United States of America v. Christopher Schrock

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 24-2346
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER SCHROCK,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00096-001)
District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Colville
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 10, 2025
____________
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 19, 2025)
____________
OPINION*
____________
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.
On February 12, 2020, while on pretrial bond for felony gun and drug charges
under Pennsylvania law,1 Christopher Schrock, who had a prior felony conviction, was
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(a)(1) (prohibiting persons convicted of certain crimes
from possessing a firearm); 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16) (prohibiting the knowing or

-- 1 of 4 --

2
arrested and found to be in possession of a firearm and ammunition. A federal grand jury
indicted Schrock on one count for being a felon in knowing possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and he pleaded guilty to that charge. Cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231. Through a notice of appeal, Schrock invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and now, for the first time, argues that his § 922(g)(1) conviction
violates his Second Amendment rights facially and as applied.
Because Schrock failed to preserve his arguments, they are reviewed for plain
error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993);
United States v. Defreitas, 29 F.4th 135, 144 (3d Cir. 2022). Under the plain-error
standard, Schrock must show (i) an error; (ii) that is plain; (iii) that affected his
substantial rights; and (iv) that the failure to correct that error would “seriously affect[]
the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at
732 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)); see also United States v.
Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 528, 530 (3d Cir. 2024) (applying the plain-error standard to an
unpreserved Second Amendment challenge).
Schrock’s facial challenge is foreclosed by precedent. A facial challenge seeks to
negate every conceivable application of a statute. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”). But this Court recognized a
valid application of § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266 (3d Cir. 2024).
See id. at 273. Hence, Schrock’s facial challenge fails at prong one of the plain-error
standard. See generally United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 356 (3d Cir. 2022)
intentional possession of a controlled substance by a person not registered under the act);
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104 (prohibiting resisting arrest).

-- 2 of 4 --

3
(explaining that at prong one, a reviewing court “uses the standard of review that would
have applied had the argument been preserved”); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,
391, 405, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (applying de novo review to a facial challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute).
By contrast, no binding precedent addresses § 922(g)(1)’s application to a
defendant released on bond while facing felony charges. The closest this Court has come
is the Moore decision, which upheld a § 922(g)(1) conviction for a person on supervised
release. See Moore, 111 F.4th at 273. Other circuits, however, have determined that our
Nation’s historical tradition supports disarming “criminal defendants facing serious or
felony charges pending trial.” United States v. Perez-Garcia, 96 F.4th 1166, 1184
(9th Cir. 2024); see also United States v. Gore, 118 F.4th 808, 815–17 (6th Cir. 2024)
(holding the historical tradition of denying bail to defendants accused of serious crimes
justifies disarming defendants under felony indictment for crimes “that required pretrial
detention at the founding”); United States v. Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713, 723–25 (5th Cir.
2025) (identifying historical support for disarming criminal defendants indicted for
serious offenses). Yet to prevail on prong two of the plain-error standard – plainness –
the error must be “clear under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; see also Puckett v.
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (explaining a “legal error must be clear or
obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”); United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d
371, 379 (3d Cir. 2013) (considering the jurisprudence of other federal appellate courts as
part of prong two of plain-error review). And it is not clear under the current law of the
Supreme Court, this Court, or our sister circuits that the Second Amendment, when
evaluated in light of this Nation’s historical tradition, see N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n,
Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022), forecloses disarming a felon who possesses a

-- 3 of 4 --

4
firearm while released on bond for gun and drug charges, see Dorsey, 105 F.4th at 530,
532 (concluding that an error is not obvious where “there can be reasonable debate as to
whether the Second Amendment permits disarmament” in an as-applied challenge).
Thus, Schrock’s as-applied challenge fails prong two of the plain-error standard, and it is
not necessary to evaluate any of the other prongs.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

-- 4 of 4 --