UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAFEHOUSE, a Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation v. U.s. Department of Justice

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 24-2027
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SAFEHOUSE, a Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation;
JOSE BENITEZ, as President and Treasurer of Safehouse,
Appellants
_______________
SAFEHOUSE, a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation
Appellant
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MERRICK B.
GARLAND, in his official capacity as Attorney General of
the United States; and JACQUELINE C. ROMERO, in her
official capacity as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00519)

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District Judges: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh
_______________
Argued on April 9, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit
Judges.
(Filed: July 24, 2025)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
Ronda B. Goldfein
Adrian M. Lowe
AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania
1211 Chestnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Ilana H. Eisenstein [ARGUED]
DLA Piper
1650 Market Street
One Liberty Place, Suite 5000
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Ben C. Fabens-Lassen
DLA Piper
2000 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 400, North Tower
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Peter Goldberger

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Law Office of Peter Goldberger
P.O. Box 645
Ardmore, PA 19003
Seth F. Kreimer
University of Pennsylvania
School of Law
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Appellants
Sarah W. Carroll
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division Appellate
Room 7511
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr. [ARGUED]
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division
Room 7241
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Counsel for Appellees
Devin S. Sikes
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
2001 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
Counsel for Amicus Faith Leaders

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PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Safehouse, a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation, was
established in 2018 to address the abuse of opioids in
Philadelphia. It seeks to provide overdose prevention services,
including supervised illegal drug use. According to Safehouse,
what it calls “medically supervised consumption” is salutary
because opioid overdoses can be mitigated if trained staff are
nearby.
This is the second time we have considered the legality
of Safehouse’s proposed activities. We previously determined
that, as a provider of supervised illegal drug use, Safehouse
would violate 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). Safehouse argues that its
Board members’ shared religious belief in the value of human
life motivates it to provide “evidence-based public-health
interventions” and that government intervention with those
services substantially burdens its religious exercise.
The District Court rejected Safehouse’s argument. It
reasoned that non-religious entities are not protected by the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. As we explain below,
that was reversible error.
I
An opioid overdose can occur minutes after drug use.
And tragically, it too often does. The Pennsylvania Department
of Health estimates that last year 702 opioid overdose deaths
occurred in Philadelphia County.1 Fentanyl—a synthetic
1 Drug Overdose Surveillance Interactive Data Reports,
Pennsylvania Department of Health Office of Drug

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opioid 50-to-100 times more potent than heroin and often laced
into more popular drugs—has further exacerbated the opioid
problem.
Safehouse urges several “harm reduction strategies.”
App. at 190. Harm reduction is a term of art for interventions
that focus on mitigating the bad effects of harmful behavior
rather than stopping the harmful behavior itself. Providing drug
users sterile syringes is a classic example and one of the
services that Safehouse proposes. Safehouse’s other harm-
reduction strategies include offering to test drugs for fentanyl
and inviting drug users to take illegal drugs in a specially
designated “consumption room” under its supervision. App. at
192.
According to Safehouse, supervised drug use is
appropriate because it means that staff can be ready to reverse
an overdose by administering Naloxone. Naloxone is easy to
administer as a nasal spray, but one who is overdosing cannot
reliably self-administer. And sometimes, multiple doses of
Naloxone, intramuscular injections of Naloxone, or oxygen
and respiratory support are required. Safehouse would not
provide any illegal drugs or allow drugs to be sold or
Surveillance and Misuse Prevention,
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/health/healthcare-and-public-
health-professionals/pdmp/data.html (click “Drug Overdose
Surveillance”; then go to the tab labelled “OD - Drug
Specificity”; then filter for Philadelphia, County in the year
2024 at the top of the page and click on “Any Opioids” in the
graph titled “Most common drug classes contributing to cause
of death, *Preliminary* 2024) (last visited May 19, 2025).

