William Joseph Webb, Jr. v. Brian J. Chapman

DLD-011 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-2471
___________
WILLIAM JOSEPH WEBB, JR.,
Appellant
v.
BRIAN J. CHAPMAN; LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN J. CHAPMAN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-20-cv-00270)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 17, 2024
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 21, 2024)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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William Webb, Jr., appeals the District Court’s orders denying his motions to
reopen his case and for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily
affirm the District Court’s orders.
As we write primarily for the litigants who are familiar with both the facts and
procedural posture of this case, we recount only the facts necessary to understand the
appeal. In January 2020, Webb filed a complaint in Delaware state court, in which he
alleged that the named defendants, who were then operating as his court-appointed legal
counsel, violated his rights by sharing privileged information with the Deputy Attorney
General, resulting in his indictment and subsequent imprisonment. ECF No. 1-1. Webb
sought monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a protective injunction. Id. In
February 2020, appellee Brian Chapman filed a notice of removal to the District of
Delaware; ECF No. 1; the following month, he filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 4. In March 2021, the District Court granted the
motion and dismissed all claims. ECF No. 26. Webb appealed, but the District Court’s
order was summarily affirmed by this Court. See Webb v. Chapman, 852 F. App’x 659
(3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
In August 2024 – more than three years after Webb’s action had been dismissed
by the District Court – Webb filed a “motion for reinstatement of case” under Rule 60(b),
in which he broadly asserted that “[t]he previous dismissal was clearly erroneous as a
matter of law.” ECF No. 34 at 2. The District Court denied Webb’s motion. ECF No. 35.

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Webb filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),
which was subsequently denied. ECF No. 40. Webb now appeals both orders. CA ECF
No. 1; see also ECF Nos. 37 & 45.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviews the denial of
Rule 59(e) and 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. See Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth.,
350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003); Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 &
n.20 (3d Cir. 2012). This Court may summarily affirm if no substantial question is
presented by the appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying either motion. Motions
for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) “must be made within a reasonable time.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). As the District Court noted, Webb’s motion to reopen his case
pursuant to Rule 60(b) came more than three and a half years after the dismissal of his
case and three years after we affirmed, and contains no facts or legal arguments which
would justify a delay of this magnitude. See Moolenaar v. Gov’t of V.I., 822 F.2d 1342,
1348 (3d Cir. 1987). See also ECF No. 35. Additionally, the few facts he does assert do
not cure any of the defects which led to the dismissal of his original action, as he
continues to attempt to sue nonstate actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Webb, 852 F. App’x
at 660. See also ECF No 34. As a result, the District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to reopen this matter pursuant to Webb’s motion to reopen under Rule
60(b).

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Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion when it declined to alter or amend
its order in response to his motion for reconsideration. Reconsideration is available in
only limited circumstances, see Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999), and as the District Court correctly noted, Webb’s Rule
59(e) motion did not present any reason as to why its order denying his motion to reopen
his case was incorrect. Id.; see also ECF No. 35. Instead, he merely reiterates the same
bald legal conclusions which led to the dismissal of his federal claims more than three
years ago.
Accordingly, the District Court plainly did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Webb’s motions, and we will summarily affirm its judgment.

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