Wilbert Williams v. Government of the Virgin Islands Board of Medical Examiners

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4795
WILBERT WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS;
THELMA R. WATSON; FRANK A. ODLUM; JOSEPH DEJAMES
Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands
(Civ. No. 1-05-cv-00097)
District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 1, 2009
Before: McKEE and FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges,
(Opinion filed: January 12, 2010)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Wilbert Williams appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to
the abstention principles articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its
progeny. Williams filed the complaint against the Virgin Islands Board of Medical
Examiners and three of its members (hereinafter the “Board”), after the Board suspended

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“In reviewing the district court’s abstention, the underlying legal questions are1
subject to plenary review, but the decision to abstain is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953, 957 (3d Cir.
1993) (citation omitted).
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his license to practice medicine. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the district
court’s decision to abstain pursuant to Younger.1
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the underlying
facts and procedural history, we need not recite either here.
“Abstention is a judicially created doctrine under which a federal court will decline
to exercise its jurisdiction so that a state court or agency will have the opportunity to
decide the matters at issue.” Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission, 791 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The doctrine
is rooted in concerns for the maintenance of the federal system and “represents an
extraordinary and narrow exception to the ‘virtually unflagging obligation of the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’” Id. (quoting Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Consequently, abstention
is justified “only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair
to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.” Id. (citation
omitted). In other words, “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
appropriate only under certain limited circumstances.” Chez Sez III Corp. v. Township of

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Union, 945 F.2d 628, 630 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Those circumstances “are
loosely gathered under discrete concepts of abstention named after leading Supreme
Court cases,” Chiropractic America v. Lavecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1999), viz.,
“Pullman” (Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)), “Burford”
(Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1941), “Younger” (Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and “Colorado River” (Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). As we have noted, this appeal involves Younger abstention.
In Younger, the district court enjoined the Los Angeles County District Attorney
from prosecuting the defendant under a constitutionally-suspect state statute. The
Supreme Court reversed, finding the injunction “a violation of the national policy
forbidding federal courts [from] stay[ing] or enjoin[ing] pending state court proceedings
except under special circumstances.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. “Although Younger
involved a state court criminal proceeding, the national policy against enjoining pending
state court proceedings has since been extended to noncriminal proceedings,” including
administrative proceedings. Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court has set out a three-part test for determining whether
Younger abstention is appropriate. “Abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is a
pending state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests;
and (3) the state proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
challenges.” Id. at 209 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

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Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). However, even if the Younger test is met, abstention is
not appropriate in all circumstances. A federal court may interfere with a state
proceeding “in certain exceptional circumstances – where irreparable injury is ‘both great
and immediate,’ where the state law is ‘flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions,’ or where there is a showing of ‘bad faith, harassment, or . . .
other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46-54).
III.
In holding that the Younger test was met, the district court found: (1) that the
Board’s proceedings are ongoing and judicial in nature; (2) that the Board has a
“significant interest . . . in regulating the practice of medicine with an eye toward
improving the public health;” and (3) that Williams has an adequate opportunity to raise
his constitutional claims because he can assert his due process claims during the territorial
forum’s review of the Board’s decision. 2008 WL 5142181 at *3-5. The district court
also rejected William’s contention that abstention is not appropriate under the Younger
bad faith and extraordinary circumstances exceptions. Id. at *5-10.
In his appeal, Williams does not challenge the district court’s holding that the
Younger test was met. Instead, he contends that there are extraordinary circumstances
present in his case that make abstention inappropriate. The extraordinary circumstances
exception is part of the Younger “bad faith, harassment or any other unusual circumstance

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that would call for equitable relief” exception . Diamond “D” Construction Corp. v.
McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 201 (2nd Cir. 2002). In Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117
(1975), the Supreme Court explained the extraordinary circumstances exception:
Only if “extraordinary circumstances” render the state court incapable of
fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can there be any
relaxation of the deference to be afforded to the state criminal process. The
very nature of “extraordinary circumstances,” of course, makes it
impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a
sufficient threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to
warrant intervention in state criminal proceedings. But whatever else is
required, such circumstances must be “extraordinary” in the sense of
creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable
relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual
situation.
Id. at 124-25 (footnote omitted). Although Kugler spoke in the context of criminal
prosecutions, the same standard applies in the civil context. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
433 (1979).
As the Second Circuit noted in Diamond “D”, the Supreme Court has found
extraordinary circumstances present on only two occasions: (1) “when a state statute is
flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might
be made to apply it”; and (2) “when the state administrative agency was incompetent by
reason of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it.” 282 F.3d at 201 (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
Williams contends that abstention is inappropriate because of the Board’s bias

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against him. “Bias exists where a court has prejudged, or reasonably appears to have
prejudged, an issue.” Kenneally v. Lundgren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted). “[T]he baseline showing of bias necessary to trigger Younger’s escape
mechanism requires the plaintiff to offer some evidence that abstention will jeopardize
his due process right to an impartial adjudication.” Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme
Court, 80 F.3d 633, 640 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “To implicate due process,
claims of general institutional bias must be harnessed to a further showing, such as a
potential conflict of interest, or a pecuniary stake in the outcome of the litigation.” Id.
To support his claim of bias, Williams contended in the district court that he was in
direct competition with Michelle Dizon, a medical doctor and a member of the Board
during the disciplinary proceedings against him. He further contended that the Board
overlooked or ignored that conflict and permitted Dizon to participate in those
proceedings. However, the district court rejected Williams’ contentions. It found that
“Williams has presented little, if any, persuasive evidence that Dizon and he are in
competition with each other or that Dizon has even a slight pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the Board’s proceedings against Williams.” 2008 WL 5142181 at *9. Upon
our review of the record, we agree with the district court that Williams did not present any
persuasive evidence of bias on the part of the Board. Accordingly, his bias claim is

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In his brief, Williams argues that the district abused its discretion by not making2
any findings regarding all of his other claims of the Board’s bias. William’s Br. at 38-43.
However, those issues were raised by Williams in his claim in the district court that the
Board acted in bad faith and, therefore, abstention was not appropriate under the bad faith
exception to Younger. As noted, the district court rejected Williams’ contention that it
should not abstain under the bad faith exception to Younger. Williams does not challenge
the district court’s holding on the bad faith exception in his appeal.
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without merit.2
Williams also argues that the Board waived its right to assert any Younger
abstention because the Board stipulated to a permanent injunction on July 22, 2005,
enjoining the Board from enforcing its June 17, 2005, suspension of Williams’ license.
However, Williams offers absolutely no authority for this waiver argument. He does cite
to Herz v. Degnan, 648 F.2d 201, 209-210 (3d Cir. 1981), which he claims stands for the
proposition that “Younger issues raised after substantial litigation had taken place in the
district court should not deprive a plaintiff of his or her chosen forum.” Williams’ Br. at
24. While we do not agree with Williams’ characterization of our holding in Herz, we
note that Herz has nothing to do with the waiver of a party’s ability to raise a Younger
abstention issue. Rather, in Herz, we simply affirmed the district court’s decision to not
abstain under Younger under the facts of that case.
IV.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court.

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