Jason Michael Woodall v. Municipality of Monroeville

BLD-140 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-2867
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JASON MICHAEL WOODALL,
Appellant
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MONROEVILLE; OFFICER PIERRE DEFELICE; OFFICER
STEVEN MARITZ; CHRISTINE J. FERRARO, Sheetz Clerk; LT. SAFAR
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-01370)
District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Colville
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 28, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 7, 2026)
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OPINION*
_________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Pro se Plaintiff Jason Woodall brought claims against several Defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff’s claims focused on two traffic stops in
2019 by members of the Monroeville Police Department, which he alleged were unlawful
and undertaken in retaliation for an earlier complaint relating to a 2018 traffic stop. After
allowing Plaintiff to amend multiple times, the District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
with prejudice. We will summarily affirm.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and
issues on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review is de novo.
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2004). We may summarily affirm if the appeal
fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. This appeal
does not.
As to the Monroeville Defendants, we agree with the District Court that many of
Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the two-year limitations periods under § 1983 and
Pennsylvania law. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claims were properly dismissed because Plaintiff (1) failed to allege
that he suffered a qualifying deprivation of liberty, and (2) was not subject to a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007).
Plaintiff’s claims regarding fabrication of evidence were properly dismissed because he
failed to provide plausible allegations of fabrication and did not allege a meaningful

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connection between the allegedly fabricated evidence and the criminal prosecution at issue.
See Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 371-72 (3d Cir. 2016). We also agree with
the District Court that Woodall failed to allege supervisory liability against Chief Cole.
See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
As to Woodall’s remaining claims, we agree with the District Court that dismissal
was appropriate because (1) the Municipality of Monroeville and Allegheny County had
no policy or custom that injured Woodall, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978), (2) Sheetz could not be sued under § 1983 because it is not a state
actor, see Kach, 589 F.3d at 646, (3) Woodall’s claims against the District Attorney
Defendants were barred by prosecutorial immunity, see Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208
(3d Cir. 2008), and (4) Woodall’s claims against Judge Herbst were barred by judicial
immunity, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
We have considered Plaintiff’s other arguments, including his challenges to certain
of the District Court’s text orders, and determined that those arguments are without merit.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm. We also grant Judge Herbst’s motion to be
relieved from filing a brief.

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