Atina Knowles v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 22-2978
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ATINA KNOWLES,
Appellant
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 2:20-cv-03513)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Carol S. Wells1
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 8, 2024
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Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and MONTGOMERY-
1 The parties consented to Magistrate Judge
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

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REEVES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 26, 2024)
Atina Knowles
63 Boulevard E
Keyport, NJ 07735
Neil J. Hamburg
Alpa V. Patel
Hamburg Law Group
1 Franklin Town Boulevard
Suite 1106
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellee
Natalie L. Peelish
Williams & Connolly
680 Maine Avenue SW
Washington, DC 20024
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

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Atina Knowles appeals the District Court’s order
denying her motion to strike Temple University’s request for
taxation of costs and the resulting $2,578.93 award. For the
following reasons, we will reverse in part and affirm in part.2
I
We outlined the facts of this case when we affirmed the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment to Temple
University on Knowles’s due process claims. Knowles v.
Temple Univ., No. 21-3131, 2022 WL 3037258 (3d Cir. Aug.
2, 2022) (per curiam). As the prevailing party, Temple filed a
bill of costs for service of subpoenas, deposition and hearing
transcripts, and copies, which Knowles moved to strike. After
holding a conference,3 the District Court denied the motion and
awarded Temple $2,578.93 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which included $625
for private process servers, $1743.55 for transcripts, and
$210.38 for copies.4 Knowles appeals.
2 The Court thanks appointed Amicus Curiae Counsel for
their valuable service on this appeal.
3 Knowles asserts that the District Court engaged in ex
parte communications with Temple’s counsel during the
conference but has provided no evidence that this occurred.
4 Temple does not challenge the reduction from its
original $775.38 request for the copy costs.

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II5
A
In the United States, litigants bear their own expenses
for lawsuits unless legislation or a contract provides otherwise.
Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d
158, 164 (3d Cir. 2012). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Congress
permitted a prevailing party to obtain reimbursement for a
“narrow[],” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560,
573 (2012), category of expenses “that a federal court may tax
as a cost under the discretionary authority found in Rule
54(d),” Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.
437, 441-42 (1987); cf. id. (holding that “[t]he discretion
granted by Rule 54(d) is not a power to evade [§ 1920’s]
specific congressional command[,]” but “[r]ather, [it] is solely
a power to decline to tax, as costs, the items enumerated in §
1920”); accord Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 164 (“Section 1920 . . .
define[s] the full extent of a federal court’s power to shift
litigation costs absent express statutory authority.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in
original)). Among other things, the costs for service of
process, transcripts, and copies may be awarded. 28 U.S.C. §
1920-21.
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo whether an expense may be taxed under § 1920
as a matter of statutory construction. See Race Tires Am., Inc.
v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 164 (3d Cir.
2012). “We reverse only if [a district court’s] application [of
law] exceeded the bounds of discretion.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 458 (3d Cir. 2000).

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B
Sections 1920(1) and 1921 set forth a court’s authority
to award a prevailing party reimbursement for the costs of
service of process. Section 1920(1) permits an award of “[f]ees
of the clerk and marshal[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). Section
1921, in turn, outlines the types of fees that “[t]he United States
marshals or deputy marshals shall routinely collect, and a court
may tax as costs[,]” including “[s]erving a subpoena or
summons[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a)(1), (a)(1)(B). At issue here
is whether such costs may be awarded only when the “marshal”
performs the service.
The word “marshal” is undefined, so we interpret it “in
accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer,
569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Dictionaries help us with this task. Pa.,
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
647 F.3d 506, 511 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). At the
time of § 1920(1)’s enactment, the term “marshal” referred to
a public, not private, actor. See Marshals, Ballentine’s Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations (1948) (“Ministerial officers
belonging to the executive department of the Federal
Government, who with their deputies have . . . powers of
executing the laws of the United States”); Private, Ballentine’s
Law Dictionary with Pronunciations (1948) (“Belonging,
relating or pertaining to private individuals, as distinguished
from belonging, relating or pertaining to the
public”). Interpreting the word “marshal” in § 1920 to mean a
public actor is consistent with § 1921, which refers to “[t]he
United States marshals or deputy marshals[,]” as those who
serve process and does not mention private process servers. 28

