Angela Reading v. North Hanover Township, New Jersey

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 23-3092
____________
ANGELA READING,
Appellant
v.
NORTH HANOVER TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY;
ROBERT DUFF, in his individual capacity and in his official
capacity as Chief of Police for North Hanover Township;
HELEN PAYNE, in her individual capacity; COLONEL
WES ADAMS, in his individual capacity and in his official
capacity as Commander, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst
(JB MDL) and 87th Air Base Wing, JB MDL, New Jersey;
COLONEL ROBERT GRIMMETT, in his individual
capacity and in his official capacity as Commander of the
87th Mission Support Group of the U.S. Air Force; LT. COL.
MEGAN HALL, in her individual capacity and in her official
capacity as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force and
Deputy Commander of the 87th Security Forces Squadron;
MAJOR NATHANIEL LESHER, in his individual capacity
and in his official capacity as a Major in the U.S. Air Force;
MAJOR CHRISTOPHER SCHILLING, in his individual
capacity and in his official capacity as a Major in the U.S.
Army Reserve; JOSEPH VAZQUEZ, in his individual
capacity and in his official capacity as a Civilian U.S.

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Department of the Air Force Employee; COLONEL
MITCHELL WISNIEWSKI, in his individual capacity and in
his official capacity as Deputy Commander, Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and Commander Army Support
Activity
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 1-23-cv-01469)
District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams
____________
Argued on September 4, 2024
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and PORTER, Circuit
Judges.
(Filed: December 20, 2024)
Christopher A. Ferrara [Argued]
Thomas More Society
420 Route 46 East
Suite 12
Fairfield, NJ 07004
Michael G. McHale
Thomas More Society
10506 Burt Circle
Suite 110
Omaha, NE 68114

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Brennan Tyler Brooks
Thomas More Society
309 W Washington Street
Suite 1250
Chicago, IL 60606
Counsel for Appellant
Walter F. Kawalec, III [Argued]
Marshall Dennehey
15000 Midlantic Drive
Suite 200, P.O. Box 5429
Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054
Counsel for Appellees Township of North
Hanover and Robert Duff
Michael V. Madden [Argued]
Madden & Madden, P.A.
108 Kings Highway East
Suite 200
Haddonfield, NJ 08033
Counsel for Appellee Helen Payne
Brian M. Boynton
Philip R. Sellinger
Daniel Tenny
Graham White [Argued]
United States Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Room 7215
Washington, DC 20530

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Counsel for Appellees Colonel Wes Adams,
Colonel Robert Grimmett, Lt. Col. Megan Hall,
Major Nathaniel Lesher, Major Christopher
Schilling, Joseph Vazquez, and Colonel Mitchell
Wisniewski
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This interlocutory appeal arises under the First
Amendment to the Constitution. Angela Reading, a mother and
former school board member, alleged that federal and local
government officials violated her right to free speech by
engaging in a campaign of censorship and retaliation after she
posted comments on Facebook. She requested a preliminary
injunction to prohibit those officials from further interfering
with her First Amendment rights. After the District Court
denied her motion, Reading appealed. Although much of the
government actors’ behavior was beyond the pale, the record
does not show a substantial risk that their acts of censorship
and retaliation will recur. So Reading lacks standing to seek a
preliminary injunction. We will affirm.
I
A
The controversy that gave rise to this case unfolded at
the Upper Elementary School (UES or School) in the North

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Hanover Township School District. As part of its 2022 “Week
of Respect,” the School invited students to design posters
“demonstrat[ing] that UES [is] a safe place where everyone [is]
accepted.” App. 185. Some students offered “messages of
general acceptance,” while others supported more specific
causes. Id.
One such poster, anchored in the center by the acronyms
“LGBTQ” and “UES,” featured descriptions of various sexual
identities and their corresponding flags. App. 125. The poster
included a “bi” flag, a “genderfluid” flag, and a “polysexual”
flag, among others. Id. It announced that “different is cool” and
instructed students that “you are who you are.” Id.
Angela Reading first saw the poster when she attended
the School’s “Math Night.” App. 123. After her seven-year-old
daughter asked what the word “polysexual” meant, she was
“livid.” Id. She took her concerns to social media. In a lengthy
post to the “NJ Fresh Faced Schools” Facebook page, Reading
wondered why an elementary school would permit its students
to “research topics of sexuality,” and worried that adults were
“talking about their sexual life” with her children. Id. She
called the poster “perverse” and argued that it “should be
illegal to expose my kids to sexual content.” Id. Although
“[k]ids should respect differences,” Reading explained, they
“should not be forced to learn about and accept concepts of
sexuality in elementary school.” Id. Reading concluded the
post by noting that her comments were “made in [her] capacity
as a private citizen and not in [her] capacity as a [school] board
member.” App. 125.
Reading’s post quickly drew the ire of military
personnel at nearby Joint Base McGuire-Dix Lakehurst, some
of whom had children at the School. Major Chris Schilling was

