William Joseph Webb, Jr. v. Department of Justice, Administrates Justice

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 22-3268
____________
WILLIAM JOSEPH WEBB, JR.,
Appellant
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATES
JUSTICE; ISLANDA L. FINAMORE, DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL; JOELLE P. HITCH, JUDGE -
FAMLY COURT, NEW CASTLE COUNTY; DIVISION
OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; SUZANNE
VALLE, SOCIAL WORKER; ROBERT MAY, WARDEN;
UNKNOWN DEJESUS, STAFF LIEUTENANT FOR
INTERNAL AFFAIRS; STACEY HOLLIS, TREATMENT
ADMINISTRATOR; UNKNOWN THONGVONG,
COUNSELOR
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 1-22-cv-00933)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________

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____________
Submitted Under 3rd Cir. LAR 34.1(a)
on May 20, 2024
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and McKEE, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion filed: September 27, 2024)
____________
Don Arrington
Cara Costanzo
Jennifer Hance
Mary E. Levy
Stephanie Terinoni
Temple University Beasley School of Law
1719 N Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
Jessica Rickabaugh
Tucker Law Group
1801 Market Street
Ten Penn Center, Suite 2500
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant
Nicholas D. Picollelli, Jr.
Office of Attorney General of Delaware
Delaware Department of Justice
820 N French Street
Wilmington, DE 19801

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Gregory E. Smith
Office of Attorney General of Delaware
Delaware Department of Justice
102 W Water Street, 3rd Floor
Dover, DE 19904
Counsel for State of Delaware by Special Appearance
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
William Webb, an inmate at Delaware’s James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC), sued prison officials for
failing to schedule court-ordered visits with his daughter. The
District Court screened and dismissed the suit, holding that
Webb did not exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process or
allege a valid constitutional claim. Seeking to appeal, Webb
placed a notice of appeal in a mailbox for JTVCC staff to
collect and file electronically. We deem his notice filed on the
day he placed it in that mailbox, so his appeal is timely. And
because the complaint states a plausible claim for relief, we
will reverse the District Court’s order and remand the case for
further proceedings.

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I
A
At all times relevant to this case, Webb has been
incarcerated at JTVCC.1 In October 2020, a Delaware family
court issued an order granting him visits with his daughter.
Since that order, however, prison officials have arranged only
one father-daughter visit. That visit, held in 2021, lasted
fifteen minutes, was supervised by an official from the state
child-services agency, and concluded “without incident or
intervention” from the supervising official. App. 21. But no
visits have been scheduled since, and Webb has become
estranged from his daughter as a result.
Seeking additional visits, Webb filed a grievance
through the prison’s internal procedure. That grievance was
returned to him as unprocessed. He tried to follow up by
writing to three prison officials, but none of them adequately
responded.
Webb, representing himself, then filed suit against
several JTVCC employees. He alleged that prison officials
violated his constitutional right to “reunification” and he
sought money damages and injunctive relief. App. 24.
The District Court dismissed the pro se complaint under
the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and
1915(e)(2)(B), which authorize courts to quickly dismiss
defective lawsuits from incarcerated plaintiffs. The Court held
1 We take these facts from Webb’s complaint and, at this stage
of the case, assume that they are true. Durham v. Kelley, 82
F.4th 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023).

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that the complaint had two fatal flaws: it revealed that Webb
failed to exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process, and it
stated no valid claim for relief against the JTVCC employees.2
The Court determined that amendment would be futile, so it
did not permit Webb to amend his complaint.
B
On November 22, 2022—twenty-eight days after the
District Court dismissed his complaint—Webb signed his
notice of appeal and took steps to send it to the Court. For
reasons we will discuss below, the Court did not receive his
notice of appeal until November 29, thirty-five days after it
entered its dismissal order.
Because it appeared that Webb’s notice of appeal was
untimely filed, the Clerk of this Court flagged the appeal for
possible dismissal. Webb (still representing himself) opposed
dismissal, arguing that his notice was timely filed under the
prison mailbox rule. We appointed counsel for Webb and
directed the parties to brief the timeliness issue alongside the
merits. 3
2 Webb’s complaint also named other defendants and raised
other claims. The District Court held that those defendants
were immune from suit, and Webb does not challenge those
holdings on appeal.
3 We thank appointed counsel from the Temple University
Beasley School of Law for ably representing Webb in this
appeal. We are also grateful to the Delaware Department of
Justice, which entered a special appearance at our request and

