US BANK NA, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial… v. B Rpenn Realty Owner Lp

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 24-1108
_________________
US BANK NA, as Trustee for the Registered Holders of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
multifamily Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2012-K18
v.
B R PENN REALTY OWNER LP,
Appellant
____________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2:21-cv-00502)
District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone
____________________________________________
Argued on September 23, 2024
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed May 8, 2025)

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Benjamin A. Garber (ARGUED)
KLEINBARD LLC
Three Logan Square
1717 Arch Street, 5th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant
Paul Ort
Raymond A. Quaglia (ARGUED)
BALLARD SPAHR
1735 Market Street, 51st Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Mortgage foreclosures are typically governed by state
law and litigated in state courts. So what do federal law and
procedure require when a lender sues to foreclose in federal
court? The answer is that lawyers’ favorite: it depends.
B-R Penn Realty defaulted on a mortgage against one
of its apartment buildings. Its lender sued, and the District
Court issued a money judgment in the lender’s favor for the
amount owed. To recover on that judgment, the lender sought
a foreclosure sale of the building. Penn Realty twice moved to

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halt the sale, the District Court denied those motions, and the
building was sold. Penn Realty now appeals the second of
those denials, arguing it was based on reversible errors of
federal and state law. We disagree, so we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2011, B-R Penn Realty took out a $46 million loan
backed by a mortgage on its Philadelphia apartment building.1
Nearly a decade later, amid the Covid pandemic, it defaulted.
U.S. Bank, Penn Realty’s lender, sued to foreclose in federal
court, invoking diversity jurisdiction over its “complaint in
mortgage foreclosure” under Pennsylvania law. App. 1–2.
After a bench trial, the District Court ruled that Penn Realty
had breached the loan agreement. But it did not foreclose the
mortgage. Instead, the Court entered a money judgment in U.S.
Bank’s favor for the amount Penn Realty owed:
$51,392,086.96. Penn Realty appealed that judgment,2 but it
did not obtain a stay. This separate appeal concerns what
happened next.
In September 2023, U.S. Bank, armed with the money
judgment, renewed its foreclosure efforts. As required by
1 Throughout, we use “apartment building” or “building” as
shorthand for the full legal description of the real estate subject
to the mortgage.
2 We affirmed in an unpublished opinion. U.S. Bank N.A. v. B-
R Penn Realty Owner, LP, No. 23-2185, 2024 WL 4284933
(3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2024).

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Pennsylvania law, Pa. R. Civ. P. 3180,3 the Bank filed a
praecipe, or request, for a writ of execution, asking the U.S.
Marshals to seize the apartment building so that it could be sold
to satisfy the judgment. A week later, the Clerk of Court issued
that writ. The Bank served it and a notice of the sale through
Penn Realty’s attorneys, Pa. R. Civ. P. 440(a)(1)(i), and, after
finding Penn Realty’s office “emptied out,” App. 359, a
marshal served the writ at the home of Penn Realty’s sole
owner.4 His wife accepted process and signed the receipt.
U.S. Bank also fulfilled Pennsylvania’s other notice
requirements before the foreclosure sale, which was first
scheduled for January 3, 2024.
• It filed an affidavit identifying the property to be
sold, Penn Realty as the defendant in the
judgment, and all known creditors and other
interest holders in the property, Pa. R. Civ.
P. 3129.1(b)–(c);
• It served those creditors and interest holders with
notice about the judgment, property to be sold,
and sale, Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.2(c);
3 The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure are codified at
Title 231 of the Pennsylvania Code.
4 Eric Blumenfeld, a real estate developer, “is the sole member
and owner of B-R Penn Realty Manager LLC,” the general
partner of Appellant B-R Penn Realty Owner, LP. He also
owns the remaining limited partnership interest in Appellant.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. B-R Penn Realty Owner, LP, No. 21-
0502, 2023 WL 2330411, at *1, n.2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2023).