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exchanged on its property. Instead, drug users would bring
their own illegal drugs to use within its facilities.
In 2019, the Department of Justice began this lawsuit
against Safehouse and its then-Executive Director seeking a
declaration that supervised illegal drug use violates 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(2). Later, the Department of Justice amended its
complaint to name José Benitez, President of Safehouse, as a
defendant. Safehouse and Benitez argued that § 856(a) does
not reach their proposed conduct, that § 856(a) exceeds
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, and that application of
§ 856(a) violates their rights under RFRA.
The District Court determined that § 856(a) did not
reach Safehouse’s proposed conduct. United States v.
Safehouse, 2020 WL 906997, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2020).
Section 856(a) makes it unlawful to “manage or control any
place . . . and knowingly and intentionally . . . make available
for use . . . the place, for the purpose of unlawfully . . . using a
controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). The District
Court read “for the purpose of” as referring only to the purpose
of whoever “manage[s] or control[s]” the “place” at issue.
United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2021)
(Safehouse I). A divided Panel of this Court rejected that
construction, read the language to refer to the purposes of third
parties, and declined Safehouse’s related invitation to
“harmonize” our reading of the plain text with recent federal
efforts to combat the opioid epidemic.2 Id. at 234–39.
2 The Panel unanimously rejected Safehouse’s argument that
§ 856(a)(2) exceeded Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce. Safehouse I, 985 F.3d at 239; id. at 243 n.1 (Roth,
J., dissenting in part).

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On remand, the District Court was left to consider
Safehouse’s RFRA and Free Exercise counterclaims.3 The
government moved to dismiss those counterclaims, and the
District Court granted its motion. Safehouse timely appealed.
The government argues that Benitez lacks appellate standing
and Safehouse asserts that the District Court erred by not
granting it leave to amend its complaint.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1345, and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
We exercise plenary review of a District Court’s order
dismissing a party’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Nichole Med.
Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340, 350
(3d Cir. 2012). Of particular importance here, we are required
to “consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and
accept all of the allegations as true.” Id. (quoting ALA, Inc. v.
CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994)).
III
The District Court dismissed Safehouse’s RFRA and
Free Exercise counterclaims because “Safehouse is not a
religious entity.” United States v. Safehouse, 729 F. Supp. 3d
451, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2024). That was error because RFRA’s
plain text and Free Exercise doctrine are clear that those
statutory and constitutional protections extend to non-natural
persons, including so-called non-religious entities. In so
3 Safehouse amended its complaint on remand to include a Free
Exercise counterclaim. See App. at 184–225.

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holding, we express no view about whether threatened
prosecution of Safehouse substantially burdens its exercise of
religion. We likewise decline Safehouse’s invitation to
determine in the first instance whether it has plausibly stated
RFRA and Free Exercise claims. We only address the proper
object of RFRA’s and the First Amendment’s protections: that
object includes a non-natural entity allegedly exercising
religion, even if the entity itself is not religious.
A
Our analysis of RFRA “begins and ends with the
ordinary meaning of” its plain text. United States v. Johnson,
114 F.4th 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2024). RFRA says the
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability,” unless it furthers “a compelling
governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of
furthering” that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b)
(emphasis added). RFRA’s object is “persons,” so Safehouse
is protected if it is a “person” under RFRA.
Neither RFRA nor its sister statute, the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, define “person,” but the
Dictionary Act does. It says that in “any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise,” “the words ‘person’
and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. The Supreme Court in
Hobby Lobby “s[aw] nothing in RFRA that suggests a
congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act
definition” and neither do we. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014). Safehouse is therefore a
“person” under RFRA and eligible for its protections.