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II
Before addressing the merits of Webb’s appeal, we must
determine whether it was timely filed. The answer turns on an
issue of first impression in our Court: whether the prison
mailbox rule established in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266
(1988) and codified in Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure applies to a system in which prison
officials electronically file inmates’ court documents. We hold
that it does. Because Webb used this system and otherwise
complied with Rule 4(c), his notice of appeal was timely filed.
In civil cases, a party seeking to appeal a district court’s
order or judgment must file a “notice of appeal . . . with the
district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order
appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).4 This thirty-day
deadline is “mandatory and jurisdictional,” Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (citation omitted), so we cannot hear
expressed its positions on timeliness and the merits. Because
the District Court dismissed Webb’s suit before any of the
defendants were served, they were not obligated to participate
in this appeal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 31.2 (2011).
4 There are some exceptions to this rule, none of which apply
here. See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (extending the
deadline to sixty days when the United States, a federal agency,
or a federal officer or employee sued in their official capacity
is a party).

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an appeal if the notice was filed late, Sec’y of Lab. v. Doyle,
675 F.3d 187, 189 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012).5
We assess whether the notice was timely by looking to
the date it was “filed with the district clerk.” Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A). For most litigants, a document is filed when it is
delivered to the district clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(2);
United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916). But we
calculate filing dates differently for incarcerated litigants.
Recognizing that these litigants face unique disadvantages, the
Supreme Court developed the prison mailbox rule. Houston,
487 U.S. 266. Under this rule, we treat an incarcerated
litigant’s notice of appeal as “filed at the time [he] delivered it
to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Id.
at 276.
The prison mailbox rule was later codified in Rule 4(c)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Fed. R. App. P.
4(c) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see Long
v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 441 n.11 (3d Cir.
2012).6 As relevant here, Rule 4(c)(1) provides that “[i]f an
inmate files a notice of appeal[,] . . . the notice is timely if it is
deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before
the last day for filing.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1). To benefit
from this rule, an incarcerated litigant must meet two
5 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. Its order dismissing the complaint is a final order
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
6 The rule announced in Houston applied to incarcerated pro se
litigants, but codification extended it to any “[i]nmate
[c]onfined in an [i]nstitution,” not just those representing
themselves. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c).

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conditions. First, “[i]f an institution has a system designed for
legal mail, an inmate confined there must use that system.” Id.
Second, the litigant must provide evidence corroborating the
date that the notice was deposited in the prison’s mail system:
either “a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1746 . . . or a notarized statement,” id. 4(c)(1)(A)(i), 7 or
some other “evidence (such as a postmark or date stamp)
showing that the notice was . . . deposited and that postage was
prepaid,” id. 4(c)(1)(A)(ii). If no such evidence accompanies
the notice of appeal, we may “exercise[] [our] discretion to
permit the later filing of a declaration or notarized statement
that satisfies Rule 4(c)(1)(A)(i).” Id. 4(c)(1)(B).
Our jurisdiction to hear this appeal turns on whether
Webb benefits from the prison mailbox rule. His notice of
appeal was delivered to the district clerk more than thirty days
after the dismissal order. However, he argues that we should
apply the prison mailbox rule and deem his notice of appeal
filed on the date when he placed it in a designated electronic-
filing mailbox in his housing unit, which was within the thirty-
day window. We invited the State of Delaware to address this
question by special appearance. The State accepted our
invitation, described the electronic filing process at JTVCC,
and conceded that the prison mailbox rule should apply to it.
We agree.
7 To comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, a declaration executed in
the United States must say “substantially the following”: “I
declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)[.]”