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U.S.C. § 1921(a)(1), (a)(1)(B). Because “the normal rule of
statutory construction [is] that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning[,]”
we interpret the word “marshal” under § 1920(1) to refer to a
public actor. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Other textual clues lead us to conclude that the statute
does not apply to private actors. First, the plain language of
the statute tells us that the actors subject to its terms are the
singular “clerk” and “marshal.” This suggests that the statute
does not cover an array of actors. Second, the statute’s use of
the word “of” is informative. The word “of” means
“proceeding from” or “belonging to[.]” Of, Webster’s New
International Dictionary (2d ed. 1937). Thus, read naturally,
“fees of the marshal” means fees belonging to, or incurred by,
the marshal—not costs charged by private servers that are
equal to or less than the amount of fees that are authorized to
be paid to the marshal, as some of our sister circuits have held.6
6 Two of our sister circuits have reach a conclusion
different from us and one has acknowledged the
reasonableness of each view. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has construed § 1920 to encompass private
service fees, reasoning that (1) § 1920(1) “refers to the fees ‘of’
the marshal but does not require payment ‘to’ the marshal”; (2)
“the [phrase] ‘fees of the marshal’ refers to fees authorized by
§ 1921, rather than fees collected by the marshal”; and (3) thus,
courts may tax “service costs that do not exceed the [amount
set for the] marshal’s fees, no matter who actually effected
service.” U.S. EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 623-24
(11th Cir. 2000); see also Collins v. Gorman, 96 F.3d 1057,
1060 (7th Cir. 1996) (offering a similar interpretation). This

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Third, canons of statutory construction and case law
also support the conclusion that costs for private servers are not
taxable. Interpreting the phrase to capture only public actors is
consistent with the canon noscitur a sociis, which provides that
“a word is known by the company it keeps.” McDonnell v.
United States, 579 U.S. 550, 568-69 (2016). Section 1920 uses
the terms “marshal” and “clerk” together, 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1),
both of whom are public officials, and this indicates that
Congress intended the provision to cover expenses incurred by
only government actors. Concluding that the provision’s plain
language applies only to public actors aligns with Supreme
Court precedent observing that (1) § 1920 is “narrow [in]
scope,” Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 573; and (2) Congress must be
“explicit” for an expense to be taxed as costs, Crawford Fitting,
482 U.S. at 445. See id. (concluding that a court may not tax
as costs the fees of litigants’ witnesses because there is no
conclusion ignores the plain text of the statute and contorts the
plain meaning of “fees of the marshal” to mean fees “measured
by” the amount authorized for marshal service. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has awarded costs for private
process servers based on its view of how service is actually
occurring in practice and not based on the statute’s language.
Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab’ys, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 178
(9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit said that it was persuaded by the view
expressed by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits but observed
that both the views of those courts and the Eighth Circuit are
reasonable and thus a district court did not abuse its discretion
in adopting one of these reasonable competing views in
declining to award fees for private servers. United States ex
rel. Evergreen Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Merritt Meridian Constr.
Corp., 95 F.3d 153, 172 (2d Cir. 1996).

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“explicit statutory . . . authorization” to do so); see also
Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 569, 572 (holding “compensation of
interpreters” under § 1920(6) does not include the cost of
translating documents because the ordinary meaning of
“interpreter” at the time of § 1920(6)’s enactment meant
someone who “translates orally from one language to
another”); Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 169 (deeming costs for e-
discovery vendors’ review and organization of information not
taxable under § 1920(4), as those tasks are not “copying” and
permitting such charges would be “untethered from the
statutory mooring”); Crues v. KFC Corp., 768 F.2d 230, 234
(8th Cir. 1985) (declining to award fees for “use of a special
process server because . . . § 1920 . . . contains no provision for
such expenses” (citation omitted)).7
Finally, should Congress wish to amend § 1920(1) to
cover private service costs, it “kn[ows] how to do
so.” Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 442. Indeed, Congress has
amended § 1920 at least twice, see generally Taniguchi, 566
U.S. at 565-75 (addressing the 1978 amendments to § 1920 and
holding them insufficient to cover the requested fees for
translating documents); Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 165
(addressing the 2008 amendments and holding e-discovery
vendors doing work other than providing copies not covered
7 See also Zdunek v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
100 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D.D.C. 1983) (“While 28 U.S.C. §
1920(1) authorizes taxation of the service fees charged by the
United States Marshals Service, there is no statutory
authorization for awarding the fees of special process servers,
as costs . . . . Consequently, the special process fees are not
taxable costs.”).

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by § 1920), but left § 1920(1) undisturbed,8 despite some courts
observing a rise in the use of private process servers. See, e.g.,
Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab’ys, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 178
(9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Accordingly, we decline to
interpret § 1920(1) to reach private actors and thus reverse the
award for costs incurred for private process servers.
C
The District Court, however, acted within its discretion
in awarding Temple transcript and copy costs. Sections
1920(2) and (4), respectively, provide for the taxation of costs
for transcripts and copies of materials “necessarily obtained for
use in the case[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), (4). The contested
transcripts and copies were necessary for Temple to prepare for
trial even if they were not ultimately used, and Knowles has
not explained how the award of those costs is inequitable.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm as to the award
of the transcript and copying fees and reverse as to the service
fees.
8 Section 1920(1) traces its origins to the Fee Act of
1853. See Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 164 (covering
“Marshals’ Fees . . . [f]or service of any warrant, attachment,
summons, capias, or other writ”).

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