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• At its direction, marshals posted handbills
containing that same information at the U.S.
Marshal’s office and two locations on the
apartment building’s grounds, Pa. R. Civ.
P. 3129.2(b)(1)–(2); and
• It published that information once a week, for
four successive weeks, in the Philadelphia
Inquirer and Legal Intelligencer, Pa. R. Civ.
P. 3129.2(d).
In December 2023—two months after the writ of
execution was issued, and less than a month before the
scheduled sale—Penn Realty filed an emergency motion to
quash the writ and cancel the sale. In support of that motion,
and at the hearing that followed, it made essentially the three
arguments it makes to us.
First, U.S. Bank was playing by the wrong rules. In its
efforts to secure the writ and provide notice of the upcoming
sale, the Bank was complying with Pennsylvania law as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). That rule
governs execution sales—sales that result from “writ[s] of
execution,” the typical way “[a] money judgment is
enforced”—and applies state law by default. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 69(a)(1). Insisting that “[t]he judgment entered by the
Court . . . [wa]s not a money judgment,” Penn Realty argued
that U.S. Bank instead received a judgment “for mortgage
foreclosure.” App. 365. In its view, the Bank was working
toward a judicial sale of the building—a sale ordered and
directed by the Court—so the sale was governed by the
relevant federal law of judicial sales, found in 28 U.S.C. § 2001
et seq. See id. § 2001(a) (“Any realty or interest therein sold

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under any order or decree of” any federal court “shall be
sold . . . upon such terms and conditions as the court directs.”).
Second, “because [U.S. Bank had] neither sought nor
received any order from the Court directing the sale of” the
apartment building under § 2001, the sale could not proceed as
scheduled. App. 366.
Third, even if Rule 69(a) did apply and Pennsylvania
law governed the sale, service was defective, because state law
did not permit service of the writ on the wife of Penn Realty’s
owner.
Though these arguments at the hearing crystalized the
issues, they resolved little. Each party and the District Court
offered different interpretations of whether and how § 2001,
Rule 69(a), and federal and Pennsylvania law applied to the
upcoming sale. Nor did the Court rule on whether service was
proper. Instead, it denied the motion without prejudice,
allowing the parties more time to develop the issues (and U.S.
Bank more time to ensure compliance before the sale). The
Bank agreed to continue the sale, and the Court announced it
would consider a second motion to quash after the sale was
rescheduled.
The Bank reset the sale for January 22, 2024, and Penn
Realty filed that second motion to quash, repeating its prior
arguments. After another hearing, the District Court denied the
motion. It held that (1) U.S. Bank was right to proceed under
Rule 69(a), regardless whether the underlying judgment was a
mortgage foreclosure or a money judgment; (2) § 2001 also
applied, and the Clerk of Court’s issuance of the writ of
execution satisfied its court-order requirement; and (3) the

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Bank properly served the writ under Pennsylvania law. The
building was sold on January 22, 2024.
Penn Realty timely appealed the District Court’s denial
of its second motion to quash, seeking a reversal of the sale.
Once more—now to us—it argues that Rule 69(a), which
governs executions on money judgments, does not apply;
Section 2001, which governs judicial sales, does, but its
requirements were not met; and service was not proper under
Pennsylvania law.
We uphold the sale and affirm the District Court’s
denial of the motion to quash, but we do not share in all the
Court’s reasoning. This was an execution sale, so Rule 69(a)
applies, not § 2001. U.S. Bank complied with the Rule’s
requirements, which import Pennsylvania law. That means
service was proper. We write precedentially to resolve the
central issue in this case: the vexing difference between an
execution sale under Rule 69(a) and a judicial sale under
§ 2001.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction over this diversity
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as the District Court’s
denial of Penn Realty’s motion was a final order.
We review a district court’s order on a motion to quash
for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the court’s legal
conclusions therein. Gillette v. Warden Golden Grove Adult
Corr. Facility, 109 F.4th 145, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2024).

