United States of America v. RICHARDSON DANGLEBEN, JR., a/k/a Richard Dangleben, Jr.

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos. 25-2807, 25-2916
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant
v.
RICHARDSON DANGLEBEN, JR.,
a/k/a Richard Dangleben, Jr.
____________
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 3:23-cr-00072-001)
District Judge: Honorable Robert A. Molloy
____________
Argued December 9, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 1, 2026)

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_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves two unrelated questions of first
impression. First, can a district court set and enforce a deadline
by which the Government must give notice of its intent to seek
the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)? We hold that it
can. Second, are Virgin Islands territorial offenses predicate
“crime[s] of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)? We
hold that they are.
I
A
Richardson Dangleben, Jr. was charged in Virgin
Islands Superior Court for first-degree murder and for using a
firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. Dangleben
was granted pretrial release provided that he not possess any
firearms, ammunition, or dangerous weapons.
The decision to release Dangleben before trial proved
fatal. Just four months after he was charged with first-degree
murder, Dangleben engaged in a shootout with police on St.
Thomas. Dangleben was shot several times but survived.
Virgin Islands Detective Delberth Phipps, Jr. was not so
fortunate. He suffered a single gunshot wound and died about
an hour later. Inside Dangleben’s car, law enforcement found
a loaded handgun, ammunition, and 300 grams of marijuana.

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B
On October 13, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted
Dangleben. As relevant here, Count One charged him with
using a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in death,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Because the underlying
alleged felony was murder, Dangleben was eligible for the
federal death penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Counts Two and
Three charged him with using a firearm in furtherance of a
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). As
required by § 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1), the Government also
charged Dangleben with several predicate crimes of violence
stemming from his alleged killing of Detective Phipps and
shootout with another officer. All of these predicate crimes of
violence were Virgin Islands territorial crimes, including
another first-degree murder charge.
1
After Dangleben was indicted, the Federal Public
Defender asked an Assistant United States Attorney assigned
to the case whether he would seek the death penalty. The
AUSA responded that the office “would not be recommending
the death penalty” to the Attorney General. Dist. Ct. Dkt.
No. 146-1, at 2–3 (emphasis added). In reliance on that
response, Dangleben did not then exercise his right to the
“prompt[]” appointment of two attorneys, at least one of whom
“shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.” See 18
U.S.C. § 3005. Both parties understood, however, that the
Attorney General—not the local U.S. Attorney’s Office—had
the ultimate authority to decide whether the Government
would seek the death penalty.

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At a status conference on November 8, 2023, the
District Court asked the Government whether it intended to
seek the death penalty and, if so, when it would file a notice of
intent as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593.1 The AUSA responded
that the “final decision is going to be coming from
Washington” but he was “confident” that the Government
would have “an answer” within 60 days. Supp. App. 4–5.
Dangleben then asked the Court to set a 60-day deadline for
the Government to decide whether “to file any 3593 Notice.”
Supp. App. 11. Describing that deadline as “[e]minently
reasonable,” the AUSA “join[ed] in that request. Id.
Given the parties’ agreement, the District Court ordered
the Government to “file any notice pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3593(a) no later than January 12, 2024.” Dist. Ct. Dkt.
No. 35. The parties then filed a joint proposed scheduling order
that included, among other things, an October 2024 (or later)
trial date. The Court adopted the jointly proposed dates and
reset trial for October 28, 2024.
1 In cases with capital-eligible charges where “the
[G]overnment believes that the circumstances of the offense
are such that a sentence of death is justified,” § 3593(a)
requires the Government to “file with the court” at “a
reasonable time before the trial” “a notice” that states (1) “the
[G]overnment believes that the circumstances of the offense
are such that, if the defendant is convicted, a sentence of death
is justified under this chapter and that the [G]overnment will
seek the sentence of death”; and (2) sets “forth the aggravating
factor or factors that the [G]overnment, if the defendant is
convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death.”
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(1)–(2).

