Sutasinee Thana v. Board of License Commissioners for Charles County, Maryland

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1660
SUTASINEE THANA; MICHAEL JAMES LOHMAN; THAI SEAFOOD & GRILL,
INC., trading as Thai Palace & Thai Palace & Lounge,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF LICENSE COMMISSIONERS FOR CHARLES COUNTY, MARYLAND;
PAMELA SMITH, Chair; GUY BLACK, Member; TOMASINA COATES,
Member; STEVEN LOWE, Member; WILLIAM YOUNG, Member,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:14-
cv-03481-PWG)
Argued: May 11, 2016 Decided: June 28, 2016
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer
wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Keenan
joined.
ARGUED: Charles Grant Byrd, Jr., ALSTON & BYRD, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellants. Kevin Bock Karpinski, KARPINSKI,
COLARESI & KARP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Michael B. Rynd, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we decide whether the district court
properly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss this
federal action challenging the actions of a state administrative
agency that were reviewed in state court.
The Board of License Commissioners of Charles County,
Maryland (“the Board”), revoked the alcoholic beverage license
of a restaurant and lounge known as Thai Palace, as well as two
consent orders that imposed conditions on the license, because
Thai Palace violated certain conditions imposed by the consent
orders. The Circuit Court for Charles County affirmed in part
and remanded in part, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the circuit court. The Maryland Court of Appeals
declined to grant certiorari.
Shortly after the Circuit Court for Charles County had
ruled and before Thai Palace filed its notice of appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals, Thai Palace commenced this federal
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment,
challenging the actions of the Board. The district court
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983). The district court concluded that because Thai
Palace “seeks to attribute error to the core of the Board’s

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order and the circuit court ruling affirming it,” its federal
action “falls neatly within the bounds of the [Rooker-Feldman]
doctrine.”
We reverse and remand, concluding that Thai Palace has,
with this action, commenced an independent, concurrent action
challenging actions by a state administrative agency. Because
Thai Palace did not request the district court to conduct
appellate review of the state court judgment itself, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To the extent
that the district court concluded that Thai Palace is seeking to
litigate the same claims or issues decided in the state
proceedings, it can, on remand, apply state law principles of
preclusion to bar this action if that proves to be appropriate.
I
Thai Palace -- formally, Thai Seafood & Grill, Inc., and
trading as Thai Palace and Thai Palace & Lounge -- is a
restaurant and lounge in Waldorf, Maryland. Sutasinee Thana,
her husband, and Michael Lohman are the owners of Thai Palace,
and Thana and Lohman hold the alcoholic beverage license on
behalf of Thai Palace. In 2009, Thai Palace1 filed an
application with the Board for an alcoholic beverage license,
1 We refer collectively to the corporation, Thana, and
Lohman as “Thai Palace.”

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effectively seeking reinstatement of an earlier license that had
been revoked in 2007 for hosting entertainment that featured
nudity. Following a hearing, the Board and Thai Palace entered
into a consent order dated November 12, 2009, by which the Board
issued the alcoholic beverage license on the condition that Thai
Palace “be operated as a family restaurant” between the hours of
11:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. and “that there shall be no
entertainment other than dinner music from either a radio and/or
t.v. . . . without prior written approval of the Board.”
Some two years later, Thai Palace requested that the Board
rescind the November 2009 Consent Order to allow it to once
again provide live entertainment. At the hearing on this
request, the Board declined to rescind the November 2009 Consent
Order but did agree to modify it. Accordingly, the Board and
Thai Palace entered into a second consent order, dated January
12, 2012, which allowed Thai Palace to extend its hours of
operation and also permitted it to offer “instrumental and
acoustical music; Karaoke; [and] DJ music and dancing.” But
this second consent order also provided that Thai Palace “shall
not allow an outside promoter to maintain control of any
entertainment and shall not offer any ‘teenager only’ events or
‘go-go’ entertainment.”2 Finally, the January 2012 Consent Order
2 According to the complaint, “go-go” music “is a subgenre
associated with funk music that originated in Washington, D.C.

