United States of America v. Kevin Alexander Scott

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-7687
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEVIN ALEXANDER SCOTT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:09-cr-00581-GLR-1)
Submitted: August 2, 2021 Decided: August 18, 2021
Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kevin Alexander Scott, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Kevin Alexander Scott appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion
for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In his motion, Scott
raised several arguments, including that his serious medical conditions made him
particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, that his post-sentencing rehabilitation established
that release was appropriate, and that changes in relevant sentencing law justified his
release. Using a § 3582(c)(1)(A) form order, the district court checked a box labeled
“DENIED after complete review of the motion on the merits,” and provided no other
explanation for the denial. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district court’s order
and remand for further proceedings.
Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court may reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” The
court is “empowered . . . to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release
that a defendant might raise” in deciding whether to grant a defendant-filed motion. United
States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted). The court must also consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors “to the extent that
they are applicable.” § 3582(c)(1)(A).
We review a district court’s ruling on an § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021). “A district court
abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially
recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or
legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158

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(4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, while there is no
“categorical . . . requirement” that a court explicitly address the movant’s arguments or
elucidate its reasoning, the court also errs if, in light of the particular circumstances of the
case, its explanation is “[in]adequate to allow for meaningful appellate review.” United
States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2021); see also Chavez-Meza v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018) (“Just how much of an explanation [is] require[d] . . .
depends . . . upon the circumstances of the particular case.”). The district court must “set
forth enough to satisfy [this] court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” High, 997 F.3d at
190 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).
Here, the district court’s brief explanation does not reveal whether it considered
Scott’s numerous arguments, nor indicate the basis on which it rejected Scott’s motion.
With no indication as to the court’s reasoning, we can only speculate as to whether the
court properly applied the governing law or whether it abused its discretion by acting
“arbitrarily or irrationally, fail[ing] to consider judicially recognized factors constraining
its exercise of discretion, rel[ying] on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commit[ting]
an error of law.” Dillard, 891 F.3d at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are
therefore unable to conduct a “meaningful appellate review.” High, 997 F.3d at 189; see
also United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 2019).
We thus vacate the court’s order, remand for further proceedings, and deny Scott’s
motion to appoint counsel. We express no view as to the merits of Scott’s compassionate
release motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

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are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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