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On the day its “seek” decision was due, the Government
asked for more time. The AUSA explained that his
“unfamiliarity with the Capital Case review process led [him]
to believe that this issue could be addressed more
expeditiously.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 40, at 1. Counsel apologized
and told the District Court that he had “requested that the
process be expedited and, in any event, will file any notice by
no later than February 12.” Id. While noting that the
Government had “acquiesce[d] to the January 12, 2024 notice
deadline, which had the practical effect of ratifying the
reasonableness of the deadline imposed,” the Court gave the
Government its extra month. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 46, at 5
(citation modified). But the Court warned that no further
extension would “be entertained absent exigent circumstances
and supporting evidence.” Id.
On February 7, 2024, the Government filed a notice
with the District Court that the United States “will not seek the
death penalty for Richardson Dangleben, Jr.” Dist. Ct. Dkt.
No. 47 (emphasis added). Given this filing, Dangleben again
had no reason to exercise his right to learned counsel. Over the
next several months, both sides sought and received various
extensions for pretrial matters, and the Court said that it would
reschedule trial after it held an omnibus motions hearing.
A little more than a year after it had represented to the
Court that it would not seek the death penalty, on February 12,
2025, the Government moved to stay proceedings for 120 days
“to review [its] no-seek decision in this capital-eligible case.”

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App. 85.2 Given the Government’s indication that it was
reevaluating its seek determination, Dangleben requested
appointment of learned counsel. “As a practical matter,”
Dangleben argued, the Government’s motion has “returned
this arguably capital-eligible case to square one.” Dist. Ct. Dkt.
No. 129, at 6 (footnote omitted). “Notwithstanding” his
objection to the Government’s stay request, Dangleben
requested a “brief delay” to give learned counsel 15 days after
appointment to “familiarize herself with the case sufficiently”
2 On January 20, 2025, almost a year after the Government
filed its notice stating that it would not seek the death penalty,
President Trump signed an Executive Order titled “Restoring
the Death Penalty and Protecting Public Safety.” Exec. Order.
No. 14,164, 90 Fed. Reg. 8463 (Jan. 20, 2025). The Executive
Order directed the Attorney General, “where consistent with
applicable law,” to “seek the death penalty regardless of other
factors for every federal capital crime involving” the “murder
of a law-enforcement officer.” Id. About two weeks later, on
February 5, the Attorney General issued a memorandum titled
“Reviving the Federal Death Penalty and Lifting the
Moratorium on Federal Executions.” App. 87. That memo
directed the Attorney General’s Capital Review Committee “to
review no-seek decisions in all pending capital-eligible cases”
that were charged during the previous Administration and
determine “whether additional capital charges are
appropriate.” App. 89. The memo further stated that, “[a]bsent
significant mitigating circumstances, federal prosecutors are
expected to seek the death penalty in cases involving the
murder of a law-enforcement officer,” App. 88, and
“[p]articular attention shall be paid” to “capital crimes
committed” “within the federal special maritime and territorial
jurisdictions.” App. 89.

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to address the Government’s motion. Id. at 8 (emphasis
omitted).
Twelve days after the Government’s motion to stay the
proceedings, the District Court appointed learned counsel.
Dangleben’s original counsel filed a declaration stating that he
would not have moved to extend the deadlines for motions and
expert disclosures—which had the practical effect of delaying
the October 2024 trial date—“[h]ad [he] thought that
continuing those deadlines could lead to reversal of the no-seek
notice.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 146-1, at 6. The declaration also
stated that, because “[a]t no time between February 7, 2024 and
January 19, 2025 did [G]overnment counsel communicate any
intent to seek the death penalty,” Dangleben’s counsel had not
requested learned counsel or pursued any mitigation
investigation. Id. at 6–7.
In mid-April, the Government filed a superseding
indictment that added the eligibility factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3591(a), as well as two aggravating factors necessary to
impose capital punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). The
Government also added a federal predicate to Count One. By
this point, the District Court still had not set a new trial date.
On May 16, 2025, the District Court denied the
Government’s stay request. United States v. Dangleben, 2025
WL 1423842, at *1 (D.V.I. May 16, 2025). Then, five days
later, the Government filed a notice to seek the death penalty
for Count One. Dangleben moved to strike the seek notice.
The District Court granted Dangleben’s motion to strike
the Government’s seek notice for five reasons. United States v.
Dangleben, 2025 WL 2647195, at *8 (D.V.I. Sept. 15, 2025).
Relevant here, the Government’s seek notice violated the

