Anthony Parker v. Lehigh County Domestic Relation Court, Et Al

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-4126
___________
ANTHONY PARKER,
Appellant
v.
LEHIGH COUNTY DOMESTIC RELATION COURT, ET AL;
DIRECTOR JULIA GREENWOOD; ADM. JUDGE RICHARD F. BETZ;
JUDGE MICHELE A. VERRICCHIO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-06368)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 21, 2015
Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Appellant Anthony Parker, pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from orders of
the District Court dismissing his complaint and denying reconsideration. For the
following reasons, we will affirm.
I.
Parker sued the Domestic Relations section of the Family Division of the Lehigh
County Court of Common Pleas (“Family Court”), Family Court Judge Michelle
Verricchio and Family Court “Administrative Judge” Richard Betz, and Domestic
Relations Office Director Julia Greenwood for due process violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Parker also asserted claims under state libel law and the Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. He alleged that, in one or more of three Pennsylvania
child support cases against him, these officials acted without jurisdiction, improperly
failed to reduce his support obligations and arrearages in light of his unemployment,
illegally refused to disclose evidence forming the basis for these determinations, and
conveyed false information about Parker to credit reporting agencies. He requested
compensatory and punitive damages and orders that the Family Court officers (1) provide
copies of documents consulted in deciding his cases and (2) correct his credit report.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss. In an April 15, 2014 order, the District Court
dismissed Parker’s amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. On
May 14, 2014, Parker requested reconsideration under Rule 60(b), which the District
Court denied on September 22, 2014. Parker filed a notice of appeal (“NOA”) on
October 7, 2014.

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II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. At the threshold, we must
determine whether our review extends to the District Court’s dismissal order, or covers
only the denial of reconsideration.1 An appellant in a civil case where the United States
is not a party must file his notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of judgment. Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A Rule 60(b) motion filed within 28 days of a judgment’s entry tolls
the appeals deadline until the motion is resolved. Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
Appellees2 argue that Parker’s October 7, 2014 NOA was, standing alone,
untimely as to the April 15, 2014 dismissal order and his Rule 60(b) motion, filed 29 days
after that order, failed to toll the appeals deadline. See Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
However, the District Court’s nine-page April 15, 2014 order contained an extensive
discussion of its reasons for dismissing Parker’s claims, and therefore did not comply
with the separate-document rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a); In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2006). Because a separate document was required but
omitted, judgment was not deemed entered until 150 days after the order’s entry. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). As Parker’s 30-day period to appeal the April 15, 2014 order
1 Although Parker’s brief addresses both orders, he mentioned only the reconsideration
order in his NOA. This omission does not deprive us of jurisdiction. The context
indicates that Parker seeks to challenge the underlying dismissal of his claims. See
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 225 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007).
2 Only Appellees Betz and Greenwood have submitted a brief. Appellees Verricchio and
the Family Court filed an untimely motion to be excused from briefing pursuant to 3d
Cir. LAR 31.2.

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therefore did not begin until September 12, 2014, his October 7, 2014 NOA was timely.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). We therefore address Parker’s challenges to both orders.
III.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing Parker’s
complaint for failure to state a claim. Jones v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d
119, 123 (3d Cir. 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must plead “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Applying this standard, we conclude that the District
Court did not err in dismissing Parker’s complaint. See Jones, 606 F.3d at 123.
First, Appellees are immune from Parker’s claims for monetary relief. The
Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against a non-consenting state directly or where the state
is the real party in interest. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429
(1997). As this immunity extends to the component districts of Pennsylvania’s unified
judicial system, it shields the Family Court from Parker’s suit. See Benn v. First Judicial
Dist., 426 F.3d 233, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2005). A judge is immune from suit for monetary
damages arising from her judicial actions, even corrupt or malicious ones, unless she acts
“in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S 9, 11–12
(1991). Parker alleged that Judge Verricchio, who formerly prosecuted child-support

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cases for the county, entered some orders in his cases before recusing herself presumably
due to the potential conflict of interest. Even assuming that they support an inference of
bias on Verricchio’s part, however, Parker’s allegations do not suggest that she acted
absent any jurisdiction over the subject matter of his cases. See id.3
“Administrative Judge” Betz is likely entitled to judicial immunity as well.
However, we cannot infer Betz’s precise function—and whether he acted in all relevant
instances in a discretionary role entitling him to such immunity—from the face of the
complaint. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1993).
Nevertheless, a court may dismiss a complaint based on a statute-of-limitations defense
where the time bar is apparent from the allegations. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d
128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002). Section 1983 claims must be brought within the state limitations
period governing personal-injury torts, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007),
which is two years in Pennsylvania. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. Parker’s only allegations
against Betz were that he presided at an October 26, 2010 motion hearing and entered a
March 26, 2011 order denying Parker’s requests for termination of his child-support
obligation and arrearages and release of related information. As both events occurred
3 We note Parker’s argument that the Family Court lacked personal jurisdiction in one of
his cases because he lived out of state. However, he married the child’s mother in Lehigh
County, and Parker does not indicate that child and mother have left Pennsylvania. His
out-of-state residency was insufficient on its own to deprive the Family Court of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carney v. Dahlmann, 624 A.2d 197, 199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