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III. ANALYSIS
To make sense of the knotted arguments before us, we
pull on a few threads. First, a primer on Pennsylvania
mortgage and foreclosure law will clarify how U.S. Bank
ended up with a money judgment despite suing for mortgage
foreclosure. Second, we confirm that the sale of the building
was an execution sale to recover against that judgment. From
there, we explain that, in federal court, execution sales to
enforce money judgments are governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 69(a), so the federal law of judicial sales,
28 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq., does not apply. Third, we verify that
Penn Realty’s execution sale of the building fully complied
with Pennsylvania law, as required by Rule 69(a).
A. Though U.S. Bank sought a judgment of mortgage
foreclosure, it received a money judgment because the
Court entered judgment on the loan, not the mortgage.
What is colloquially known as a “mortgage” describes
a familiar financial arrangement: a loan from a lender, usually
for the purchase of real estate, paid back over time, or else the
lender takes the real estate. In practice, this comprises two
distinct agreements.5
The first is the loan. A lender, usually a bank, loans the
borrower money to buy real estate. The parties form a contract:
5 We simplify here. What we call “a loan” often involves more
than one document. The promissory note sets the financial
terms of the loan and binds the borrower to repay. A separate
loan agreement imposes additional terms on the lender and
borrower. E.g., Germantown Sav. Bank v. Talacki, 657 A.2d

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the lender will provide a sum of money at a certain interest rate,
and the borrower is obligated to pay it back, in full and on time.
The second is the mortgage. It ensures the borrower
“perform[s]” that loan “obligation” by giving the lender a lien
on the real estate. Stillwater Lakes Civic Ass’n v. Krawitz, 772
A.2d 118, 121 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). If instead the borrower
defaults on the loan, “the mortgage entitles the [lender] to
pursue foreclosure”—“the process in which property [subject
to] a mortgage is sold to pay off the loan balance due.”
Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466, 469
(2019) (quotation omitted).
Foreclosure typically begins as a lawsuit and ends as an
auction.6 In Pennsylvania, a foreclosure suit “is strictly an in
1285, 1287 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“In addition to the
Mortgage, several other instruments were entered into[,]
including a Promissory Note [and] Loan Agreement . . . .”).
Mortgages, too, take various forms, each a different bargain for
interests in the real estate. Comment, Restatement (Third) of
Property (Mortgages) § 1.1 (1997) [Restatement]. All are
beyond this opinion.
6 The word “foreclosure,” like “mortgage,” maintains a narrow
legal meaning despite broader everyday usage. When a
borrower defaults on a loan, the lender may “accelerate”
repayment and declare the full balance due. E.g., Bell Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n of Bellevue v. Laura Lanes, Inc., 435 A.2d 1285,
1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). If the borrower fails to pay that
large sum, the lender will proceed to foreclosure. Yet from
acceleration until the foreclosure sale is complete—a process
that can take months—the borrower has the right to pay the
balance, cure the default, and “redeem” the property from the

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rem” proceeding by the lender against the real estate, and its
“purpose is solely to effect” a sale “of the mortgaged property.”
Nicholas v. Hofmann, 158 A.3d 675, 696 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017)
(quotation omitted). If the lender wins and obtains a judgment
of mortgage foreclosure, the property will be sold at a
foreclosure sale, and the proceeds will be applied to offset what
the borrower owes: “the debt, interest, and costs which are due,
or have accrued to, the [lender as] judgment creditor.” GMAC
Mortg. Corp. of Pa. v. Buchanan, 929 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2007).
But if a lender is threatening foreclosure because the
borrower failed to pay, that means the borrower breached the
terms of the loan. The lender may instead sue for that.
“Although foreclosing on the . . . mortgaged property is the
usual course of action taken by a [lender, an] action for a
breach of the contract terms in the [promissory] note and [loan]
agreement is valid and proper.” Fayette Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Hercik, 13 Pa. D. & C. 4th 118, 120 (Com. Pl. 1991) (citing
Beaver Cnty. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Winowich, 187 A. 481 (Pa.
1936)). Unlike an in rem foreclosure, the lender’s suit for
breach of contract will be in personam against the borrower,
and a prevailing lender will be awarded a money judgment for
the debt. Nicholas, 158 A.3d at 696. To satisfy that judgment,
mortgage. From English Chancery practice, this is known as
the equity of redemption. Still today, to foreclose a mortgage
is to foreclose the borrower’s equitable right of redemption
and extinguish any chance of keeping the property.
Restatement § 3.1. In Pennsylvania, the moment of foreclosure
is quite precise: the instant “the auctioneer’s hammer falls” at
the foreclosure sale. 15 West’s Pa. Prac., Mortgages § 5:5 (3d
ed. 2024).

