United States of America v. Rahsaan Diante Pearson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4150
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAHSAAN DIANTE PEARSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:17-cr-00361-WO-1)
Submitted: May 24, 2022 Decided: June 6, 2022
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brian M. Aus, BRIAN AUS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Frank Joseph Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Rahsaan Diante Pearson appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his term of
supervised release and imposing 60 days of imprisonment and 34 months of supervised
release. On appeal, Pearson’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning the reasonableness of Pearson’s sentence. Although notified of his right to do
so, Pearson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
“A district court has broad . . . discretion in fashioning a sentence upon revocation
of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 206
(4th Cir. 2017). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum
and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted). “To
consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first must determine
whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. Even if a
revocation sentence is unreasonable, we will reverse only if it is “plainly so.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A district court imposes a procedurally reasonable sentence by “considering the
Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” “adequately explain[ing] the chosen sentence,” and
“meaningfully respond[ing] to the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments” for a different
sentence. Id. (footnote omitted). And a court complies with substantive reasonableness
requirements by “sufficiently stat[ing] a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentence

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within the policy statement range is presumed reasonable.” United States v. Padgett, 788
F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court correctly calculated a policy statement range of 8 to 14
months, provided defense counsel with an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence,
and allowed Pearson to address the court. The court then imposed a presumptively
reasonable prison sentence far below the policy statement range.* Finally, the court
reimposed Pearson’s original 36-month term of supervised release, minus the 60-day
period of imprisonment, indicating that it wished to revert to the status quo ante once
Pearson completed his 60 days in prison. Based on our review of the record, we conclude
that the court acted well within its discretion in conducting the revocation proceeding and
fashioning Pearson’s revocation sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Pearson’s revocation
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Pearson, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Pearson requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Pearson.
* Although Pearson has already served his custodial sentence, we conclude that the
appeal from this part of the sentence is not moot, given that a successful challenge to the
60-day sentence could potentially result in a shorter term of supervised release. See United
States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 67 (4th Cir. 2018).

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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