United States of America v. DAVID ALLEN, JR., a/k/a David J. Allen, Jr., a/k/a Yamah Qiyamah Bey, a/k/a Kranston X

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4570
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID ALLEN, JR., a/k/a David J. Allen, Jr., a/k/a Yamah Qiyamah Bey, a/k/a
Kranston X,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. Mark S. Davis, Chief District Judge. (4:15-cr-00007-MSD-LRL-1)
Submitted: June 24, 2024 Decided: July 8, 2024
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD, MORECOCK,
TALBERT & WOODWARD, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D.
Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Vetan Kapoor, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
David Allen, Jr., appeals the district court’s imposition of a 24-month term of
imprisonment following the court’s revocation of his supervised release. Allen argues that
his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not afford proper
weight to Allen’s sincerely held sovereign citizen beliefs. Finding no error, we affirm.
“A sentencing court has broad discretion to impose a revocation sentence up to the
statutory maximum.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436
(4th Cir. 2020). When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,
we first “determine whether the sentence is unreasonable at all.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 296
(internal quotation marks omitted). “In making this determination, we follow generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of
supervised release revocation sentences.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th
Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if we conclude that a revocation
sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we consider “whether it is
plainly so.” Id. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” Coston,
964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the explanation indicates “that the

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court considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties,” Patterson,
957 F.3d at 436-37 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an
appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.”
Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The record reflects that the district court adequately explained the sentence and
stated an appropriate basis for concluding that Allen should receive the sentence it
imposed. Contrary to Allen’s arguments on appeal, the court properly considered Allen’s
mitigating argument regarding his sovereign citizen beliefs, but it ultimately found that the
maximum available sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment was warranted in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors and Chapter Seven of the Guidelines. Specifically, the court emphasized
Allen’s history and characteristics, the need to protect the public given his repeated refusals
to register as a sex offender, and his extensive breach of the court’s trust through consistent
supervised release violations. Therefore, in light of the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Allen’s sentence is not unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s amended order and deny Allen’s pro se
motion for new counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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