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especially fixated on the post. In an email to local parents,
Schilling complained that Reading’s post was “filled with too
many logical fallacies to list.” App. 126. He accused her of
“try[ing] to over sexualize things” to “give her arguments more
power,” insisting that she did “not hav[e] the proper resources
and/or education on the matter.” Id. Schilling was “very
concern[ed]” that Reading served as a local school board
member. Id.
Writing from his personal email account, Schilling also
worried that Reading would “stir[] up right wing extremists.”
App. 127. He raised this alarm in another email to parents,
warning that Reading’s post “could needlessly injure the
school and others in the community.” Id. He encouraged
parents to speak out against Reading and to “keep the pressure
on until her disruptive and dangerous actions cease.” App. 131.
The controversy grew when Schilling elevated his
concerns to the leadership at Joint Base McGuire-Dix
Lakehurst. Now writing from his military email account,
Schilling cautioned Major Nathaniel Lesher that Reading’s
post could “give[] a road map to anyone looking to make a
statement, political, ideological, or even violent.” App. 132–
33. In response, Major Lesher promised to forward the issue to
Robert Duff, the Chief of Police for Hanover Township. After
Reading’s post gained modest traction online, Schilling once
again contacted Lesher, who vowed to “push this again” to
Duff. App. 135–36.
Instead of de-escalating the matter to the Hanover
Township Police, the situation intensified when more military
personnel got involved. Air Force Antiterrorism Program
Manager Joseph Vazquez wrote that Reading’s post “really
gets under my skin for sure.” App. 137. He assured Major

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Schilling that he was “sending this to our partners with NJ
Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness as well as the
NJ State Police Regional Operations Intelligence Center,”
which “keep an eye on far right/hate groups.” Id. And
Lieutenant Colonel Megan Hall advised two local school
superintendents, including Defendant Helen Payne, that
Reading’s posts “have created a concern for the safety of our
military children and families.” App. 141. She worried that
they “could become targets from extremist personnel/groups.”
Id.
Major Schilling reported his colleagues’ involvement to
parents in the community. In an email sent from his personal
account, Schilling explained that he had been “actively
working with the base leadership over the past few days” and
that “they are working to support us in our efforts.” App. 139.
Schilling’s efforts bore fruit. On November 30, Chief
Duff successfully convinced Nicole Stouffer, the administrator
of “NJ Fresh Faced Schools,” to remove Reading’s post from
the page. As Stouffer described the episode,
While professing that he was not actually
ordering me to take the post down, Duff
intimidated me into doing so by telling me that
the post, and Mrs. Reading, were under
investigation by Homeland Security because of
the supposed potential for the post to cause a
school shooting like the one that had occurred at
Uvalde Texas, or a mass shooting like the one
that had occurred at a gay nightclub in Colorado.
Duff told me that the “threat” posed by this
innocuous post was such he had had to provide
extra security for the North Hanover schools

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because of the threat of violence. He was clearly
and unequivocally pressuring me to censor the
post while trying to pretend that he was not doing
so.
App. 304. After briefing military personnel on this
development, Chief Duff promised to “continue to see if I can
get additional posts removed from other social media posts.”
App. 143.
The controversy didn’t end there. One comment on
Reading’s post revealed the “location” of upcoming school
board meetings, which were held at “times . . . publicly listed
on the school website.” App 153. So even though Reading’s
post had been taken down, Major Schilling feared that
outsiders might still endanger the community. Worried for the
“military parents [who] attend these meetings,” Schilling
sought even more support from base leadership. Id. So
Antiterrorism Program Manager Vazquez forwarded
Schilling’s concerns to the New Jersey Office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness, who in turn notified the Burlington
County Prosecutors Office Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.
Meanwhile, Chief Duff offered to “continue to monitor social
media and take appropriate action if needed.” App. 160.
Many of these developments were shared with the
public. In a “Community Update” email, Superintendent Payne
stated that recent events had “caused safety and security
concerns for many families” and offered the following
assurance:
[t]he safety and security of our students and staff
is always of primary importance, and ensuring
that has been my first priority, even as we

