Jamie L. Brown v. TROY MEINK, Secretary of the Air Force

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-6840
JAMIE L. BROWN,
Petitioner – Appellant,
v.
TROY MEINK, Secretary of the Air Force; THOMAS SHUBERT, President, Air
Force Clemency and Parole Board,
Respondents – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Deborah L. Boardman, District Judge. (1:22-cv-00410-DLB)
Submitted: June 9, 2026 Decided: July 16, 2026
Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Robert Feldmeier, THE LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT FELDMEIER,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Molissa
H. Farber, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Jamie Brown appeals the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition
challenging the validity of his court-martial convictions. See Brown v. Kendall, No. 1:22-
cv-00410-DLB, 2023 WL 2648781 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2023). We affirm.
A general court-martial convicted Brown of one specification of sexual assault and
one specification of attempted sexual assault, in violation of Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) articles 80 and 120, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880(a), 920(b). Brown was sentenced to
34 months’ confinement, reduced to the grade of E-4, and dishonorably discharged from
the Air Force. In an unpublished but lengthy opinion, the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals (AFCCA) affirmed Brown’s convictions. United States v. Brown, No. ACM
39728, 2021 WL 3626397 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2021). The court denied Brown’s
petition for reconsideration. Brown then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (CAAF) for review, which that court summarily denied. United States v. Brown,
82 M.J. 184 (C.A.A.F. 2022). It also denied Brown’s petition for reconsideration. United
States v. Brown, 82 M.J. 222 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
Brown then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,
challenging his court-martial convictions on three grounds. First, he argued that the
military judge erred in “permitting the panel to return findings by less than a unanimous
verdict.” Brown, 2023 WL 2648781, at *4.1 He contended this error was jurisdictional.
1 “Within the military justice system, an accused has a right to trial before a panel
of military members.” United States v. St. Blanc, 70 M.J. 424, 427 (C.A.A.F. 2012). “As
a unit, the members operate in a manner roughly similar to a jury in a civilian proceeding.”

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Id. at *5. Second, he argued that the military judge erred in “instructing the panel as to
uncharged theories of criminal liability.” Id. at *4. And third, he argued that the military
judge erred by “excluding potentially exculpatory evidence and refusing to permit Brown
to cross examine a witness based on that evidence.” Id.
The district court dismissed Brown’s petition. First, the court ruled that, contrary
to Brown’s assertions, his panel-unanimity argument did not implicate the court-martial’s
jurisdiction. Id. at *5. And because the military courts fully and fairly considered Brown’s
argument, the district court held that it could not review that claim on the merits. Id. at *4–
5. The district court then reached the same conclusion for Brown’s two other challenges:
because the military courts fully and fairly considered Brown’s arguments, federal-court
review on the merits was unavailable. Id. at *5–7. Brown appealed, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s habeas petition de novo.
Dorrbecker v. Howard, 173 F.4th 142, 146 n.3 (4th Cir. 2026). As we recently explained,
“though federal courts have ‘jurisdiction over applications for habeas corpus from persons
confined by the military courts,’ ‘the scope of matters open for review’ is ‘narrow.’” Id.
at 146 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953) (plurality opinion)). “We may
‘assess de novo’ legal challenges to the military courts’ jurisdiction.” Id. at 147 (ellipsis
Santucci v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 66 F.4th 844, 846 n.1 (10th Cir.
2023); see United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 117 n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (Sullivan, J.,
concurring in the result) (“[C]ourt-martial members in a functional sense are commonly
referred to as a military jury.”). We follow the parties’ convention here and refer to these
court-martial members as a “panel.”

