United States of America v. Ryan Mendoza

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 25-1154
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RYAN MENDOZA,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2:21-cr-00503-001)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on November 13, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 8, 2026)

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Ryan R. Smith
Suite 820
310 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellant
Adam N. Hallowell
Laura S. Irwin
Office of United States Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Ryan Mendoza moved to suppress evidence the
Government obtained in its search of his hotel room after
checkout time. The District Court denied his motion, holding
that he failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in that hotel room. We agree. Five hours after
checkout time, any expectation of privacy Mendoza had was
not objectively reasonable.

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I. BACKGROUND
Around 1:00 a.m. on February 24, 2021, Ryan Mendoza
checked into a Pittsburgh hotel for a two-night stay—the night
spanning February 23 to 24 and the night spanning February
24 to 25. He obtained a receipt stating that his departure date
was February 25. On the back of each guest room door, and
usually on a plaque behind the front desk, the hotel posted signs
stating that checkout time was noon. The hotel usually set
guests’ key cards to deactivate two hours after checkout time.
The hotel permitted guests to check out either by going
to the front desk or simply by walking out of the hotel without
notifying anyone. By noon on February 25, Mendoza had not
gone to the front desk to check out. So the hotel’s system
added him to a “due-out” list. Hotel staff check rooms on the
list to ensure they have been vacated. When the hotel manager
checked Mendoza’s room around 2:00 p.m., he saw a number
of personal items but no luggage. He marked the room as a
checkout, but found the situation odd. A few hours later, the
manager returned for another check and discovered a backpack
containing wrapped packages of white powder. He told a staff
member to call the police.
They arrived around 5:20 p.m. Hotel staff informed the
officers that they had found a bag containing drugs in the room
of a “walk-out” guest whose stay had ended at noon that day.
Police entered the hotel room without a warrant, accompanied
by the hotel manager. In the room, the officers “double-
check[ed]” with the manager that the guest had “checked out.”
Supp. App. 4, at 8:35–8:50. The manager appeared to
understand the question as asking whether the guest physically
checked out at the front desk, so the officer sought to clarify
that the room was “vacant,” the guest “ha[d] nothing to do with

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this room anymore,” possession of the room had reverted to the
hotel, and the guest would not be allowed back in if he tried to
return. Id., at 8:50–9:35. The manager confirmed this
understanding. The police also asked the manager to alert them
if the guest returned.
Around 10:00 p.m., Mendoza returned to the hotel. He
was arrested with room keycards and the receipt in his pocket.
Mendoza moved to suppress the fruits of the hotel room
search under the Fourth Amendment, arguing he had not
vacated the room when the police searched it warrantlessly. At
the suppression hearing, the hotel manager testified that guests
could check out either by going to the front desk or by walking
out. After the designated checkout time, walk-out guests’
balances are charged to their credit cards on file, their room
keys are deactivated, and their rooms are considered vacant.
The District Court denied Mendoza’s motion. He
appeals.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We
review a district court’s order denying a motion to suppress
under a mixed standard of review. We review findings of fact
for clear error, but exercise plenary review over legal
determinations.” United States v. Dyer, 54 F.4th 155, 158 (3d
Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). And “[b]ecause the District
Court denied the suppression motion, we view the facts in the
light most favorable to the Government.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2020)).

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III. ANALYSIS
As an initial step in determining whether a search
violated the Fourth Amendment, we ask whether the person
claiming its protection had “a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded place.” United States v. Montalvo-Flores, 81
F.4th 339, 342 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). This inquiry involves a “subjective”
prong—whether the defendant actually expected privacy in
that place—and an “objective” prong—whether any such
expectation was one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.1 Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Mendoza “bears the
burden of proving each element.” Id. at 343. If he fails his
objective burden, he cannot claim Fourth Amendment relief
even if he did have a subjective expectation of privacy.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a hotel guest’s privacy
interest in a hotel room is the same as that of a tenant in a rented
house. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). But
that interest dissipates when the guest vacates the room. Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). “The hotel then
ha[s] the exclusive right to its possession,” and hotel
management may consent to a search. Id.
There is no precedential authority in our Circuit
governing whether hotel guests maintain an objectively
1 Courts often refer to this doctrine as a Fourth Amendment
standing inquiry because it requires defendants to demonstrate
a privacy interest in a searched place before seeking relief
under the Fourth Amendment. See Montalvo-Flores, 81 F.4th
at 342 & n.4. However, this inquiry is not jurisdictional and
should not be confused with Article III standing. Id. at n.4.