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Court-ordered deadline. Id. at *3–4. “The Government,” the
Court explained, “cannot dispute that the Court and the parties
proceeded for over twelve months under the impression that
the Government would not be seeking the death penalty.” Id.
at *3. Although § 3593 “is silent regarding any notice to be
filed by the [G]overnment in the event it elects not to seek the
death penalty,” the Court reasoned that its inherent power to
control its own docket extended to “setting and enforcing
deadlines, including a deadline for filing a Section 3593
notice.” Id. Because the Government filed its seek notice “well
over a year after the Court-extended deadline of February 12,
2024,” the notice “clearly violate[d]” that deadline. Id.
2
Separate and apart from the weighty issue of the death
penalty, Dangleben moved to dismiss Counts One, Two, and
Three of the Superseding Indictment, arguing that only federal
crimes, not territorial offenses, can be “crime[s] of violence”
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The Government countered
that territorial crimes of violence can qualify as § 924(c)
predicates because the District Court of the Virgin Islands has
jurisdiction over certain territorial offenses under 48 U.S.C.
§ 1612(c), so those offenses “may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States” as § 924(c) requires.
The District Court agreed with Dangleben. According
to the Court, “Virgin Islands offenses cannot support a charge
under Section 924(c).” United States v. Dangleben, 2025 WL
2724050, at *7 (D.V.I. Sept. 25, 2025). Because Counts Two
and Three alleged only territorial predicate offenses, those
Counts had to be dismissed. Count One, however, alleged
territorial and federal predicate offenses, so it “remain[ed] a

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viable offense” even after the territorial predicates were
stricken. Id.
The Court recognized that the District Court of the
Virgin Islands “is considered a ‘court of the United States’ for
purposes of Title 18.” Id. at *4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 23). And
under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c), “the District Court of the Virgin
Islands has concurrent jurisdiction over local Virgin Islands
offenses if those offenses arise out of the same transaction as a
federal offense.” Id. So “the plain and unambiguous language
of Section 924(c),” the Court recognized, “would allow Virgin
Islands felony offenses to serve as predicate offenses in cases
prosecuted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.” Id.
Despite the statute’s text, the Court refused to apply it
as written. According to the Court, it would be “absurd” for
“Virgin Islands defendants” to be “prosecuted under a version
of a federal offense not available in any other federal court”
and “subjected to harsher punishment.” Id. at *5. The
Government’s pursuit of the death penalty here “highlight[ed]”
the absurdity, the Court thought, because it would be
“nonsensical, oxymoronic, and certainly inconsistent” that “a
Virgin Islands defendant could be subject to the death penalty
in federal court for committing a Virgin Islands crime when the
laws of the Virgin Islands do not allow for the penalty of
death.” Id.
The District Court also supposed that the “policy
reasons” behind § 924(c) and § 1612(c) “support[] a finding of
legal absurdity and disregarding the plain language.” Id. at *6.
“Congress passed Section 924(c),” the Court suggested, “to
prevent the carrying and use of firearms in the commission of
federal felonies,” whereas Congress passed § 1612(c) for the
“wholly unrelated” purpose of obviating the need to try “in

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different courts aspects of the same offenses or closely related
offenses.” Id. (citations omitted). So the Court concluded that
“[t]here is no indication that Congress enacted Section 1612(c)
for the purpose of allowing local Virgin Islands offenses to
serve as predicate offenses under Section 924(c).” Id.
II3
The Government timely appealed the District Court’s
order granting the motion to strike the seek notice and its order
dismissing several counts in the indictment. We consolidated
the appeals and begin with the question of our jurisdiction.
“In general,” the Government “may appeal in a criminal
case only as permitted by the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731, which limits appeals to cases involving the dismissal
of charges, suppression or exclusion of evidence, return of
seized property, or release of a defendant.” United States v.
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 392 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
“[D]ismissal of the death penalty notice” is, “in effect, a partial
dismissal of the charge,” so its appeal falls within § 3731.
United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d
on other grounds, 536 U.S. 862 (2002). Accord United States
v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2001); United
States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1993).
We join the chorus now and hold that § 3731 authorizes
the Government to appeal an order that strikes a notice of intent
to seek the death penalty. As the Fifth Circuit explained long
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231
and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), (c).

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ago, an order striking the death penalty “[is] in every practical
way as much of an alteration from the grand jury’s charge as
the striking of predicate acts” because it “remove[s] a discrete
basis of criminal liability.” Woolard, 981 F.2d at 757. Or, as
the First Circuit put it, “[b]y striking a statutorily authorized
penalty, the district court effectively dismissed a significant
portion of the counts against the defendants” and “[t]he order
appealed from has significant consequences for the trial of the
case,” which are “every bit as important as the consequences
from striking a count in an indictment.” Acosta-Martinez, 252
F.3d at 16. Those consequences include, for example, that a
capital defendant is entitled to extra peremptory challenges,
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b)(1), and to two attorneys, at least one of
whom is learned in capital cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3005. See Cheely,
36 F.3d at 1441; Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 17. And a capital
defendant has the right to bifurcated jury proceedings in the
guilt and penalty phases. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). For its part, the
Government may seek a death qualified jury. See Uttecht v.
Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007); White v. Wheeler, 577 U.S. 73,
77 (2015) (per curiam).
We also have collateral order jurisdiction over the
District Court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. First, the
District Court’s order “conclusively determine[d] the disputed
question”: whether this case can proceed as a capital case. Geo
Grp., Inc. v. Menocal, 146 S. Ct. 774, 781 (2026) (citation
omitted). Second, the order “resolve[d] an important issue
completely separate from the merits,” id. (citation omitted),
because it did not resolve “whether or not the accused is guilty
of the offense charged,” Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,
659 (1977). In arguing that the Government cannot seek the
death penalty here, Dangleben “makes no challenge
whatsoever to the merits of the charge against him.” Id.