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As the State explains, JTVCC has established an
electronic filing system for inmates’ court documents. Under
an agreement between the Delaware Department of
Corrections and the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware, prisoners at JTVCC file documents with the
District Court by placing them in a mailbox in their housing
unit. Security staff gather these filings and bring them to the
prison’s central mailroom. Paralegals then collect the filings
from the mailroom, log them in a spreadsheet, scan them, and
email them to the District Court.8 (Inmates housed in units
with access to JTVCC’s law library have an additional option:
they can bring their court filings directly to the law library for
a paralegal to log, scan, and email to the Court. Webb is
housed in a unit without access to the law library, so he must
use an in-house mailbox for electronic filing.)
Following this procedure, Webb placed his notice of
appeal in an in-house mailbox on November 22. That is the
date listed on the notice and the accompanying certificate of
service, in which Webb stated that he “served a true and correct
copy of the attached Notice of Appeal . . . by placing [the]
same in the U.S. mailbag at JTVCC.” App. 14–15. Webb later
confirmed in an affidavit that he “placed the Notice of Appeal
in the in-house mail on the date it was signed.” App. 41.
We have not yet applied the prison mailbox rule to a
system like JTVCC’s, in which prison officials submit
inmates’ filings electronically. When the rule was developed,
court documents were delivered by hand or by mail. But
changing filing methods have not disturbed the underlying
8 This agreement does not cover inmates at other Delaware
prisons or filings in Delaware state courts.

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legal principle. The Supreme Court developed the prison
mailbox rule because incarcerated litigants lose control of their
legal submissions as soon as they give them to prison officials.
“Unskilled in law, unaided by counsel, and unable to leave the
prison,” prisoners “ha[ve] no choice but to entrust the
forwarding of [their] notice[s] of appeal to prison authorities
whom [they] cannot control or supervise and who may have
every incentive to delay.” Houston, 487 U.S. at 271.
With this reasoning in mind, we see no meaningful
distinction between inmate filings that prison staff submit to
the court electronically and those that are delivered on paper.
Even though Webb’s notice was filed electronically, he lost the
ability to monitor its progress and ensure its timely delivery to
the District Court as soon as he placed it in the prison’s in-
house mailbox. It is no surprise, then, that our sister circuit had
little trouble extending the prison mailbox rule to electronic
filings—after all, “pro se prisoners are no more able to
guarantee that properly tendered documents are e-filed than
that they’re mailed.” Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 859 (7th
Cir. 2015). Following its lead, we hold “that a pro se prisoner’s
legal documents are considered filed on the date that they’re
tendered to prison staff in accordance with reasonable prison
policies, regardless of whether they are ultimately mailed or
uploaded” electronically. Id.9
9 Like the Seventh Circuit, we recognize that some language in
Rule 4(c) does not neatly translate to electronic filings. For
instance, the rule requires incarcerated litigants to provide a
declaration, notarized statement, or other evidence that postage
was prepaid. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii). This

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We also conclude that Webb met the other requirements
of Rule 4(c)(1). By placing his notice in the in-house mailbox,
he used his prison’s established system for handling legal mail.
And the signed and dated certificate of service he submitted
alongside his notice of appeal is “evidence . . . showing that the
notice was so deposited” sufficient to satisfy Rule
4(c)(1)(A)(ii). See Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 451
n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (presuming that an incarcerated litigant filed
a document on the date he executed it); United States v.
Rinaldi, 447 F.3d 192, 194 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Long,
670 F.3d at 439 n.4 (same); cf. Ford v. Wilson, 747 F.3d 944,
949 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing “the certificate of service [the
incarcerated litigant] included with his notice of appeal” as
additional evidence of timely filing).10 Webb’s notice was
therefore timely filed, and we may proceed to the merits of his
appeal.
III
Turning to the merits, Webb challenges the District
Court’s screening-stage dismissal on two grounds. First, he
requirement “is obviously not applicable when e-filing.”
Taylor, 787 F.3d at 859 n.10.
10 Even if the certificate of service were insufficient, we would
exercise our discretion to accept Webb’s subsequently
submitted affidavit, which supports his version of events and
complies with Rule 4(c)(1)(A)(i). Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(B);
see Carney v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347,
1351 (10th Cir. 2017) (“We exercise our discretion under Fed.
R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(B) to permit the later filing of [the
incarcerated litigant’s] declaration and deem the appeal
timely.”).