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the lender may seize—and if needed, sell—the borrower’s
property by a process called execution. Thus a lender who
seeks to collect on a money judgment “could resort to all the
property of the debtor not protected [from execution], and for
this purpose could issue one execution after another until the
full amount of the debt was realized.” Beaver Cnty., 187 A. at
484.
When it is available, most mortgage lenders take the
more direct route to recover their money: foreclosure. It
appears U.S. Bank meant to do so when it filed a “complaint in
mortgage foreclosure,” App. 1, asserting it was “authorized by
the [m]ortgage and by Pennsylvania law to foreclose the
[m]ortgage,” App. 8. And before us, Penn Realty urges the
same: “Because the only claim asserted in this action is one for
mortgage foreclosure, the only judgment that can exist,” and
the one the District Court issued, was “for mortgage
foreclosure and not for a money judgment.” Opening Br. 9.
That is wrong twice.
In its complaint, alongside the claim for mortgage
foreclosure, U.S. Bank also sought judgment “against [Penn
Realty] in the amount of $46,290,900.25,” plus any interest,
fees, and costs “recoverable under the Loan Documents.”
App. 9. For support, it offered detailed allegations about the
origination and assignment of the loan, its terms and Penn
Realty’s defaults, and the parties’ forbearance agreement. And
for evidence, it offered Exhibit A: a copy of the loan. True, the
complaint also alleges a breach of the mortgage. But when a
lender files a complaint in mortgage foreclosure that “recites”
the “terms” of the loan, “attaches [the loan] as an exhibit to the
complaint,” and seeks judgment against the borrower “in a
specified amount,” the action may be construed as both in rem

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against the property and in personam against the borrower.
Insilco Corp. v. Rayburn, 543 A.2d 120, 124 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988). Usually this is forbidden. “An action in mortgage
foreclosure is strictly an in rem action and may not include an
in personam action to enforce [the loan].” Id. at 123; see also
Pa. R. Civ. P. 1141(a) (“[A]n action to foreclose a
mortgage . . . shall not include an action to enforce a personal
liability.”). Yet if the borrower “waives any objection” to the
combined actions, the lender can proceed on both. Insilco, 543
A.2d at 123.
Here, after U.S. Bank combined the actions in its
complaint, the parties spent two years litigating Penn Realty’s
liability on the loan. Because Penn Realty “raised no objection
to the form of the complaint until after judgment was entered,”
it waived its right to object to the combined actions and failed
to “preserve[] this issue for appeal.” Kretschman v. Stoll, 352
A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
All told, the Court ruled that Penn Realty had breached
the loan and owed a balance, so it entered a $51 million money
judgment in the Bank’s favor. Though that judgment granted
U.S. Bank the relief it sought on the loan, it did not foreclose
the mortgage. In fact, the District Court never entered a
judgment in mortgage foreclosure, and after the money
judgment issued, U.S. Bank never asked for one. As a result,
the judgment that exists—the only judgment that exists—is the
money judgment. Perhaps that is an unintuitive outcome of the
Bank’s so-called “complaint in mortgage foreclosure,” but it
was the outcome here.7
7 We emphasize that this money judgment is distinct from the
typical in rem foreclosure judgment that states the amount

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B. U.S. Bank enforced its money judgment through an
execution sale, which was governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 69(a), not the federal law of judicial
sales, 28 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq.
In federal courts, a “money judgment is enforced by a
writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The “procedure on execution . . . must accord
with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a
federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Id.
The sale of the building, in satisfaction of the money
judgment, was an execution sale. It follows that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2001 et seq., which governs federal judicial sales, did not
apply.
1. The sale of the building was an execution sale.
Execution sales are “sales under common-law
executions which issue by mere praecipe of the judgment
creditor on the judgment without order of the court, and in
which the levy and sale of the marshal are ministerial.” Yazoo
owed in default. In the Commonwealth, all judgments of
mortgage foreclosure must be entered for a “sum of money”
owed. 15 West’s Pa. Prac., Mortgages § 2:9 n.1 (3d ed. 2024)
(citing Landau v. W. Pa. Nat’l Bank, 282 A.2d 335, 340 (Pa.
1971)). But the sum certain of an in rem foreclosure judgment
is enforceable only against the property, not against the debtor.
See Green Tree Consumer Disc. Co. v. Newton, 909 A.2d 811,
815–16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Insilco, 543 A.2d at 123. By
contrast, the money judgment here resulted from U.S. Bank’s
in personam action on the loan.