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“Rather, he is contesting the very authority of the Government
to hale him into court to face trial on the charge against him.”
Id. Third, the District Court’s order is “effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Geo Grp., 146
S. Ct. at 781 (citation omitted). If Dangleben is convicted on
Count One after a non-capital trial, the Double Jeopardy
Clause would bar the Government from retrying him for the
capital version of that crime, see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
165–66 (1977), unless Dangleben obtained reversal on grounds
other than sufficiency of the evidence. See Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1978). Dangleben concedes as
much. So a seek order “involve[s] a right that would be
irretrievably lost absent an immediate appeal.” Geo Grp., 146
S. Ct. at 783 (citation omitted).
III
Having established our jurisdiction, we turn to the
District Court’s order striking the Government’s death penalty
notice under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(1).
A
If the Government wishes to pursue the death penalty
for a capital-eligible offense, it must file a notice that it “will
seek the sentence of death” at “a reasonable time before the
trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). The Government is not statutorily
required to state that it will not seek the death penalty. But what
if a court orders the Government to file a seek notice and the
Government represents to the court that it will not seek the
death penalty? Common sense, fair play, and basic criminal
procedure all require that the court can enforce the
Government’s promise.

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The Government disagrees, contending that the District
Court violated § 3593(a) because the statute requires only that
a death notice be filed “a reasonable time before the trial.”
Gov’t Br. 36 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)). But as the
Government also acknowledges: “district courts have the
inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms
with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of
cases.” Gov’t Br. 35 (quoting Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47
(2016)). For that reason, “we accord district courts great
deference with regard to matters of case management.” Drippe
v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010). Yet that
inherent authority “cannot contradict any express rule or
statute” and “must be a reasonable response to the problems
and needs confronting the court’s fair administration of
justice.” Dietz, 579 U.S. at 45–46 (citation modified).
Mindful of the black-letter law just noted, we first
consider whether § 3593(a) precludes or otherwise displaces a
district court’s inherent power to set a deadline by which the
Government must notice if it will seek the death penalty. It
does not. Recall that § 3593(a) directs the Government to file
a seek notice “a reasonable time before the trial.” What
constitutes a “reasonable time” will vary from case to case and
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. So we
hold that § 3593(a) does not displace a district court’s inherent
power to manage its cases to ensure a just and fair resolution.
In fact, the requirement that the Government file a seek notice
within “a reasonable time” will sometimes require the district
court to police that line. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).
Setting a seek deadline is sensible for at least three
reasons. First, it allows the court to manage the case fairly and
efficiently from start to finish. Second, it helps counsel litigate
the case effectively. Third, it ensures that defendants’ rights are

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protected. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005 (authorizing learned
counsel), 3599(a) (authorizing counsel, investigative, and
expert services for indigent defendants).
Apart from those considerations, consider the practical
effect of the Government’s position. If the Government had
carte blanche to revoke its no-seek decisions, defense counsel
would have to make decisions about staffing, discovery, and
trial strategy as if the case would have a guilt and a penalty
phase even after the Government affirmed that it was not
seeking the death penalty. The waste of time and expense in
those circumstances is obvious.
All these reasons apply in this case. Dangleben sought,
and the Court granted, various extensions for pretrial matters.
Yet he would not have done so “[h]ad [he] thought that
continuing those deadlines could lead to reversal of the no-seek
notice.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 146-1, at 6. And given the
Government’s no-seek representation, Dangleben had no
reason to exercise his right to learned counsel or prepare for his
mitigation hearing. For the same reasons a court can generally
set and enforce deadlines, it was not unreasonable—not an
abuse of discretion—for the District Court to hold to that
deadline in this case. See United States v. Wright, 913 F.3d 364,
369 (3d Cir. 2019).
The Government argues that even if the District Court
had the power we just described, its February 2024 deadline
was no longer “reasonable” because it was tied to a trial date
that did not hold. But the parties always knew that the seek
decision and trial date were connected, either because a seek
notice would mean the need for more time to prepare for a
capital trial, or because a no-seek notice would result in an
earlier trial. At the November 8, 2023 status conference, the

