United States of America v. Anthony D. Bressi

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-1824
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.
ANTHONY D. BRESSI,
Appellant
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa.
Judge Matthew W. Brann, No. 4:19-cr-00207
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
Submitted: June 11, 2026; Filed: Aug. 19, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. Anthony Bressi appeals his 360-month prison sentence
for conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute controlled
substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). For the reasons that follow, we
will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Bressi and his company, SHIVA Science and Technology Group, LLC (“SHIVA”),
were the subject of a federal grand jury investigation, and grand jury subpoenas were issued
for Bressi’s and SHIVA’s financial records. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) special
agent Timothy O’Malley—the lead investigator on the case—emailed a Drug Enforcement
 This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent.

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Administration (“DEA”) chemist with a list of chemicals and equipment the subpoenas
revealed Bressi had purchased. O’Malley asked the chemist to evaluate the list and advise
whether the materials could be used to make meth or narcotics. The chemist informed
O’Malley that several of the chemicals listed could have been used to manufacture illicit
drugs.
Subsequently, law enforcement discovered chemicals at SHIVA headquarters that
demonstrated SHIVA’s capacity to produce fentanyl and fentanyl analogues. Bressi
admitted to manufacturing drugs for sale in an interview with police that was “friendly and
conversational.” United States v. Bressi, No. 19-cr-207, 2023 WL 3011848, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 19, 2023). Bressi was taken to and Mirandized at the police barracks, where he
repeated his earlier confession in greater detail and on video. Bressi was indicted for
conspiracy to manufacture and distribute fentanyl, 3-methylfentanyl, carfentanil, and
acetyl fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession with intent to distribute
acetyl fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Bressi filed a series of pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress his
videotaped confession to law enforcement. The District Court denied all the motions,
finding that Bressi was not in custody during his first confession and that he was advised
of his Miranda rights prior to his second confession. Bressi separately sought to suppress
his confession because, he argued, the police coerced him into making incriminating
statements. The District Court denied this motion, concluding that Bressi’s claim that he
had been offered full immunity in exchange for his cooperation was not credible. The

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District Court also denied Bressi’s motion to suppress records obtained via grand jury
subpoena.
The case proceeded to trial, and Bressi’s videotaped confession was played to the jury.
The following day, the District Court, anticipating that Bressi would continue to argue that
his confession was coerced, held a hearing on the issue of voluntariness sua sponte and
found that Bressi’s confession was voluntary. Bressi was found guilty and sentenced to 360
months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
II. 1
On appeal, Bressi contends that the government disclosed grand jury material in
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and that the District Court erred in
playing his videotaped confession for the jury without first holding a voluntariness
hearing.2 We address these claims in turn.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2 Bressi raises several other issues, none of which have merit. He argues the Controlled
Substances Act is unconstitutional and that the government violated the Fourth Amendment
in subpoenaing his financial records without a search warrant. We reject both arguments as
contrary to binding precedent. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (CSA is valid
exercise of federal power); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976) (no
expectation of privacy in bank’s financial records). Bressi also asserts that the government
destroyed exculpatory evidence. But the files that Bressi alleges were destroyed did not
“possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed” and
so he would not prevail even if his allegations of destruction are true. California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). Next, Bressi argues the District Court denied him his
Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial. Rather than asking to represent
himself, Bressi requested substitute counsel, which the District Court properly denied.
Finally, Bressi argues the government issued grand jury subpoenas after the indictment was
filed and failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Bressi has not met his
burden of showing the post-indictment subpoenas were issued for the sole purpose of
securing additional evidence for trial, In re Grand Jury Procs., 632 F.2d 1033, 1040–41

