United States of America v. Dwight Lamar Spears

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-6802
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DWIGHT LAMAR SPEARS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Spartanburg. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (7:08-cr-00112-JMC-3; 7:12-cv-03022-
JMC)
Submitted: January 17, 2023 Decided: January 20, 2023
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dwight Lamar Spears, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Dwight Lamar Spears appeals the district court’s order construing his Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment as an unauthorized, successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion and denying it on that basis.∗ Our review of the record confirms that the district
court properly construed Spears’ Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2255 motion over
which it lacked jurisdiction because he failed to obtain prefiling authorization from this
court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h); McRae, 793 F.3d at 397-400.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
Consistent with our decision in United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th
Cir. 2003), we construe Spears’ notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file
a second or successive § 2255 motion. Upon review, we conclude that Spears’ claims do
not meet the relevant standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We therefore deny authorization
to file a successive § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
∗ A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the district court’s
jurisdictional categorization of a Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized, successive § 2255
motion. United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015).

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