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Court set the original January 2024 seek deadline. The parties
then submitted a joint proposed scheduling order with a trial
date and other pretrial deadlines, “[p]resuming” that the
Government “does not provide notice pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3593(a).” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 37, at 2; see also id. at n.2
(“These dates all presume that the [G]overnment does not
provide section 3593(a) notice.”). But the order stated: “[i]f the
[G]overnment does provide notice” by the deadline, “all dates
will need to be revisited.” Id. at n.2. The Government’s own
statements and representations buttress our conclusion that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the
February 12, 2024 seek deadline.
B
None of the Government’s remaining counterarguments
persuades. To begin, the Government does not point us to any
authority suggesting that district courts may not set and enforce
seek deadlines. As the District Court for the Virgin Islands has
observed, it is “not unusual for courts to set Section 3593
Notice deadlines even in the absence of a concrete trial date.”
United States v. Cole, 799 F. Supp. 3d 438, 450 n.9 (D.V.I.
2025); see also, e.g., United States v. Meehan, 2026 WL
447431, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2026); United States v.
Suarez, 801 F. Supp. 3d 872, 876–80 (N.D. Cal. 2025); United
States v. Rivas-Moreiera, 2023 WL 11960650, at *1–2 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 7, 2023).
The Government also contends that the District Court’s
seek deadline impeded the Executive’s “exclusive authority
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”
Gov’t Br. 37 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
693 (1974)). We agree that “the Executive Branch has ‘broad
discretion as to whom to prosecute,’” and that “this discretion

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‘rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute
is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.’” Wright, 913 F.3d
at 373 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08
(1985)). But the District Court here understood and respected
the Government’s prerogative to pursue the death penalty.
During a status conference some four months after
Dangleben’s initial appearance, the Court solicited the
Government’s view as to “the timeframe” for a seek notice.
Dist Ct. Dkt. No. 46, at 2. The Government represented that 60
more days to issue a notice was “[e]minently reasonable,”
Supp. App. 11, and the Court set a deadline of January 12,
2024. The Court then granted—over a defense objection—the
Government’s request for an extension of that deadline to
February 12, 2024, due to what the AUSA admitted was his
misunderstanding of the “complex nature of the Justice
Department protocol” regarding the decision to seek the death
penalty. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 46, at 2, 5. At no time did the Court
attempt to review the Government’s death penalty decision or
to interfere with its decisionmaking process. The Court
“simply set a reasonable deadline regarding an important issue
and expected compliance with that deadline.” United States v.
Spurlock, 782 F. Supp. 3d 987, 1007 (D. Nev. 2025), appeal
dismissed, 2025 WL 2319947 (9th Cir. June 11, 2025).
So the issue is not, as the Government frames it,
“whether to seek the death penalty” falls within the purview of
the Executive Branch; it does. Gov’t Br. 28 (citation omitted).
Instead, the issue is whether courts have the right to manage
their cases; they do. Cf. United States v. Slone, 969 F. Supp. 2d
830, 832, 835–38 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s
request to set a deadline involving part of DOJ’s internal Death
Penalty Protocol, but indicating that it could set a seek

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deadline, which directly affects “the Court’s administrative
concerns”).
The Government suggests it can contravene a district
court’s order setting or enforcing a seek deadline because its
seek reversal is analogous to a superseding indictment. To be
sure, a prosecutor’s “initial decision should not freeze future
conduct,” because courts cannot “presume that every case is
complete at the time an initial charge is filed.” United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 & n.14 (1982). But analogizing a
superseding indictment to the Government’s attempt to
contravene its representation to the Court that it would not seek
the death penalty a year after the Court’s deadline overlooks
the differences between an ordinary and a capital trial. This is
particularly so here, where the Court set a seek deadline at
Dangleben’s request that the Government joined.
The Government also attempts to analogize its seek
reversal to a case where new evidence compels a change in
position. This analogy is a nonstarter because Dangleben’s
case does not involve new evidence. As the District Court
explained, the Government’s about-face was not “based on
new information that wasn’t previously available to the
Government,” and there were no “significant case-related
developments” between the no-seek and death notices.
Dangleben, 2025 WL 2647195, at *2. As the Government
candidly admitted, its reversal of position stemmed from its
“fail[ure] to properly evaluate the appropriate penalty based on
the available evidence.” Gov’t Br. 38.
To sum up: The Government is correct that it retains
“discretion to evaluate the appropriate charges based on known
facts.” Reply Br. 7–8. But it is equally true that the Government
cannot usurp the Court’s case-management function. On the