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says that his complaint did not definitively allege that he failed
to exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process. And second,
he argues that his complaint stated a valid constitutional claim.
We review the dismissal de novo, accepting the complaint’s
factual allegations as true. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373
(3d Cir. 2020).11 Applying this standard, we agree with Webb
on both fronts.
A
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
inmates must “exhaust[]” “such administrative remedies as are
available” in the prison system before bringing a lawsuit about
prison conditions in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate
suits about prison life . . . .” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002).
As the statute makes clear, prisoners need only exhaust
“available” administrative remedies. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.
632, 635–36 (2016). In this context, “available” means
“capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained
of.” Id. at 642 (cleaned up). A prison’s internal grievance
process is not “available” if, for example, (1) “it operates as a
simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates,” (2) it is
“so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of
use” because “no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it,”
11 Because Webb drafted the complaint himself, we construe it
liberally, holding it to “less stringent standards” than one
drafted by a lawyer. Durham, 82 F.4th at 223 (quoting Shorter
v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 371 (3d Cir. 2021)).

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or (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking
advantage of [it] through machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation.” Id. at 643–44.
In addition, an incarcerated plaintiff generally need not
demonstrate that he exhausted his prison’s available grievance
procedures in his complaint. Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies “is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead
and prove,” so the issue is typically resolved later in the
litigation process. Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286,
295 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d
265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013)); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216
(2007). But there is a narrow exception to this rule: when the
inmate’s complaint itself makes clear that he failed to exhaust
the prison’s available grievance procedures, a court may
dismiss the suit without waiting for the defendants to raise the
issue and meet their burden of proof. Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th
255, 264 (3d Cir. 2024).
The District Court concluded that the exception applied
here. Yet a review of Webb’s complaint leaves us far from
certain that his allegations conveyed a failure to exhaust
JTVCC’s available grievance procedures. True, Webb marked
the “No” checkbox in response to the complaint form’s
question “[i]s the grievance process completed?” App. 24. But
the form offered a section for further explanation, in which
Webb wrote that his grievance “was returned as unprocessed,”
that he then “went on the tablet and wrote” to prison officials,
and that he received “an illegal response.” Id.
Reading Webb’s complaint as a whole, then, it is not
obvious that he failed to exhaust JTVCC’s available grievance
procedures. His explanation raises the “reasonable
inference[]” that, by the time he filed his complaint, he had

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taken his grievance as far as it could go in the prison’s internal
process. Durham, 82 F.4th at 223; see Small, 728 F.3d at 273
(holding that a prisoner exhausted available remedies when he
did not receive a decision on his grievance and the prison had
no process for appealing non-decisions); Hacker v. Dart, 62
F.4th 1073, 1081 (7th Cir. 2023) (prisoner exhausted when
there was “no conceivable next step for [him] to take” (cleaned
up)); cf. Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019)
(prisoner exhausted administrative remedies when his prison
failed to respond to his grievance on time). Alternatively,
Webb has plausibly alleged that JTVCC’s rules for
unprocessed grievances were “so opaque” that they rendered
administrative remedies unavailable. Ross, 578 U.S. at 643.
Without a developed record on JTVCC’s grievance
procedures, we will leave it to the District Court to make these
determinations in the first instance. But the complaint raises
enough uncertainty about exhaustion to preclude dismissal at
the screening stage.12
12 While we reach this conclusion based on Webb’s complaint
alone, we observe that the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware has repeatedly found JTVCC’s policies
for unprocessed grievances to be confusing or indeterminate.
See, e.g., Fatir v. Phelps, No. 18-1549, 2021 WL 827142, at
*8 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2021) (“If the [Delaware Department of
Corrections] requires inmates to administratively exhaust
grievances returned as ‘unprocessed’ then prison policy should
indicate the process to exhaust unprocessed grievances.”);
Abbatiello v. Metzger, No. 19-1317, 2021 WL 678137, at *4
(D. Del. Feb. 22, 2021) (“Our District Court has previously

