Rajul Ruhbayan v. REBECCA BEACH SMITH, District Judge

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-7419
RAJUL RUHBAYAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
REBECCA BEACH SMITH, District Judge; ROBERT B. KING, Appeal Judge;
ALLYSON K. DUNCAN, Appeal Judge; WILLIAM W. WILKINS, Appeal Judge,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:21-ct-03133-BO)
Submitted: March 24, 2022 Decided: July 15, 2022
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rajul Ruhbayan, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Rajul Ruhbayan appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), complaint as
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.* Ruhbayan sued the district court judge who presided
over his trial and the three judges from this court who decided his direct criminal appeal.
The district court determined that Defendants were protected by absolute judicial
immunity. We affirm.
Ruhbayan asserts that his complaint sought prospective declaratory relief, liability
for which a judge is not immune. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a district court is required
“to engage in a preliminary screening of any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity.” McClean
v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 394 (4th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax
v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020). A district court must dismiss the complaint if it
“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). “[A] complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Such a
circumstance exists, for example, when the complaint “describ[es] fantastic or delusional
scenarios” or seeks relief “on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327-28.
* The district court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), but that statute is inapplicable to
Ruhbayan who was a fee paid litigant.

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Bivens does not bar declaratory relief against judges. Just. Network Inc. v.
Craighead Cnty., 931 F.3d 753, 763 (8th Cir. 2019) (considering 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978) (noting that it is inappropriate to
create a distinction between state and federal judges for immunity purposes). However,
“[a] declaratory judgment is meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties
in anticipation of some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a past act.” Just.
Network, 931 F.3d at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Blanciak v.
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that relief sought is
not prospective where “specific allegations target past conduct, and the . . . remedy [sought]
is not intended to halt a present, continuing violation of federal law”). Thus, a claim for
declaratory relief that will avoid judicial immunity is, at most, limited to prospective
declaratory relief. See Just. Network, 931 F.3d at 764.
We find that Ruhbayan’s request for declaratory relief is purely retrospective. He
sought a declaratory judgment that past actions that occurred within the context of his
criminal proceeding violated his constitutional rights. As a result, Defendants are protected
by judicial immunity, and the district court correctly determined that Ruhbayan was not
entitled to relief under Bivens. As such, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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