United States of America v. Brenda Joyce Hall

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4510
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRENDA JOYCE HALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (5:20-cr-00218-BR-1)
Submitted: March 17, 2023 Decided: May 19, 2023
Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief
Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Brenda Joyce Hall pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to a
single-count information charging her with misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 4. Hall’s conviction stemmed from her failure to report and actions to conceal a federal
student loan fraud scheme. The district court sentenced Hall to five years of probation and
ordered her to pay $727,957 in restitution to the United States Department of Education.
On appeal, Hall argues that the district court lacked authority to order restitution for her
offense under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), Pub. L. No.
104-132, §§ 201-11, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227-41 (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A). The Government has moved to dismiss Hall’s appeal as barred by the appeal
waiver contained in the plea agreement.1 For the reasons stated below, we deny the
Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm the district court’s judgment.
Hall does not contest that her appeal waiver is valid, and our independent review
confirms the validity of Hall’s waiver of appellate rights. See United States v. Thornsbury,
670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Generally, if a district court questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the
record indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the
waiver is valid.”). Hall also acknowledges that restitution is a part of a defendant’s
sentence and that a defendant’s waiver of her right to appeal her sentence, like Hall’s
1 We deferred action on the Government’s motion to dismiss pending the
completion of briefing.

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waiver, generally encompasses a challenge to a restitution order. United States v. Cohen,
459 F.3d 490, 496-97 (4th Cir. 2006).
But Hall argues that the appeal waiver does not preclude our review of her
challenges to the restitution aspect of her sentence because they implicate the district
court’s authority to order restitution under the MVRA.2 Hall correctly observes that we
have recognized a “narrow class of claims” that may be raised on direct appeal “despite a
general waiver of appellate rights.” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 220 n.2 (4th
Cir. 2005). And that narrow class includes challenges to restitution orders imposed beyond
the statutory authority of the district court and that are thus “illegal.” United States v.
Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2021). Because Hall’s arguments on appeal question
the district court’s statutory authority to impose restitution, we conclude that they are
outside the appeal waiver, and we deny the Government’s motion to dismiss.
On the merits, we are satisfied that the district court had the statutory authority to
impose restitution. The district court imposed restitution under the MVRA. As relevant
here, the MVRA requires district courts to order restitution for certain offenses, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(a)(1), such as “an offense against property” under Title 18—“including any
offense committed by fraud or deceit”—that results in “an identifiable victim” suffering a
“pecuniary loss,” id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(1)(B). And the MVRA defines a “victim”
2 Hall does not argue that any of the exceptions to the appeal waiver in the plea
agreement apply.

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as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense
for which restitution may be ordered.” Id. § 3663A(a)(2).
In assessing whether an offense is “an offense against property,” we employ a
fact-specific approach that considers the circumstances of the defendant’s offense.3 United
States v. Ritchie, 858 F.3d 201, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017). Using that approach here, we are
satisfied that Hall’s offense is “an offense against property” that was committed through
“fraud or deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). Hall’s offense also directly and
proximately harmed the Department of Education and caused it to suffer a pecuniary loss.
See id. § 3663A(a)(2), (c)(1)(B).
To explain, Hall created fake high school transcripts that allowed others to enroll in
college and obtain federal student aid from the Department of Education to which they
were not entitled. Hall also helped some of those people fill out college enrollment
applications, completed their coursework so that they would not be disenrolled, and
accessed their bank accounts to transfer student loan refunds to bank accounts that were
used to fund a cult of which Hall was a member. Hall’s fraudulent and deceitful conduct
caused the Department of Education to disburse $727,957 in federal student aid to students
who were not qualified to receive such aid. Based on those facts, the district court had the
3 In her reply brief, Hall asserts that our fact-specific approach contravenes
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). But we have held that Apprendi does
not apply to restitution orders. United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012).
And we have rejected Hall’s proposed alternative, i.e., the categorical approach. Ritchie,
858 F.3d at 209-11. We are bound by those prior decisions. See McMellon v. United
States, 387 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[O]ne panel cannot overrule
another.”).

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authority to order Hall to pay restitution to the Department of Education under the MVRA.4
See United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310, 311, 321-24 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming
restitution order under MVRA where defendant was convicted of misprision of a felony).
Accordingly, we deny the Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4 Hall summarily suggests that the district court could not have ordered restitution
under the “offense against property” provision of the MVRA because it requires an
“identifiable victim” and misprision of a felony is a “semi-inchoate crime” that has no
victim. Appellant’s Br. at 8. But Hall’s opening brief neither expands upon this suggestion
nor identifies any supporting authority. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring
argument section of brief to include “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with
citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”). Hall also
argues that the plea agreement is not specific enough to support the district court’s
imposition of restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3) (authorizing district court to order
restitution to person who is not “victim” if plea agreement so provides). We need not
resolve this argument, however, given our conclusion that the district court could order
restitution under the “offense against property” provision of the MVRA.

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