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B
Webb’s complaint withstands the screening stage for an
additional reason: construed liberally, it states a valid claim for
relief. The complaint alleges that “[s]ince October 19, 2020,
[Webb] has had court ordered visits to be scheduled” by prison
officials, that those visits have “only been performed once”
despite that single visit concluding “without incident or
intervention,” and that he is in “immediate danger of
estrangement” from his daughter as a result. App. 21–22.
Though “inartfully pleaded,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citation omitted), these allegations
support a plausible freedom-of-association claim under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Constitution “protects
noted that the returns of unprocessed grievance instructions in
use at JTVCC are confusing at best.” (cleaned up));
Montgomery v. Onuoha, No. 19-001, 2020 WL 4673828, at *3
(D. Del. Aug. 12, 2020) (holding that the “[p]laintiff had no
available administrative remedies” because his grievances
were returned as unprocessed and the prison had no rules
outlining how to proceed). Because the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement is so unforgiving, “prisons should create
understandable grievance procedures” that are “clear and
transparent enough to allow ordinary inmates to navigate
them.” Hacker, 62 F.4th at 1078. Fair, transparent procedures
further the interests of inmates and prison officials alike. See
Mack, 839 F.3d at 296 (observing that grievances processes
offer prison officials an opportunity to gather information and
“take appropriate responsive measures” before an inmate sues
(quoting Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir.
2004)).

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an individual’s right to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships,” including the parent-child relationship.
Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist.,
971 F.3d 416, 431 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Because
“freedom of association is among the rights least compatible
with incarceration,” this right is sharply curtailed in prison.
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). But it is not
extinguished altogether. Id. (“We do not hold, and we do not
imply, that any right to intimate association is altogether
terminated by incarceration . . . .”); see also Inmates of
Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 759 (3d Cir.
1979) (upholding a ban on contact visits but observing that the
policy did “not preclude[] [a prisoner] from visiting with
members of his family and others”). Indeed, “while the
[Supreme] Court has sustained significant abridgments of
prisoners’ associational rights, . . . [those] sustained policies
have often contained exceptions expressly privileging
prisoners’ communications with immediate family members.”
Tiedemann v. von Blanckensee, 72 F.4th 1001, 1013 (9th Cir.
2023).
To evaluate policies that burden prisoners’
constitutional rights, courts use the well-worn, four-factor test
set out in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987).13 At its
13 Webb also argues on appeal that his complaint plausibly
alleges a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This claim is closely intertwined with the
freedom-of-association claim: both rely on the complaint’s
allegations that prison officials impeded Webb’s relationship
with his daughter. We decline to define the boundaries

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core, that test asks whether the challenged policy is
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634, 653 (2019) (quoting
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). This “highly fact sensitive” inquiry is
ill-suited to resolution on the complaint alone. Jones v. Brown,
461 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2006). And while the inquiry is
deferential to prison officials by design, “it is also not a blank
check.” Tiedemann, 72 F.4th at 1013.
Unsurprisingly, then, we cannot resolve the Turner
analysis at this early stage. We read Webb’s claim that the visit
with his daughter concluded “without incident or intervention”
to allege that prison officials’ failure to schedule further visits
was not rationally related to legitimate penological interests—
an allegation that we must take as true for now. App. 21. And
without any responsive pleading from the defendants, we
cannot assess how they justify their actions. While we express
between these claims at this early stage because both would be
subject to the Turner test. Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 370
(3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has
consistently applied the Turner standard to prisoners’
constitutional rights claims,” including substantive due process
claims); see Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 323 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that “prison inmates retain a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process right to privacy in their medical
information” but that the right’s scope was limited by the
Turner test).

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no opinion on the ultimate merit of Webb’s claim, the
complaint’s allegations are sufficient at this juncture.14
* * *
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the
District Court’s order dismissing Webb’s complaint and
remand the case for further proceedings.
14 Because we conclude that Webb’s complaint, read liberally,
states a constitutional claim, we need not determine whether
the District Court erred in denying Webb permission to amend
it. See Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 n.3 (3d Cir.
2017).

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