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facts of this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it struck the Government’s very belated (and
contradictory) notice to seek the death penalty.4
IV
We next turn to whether Virgin Islands territorial
offenses can qualify as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). We review this question of statutory
interpretation de novo. United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160,
162 (3d Cir. 2020).
A
Section 924(c) punishes “any person who, during and in
relation to any crime of violence . . . for which the person may
be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). To qualify as a § 924(c)
predicate, a Virgin Islands territorial offense must be a
(1) “crime of violence” that (2) can be “prosecuted in a court
of the United States.” Section 924(j) “raise[s] the ceiling of
punishments § 924 authorize[s],” Barrett v. United States, 146
4 We need not, and do not, address whether the Government’s
attempted seek notice complies with § 3593(a)’s requirement
that such notices be filed a “reasonable time” before trial;
whether the Government’s attempted seek notice is an
“amendment” to its earlier no-seek decision that requires
“good cause” under § 3593(a) and, if so, whether the
Government can make that showing; or whether permitting the
Government to seek the death penalty after it told Dangleben
it would not violates Dangleben’s Fifth Amendment
procedural due process rights.

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S. Ct. 482, 490 (2026), and permits the Government to seek the
death penalty when a defendant, “in the course of a violation
of [§ 924(c)], causes the death of a person through the use of a
firearm” and “the killing is a murder,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1).
Because § 924(j) refers to § 924(c), the “crime[s] of violence”
that qualify as predicate offenses under § 924(c) also qualify
for § 924(j).
The first requirement is satisfied here. Section 924(c)
defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense that is a felony
and . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The definition of a “crime of
violence” is not limited to federal offenses but applies to any
“felony” that has the required elements. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).
Many territorial offenses so qualify, including several of which
Dangleben stands accused—a point he does not contest.
The second requirement is also satisfied. “[E]xcept
where otherwise expressly provided,” Congress has specified
that “the term ‘court of the United States’ includes” “the
District Court of the Virgin Islands.” 18 U.S.C. § 23.5 And
territorial Virgin Islands offenses may be prosecuted in the
District Court of the Virgin Islands because Congress has
granted that court “concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of
5 The District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands is not
an Article III court. United States v. Gillette, 738 F.3d 63, 70
(3d Cir. 2013). Its jurisdiction flows from Article IV, which
empowers Congress to regulate the territories of the United
States. U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3 cl. 2. Still, Congress has chosen
to define “court of the United States” to include this territorial
court. 18 U.S.C. § 23.

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the Virgin Islands . . . over those offenses against the criminal
laws of the Virgin Islands . . . which are of the same or similar
character or part of, or based on, the same act or transaction”
that constitutes an offense against federal law. 48 U.S.C.
§ 1612(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3231. So the District Court of the
Virgin Islands has “jurisdiction over charges alleging local
crimes that are related to federal crimes.” United States v.
Gillette, 738 F.3d 63, 71 (3d Cir. 2013).
As the District Court recognized, “reading these federal
statutes together, it would appear that, in the context of the
allegations in this case, the plain and unambiguous language of
Section 924(c), [along with] Section 1612(c), would allow
Virgin Islands felony offenses to serve as predicate offenses in
cases prosecuted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.”
Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *4; see also United States v.
Hodge, 2016 WL 8730657, at *5 (D.V.I. Apr. 15, 2016)
(Virgin Islands territorial offenses can be § 924(c) predicates),
aff’d in part and vacated in part 870 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2017).
We agree and hold that § 924(c)’s text applies to territorial
offenses that can be prosecuted in the District Court of the
Virgin Islands.
B
The District Court should have stopped when it
concluded that “the plain and unambiguous” text would allow
Virgin Islands felony offenses to serve as predicate offenses in
cases prosecuted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.
Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *4. “If the words of a statute
are unambiguous,” then the “first step of the interpretive
inquiry is [the] last.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 13 (2019).
Instead, the District Court “disregard[ed] the plain language”
because it perceived that reading would lead to a “result that

