United States of America v. Helen Jean Anderson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4554
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HELEN JEAN ANDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:14-cr-00040-HMH-1)
Submitted: April 26, 2016 Decided: May 31, 2016
Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr., OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Helen Jean Anderson pled guilty pursuant to a written plea
agreement to conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1349 (2012). The district court imposed a within-
Guidelines sentence of 105 months’ imprisonment and ordered
Anderson to pay $407,336.86 in restitution. In accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Anderson’s counsel has
filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court provided
sufficient reasoning for its imposition of a 105-month sentence.
Although notified of her right to do so, Anderson has not filed a
pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
Our review of Anderson’s sentence is for reasonableness,
under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We first review for significant procedural
error. Id. at 51. Procedural error includes improperly
calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, and failing to adequately explain the
selected sentence. Id. Although a sentencing court need not issue
a comprehensive, detailed opinion explaining the sentence imposed,
the sentencing judge should provide an explanation sufficient “to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal

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decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
356 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (“Th[e] individualized
assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy but it must provide a
rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate to
permit meaningful appellate review.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Our review of the record reveals that the sentencing
court properly calculated Anderson’s Guidelines range and relied
on Anderson’s extensive criminal record, the need to protect the
public, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c), and the seriousness of
Anderson’s offense compared to the Guidelines range produced as a
result of stipulations in Anderson’s plea agreement when imposing
its sentence. Accordingly, we find no procedural error at
sentencing.
Having found no procedural error, we next review for
substantive reasonableness, “examin[ing] the totality of the
circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the
standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez,
750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014). Where the sentence imposed
falls within or below the properly-calculated Guidelines range,
this court applies a presumption of reasonableness. United
States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). Here, nothing

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in the record overcomes the presumption of reasonableness attached
to the within-Guidelines sentence imposed by the district court.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Anderson, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Anderson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Anderson.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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