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provided that it would remain in effect for a period of three
years, after which it would expire and be “null and void and of
no further effect.”
Notwithstanding the terms of the January 2012 Consent
Order, Thai Palace contracted with various “go-go” bands to
perform at Thai Palace. After receiving information about these
concerts from the police, the Board issued an order on June 20,
2013, requiring Thai Palace to show cause why the January 2012
Consent Order “should not be revoked.” Following an evidentiary
hearing, the Board issued a decision revoking the November 2009
Consent Order, the January 2012 Consent Order, and Thai Palace’s
alcoholic beverage license.
Pursuant to Maryland statutory provisions for review of
administrative orders, Thai Palace filed a petition for review
of the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Charles County.
See Md. Code Ann., Art. 2B, § 16-101. The circuit court
affirmed the Board with respect to its revocation of the January
2012 Consent Order; concluded that the Board had made no
findings that the November 2009 Consent Order had been violated;
and remanded for further findings in connection with whether
Thai Palace’s alcoholic beverage license should be revoked.
Thai Palace appealed the circuit court’s decision to the
in the mid-1960’s to late 1970’s” and that “remains primarily
popular in the area as a uniquely regional music style.”

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Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed by decision
dated January 29, 2016. Thana v. Bd. of License Comm’rs for
Charles Cnty., 130 A.3d 1103 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
Thereafter, Thai Palace filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Maryland Court of Appeals, which denied the
petition on May 23, 2016.
Before filing its appeal to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, Thai Palace commenced this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that, by conditioning its alcoholic beverage
license on its agreement not to host “go-go” entertainment and
by enforcing that condition, the Board had violated its First
Amendment rights. Thai Palace sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, $500,000 in compensatory damages, and attorneys fees and
costs. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the district court
granted by order dated May 14, 2015. The court concluded that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, explaining that Thai Palace “plainly seeks to
attribute error to the core of the Board’s order and the circuit
court ruling affirming it (and thereby, to overturn them).”
From the district court’s order dismissing the complaint,
Thai Palace filed this appeal.

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II
Thai Palace contends, contrary to the district court’s
holding, that it does not, by this action, “seek review . . . of
the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County” and that
the district court therefore erred in applying the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to dismiss the action. It argues that its
federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeks compensatory damages,
as well as equitable relief, for the Board’s conditioning of its
alcoholic beverage license on its agreement not to promote or
offer “go-go” entertainment and for the Board’s enforcement of
that condition, in violation of the First Amendment. Thai
Palace observes that, because “[c]ompensatory damages cannot be
awarded in [its administrative appeal,] . . . the [Rooker-
Feldman] doctrine is not applicable.” It maintains that rather
than dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the district
court should have stayed the case pending the outcome of the
state court proceedings and then applied principles of
preclusion to address the Board’s arguments.
The Board, in contrast, contends that the district court
correctly dismissed this action under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, arguing that “[t]here could have been no favorable
resolution to [Thai Palace’s] claim in the district court
without a corresponding determination that the State court’s
judgment, and the Board’s decision affirmed by that State

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court’s judgment, were decided in error.” The Board notes
further that “[t]here could be no award of compensatory damages
without the same federal review and rejection of the State court
judgment which is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” In
short, the Board argues that Thai Palace “asked the district
court to sit in direct review of the State court’s judgment and
by extension, the underlying decision of the Board, an
administrative agency.” Alternatively, the Board argues that
“there is no longer a justiciable controversy before the Court,
as [the January 2012 Consent Order] became null and void by its
own terms as of January 12, 2015.”
The principal issue thus presented is whether the district
court properly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss
this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine followed from Congress’ careful
assignment of federal subject matter jurisdiction, allocating
original jurisdiction to the district courts in, for example, 28
U.S.C. § 1330(a) (actions against foreign states), § 1331
(federal question jurisdiction), and § 1332(a) (diversity
jurisdiction), while allocating appellate jurisdiction over
final state court judgments to the Supreme Court in § 1257(a).
The doctrine thus holds that “lower federal courts are precluded
from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court
judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per

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curiam). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow and
focused, “confined to ‘cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Id.
at 464 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284).
Of course, Congress could allocate jurisdiction to district
courts to “oversee” state court judgments, as it has done in
authorizing federal habeas review, see Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292
n.8, but it has not done so generally to confer on district
courts appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. The
doctrine goes no further than necessary to effectuate Congress’
allocation of subject matter jurisdiction between the district
courts and the Supreme Court, as the Exxon Court emphasized in
noting that the doctrine should be applied no broader than the
holdings in the two cases from which the doctrine takes its
name. Id. at 284.
In Rooker, a party that lost before the Indiana Supreme
Court and that failed to obtain review by the U.S. Supreme Court
filed an action in federal district court, challenging the
constitutionality of the state court judgment and seeking to
have it declared “null and void.” 263 U.S. at 414-15.
Affirming the district court’s dismissal of the federal suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ruled