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no rational legislature could have intended” and the “policy
reasons behind the enactment of Sections 924(c) and 1612(c)
support[]” that departure from the text. Dangleben, 2025 WL
2724050, at *5–6 (citation modified). Neither rationale
supports a holding contrary to the text’s ordinary meaning.
The District Court set the bar for absurdity too low. A
“result that may seem odd is not absurd,” Cochise Consultancy,
Inc. v. United States ex. rel Hunt, 587 U.S. 262, 271 (2019)
(citation modified), and “does not include substantive errors
arising from a drafter’s failure to appreciate the effect of certain
provisions,” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 238 (2012). And “[a]s long
as Congress could have any conceivable justification for a
result—even if the result carries negative consequences—that
result cannot be absurd.” Riccio v. Sentry Credit, Inc., 954 F.3d
582, 588 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc); see also Scalia & Garner,
Reading Law, at 237 (cautioning that “absurdity can be a
slippery slope” and “can lead to judicial revision of public and
private texts to make them (in the judges’ view) more
reasonable.”). “Anything more would threaten the separation
of powers, undermine fair notice, and risk upsetting hard-
earned legislative compromises.” Yellen v. Confederated
Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 594 U.S. 338, 381 n.3 (2021)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). As these authorities suggest, the
District Court erred when it applied the absurdity doctrine.
For starters, territories are not states. Congress has
plenary power over the territories, so some differential
treatment between the two is to be expected. “[A]s a United
States territory, the U.S. Virgin Islands does not have
independent sovereignty but derives such powers as its
[G]overnment possesses directly from congressional grant
under article IV, section 3 of the federal Constitution.” United

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States v. Hodge, 870 F.3d 184, 195 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation
modified). Given that backdrop, there is nothing absurd about
allowing § 924(c) charges to be premised on Virgin Islands
territorial crimes of violence that already may be prosecuted in
the District of the Virgin Islands, a federal court. 48 U.S.C.
§ 1612(c). One “conceivable justification” for this result,
Riccio, 954 F.3d at 588, is that Congress wanted to deter and
punish the violent use of firearms in the Virgin Islands by
extending the enhanced punishments in § 924(c) and § 924(j)
to all offenses over which the District of the Virgin Islands has
jurisdiction—territorial and federal.
Similarly, it is not absurd that applying § 924(c) as
written in this context “allows federal death penalty
prosecutions for wholly local offenses.” Dangleben Br. 45.
Again, Congress has established a unique jurisdiction for the
District of the Virgin Islands. And it is not “nonsensical,”
Riccio, 954 F.3d at 588 (citation modified), that certain
territorial offenses, prosecutable in “a court of the United
States” as stand-alone crimes, can also trigger separate federal
liability—especially given Congress’s expansive authority
over territories. Cf. Hodge, 870 F.3d at 194–95. Finally, the
District Court erred when it deemed relevant the fact that the
Virgin Islands does not impose the death penalty for territorial
crimes. The federal government can seek the death penalty for
federal crimes committed even in states that have abolished it.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see United States v. Gabrion, 719
F.3d 511, 521–24 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc).6
6 The Government’s reading is more rational. Dangleben’s
atextual reading reaches all § 924(c) prosecutions, not just the

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It was also error to conclude that “policy reasons”
support “a finding of legal absurdity and disregarding the plain
language.” Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *6. According to
the Court, “[o]ne of the explicit purposes in creating the
concurrent jurisdiction statute was ‘to obviate the need for
trying in different courts aspects of the same offenses or closely
related offenses.’” Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *6
(quoting Gillette, 738 F.3d at 71). It reasoned: “[t]here is no
indication that Congress enacted Section 1612(c) for the
purpose of allowing local Virgin Islands offenses to serve as
predicate offenses under Section 924(c).” Id. But even if
“Congress passed Section 1612(c) for a purpose wholly
unrelated to . . . Section 924(c),” id., we must follow the text.
See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d
248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) (When “the statutory language is
unambiguous, the court should not consider statutory purpose
or legislative history, because [the Court] operate[s] under the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (citation
modified)). For “if Congress has made a choice of language
which fairly brings a given situation within a statute,” Riva v.
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 1121, 1124 (3d Cir. 1972) (citation
omitted)—as it did in both § 924(c) and § 1612(c)—“a statute
is not to be confined to the particular applications contemplated
by the legislators,” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
315 (1980) (citation modified). In sum, the District Court’s
small fraction that are capital-eligible under § 924(j). If
Dangleben were right, no territorial crimes of violence could
serve as predicates for routine § 924(c) prosecutions. That
approach disregards the meaningful differences between
territories and states.

