in Re: Hector L. Huertas v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 3d Cir. 1996 , such is not the case here. Huertas’s action…

ELD-015-E NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1084
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IN RE: HECTOR L. HUERTAS,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 08-cv-02009)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
January 11, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 11, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Hector Huertas, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
seeking to compel the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to rule on
a motion for default judgment and asking this Court to set aside a scheduled conference.
We will deny the mandamus petition.
Huertas filed a complaint against TransUnion, LLC, Experian, Inc., Doctor Ronald
Brody, NRA Group, LLC, and Citigroup, Inc. alleging violations of the Fair Credit

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Reporting Act, fraud, medical malpractice, libel, and slander. On August 21, 2009,
Huertas filed a motion for default judgment against Brody because he had not responded
to the complaint. On August 31, 2009, the District Court issued an order dismissing the
action, stating that it had been reported that the parties had settled the matter.
Huertas wrote a letter to the District Court on November 12, 2009, requesting a
ruling on his motion for default judgment against Brody. On November 23, 2009, the
District Court issued an order reopening the case as to Huertas’s claims against Brody,
noting that it had come to the Court’s attention that Brody was not a party to the settlement
and that he remained in default. On December 10, 2009, the District Court scheduled a
conference for January 12, 2010, with Huertas and Brody. Huertas seeks a writ of
mandamus compelling the District Court to rule on his motion for default judgment and
asks us to set aside the scheduled conference.
The writ of mandamus traditionally has been used to confine an inferior court to a
lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when
it is its duty to do so. In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted). The writ is a drastic remedy that is seldom issued and its use is discouraged. Id.
A petitioner must show that he has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief and
that the right to a writ is clear and indisputable. Id. at 141.
Docket management is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court. In
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). Although mandamus

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relief may be warranted where a district court’s delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise
jurisdiction, Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), such is not the case here.
Huertas’s action was dismissed shortly after he filed his motion for default judgment. The
District Court reopened Huertas’s case as to Brody when Huertas notified the Court of the
pending motion for default judgment. The District Court scheduled a conference shortly
thereafter. The delay in adjudicating the motion for default judgment does not amount to a
failure to exercise jurisdiction. Huertas has not shown that the right to a writ is clear and
indisputable. Similarly, mandamus relief is not warranted as to Huertas’s request that we
set aside the conference scheduled by the District Court. Huertas has not established a
right to such relief. Huertas also has not asked the District Court to defer the conference
or presented to that Court any argument as to why it should not hold the conference.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
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