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responded to this situation over the past couple
of days. I assure you that I have been in
continuous close contact with the North Hanover
Police and they have been very supportive and
present for us. They are taking any risks very
seriously, are aware of our concerns and have
been working on their end to provide any support
we need.
App. 186. On top of these public-facing comments,
Superintendent Payne and Chief Duff privately lambasted
Reading in a string of text messages to each other. Duff called
Reading “sick in the head,” to which Payne responded, “[o]ld
news.” App. 267. Duff asserted that Reading “should know
better and keep her mouth shut,” to which Payne responded,
“She can’t. She is not capable.” App. 279.
Major Schilling gave an update of his own. In a post to
the Northern Burlington Parents Facebook page, he
acknowledged that “[t]he current situation involving Mrs[.]
Reading’s actions has caused safety concerns for many
families.” App. 165. But “[t]he Joint Base leadership takes this
situation very seriously,” and “Security Forces [are] working
with multiple state and local law enforcement agencies to
monitor the situation to ensure the continued safety of the
entire community.” Id.
These efforts led to what Reading calls “an over-the-top
show of force” at the next Board of Education meeting on
December 13. Reading Br. 25. She claims that Chief Duff
arranged for “a multi-jurisdictional battalion of armed police
officers, install[ed] a metal detector, and requir[ed] bag
searches.” Id. Reading alleged that “panic-stricken attendees
assailed” her at the meeting, “falsely accusing her of

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jeopardizing school safety when no ‘threat’ had ever
materialized.” Id.
Reading defended herself in the media. She emailed
government officials, appeared on national television, and was
interviewed on local radio. She also published articles on a
blog, which covered topics ranging from government
censorship to developments in education policy.
After these events, Reading maintains that her “life and
career were radically altered for the worse.” Reading Br. 5.
Since the controversy began, Reading lost a job offer, resigned
from her position on the Northern Burlington County Regional
School Board, and withdrew her children from public schools.
She blames Defendants, whose conduct “rendered [her] a
pariah in her community.” Reading Br. 28.
All of this—emails, phone calls, text messages,
community letters, heightened security, and referrals to
counter-terrorism authorities—because of a single Facebook
post.
B
Reading sued local officials and military personnel. She
alleged, among other things, violations of her First
Amendment free speech rights.1 Her complaint sought
1 Defendants include local officials—North Hanover Schools
Superintendent Helen Payne and Hanover Chief of Police
Robert Duff—as well as military personnel—Colonel Wes
Adams, Colonel Robert Grimmett, Colonel Mitchell
Wisniewski, Lieutenant Colonel Megan Hall, Major Nathaniel

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compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief.
Shortly after filing her amended complaint, Reading
moved for a preliminary injunction. She asked the Court to bar
Defendants from censoring, attempting to censor, pressuring
others to censor, or adopting censorship policies about
Reading’s protected speech. She also sought to prohibit
Defendants from “threat-tag[ging]” her speech or otherwise
referring it to law enforcement, and to require Defendants to
“undergo regular First Amendment training.” App. 206–07.
The District Court considered whether Reading had
standing to seek injunctive relief, but it ultimately denied the
motion because Reading failed to show irreparable harm.
Reading timely appealed.
II
Reading invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and our jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). We review the District Court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its order denying the preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion. See Pyrotechnics Mgmt., Inc. v. XFX
Pyrotechnics LLC, 38 F.4th 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2022). Because
this is a First Amendment case, the Court “must conduct an
Lesher, Major Christopher Schilling, and Air Force
Antiterrorism Program Manager Joseph Vazquez.