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A.
Bressi argues dismissal of his indictment is warranted because the government
violated Rule 6(e) by neglecting to provide the court with the names of all persons who
received grand jury material and failing to advise the recipients of their obligation of
secrecy. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
an indictment based on violations of Rule 6(e). United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 238
(3d Cir. 2011).
Rule 6(e) prohibits an “attorney for the government” from disclosing a “matter
occurring before the grand jury.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B)(vi). This provision contains
an exception for “government personnel” whom the “attorney for the government considers
necessary to assist” in enforcing the law so long as the attorney certifies that they informed
the personnel of their obligation of secrecy and provides the court with the personnel’s
names. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), (B). As an agent of the government attorney,
O’Malley possessed the same authority as the attorney to make disclosures. See United
States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1125 (3d Cir. 1977). O’Malley was thus permitted to
share the grand jury information with the DEA chemist because O’Malley considered the
chemist’s expertise necessary to enforce the law.
Violations of Rule 6(e) will only warrant dismissal of an indictment if the violation
“substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict.” Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
(3d Cir. 1980), and the government had no duty to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury, United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52–53 (1992).

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States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).3 Even assuming O’Malley did not
advise the chemist of his secrecy obligation or provide the District Court with the chemist’s
name, the District Court acted within its discretion in finding that this violation of Rule
6(e)(3)(B) resulted in no harm and did not require a remedy. Bressi does not explain, and
the record does not support, how the alleged violation might have influenced the grand
jury’s decision to indict. The DEA chemist was otherwise permitted to review the materials,
and no information was disclosed to the public in a manner that undermined the purpose
of grand jury secrecy. See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219
(1979) (explaining that the purposes of the secrecy requirement are to encourage witnesses
to testify honestly, prevent grand jury subjects from unduly influencing grand jurors, and
protect the accused from public shame).
Thus, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bressi’s
motion to dismiss the indictment.
B.
Bressi contends that his confession was involuntary and that the District Court erred
in denying his motion to suppress the confession without holding a hearing pursuant to
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). We exercise plenary review over a district court’s
3 The disclosure alleged here would not qualify as an “isolated exception[]” that so erodes
the structural protections of the grand jury as to render the proceedings fundamentally
unfair and exempt the disclosure from a prejudice determination. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487
U.S. at 256–57.

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determination of voluntariness and review its findings of fact for clear error. United States
v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 1994).
We first must determine whether Bressi’s confession was voluntary by evaluating
the totality of the circumstances. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).
Relevant considerations include the coercive nature of the interrogation, Lam v. Kelchner,
304 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002), the defendant’s awareness of the nature of the suspected
offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b), and the defendant’s prior dealings with law enforcement,
United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2005). The District Court found not
credible Bressi’s allegation that the government offered him immunity in exchange for his
confession; and when Bressi confessed, he had been advised of his Miranda rights, he was
aware he was a suspect in a drug-related offense, and he had experience with the criminal
system. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the District Court that
Bressi’s confession was voluntary.
A defendant objecting to the voluntariness of his confession is entitled to a
proceeding that ensures a “reliable and clear-cut determination” that their confession was
not coerced. Denno, 378 U.S. at 391. A jury may not hear a confession until the trial judge
determines “with unmistakable clarity” that the confession was voluntary. Sims v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 538, 544 (1967). Here, the jury had heard the confession by the time the District
Court made an explicit finding of voluntariness in its mid-trial hearing. But Denno instructs
that such an error does not entitle Bressi to relief. 378 U.S. 394–95. In Denno, the trial
judge did not make any voluntariness finding before submitting the confession to the jury.
Id. at 374–75. The Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine

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whether the confession was voluntary, explaining that if the confession would be deemed
voluntary, then the flaw in the original proceeding caused “no constitutional prejudice” and
a new trial would not be required. Id. at 394–95; see also Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S.
446, 451 (1971) (noting that Jackson does not entitle habeas petitioners to new hearings on
voluntariness based on “shortcomings in the procedures” used to determine voluntariness
unless applicants demonstrate their confession was involuntary). Bressi did receive a
reliable determination that his confession was voluntary at the mid-trial hearing—a
determination we affirm on appeal—and as such any error was sufficiently remedied.
III.
We hold that the disclosure of grand jury materials was not prejudicial and the
failure to hold a pretrial Denno hearing does not necessitate relief. We will affirm the
District Court.

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