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purposivist arguments fail on their own terms, and cannot
supplant the text of § 924(c) and § 1612(c).
C
We acknowledge that two judges in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia have, contrary to the
conclusion we reach today, held that local D.C. offenses cannot
serve as § 924(c) predicates. See United States v. Brown, 58 F.
Supp. 3d 115, 118–31 (D.D.C. 2014); United States v. Mejia,
657 F. Supp. 3d 123, 134 (D.D.C. 2023). The District of
Columbia is on similar footing to the Virgin Islands in this
context because its federal district court also exercises
jurisdiction over local offenses related to violations of federal
law. See D.C. Code § 11-502(3). Brown resorted to legislative
history after finding ambiguous the phrase “may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States.” 58 F. Supp. 3d at 121–22
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). Brown further explained that,
“[t]aken most literally (and broadly), the phrase could
encompass any crime of violence that may—i.e., can
possibly—be prosecuted in a federal district court.” Id. at 122.
The court also reasoned that “the language could be read more
narrowly (and perhaps more naturally) as simply meaning
federal offenses—i.e., only crimes of violence that themselves
may be prosecuted in federal court directly because such court
has original jurisdiction over them, a universe limited to
federal, U.S. Code offenses.” Id.
In our view, Brown’s analysis is unpersuasive because
it “manufacture[d] ambiguity where none exists.” United
States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). In so doing, Brown
failed to recognize that § 924(c)(1)(A)’s “most literal[]”
meaning is also its “more natural[]” one. Id. The District Court
here rightly concluded that Brown’s reading was

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25
“unpersuasive” because it “requires the insertion of the word
‘federal’ to modify the word ‘offense’ in defining the term
‘crime of violence’” and “significantly modifies the plain
language of the statute.” Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *4
n.7.
Also, the evidence Brown examined to purportedly
divine Congress’s intent does not hold up. The District Court
relied on the same evidence, which Dangleben reiterates on
appeal: (1) the legislative history of § 924(c); (2) how other
courts have interpreted § 924(c). But we have no need to resort
to legislative history when the statute’s meaning is clear. Est.
of Arrington v. Michael, 738 F.3d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 2013); see
also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011)
(“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is
meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”). And although
Brown claimed that other courts had interpreted the phrase
“‘crime . . . for which [the defendant] may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States’ to mean a federal crime,” 58 F.
Supp. 3d at 127–28 (collecting cases), these cases either made
that remark in passing or resorted to legislative history to
support their conclusion.
D
Dangleben’s remaining counterarguments fail. First, he
contends that we should adopt his reading of § 924(c) on
constitutional-avoidance grounds. “[W]hen presented with two
‘fair alternatives,’” this canon counsels courts to “adopt[] the
narrower construction of a criminal statute to avoid having to
hold it unconstitutional if it were construed more broadly.”
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 463 (2019). But the
canon “has no application in the absence of statutory
ambiguity.” United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.,

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26
532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001). Contra Dangleben, the same is true
for the rule of lenity. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Colon,
62 F.4th 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2023). As we have explained,
§ 924(c) is unambiguous.
Dangleben next contends that the Government’s
§ 924(c) reading creates “vagueness problems.” Dangleben Br.
49–50. He argues that a “layperson” would not know § 924(c)
“applies differently in the Virgin Islands than elsewhere.”
Dangleben Br. 50. But the vagueness doctrine applies only
where “a criminal law [is] so vague that it fails to give ordinary
people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless
that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States,
576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). Here, the relevant statutes give
straightforward notice that the District Court of the Virgin
Islands is a “court of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 23. So a
defendant can be charged in that court for “offenses against the
criminal laws of the Virgin Islands . . . which are of the same
or similar character or part of, or based on, the same act or
transaction or two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan” as
a violation of the United States Code. 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), (c).
Nor may he use or carry a firearm during and in relation to “any
crime of violence . . . for which [he] may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). There is
no vagueness here. As the District Court recognized, “the plain
and unambiguous language of Section 924(c)” applies to
territorial crimes of violence. Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050,
at *4.
***
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District
Court’s order granting the motion to strike the death penalty

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and will reverse and remand its order dismissing Count Two,
Count Three, and three predicate offenses from Count One,
with instructions to reinstate those charges.
Adam F. Sleeper [Argued]
Office of United States Attorney
District of the Virgin Islands
William A. Glaser [Argued]
Criminal Division
United States Department of Justice
Counsel for Appellant
Matthew A. Campbell [Argued]
Office of Federal Public Defender
Aren K. Adjoian
Brett G. Sweitzer
Katherine C. Thompson
Federal Community Defender Office
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Allison F. Miller
Law Office of Allison Ferber Miller
Counsel for Appellee
Renee Pietropaolo
Elisa A. Long
National Association of Federal Public Defenders

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Amicus in Support of Appellee

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