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that the federal suit amounted to an appeal of the state court
judgment and that Congress had vested jurisdiction to entertain
such an appeal only in the Supreme Court. Id. at 415-16.
In Feldman, the plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia’s
highest court in federal district court after the District of
Columbia court denied their requests for a waiver of a bar
membership rule. 460 U.S. at 468. Again, the Supreme Court
affirmed dismissal of the case, holding that while the
plaintiffs could challenge the constitutionality of the bar
admission rule itself in a federal district court, they could
not challenge the District of Columbia court’s judgment denying
their waiver petitions in a federal district court. Id. at 482-
83.
In the years following these two decisions, which together
defined the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, courts, including this
court, broadly interpreted the doctrine as barring the loser in
a state court adjudication “from bringing suit in federal court
alleging the same claim or a claim that could have been brought
in the state proceedings,” thereby sliding the analysis into an
application of claim preclusion principles. Davani v. Va. Dep’t
of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
In Exxon, however, the Supreme Court corrected this
misunderstanding, warning that such an expansive construction of
the doctrine threatens both to “overrid[e] Congress’ conferral

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of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction
exercised by state courts, and [to] supersed[e] the ordinary
application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.”
544 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added). Seeking to bring the doctrine
back to its narrow focus, the Exxon Court clarified that, rather
than serving as preclusion by another name, “[t]he Rooker-
Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Id. at 284 (emphasis added). The Court even
indicated that it sought to restrict the doctrine to cases whose
procedural postures mirrored those in the Rooker and Feldman
cases themselves:
Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances
in which this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a
United States district court from exercising subject-
matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be
empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of
authority[.] In both cases, the losing party in state
court filed suit in federal court after the state
proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by
the state-court judgment and seeking review and
rejection of that judgment.
Id. at 291 (citations omitted).
To emphasize the narrow role that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is to play, the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly

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that, since the decisions in Rooker and Feldman, it has never
applied the doctrine to deprive a district court of subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.
521, 531 (2011); Lance, 546 U.S. at 464; Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287.
Similarly, since Exxon, we have never, in a published opinion,
held that a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
To be sure, the distinction between preclusion principles
and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can sometimes be subtle, but it
is nonetheless important to maintain. Preclusion principles are
designed to address the tension between two concurrent,
independent suits that results when the two suits address the
same subject matter, claims, and legal principles. Whereas the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, by contrast, assesses only whether the
process for appealing a state court judgment to the Supreme
Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) has been sidetracked by an
action filed in a district court specifically to review that
state court judgment. Thus, if a plaintiff in federal court
does not seek review of the state court judgment itself but
instead “presents an independent claim, it is not an impediment
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the same or a
related question was earlier aired between the parties in state
court.” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Exxon, 544

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U.S. at 292-93). Rather, the Court has recognized that
Congress’ policy allows for concurrent litigation in federal and
state courts, noting that any tensions between the two
proceedings should be managed through the doctrines of
preclusion, comity, and abstention. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292-93.
Consistent with this narrow articulation of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court has also recognized that
state administrative and executive actions are not covered by
the doctrine. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,
535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002) (“[T]he [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine
has no application to judicial review of executive action,
including determinations made by a state administrative
agency”); see also Lance, 546 U.S. at 464; Exxon, 544 U.S. at
287. State administrative decisions, even those that are
subject to judicial review by state courts, are beyond doubt
subject to challenge in an independent federal action commenced
under jurisdiction explicitly conferred by Congress.
In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this
federal action is a concurrent, independent action supported by
original jurisdiction conferred by Congress on federal district
courts, even though the complaint in the action includes claims
and legal arguments similar to or the same as those made in the
state proceedings, and that therefore it is not barred by the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. There are several reasons supporting
this conclusion.
First, if we apply strictly the Supreme Court’s instruction
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is to be “confined to cases of
the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name,” Exxon, 544
U.S. at 284, we would conclude that the doctrine does not apply
here because the district court here was not called upon to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over a final judgment from “the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a) (emphasis added), as was the case in both
Rooker and Feldman. In those cases, instead of seeking review
in the Supreme Court of a judgment entered by the State’s
highest court, the losing party pursued review of the judgment
in a federal district court, frustrating the Supreme Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction over such a judgment. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a) (providing that “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered
by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court” in cases raising
federal questions); see also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291 (noting
that, in both Rooker and Feldman, the plaintiff “filed suit in
federal court after the state proceedings ended” (emphasis
added)). Obviously, the case before us does not fit that
profile.