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reasonable expectation of privacy in their rooms after checkout
time if they have not taken some affirmative action to check
out. However, the many circuits to have confronted the issue
unanimously hold that the expectation lapses after checkout
time. See, e.g., United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52, 55 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States v. Jackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Ramirez, 810 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir.
2011); United States v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1128–30 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir.
1970); United States v. Ross, 964 F.3d 1034, 1043 (11th Cir.
2020).
That rule makes sense. Checkout time is an appropriate
marker for the end of a guest’s possession of a room and the
resumption of possession by the hotel. Once checkout time has
passed, hotel staff may—indeed, must—enter a room to clean
it and prepare it for the next guest, who might be arriving just
a short time later.2 Leftover items can be removed by a hotel
after checkout time. Keycards can be deactivated, terminating
the guest’s access to the room. And many hotels, like the one
here, do not require guests to check out affirmatively at the
front desk; instead, they simply charge the credit card on file
2 That hotel staff may enter a room to maintain it during a
guest’s stay does not defeat the guest’s reasonable expectation
of privacy from police intrusion. See United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). But hotel staff acquire complete
discretion to enter the room after checkout time—for example,
they may reasonably ignore a “Do Not Disturb” doorhanger
left by a guest after checkout. See Ross, 964 F.3d at 1043.

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after checkout time. Accordingly, guests can lose their privacy
interests in a hotel room even without taking affirmative action
to check out.
To argue otherwise, Mendoza points to testimony from
the hotel manager that “people come in and they think they
have the room for 24 hours.” App. 71. On the basis of this
testimony, Mendoza contends it was objectively reasonable for
him to believe he had the room for a full 48 hours after
checking in for a two-night stay. That argument fails. As a
matter of societal expectation, most hotel guests understand
that the checkout time is a fixed time of day that does not
change based on the time they checked in. Travelers receive
this information in many ways, including signage, receipts, and
the typical check-in colloquy at the front desk. Here, the
manager testified that the hotel had signs about the checkout
time posted in multiple locations. And Mendoza himself
received a receipt stating that his departure date was February
25, not February 26 as it would have been if he had the room
for 48 hours.
Because this search happened five hours after checkout
time, and there were neither communications between
Mendoza and the hotel regarding a late checkout nor any other
potentially ambiguous circumstances, it does not raise a close
question. A future case nonetheless might. Does the
reasonable expectation of privacy disappear immediately at
checkout time, or might there be a “grace period” for stragglers
who remain slightly overtime? If there should be a grace
period, does it vary based on the patterns and practices at that
particular hotel, or the hotel’s communications with that
particular guest? Circuits disagree on these questions, and we
need not weigh in here. Compare United States v. Kitchens,
114 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1997) (allowing guest to retain

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legitimate expectation of privacy after checkout time if hotel
has pattern or practice that would make the expectation
reasonable), and Lanier, 636 F.3d at 232 (same), and Dorais,
241 F.3d at 1129 (same), and United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d
146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986) (same), with Ross, 964 F.3d at 1043
n.6 (expressly rejecting such an exception in favor of “clear
Fourth Amendment rules”).
Instead, it is sufficient to say that any subjective
expectation of privacy Mendoza had in a hotel room five hours
after checkout time was not one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Lacking objective reasonableness, his
expectation of privacy cannot support a Fourth Amendment
claim.
* * * * *
To demonstrate that a search violated his rights under
the Fourth Amendment, Mendoza must first show that the
place searched was one in which he maintained a legitimate
expectation of privacy. An expectation of privacy is legitimate
only if it is objectively reasonable. Mendoza’s expectation of
privacy in his former hotel room, five hours after checkout
time, was not. As such, the police’s search of that room did
not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
We therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of the
motion to suppress.

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