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& M.V.R. Co. v. City of Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10, 19 (1921).
These sales are distinct from judicial sales, which are
“conducted pursuant to directions of the court and the federal
statutes.” United States v. Branch Coal Corp., 390 F.2d 7, 9
(3d Cir. 1968); see also Yazoo, 257 U.S. at 19 (explaining that
judicial sales are “made under order or decree of the court and
requir[e] confirmation by the court for their validity”).
Here, even Penn Realty agrees “there [wa]s no order
authorizing or directing” a sale of the building. Opening Br. 6.
Instead, to satisfy the money judgment in its favor, U.S. Bank
executed against the building and sold it. Beaver Cnty., 187 A.
at 484. It filed a praecipe for a writ of execution, the Clerk of
Court issued that writ, and the Bank enlisted the marshals for
“ministerial” assistance in “levy and sale.” Yazoo, 257 U.S. at
19. These are the essential steps of an execution sale. Id.
In any event, though the parties dispute the type of sale,
they do not dispute its effect. This execution sale foreclosed
the mortgage as a judicial sale would. See n.6, above.
Pennsylvania law allows for mortgage foreclosure by
execution when “judgment is entered on” the loan, “the
obligation secured by the mortgage.” Note, Pa. R. Civ.
P. 3180(a). That is what happened here. The mortgage securing
the loan “entitle[d]” U.S. Bank to pursue foreclosure, so the
apartment building was “sold to pay off the loan balance due”
and the mortgage was foreclosed. Obduskey, 586 U.S. at 469
(quotation omitted). In this case, the foreclosure sale was an
execution sale, not a judicial sale.

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2. Because the execution sale of the apartment
building was not a judicial sale, 28 U.S.C. § 2001
did not apply to impose additional requirements.
Though federal law may bear on an execution sale “to
the extent it applies,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1), no such law
applied to the sale of the building. Even so, the parties and the
District Court invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq., which governs
judicial sales. We clarify its limited scope—and inapplicability
here.
“Congress has authorized the federal judiciary to use
sound discretion in setting the terms and conditions for judicial
sales.” Branch Coal, 390 F.2d at 10. That authorization lies in
§ 2001, which applies to the sale of “[a]ny realty or interest
therein sold under any order or decree of any court of the
United States”—in fewer words, federal judicial sales.
§ 2001(a). And when setting the terms and conditions of a
judicial sale, courts are guided by §§ 2002–07, which govern
notice, appraisal, the role of the marshals and other federal
officials, and so on. (For ease of reading, we shorthand these
statutes as “§ 2001” hereafter.)
But we emphasize, backed by a century of case law, that
§ 2001 applies solely to judicial sales, a category that does not
sweep in every sale resulting from a lawsuit. Some sales, like
the one here, are execution sales. As “the language of [§ 2001]
limits its application to judicial sales made under order or
decree of the court and requiring confirmation by the court for
their validity,” § 2001 does not apply to execution sales, which
are neither court-ordered nor court-confirmed. Yazoo, 257 U.S.
at 19 (interpreting § 2001’s predecessor statutes); see also Weir
v. United States, 339 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding that

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Arkansas law, not § 2001, governed the execution sale of
appellant’s farmland because “it is manifest from the language
of [§ 2001] that it is clearly made applicable only to ‘judicial
sales’”); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Land Ests., 90 F.2d 457,
458 (2d Cir. 1937) (applying predecessor statutes and holding
that the sale of certain property, in lieu of foreclosure, “was not
a judicial sale” because it was not “made under order or decree
of the court”); Champion Box Co. v. Manatee Crate Co., 75
F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1935) (same) (interpreting predecessor
statutes).
The parties and the District Court blunt this sharp
distinction between execution sales and judicial sales, reading
two out-of-circuit foreclosure cases—United States v. Petty
Motor Company, 767 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1985), and Travelers
Insurance v. Lawrence, 509 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1974)—to offer
more than they do.
To be sure, it is “unassailable that a judicial sale on a
mortgage foreclosure is not the same as execution on a [money]
judgment.” Petty Motor, 767 F.2d at 715. In the former, the
sale is ordered by and thus “within the control of the court”; in
the latter, we repeat, the sale is executed after “praecipe of the
judgment creditor,” with the marshals serving only a
ministerial role. Id. (quoting Yazoo, 257 U.S. at 19). Petty
Motor involved the former. Following “a judicial foreclosure
of a real estate mortgage,” the court “entered a separate order
of sale,” and the property was sold. Id. at 713 (emphasis
added). That was a judicial sale, as it occurred under
“order . . . of [a] court of the United States.” § 2001(a).
Perhaps more relevant here, the Petty Motor court
concluded that Rule 69(a) could never apply to foreclosures by

