King Grant-Davis v. ALAN WILSON, South Carolina Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-2157
KING GRANT-DAVIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALAN WILSON, South Carolina Attorney General; MARK KEEL, Chief of the
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; MERRICK B. GARLAND, United
States Attorney General; MARCIA L. FUDGE, United States Secretary of
Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:19-cv-00392-DCN)
Submitted: September 21, 2023 Decided: November 3, 2023
Before GREGORY and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
King Grant-Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Murcier Bowens, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina;
Leon David Leggett, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
King Grant-Davis filed a second amended complaint raising facial and as-applied
challenges to the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act (“SORA”), S.C. Code Ann.
§§ 23-3-400 to -555 (2007 & Supp. 2022), the federal Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901-20962, and related federal laws. After Defendants
moved to dismiss, Grant-Davis moved to amend or correct his second amended complaint
and for partial summary judgment. The magistrate judge denied the motion to amend or
correct and recommended granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss and denying Grant-
Davis’ motion for partial summary judgment. Over Grant-Davis’ objections, the district
court accepted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, dismissed Grant-Davis’
second amended complaint, and denied as moot his motion for partial summary judgment.
The court also denied Grant-Davis’ motion to reconsider the magistrate judge’s order
denying Grant-Davis’ motion to amend or correct the second amended complaint. We
dismiss in part and affirm in part.
In Powell v. Keel, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that “SORA’s lifetime
registration requirement is unconstitutional absent any opportunity for judicial review to
assess the risk of re-offending.” 860 S.E.2d 344, 352 (S.C. 2021). The court, however,
“reserve[d] the effective date of this opinion for twelve (12) months from the date of filing
to allow the General Assembly to correct the deficiency in the statute regarding judicial
review.” Id. Because Grant-Davis raised a similar challenge to SORA, we placed his
appeal in abeyance for the effective date of Powell or until the South Carolina General
Assembly amended SORA consistent with Powell.

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The South Carolina General Assembly acted after Powell, and SORA now provides
that a sex offender may apply to be removed from the registry and outlines a process of
judicial review if that application is denied. See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-462 to -463.
Because the South Carolina General Assembly has remedied the constitutional defect in
SORA identified in Powell, we conclude that this issue is moot. See Cela v. Garland,
75 F.4th 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2023) (“A case becomes moot when it is impossible for a court
to grant any effectual relief to the prevailing party.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Eden, LLC v. Justice, 36 F.4th 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[A] case may become moot after
entry of a district court’s judgment and while an appeal is pending.”). We therefore dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction Grant-Davis’ appeal of the district court’s dismissal of this portion
of Count 4. See Cela, 75 F.4th at 360.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment.
Grant-Davis v. Wilson, No. 2:19-cv-00392-DCN (D.S.C. Sept. 20 & 27, 2021). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART

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