMES MASON, SR.,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-07-cr-00379-001
District Judge: The Honorable Alan N. Bloch
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 16, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 21, 2009)
OPINION
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Farren Mason, Sr., pleaded guilty to three counts of distribution and
possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). The District Court sentenced him to a within-
Guidelines term of 57 months of imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently.

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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have1
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
On appeal, he claims that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. We assess procedural and substantive reasonableness by applying the
abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009)
(en banc). “[A]n abuse of discretion has occurred if a district court based its decision on
a clearly erroneous factual conclusion or an erroneous legal conclusion.” Id. at 567–68.
We will affirm.1
First, we do not believe that the District Court misinterpreted the “minor role”
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2.
“[T]he appropriateness of a minor role adjustment turns on ‘the relativity of [the
defendant’s] conduct to the total [relevant conduct] . . . .’” United States v. Isaza-Zapata,
148 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1085
(3d Cir. 1991)). “The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that . . . the minor role
adjustment should apply.” Id. at 240. Here, Mason claims that the District Court
improperly focused on his offenses of conviction in determining whether he had a minor
role, instead of considering the existence of a larger drug distribution scheme involving
additional drug sales by others. But Mason never asserted in the District Court that he
was a participant in some larger drug trafficking scheme. In his presentence position
papers, Mason presented three reasons for a minor role reduction: 1) “he was selling his
nephew’s cocaine at his nephew’s direction for a fee . . .”; 2) “the nephew was selling

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crack over the course of at least August 2005 through September 2007 . . .”; and 3) “the
nephew was the source of the crack cocaine in this case . . . .” The second reason
suggests that additional drug sales occurred; however, Mason never claimed that these
additional drug sales were “jointly undertaken criminal activity” in which he was a
participant, or that he otherwise “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused” them. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(1)
(defining “relevant conduct” for Guidelines calculations). Indeed, the District Court
notified Mason that he could, if he wanted to, argue at sentencing that “his nephew’s
additional drug dealing is somehow relevant conduct in this case . . . ,” but Mason did not
do so. Since Mason made no showing that he was involved in his nephew’s additional
drug sales or that he otherwise participated in some larger drug trafficking scheme, the
District Court properly focused its inquiry on whether the nephew’s supplying and
directing of Mason’s drug sales warranted granting Mason a minor role reduction.
Second, we reject Mason’s claim that the District Court improperly gave the
Guidelines presumptive weight. Mason places undue emphasis on the Court’s statement
that “the sentencing guidelines . . . would only be advisory to the Court, therefore, for
good reason, the Court may sentence you outside of the recommended guideline range.”
The Court made this statement at Mason’s guilty plea hearing almost three months prior
to Mason’s sentencing. It sheds no light on whether the Court presumed the Guidelines to
be reasonable at sentencing. Additionally, the Court’s statement does not demonstrate a
belief that absent “good reason,” the Court could not sentence outside of the Guidelines

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range. At most, the Court’s statement reveals an adherence to the notion that “good
reason” is sufficient to justify a variance from the Guidelines range; it does not show that
the Court improperly thought that “good reason” was necessary to justify a variance.
Similarly, we see no merit in Mason’s assertion that, by responding to a call for
“leniency” with the statement “I’m bound by the law as well,” the Court suggested a
belief that varying from the Guidelines was incompatible with the law.
Third, we see no error in the District Court’s refusal to vary from the Guidelines in
order to account for the disparity between Guidelines’ recommendations for crimes
involving crack and powder cocaine. Here, the District Court determined that “under the
circumstances of this case, such a variance is unwarranted.” The Court then explained the
relevant circumstances: “Defendant’s sentence has already been substantially reduced
because of [18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)] and . . . [f]urther reduction is not warranted given the
seriousness of the multiple offenses in this case.” These statements suggest that the
District Court understood that it had the authority to vary from the crack-to-powder ratios
contained in the Guidelines, but ultimately decided that such a variance was not
warranted. Therefore, the District Court committed no error. See United States v. Wise,
515 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts [are] ‘under no obligation to impose a
sentence below the applicable Guidelines range solely on the basis of the crack/powder
cocaine differential,’ [but] a district court ‘errs when it believes that it has no discretion to
consider the crack/powder cocaine differential . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Gunter,
462 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2006))).

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On appeal, Mason complains that the District Court also overlooked other facts at2
sentencing. We do not agree. Facts like Mason’s age, criminal history points, and
strained finances were detailed in the Presentence Investigation Report, which the District
Court carefully read and considered. Since Mason did not cite to these facts again at
sentencing, the District Court needed to do nothing more. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (“A
sentencing court does not have to ‘discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a)
factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.’”
(quoting United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006))).
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Fourth, our review of the record reveals that the District Court adequately
“acknowledge[d] and respond[ed] to any properly presented sentencing argument which
has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.” United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313,
329 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court pointed out that the Bureau of Prisons could adequately
treat Mason’s medical condition, rendering a reduction in sentence unnecessary
“regardless of whether defendant’s request is treated as a request for departure or a
variance . . . .” As noted above, the Court acknowledged and responded to Mason’s
request for a variance due to the crack-to-powder ratios. And we see no problem with the
District Court’s failure to specifically mention Mason’s employment history and family
ties. Mason cited both in his plea for leniency. Therefore, the Court’s specific refusal to
grant a variance based on leniency alone was ample acknowledgment and response.2
Indeed, the District Court has provided us with “sufficient justifications on the record to
support the sentencing conclusions.” United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 196 (3d
Cir.2008).
Finally, we believe that Mason’s within-Guidelines sentence of 57 months of
imprisonment for each count to be substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we will affirm

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the District Court’s judgment. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (“[I]f the district court’s
sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the
district court provided.”).

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