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judicial sale, as the Rule reached only “judgment
execution[s],” like execution sales, “in federal courts.” 767
F.2d at 715 (emphasis in original). This decision split from
Travelers Insurance, which held that Rule 69(a) sometimes
may apply to foreclosures by judicial sales. There, alongside a
“judgment and decree” of mortgage foreclosure under Oregon
law, the district court ordered the property sold—a judicial
sale. 509 F.2d at 85. But on appeal, unlike the Tenth Circuit in
Petty Motor, the Ninth Circuit held that both Rule 69(a) and
federal statutes applied to the judicial sale, and Oregon law
controlled unless displaced by federal law. Id. at 87–88.
Here, referring to Petty Motor and Travelers Insurance,
the District Court correctly observed that “courts are split on
whether Rule 69(a), which discusses money judgments,
reaches mortgage foreclosures.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. B-R
Penn Realty Owner, LP, No. 21-0502, 2024 WL 169574, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2024) (cleaned up). Before us, the parties
argue from the same premise. But the true split between Petty
Motor and Travelers Insurance is what law applies to judicial
sales, not what procedure applies to mortgage foreclosures. In
this case, we must decide whether § 2001 applied—through
Rule 69(a)—to the execution sale of the apartment building.
We hold it did not, because § 2001 applies only to judicial
sales.8
8 Once more, there is no question that § 2001 applies to judicial
sales. Branch Coal, 390 F.2d at 9–10. But we hold open the
related question of whether Rule 69(a) might. Contra United
States v. Wiegman, 111 F.3d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1997) (describing
our decision in Branch Coal as holding “that a judicial sale is
not governed by Rule 69(a)”). Rule 69(a) contemplates merely
that “[a] money judgment is enforced” by an execution sale

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The District Court held otherwise, ruling that both Rule
69(a) and § 2001 applied, U.S. Bank had satisfied the
requirements of Rule 69(a), and the Clerk’s issuance of the writ
met § 2001’s requirement for a court order. As we will next
explain, the Court was right about the application of Rule 69(a)
and Penn Realty’s compliance with it, but we disagree that
§ 2001 applied to this execution sale.
Even so, our charge from Congress is “to review cases
for errors of law ‘without regard to errors’ that do not affect the
parties’ ‘substantial rights.’” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S.
396, 407 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111)). That is, we
disregard harmless errors. We do so here, agreeing with Penn
Realty’s concession at argument that it was “absolutely not”
prejudiced by the District Court’s misapplication of § 2001.
“unless the court directs otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1).
We see no reason why a federal money-judgment creditor
could not seek a court-ordered judicial sale to satisfy the
judgment. (Doing so, though, would seem to require an
inefficient side-step around state-law execution.) Were that the
case, the sale—a judicial sale to enforce a money judgment—
would “accord with the procedure of the state where the court
is located, but a federal statute [would] govern[] to the extent
it applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The applicable federal
statute would be § 2001. When faced with a case that requires
us to decide this point, we will. Today, we need resolve only
that § 2001 does not apply to execution sales.

