New Century Financial v. Bezalel Grossberger

DLD-027 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 25-1857
___________
NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL
v.
BEZALEL GROSSBERGER,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-09239)
District Judge: Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 6, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 13, 2025)
__________
OPINION*
__________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Pro se appellant Bezalel Grossberger appeals from the District Court’s remand
order. Because this appeal fails to present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the District Court’s decision. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
In 2024, New Century Financial Services, Inc. (“NCF”) sought an order from the
Superior Court of New Jersey to revive a judgment entered in its favor against
Grossberger in 2005 in a contract dispute. Soon after, Grossberger filed a notice of
removal in the District Court, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1443. After granting
Grossberger leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the District Court remanded the case sua
sponte back to state court after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the matter. Grossberger has appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1443.1 We review de
novo the District Court’s decision to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393, 403 (3d Cir. 2021). We may summarily
1 Typically, an order remanding a matter back to state court “is not reviewable on appeal
or otherwise,” but that jurisdictional bar does not apply to cases removed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1442 or 1443. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In his notice of removal, as well as
his appellate filings, Grossberger cited § 1443 as one ground for removal. Those
citations were sufficient to invoke § 1443, which gives us jurisdiction to review the entire
remand order. See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532,
1538 (2021) (explaining that “just . . . by citing” either § 1442 or § 1443, a defendant
sufficiently invokes the removal statute such that an appellate court has jurisdiction to
review all grounds for removal raised in the District Court).

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affirm a district court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.
See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
The District Court properly examined plaintiff NCF’s claims to determine that
there was no basis for federal question jurisdiction here, as the underlying dispute was a
contract matter under state law. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987) (noting that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented
on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint”). Although Grossberger sought
to allege federal counterclaims against the New Jersey Superior Court for violating his
rights during various state court proceedings, federal question jurisdiction must arise
from a state court plaintiff’s claims, not anticipated counterclaims or third-party claims.
See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002)
(“[A] counterclaim—which appears as part of the defendant’s answer, not as part of the
plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis for [federal question] jurisdiction.”).
On appeal, Grossberger argues that the New Jersey state courts are biased against
him because of his prior litigation history, and that he seeks to litigate the case in a
federal forum because he believes that this matter involves a religious dispute. However,
Grossberger has not asserted any rights guaranteed by a federal law “providing for . . .
equal civil rights” in the context of § 1443, nor identified any state law that would
prevent him from vindicating such rights, as required to invoke § 1443(1) as a ground for

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removal. See Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Georgia v.
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966) (concluding that the phrase “equal civil rights” for
purposes of § 1443 means federal laws that expressly provide for racial equality).
Grossberger also did not assert diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as a
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724
F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he burden is on the removing party to establish federal
jurisdiction.”). Thus, the District Court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this matter.
Accordingly, because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s decision.2
2 We deny Grossberger’s requests to “consolidate” this appeal with an already-concluded
District Court case.

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