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more than two years before Parker filed suit on October 30, 2013, his complaint
established that his claims against Betz are time barred. See Robinson, 313 F.3d at 135.4
Parker alleged that Director Greenwood (1) failed to effect proper service, (2)
permitted one of his cases to be filed in the wrong venue, (3) failed to inquire into, and
then provide Parker with notice of, the alleged emancipation of a child he was supporting,
(4) reported “opprobrious information” about him to credit reporting agencies, and (5)
helped prevent disclosure of the child-support information Parker sought. Whether these
activities were on behalf of the court or part of the prosecution of Parker’s child-support
cases, she is eligible at least for qualified immunity. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 1975).
Public officials are qualifiedly immune from damages liability for “the
performance of their discretionary functions when their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268 (internal quotation omitted). Parker’s complaint lacks
allegations supporting a reasonable inference that Greenwood, even if she incompetently
or erroneously performed duties affecting his cases, clearly violated one of his statutory
4 Parker argues that the limitations period on his claim does not commence until his child
support arrears are fully paid, citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). However,
Heck’s deferred accrual date applies only where there is an outstanding criminal
judgment at issue, unlike here. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393. Parker’s claim against
Betz accrued as soon as all events underlying his cause of action occurred—that is, upon
Betz’s entry of the disputed March 26, 2011 order denying Parker relief. See id. at 388.

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or constitutional rights. See id. Greenwood therefore also enjoys immunity from
Parker’s damages claim. See id. at 268–69; Waits, 516 F.2d at 206.
Second, were it appropriate, neither we nor the District Court can grant the
injunctive relief Parker requested. Among federal courts, only the Supreme Court may
directly review and reverse the Family Court’s decisions regarding Parker’s child-support
obligations and information disclosure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005) (citations omitted). We also lack
jurisdiction to compel the state court or its officers to disclose documents to Parker or
report new credit information. See In re Wolenski, 324 F.2d 309, 309 (3d Cir. 1963).
Moreover, Parker did not plausibly allege his entitlement to such orders. While he
sought release of the information under FOIA, FOIA governs only federal agencies, not
state entities such as the Family Court. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1); St. Michael’s
Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981). Parker argues
that under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), due process required disclosure of
“exculpatory” evidence. The Brady doctrine, however, typically applies in the context of
criminal proceedings and concerns suppression of evidence by the prosecutor, not the
court. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353–54 (6th Cir.
1993); NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, Parker
did not plausibly allege the existence of any evidence showing his entitlement to reduced
payments or—if such evidence existed—that it was not considered by the Family Court
in determining Parker’s child-support obligation. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,

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433 (1995) (explaining that Brady doctrine requires a reasonable probability of a different
outcome if evidence had been disclosed).
As for Parker’s claim that Greenwood libeled him by providing “opprobrious
information” about him to credit reporting agencies, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”), in pertinent part, bars defamation claims against “any person who furnishes
information to a consumer reporting agency . . . except as to false information furnished
with malice or willful intent to injure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). Parker did not indicate
exactly what information was provided, but presumably it concerned his child-support
arrearages. His complaint does not support a reasonable inference either that the
information was false or that Greenwood acted with malice or intent to injure in reporting
it. See id. Hence, the FCRA would prohibit his libel claim.
IV.
We review the District Court’s denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion.
See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446–47 (3d Cir. 2012); Morris v. Horn,
187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999). Although Parker invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), his
grounds for reconsideration amount to arguments that the District Court erred in
dismissing his claims. Allegations of legal error do not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)
and are properly asserted in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. United States v. Fiorelli, 337
F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003). Even if analyzed under Rule 59(e), Parker’s arguments fall
short. He has not shown that the District Court made a clear legal or factual error, and
points to no applicable change in law or new evidence to support altering or amending

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the judgment. See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Appellees Betz and Greenwood’s motion to seal unredacted documents is granted.
Appellees Verricchio and the Family Court’s motion to be excused from filing a brief is
granted.

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