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C. U.S. Bank complied with all requirements for an
execution sale under Pennsylvania law.
As no federal law applied, the execution sale under
Rule 69(a) needed only to comply “with the procedure of the
state where the court is located”—Pennsylvania. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 69(a)(1). Relevant here, the Commonwealth’s Rules of Civil
Procedure impose requirements for service of process, Pa. R.
Civ. P. 400 et seq., the enforcement of money judgments, Pa.
R. Civ. P. 3101 et seq., and execution of judgments against
mortgaged real estate, Pa. R. Civ. P. 3180 et seq.
Before us, as in the District Court, Penn Realty faults
only the Bank’s service of the writ; it “does not otherwise
challenge U.S. Bank’s compliance with Pennsylvania’s myriad
rules for executing judgments.” 2024 WL 169574, at *3 n.1.
Because U.S. Bank did not properly serve the writ on Penn
Realty, it argues, we must reverse the sale. But Pennsylvania
law did not require that Penn Realty be served with the writ at
all, so we reject both the premise and the remedy.
In Pennsylvania, service of a writ of execution against
mortgaged real estate “shall be made by the sheriff noting upon
the writ a brief description of the mortgaged property and a
statement that the sheriff has levied upon defendant’s interest
therein.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 3182. “[F]or the execution of
judgments in the federal system,” of course, the U.S. Marshals
are appropriately substituted for the local sheriff. LNC Invs. v.
Dem. Rep. Congo, 69 F. Supp. 2d 607, 613 n.8 (D. Del. 1999)
(citing Yazoo, 257 U.S. at 24–25). But “[s]ervice of the writ
upon the mortgagor or real owner is not required”; only “notice
of the sale” is, in compliance with Rule 3129.1. Note,
Pa. R. Civ. P. 3182 (emphasis added). Penn Realty has no

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answer for this. Nor does it contend the Bank violated the
notice requirements of Rule 3129.1, which incorporates
neighboring Rule 3129.2.
Rule 3129.2 required that Penn Realty be served not
with the writ, but with notice of the sale. Pa. R. Civ.
P. 3129.2(c)(1). It was. Penn Realty was a “defendant in the
judgment” and had “entered an appearance,” so U.S. Bank
properly served notice “in the manner provided by Rule 440.”
Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.2(c)(1)(ii). That Rule permits service of
non-original process (like a notice of sale) “by handling or
mailing a copy to or leaving a copy for each party at the address
of the party’s attorney of record.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 440(a)(1)(i).
U.S. Bank did so. We read Pennsylvania law to require no
more, and the Commonwealth’s courts agree. JP Morgan
Chase Bank N.A. v. Palumbo, No. 2413 EDA 2019, 2020 WL
914726, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020) (holding that
lender who mailed borrower’s counsel a notice of sale did not
need to serve the writ to “satisfy the issuance, service, and
notice requirements of a writ of execution for a mortgage
foreclosure” under Pennsylvania law).
This may all be beside the point. “The notice
requirements of [Rules] 3129.1, 3129.2, and 3129.3 were
intended to protect fundamental rights of due process by
insuring that persons with an interest in real estate would
receive adequate notice before being deprived of their
property.” First E. Bank, N.A. v. Campstead, Inc., 637 A.2d
1364, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). We underscore “adequate”:
the notice must be “reasonably calculated to inform interested
parties of the pending action” and provide “the information
necessary to provide an opportunity to present objections.” Id.
(emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Penn Realty says the

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Bank’s efforts at service were “ineffective,” Opening Br. 17,
but it identifies no injury or prejudice. Nor could it—there was
none. Penn Realty filed two motions to quash the writ and
attended two hearings in support, making plain it had
“adequate notice” of the sale and “opportunity[ies] to present
objections.” First E. Bank, 637 A.2d at 1366. It nonetheless
asks us to reverse the sale that it knew about, argued against,
and moved twice to cancel—all because, it offers, the wrong
person was served with the writ. Even if the law required that
the writ be served, we would refuse Penn Realty’s invitation to
set aside the sale. Due process does not penalize foot faults
with forfeiture.
At bottom, U.S. Bank complied with Pennsylvania law
as required by Rule 69(a), so we affirm the District Court’s
ruling.
* * *
U.S. Bank sued for a judgment in mortgage foreclosure.
What it received was a money judgment, which it enforced
through an execution sale of Penn Realty’s apartment building.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) required U.S. Bank to
comply with all applicable Pennsylvania law, and it did.
For these reasons, we uphold the sale and affirm the
District Court’s denial of Penn Realty’s motion to quash.

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