United States of America v. Marcus Desean McDougald

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4440
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS DESEAN MCDOUGALD,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 23-4446
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS DESEAN MCDOUGALD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:17-cr-00098-WO-1; 1:22-cr-00353-
WO-1)
Submitted: April 10, 2025 Decided: April 14, 2025

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Before WILKINSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Marcus Desean McDougald challenges his conviction
and 72-month sentence following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the revocation of his supervised release,
for which the district court imposed a consecutive 14-month prison term. On appeal,
McDougald’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the validity
of McDougald’s guilty plea and the reasonableness of his sentences. Although he was
notified of his right to do so, McDougald has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We
affirm.
Because McDougald did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea,
we review the validity of his plea for plain error. United States v. King, 91 F.4th 756, 760
(4th Cir. 2024). Our review of the plea colloquy confirms that the district court fully
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and properly determined that McDougald’s plea was
knowing, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis. Discerning no plain error,
we conclude that McDougald’s guilty plea is valid.
Generally, we review a defendant’s sentence “for reasonableness, applying a
deferential abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Morehouse, 34 F.4th 381, 387
(4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). We first ensure that the court
“committed no significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating the Sentencing
Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or inadequately
explaining the sentence. United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir. 2014). If we

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find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we then review its substantive reasonableness
under “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);
United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). The sentence imposed must
be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
We discern no error in the district court’s calculation of McDougald’s advisory
Guidelines range. As defense counsel acknowledges, the argument that McDougald’s prior
conviction for possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance
is not a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines is foreclosed by our decision in
United States v. Miller, 75 F.4th 215, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2023) (holding N.C. Gen Stat. § 90-
95(a)(1) (2021) is a controlled substance offense for purposes of U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual §§ 2K2.1(a)(2), 4B1.2(b)),∗ and our review of the record reveals no
reversible error in the district court’s other calculations.
The district court also appropriately considered the parties’ sentencing arguments
and adequately explained its reasons for imposing a variant sentence one-month above the
policy statement range. See United States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 292 (4th Cir. 2021)
(“variant sentences are generally reasonable when the reasons justifying the variance are
∗ For reasons appearing to the court, we placed this appeal in abeyance for United
States v. Jackson, 127 F.4th 448, 455 (4th Cir. 2025) (holding there is no irreconcilable
conflict between United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022), and United
States v. Davis, 75 F.4th 428 (4th Cir. 2023)). The opinion in Jackson supports our
decision to affirm McDougald’s sentence.

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tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We conclude that
McDougald’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Next, Anders counsel questions whether the district court imposed a reasonable
revocation sentence. “A district court has broad . . . discretion in fashioning a sentence
upon revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. Slappy, 872
F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “To consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first
must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id.
If a sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable, only then do we consider
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656
(4th Cir. 2007).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statements and the
applicable § 3553(a) factors. Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory
maximum. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). Our review of the
record confirms that McDougald’s revocation sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable. The district court correctly identified the policy statement range, considered
the relevant statutory factors, and adequately explained its reasons for selecting the 14-
month sentence, which is within the policy statement range.

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire records in these cases and
have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgments. This court requires that counsel inform McDougald, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If McDougald requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on McDougald. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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