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independent examination of the factual record as a whole.”
McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy.
See Del. State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of Safety
& Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2024). To obtain
one, the plaintiff must show that “[(1)] [she] is likely to succeed
on the merits, that [(2)] [she] is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief, that [(3)] the balance of
equities tips in [her] favor, and that [(4)] an injunction is in the
public interest.” Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms.,
Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
III
A
Before considering the prerequisites for a preliminary
injunction, we turn to jurisdiction. The District Court declined
to resolve Reading’s motion for preliminary injunction on
standing grounds, instead denying relief because Reading
failed to show irreparable harm. After all, the requirements for
standing and irreparable harm are similar, and courts often
discuss them together. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983) (“[C]ase or controversy considerations
‘obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint
states a sound basis for equitable relief.’” (citation omitted)).
But in preliminary injunction cases, the doctrines often do
distinct work: the likelihood of harm concerns justiciability,
while the character of that harm is a question of remedies. See
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule
220–22 (1991). Because this motion turns on the likelihood,
rather than the character, of Reading’s purported harms, we

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analyze her motion through the lens of Article III standing.2
B
The jurisdiction of the federal courts extends only to
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. And
“[u]nder Article III, a case or controversy can exist only if a
plaintiff has standing to sue.” Associated Builders &
Contractors W. Pa. v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cnty., 81 F.4th
279, 286 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). To establish Article
III standing, a plaintiff must “show that she has suffered, or
will suffer, an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual
or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603
U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 409 (2013)) (cleaned up). The plaintiff has to satisfy
these requirements, which she must do “for each form of relief
that [she] seek[s].” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
431 (2021).3
2 We agree with the District Court that “[r]egardless of how
[Reading’s] failure is described, the result is the same: Plaintiff
will not receive her injunction.” Reading v. N. Hanover Twp.,
2023 WL 7986408, at *7 n.9 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2023). Still,
when justiciability and hence our power to order relief is in
question, we must address that issue first.
3 Because this interlocutory appeal concerns only Reading’s
request for a preliminary injunction, we limit our standing
inquiry to that form of relief. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105
(holding that a plaintiff must establish standing to seek a
preliminary injunction even when he also seeks damages).

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Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks prospective relief to
address future harm, she must show that “the threatened injury
is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the
harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.
149, 158 (2014) (cleaned up). Evidence of “past exposure to
illegal conduct” does not automatically justify an injunction
against future violations, O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
495 (1974), but it is relevant as “a launching pad for a showing
of imminent future injury,” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 59.
C
Reading advances two theories of standing to support
her request for a preliminary injunction. The first involves
future injury. To succeed on this theory, Reading must show
that at least one defendant is likely to censor her speech, to
coerce a third party to censor her speech, or to retaliate against
her for engaging in speech. “On this record, that is a tall order.”
Id. at 58.
Reading’s primary evidence of future harm is the
predictive value of Defendants’ past conduct. Her emphasis is
understandable, for “[i]f a plaintiff demonstrates that a
particular Government defendant was behind her past social-
media restriction, it will be easier for her to prove that she faces
a continued risk of future restriction that is likely to be
traceable to that same defendant.” Id. at 59. But “easier” does
not mean automatic. For example, in Murthy v. Missouri, the
Supreme Court considered a request for a preliminary
Because “standing is not dispensed in gross,” we leave for the
District Court the question of whether Reading has standing to
pursue her claims for damages or declaratory relief.
TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 431.

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injunction barring a host of government defendants from
coercing the removal of plaintiffs’ social media posts.
Plaintiffs argued that because the Government defendants had
coerced the removal of their social media posts in the past,
there was a substantial risk they would do so again. The
Supreme Court disagreed. And it did so because the
Government’s alleged suppression campaign “had
considerably subsided” by the time plaintiffs sued, so even the
strongest evidence of past censorship could not show “a
likelihood of future injury traceable to” the Government
defendants. Id. at 71–72.
Murthy dictates the outcome in Reading’s case. The
bulk of Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct took place
during a three-week period, and almost all of it ended by mid-
December 2022. Superintendent Payne sent her “Community
Update” on December 1; Chief Duff’s heightened security
ended upon the conclusion of a school board meeting on
December 13; and the Federal Defendants’ spate of
communications slowed significantly by December 5. Indeed,
during oral argument, Reading’s counsel could not identify any
unlawful acts by Defendants since the initial events nearly two
years ago. Even if Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
deprive Reading of her First Amendment right to speak freely
during the final weeks of 2022, any threat “had considerably
subsided” by the time she sued in March 2023. Id. at 71.
Reading’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. She first
quotes the Supreme Court’s statement in Susan B. Anthony List
v. Driehaus that Defendants’ “refusal to ‘disavow’ past
enforcement . . . indicate[s] a credible threat of recurrence.”
Reply Br. 4 (quoting Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 164–65). Her
reliance on Driehaus is misplaced. That case involved a
preenforcement challenge to an Ohio law that “prohibit[ed]