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Second, and more fundamental to the controlling indicia
articulated by the Supreme Court in Exxon, Thai Palace’s action
was, and is, challenging the action of a state administrative
agency, rather than alleging injury caused by a state court
judgment. Nowhere in its complaint did Thai Palace seek review
of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles Country.
Instead, as the district court acknowledged, its claims are
premised on injuries allegedly caused by the Board. Because
Thai Palace’s federal action does not seek redress for an injury
allegedly caused by a judgment of a state court, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284
(holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to cases
brought to “complain[] of injuries caused by state-court
judgments”).
Third, and more generally, because Thai Palace challenges
state administrative actions, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply as a categorical matter. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287
(“Rooker-Feldman does not apply to a suit seeking review of
state agency action”); Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 614 n.3 (same).
Fourth, the differences between the two proceedings
demonstrate that this federal action must be seen as an
independent, concurrent action that does not undermine the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over any state court judgment. See
Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532. The state proceeding in this case was

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an agency-initiated proceeding, in which limited and deferential
judicial review was afforded. The agency’s authority extended
only to issuing, modifying, and revoking Thai Palace’s alcoholic
beverage license, and judicial review was limited to determining
whether the Board’s decision was “supported by substantial
evidence” and whether the Board “committed [an] error of law.”
Paek v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of License Comm’rs, 851 A.2d
540, 544 (Md. 2004). Moreover, in reviewing the Board’s
decision, Maryland courts could only modify, affirm, reverse, or
remand the proceedings to the Board, possessing no authority to
award damages. See Md. Code Ann., Art. 2(B), § 16-101(e)(4).
Any final judgment by the State’s highest court could then be
reviewed by the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). This
action, on the other hand, was commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to challenge the constitutionality of the Board’s actions under
the First Amendment, and the district court possessed original
subject matter jurisdiction over such an action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). In addition to
declaratory and injunctive relief, Thai Palace also sought
damages. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court, as well as
our court, has never held that a federal district court is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from exercising its
subject matter jurisdiction over such a concurrent proceeding,
even though the district court would have to give effect to 28

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U.S.C. § 1738, which requires federal courts to “give the same
preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of
that State would give.” Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama
Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986).
And fifth, while pursuing this independent, concurrent
action, Thai Palace in fact never sought to bypass the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) over
any relevant state court judgment. To the contrary, it
challenged the judgment of the Circuit Court of Charles County
by appealing it to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and
ultimately the Maryland Court of Appeals, thereby remaining on
track for potential review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus,
Thai Palace did not frustrate the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction,
and the purpose behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was not
implicated.
Rather than limit itself to the narrow question of whether
it was called upon to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a
state court judgment, the district court effectively applied
preclusion principles to conclude that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine divested it of subject matter jurisdiction. For
example, the court noted that, in this action, Thai Palace was
presenting “the substance of the very constitutional challenge”
that the Circuit Court for Charles County addressed; that it
“could not possibly rule in [Thai Palace’s] favor on these

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claims without finding error by the state court”; and that Thai
Palace’s “success on the merits would necessitate a finding that
the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.”
(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Yet these
observations about the similarity of the claims are beside the
point. While the court’s concerns may have been accurate and
valid, they do not relate to whether Rooker-Feldman applies.
See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293 (“Nor does [the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine] stop a district court from exercising subject-matter
jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in
federal court a matter previously litigated in state court”).
Rather, the district court’s concern that it could not rule in
Thai Palace’s favor without attributing error to the state court
amounted to the application of traditional preclusion
principles.
At bottom, we conclude that this federal action, commenced
by Thai Palace under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging injury
inflicted by actions of a state administrative agency, qualifies
as an independent, concurrent action that does not undermine the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court
judgments, and accordingly the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply. Of course, this is not to say that this action can
continue if it is barred under state preclusion principles.
Nonetheless, in this posture at this time, we must reverse the

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district court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling and remand for further
proceedings.3
REVERSED AND REMANDED
3 We note that this case is not moot, as the Board claims,
given that Thai Palace seeks compensatory damages for past harm.

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