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The government argues that Congressional reports in
RFRA’s legislative history made “no mention of protecting
non-religious entities.” Appellee’s Br. at 11. As we said earlier,
“when the text is clear, we will not look beyond it to
lawmakers’ statements.” Safehouse I, 985 F.3d at 239. But the
government’s argument goes a step further. It asks us to
conclude the plain text of a statute does not reach what
Congress did not enumerate in the several Congressional
reports generated during the legislative process. We decline to
draw that inference. If an entity reasonably fits within the
statutory language, it is of no moment that Congress did not
name it in the legislative history. “ ‘[T]he fact that [a statute]
has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress’ does not demonstrate ambiguity; instead, it simply
‘demonstrates [the] breadth’ of a legislative command.”
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020) (quoting
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
If there was any doubt as to whether Safehouse is a
“person” under RFRA, Hobby Lobby eliminated it. There, the
Supreme Court explained that “[n]o known understanding of
the term ‘person’ includes some but not all corporations,” so
three closely held for-profit corporations were entitled to
RFRA’s protections. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 708.
The government in Hobby Lobby conceded that
nonprofit corporations are persons under RFRA. Id. at 708
n.20. And though the Court split 5-4 on whether for-profit
corporations are “persons,” it was unanimous that nonprofit
corporations are. Id. at 751–53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The
majority went further. It suggested that even “large, publicly
traded corporations” are RFRA persons, though it would be
“unlikely” for “corporate giants” to assert such claims in the

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first place. Id. at 717. In such cases, the applicability of RFRA
would likely hinge on sincerity. Id.
The District Court thus erred in determining that
Safehouse can never qualify for the protections of RFRA
because it is a non-religious entity. The District Court properly
recognized that “corporations can be considered ‘persons.’ ”
Safehouse, 729 F. Supp. 3d at 456. But it improperly asked
whether Safehouse is a “religious entity,” id. at 454, 456,
focusing on statements in Safehouse’s incorporating
documents, its website, in its application for tax-exempt status,
id. at 455, and aspects of Pennsylvania corporate law, id. at
456–57. The government defends that approach on appeal. At
oral argument, the government proposed the following test: a
corporate entity like Safehouse is eligible for protection under
RFRA only if its corporate documents bind it to operate in
accordance with a religious purpose.
Whatever the merits of this framework, it has no basis
in RFRA’s plain text. “RFRA applies to ‘a person’s’ exercise
of religion” and Safehouse is a “person” claiming to exercise
religion, so it is eligible for RFRA’s protections. Hobby Lobby,
573 U.S. at 707 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)). Just as
Safehouse’s compassion did not shield it from the plain text of
§ 856(a)(2), concerns about its proposed services do not
withdraw the protections of RFRA.
B
Safehouse is also protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
As Hobby Lobby recognized, “free-exercise claims brought by
nonprofit corporations” are nothing new. Id. at 708; see also
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S.
617, 625 (2018) (“[a] baker, in his capacity as the owner of a

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business serving the public” is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause). That provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to
corporate entities is “well-established.” Metro. Life Ins. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985); see, e.g., Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2010) (Free
Speech Clause); Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325
(1978) (Warrant Clause). Against that backdrop, there is no
“non-religious entities” carveout from the First Amendment.
After all, the purpose of extending rights to corporate persons
is to protect the rights of natural persons acting through the
corporate form. Hobby Lobby, 503 U.S. at 706–07. That
purpose is no less true for religious exercise than it is for other
rights.
IV
Next, the government contends that José Benitez lacks
appellate standing because, it argues, only Safehouse asserted
RFRA and Free Exercise counterclaims. That is correct.
Benitez asserted RFRA as an affirmative defense, but not as a
counterclaim. App. at 108, ¶3. Thus, Benitez was not aggrieved
by the District Court’s order and lacked standing to appeal the
District Court’s dismissal.
V
Finally, Safehouse argues that the District Court erred
by dismissing its counterclaims without addressing its request
for leave to amend its complaint. Because we reverse the
District Court’s holding that the protections of RFRA and the
First Amendment do not extend to Safehouse, we need not
address whether the District Court erred by not granting leave
to amend.

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* * *
For the reasons above, we will reverse the District
Court’s order that Safehouse is not protected by RFRA and the
Free Exercise Clause as a non-religious entity and remand for
it to consider whether Safehouse has plausibly pleaded RFRA
and Free Exercise counterclaims. Because Benitez was not
properly joined to this appeal, we will dismiss this appeal as to
him.

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