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certain ‘false statements’ during the course of a political
campaign.” 573 U.S. at 151–52. In finding a “substantial risk”
that the law would be enforced against the plaintiff, the Court
relied on the Ohio Elections Commission’s refusal to disavow
the possibility of future enforcement, not its failure to
apologize for past transgressions. See id. at 165. Unlike the
Commission in Driehaus, here the law enforcement
Defendants confirmed that they are not presently surveilling
Reading and have no plans to do so. The record supports them
on that score. While Reading continues to author blog posts
about the appropriateness of “LGBTQ+ issues in public
schools,” App. 375–76, Defendants have done nothing more to
silence or retaliate against her.
Reading also argues that the “voluntary cessation”
doctrine excuses her failure to show a likelihood of future
harm. That exception to the mootness rule provides that “a
defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice will
moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice
cannot reasonably be expected to recur.” FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S.
234, 241 (2024) (cleaned up). And it ensures that a defendant
cannot “suspend its challenged conduct after being sued, win
dismissal, and later pick up where it left off.” Id. Unable to
make out a likelihood of future harm, Reading relies on this
doctrine to try to shift her burden of proof—under the
voluntary cessation exception, it is Defendants who must make
“absolutely clear that [their] allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur.” Reply Br. 12 (quoting
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 170 (2000)). Because they have not made this

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showing, Reading suggests, we have jurisdiction to reverse the
District Court’s order.
We disagree because Reading cannot recharacterize as
mootness what is really a question of standing. This is not a
case where Reading once had standing to seek injunctive relief
but lost it during the pendency of litigation. Instead, “the issue
here” is whether Reading “meets the preconditions for
asserting an injunctive claim in a federal forum.” Lyons, 461
U.S. at 109. Because Reading has not since the filing of her
action established a likelihood of future harm, the doctrines of
mootness and voluntary cessation provide her no refuge.
Reading’s second theory of injury—that she suffers
present harms because of Defendants’ past suppression
campaign—fares no better than the first. She claims that the
specter of government censorship and retaliation has chilled
her freedom of speech, and only a preliminary injunction will
enable her to “resume full-throated advocacy for her point of
view.” Reply Br. 6. But even assuming Reading has been
deterred from speaking,4 we have made clear that “‘generalized
allegations’ of chilled speech cannot establish an existing
injury” under Article III. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Cnty. of
Delaware, 968 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
To hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to “manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on
their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly
impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416. Thus, “an allegation
4 Because Reading has appeared on a national television
program, participated in a local radio interview, and authored
many blog posts about this controversy, she has apparently
overcome whatever “subjective chill” she once experienced.

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that certain conduct has (or will have) a chilling effect on one’s
speech must claim a threat of specific future harm.” Nat’l
Shooting Sports Found. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 80 F.4th 215, 220
(3d Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Because Reading cannot show a
likelihood of future harm, she likewise cannot prevail on her
theory of present self-censorship.5
* * *
Reading’s allegations are serious and raise important
questions under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. Reading expressed concern about whether her
seven-year-old daughter was being exposed to sexual topics
that have no place in an elementary school. Regardless of
whether one agrees with Reading’s concern, the record
suggests that Defendants’ response to her blog post was, to put
it mildly, disproportionate. Although that past conduct may
very well result in remedies for damages or declaratory relief,
this narrow appeal concerns only Reading’s standing to seek a
preliminary injunction. And because Reading has not shown a
likelihood of future injury, she lacks standing to seek that form
of relief. We will affirm the District Court’s order denying
5 As further evidence of “ongoing harm, retaliatory
‘investigation’ and ‘threat-tagging,’” Reading points to a
recently filed declaration asserting that she has been “stripped
of [her] ‘Trusted Traveler’ status under the CLEAR Program.”
Reading Decl. 5. If true, this disturbing evidence does not
establish standing for a preliminary injunction here because
neither the Department of Homeland Security nor the
Transportation Security Administration is a named defendant.
To the extent Reading casts heightened airport screening as an
ongoing effect of Defendants’ conduct, she “ha[s] a
redressability problem.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 73.

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Reading’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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