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omitted) (quoting Willenbring v. United States, 559 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2009)). “But
when it comes to a petitioner’s non-jurisdictional claims, our review is limited to
determining whether the military courts have ‘dealt fully and fairly with’ the claims.” Id.
(quoting Burns, 346 U.S. at 142). If they have, “then we ‘cannot review’ them.” Id.
(quoting Ward v. United States, 982 F.3d 906, 912 (4th Cir. 2020)). Under this standard,
Brown cannot prevail.
First, the district court correctly held that Brown’s panel-unanimity argument does
not implicate the court-martial’s jurisdiction. In Dorrbecker, we explained that there are
generally “three prerequisites that must be met for courts-martial jurisdiction to vest.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Brown’s challenge most plausibly relates to the third
prerequisite—that “there must be a properly convened and composed court-martial.” Id.
at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Willenbring, 559 F.3d at 231 (“[A] court-
martial proceeding must be convened and constituted in conformity with the applicable
statutes, specifically the UCMJ; otherwise the military court lacks jurisdiction.”). But, as
the district court concluded, Brown does not actually challenge the process of convening
or the composition of the court-martial. Instead, he claims only that the military courts
erred in allowing the panel serving as part of a properly convened and composed court-
martial to return non-unanimous findings. Brown provides no authority for the proposition
that this alleged error stripped the court-martial of jurisdiction. Indeed, as we explained in
Dorrbecker, errors made in the course of resolving a charge—even if legal or constitutional
in nature—are not enough. See 173 F.4th at 149–150; Burns, 346 U.S. at 143–146

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(declining to review petitioners’ constitutional due process claims because the military
courts fully and fairly reviewed them).
The question thus becomes whether the military courts gave full and fair
consideration to Brown’s claim that he was entitled to unanimous panel findings. In
Dorrbecker, we relied on “a straightforward reading” of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Burns to find that the military courts fully and fairly considered the argument presented.
173 F.4th at 150–152. That same straightforward reading counsels the same result here
because the record shows that the military courts “‘heard [Brown] out on’” his argument
that non-unanimous panel findings violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 151 (quoting
Burns, 346 U.S. at 144). The AFCCA “carefully considered” and rejected Brown’s
argument that “the non-unanimous verdict violated [his] Fifth Amendment and Sixth
Amendment rights in light of Ramos v. Louisiana.” Brown, 2021 WL 3626397, at *1
(footnotes omitted). Though the court declined to discuss the issue in depth, it cited a prior
CAAF case that observed, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 39 (1942), that there is no Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in courts-martial.
Id. (citing United States v. Easton, 71 M.J. 168, 175 (C.A.A.F. 2012)).2 We reject Brown’s
2 Since the district court’s decision in this case, the CAAF has held that court-martial
convictions premised on non-unanimous panel findings do not violate the Fifth or Sixth
Amendments. See generally United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F. 2023), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 1003 (2024); see id. at 294–298 (specifically rejecting the argument that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana changed the long-established rule that
the Sixth Amendment does not apply to courts-martial).

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contention that the AFCCA’s consideration of this issue was not full or fair under Burns.3
Further, although the CAAF summarily denied Brown’s petition for review on this subject,
we held in Dorrbecker that summary denial of a petition for review does not indicate a lack
of full and fair consideration. See 173 F.4th at 152. Because the military courts gave the
panel-unanimity issue full and fair consideration, we “cannot review” Brown’s claim on
the merits. Id. at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, the military courts also fully and fairly considered Brown’s claim that the
military judge erred in instructing the panel on uncharged theories of liability. Brown
challenges two instructions: the military judge’s “bodily harm instruction,” Opening Br.
16, and the military judge’s “asleep and unconscious instruction,” id. at 19. The military
courts heard Brown out on his arguments about both. As an initial matter, the AFCCA’s
opinion makes clear that these issues were “‘explored’ or at least ‘available for exploration
at the trial.’” Dorrbecker, 173 F.4th at 151 (quoting Burns, 346 U.S. at 145); see Brown,
2021 3626397, at *9–12. Next, Brown raised his challenges to both instructions before the
AFCCA, and that court rejected the challenges after a fulsome discussion on the merits.
Brown, 2021 WL 3626397, at *9–12. Finally, Brown again raised his challenges before
the CAAF, which summarily denied his petition for review. That is full and fair
consideration. See Dorrbecker, 173 F.4th at 150–152. Therefore, we cannot review this
claim either. See id. at 147.
3 Indeed, the AFCCA’s summary rejection of this argument is unsurprising given
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos—on which Brown based his argument—
nowhere mentioned the military justice system. See generally Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.
Ct. 1390 (2020).

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Lastly, the military courts fully and fairly considered Brown’s argument that not
allowing him to “introduce certain evidence of other sexual behavior by [the victim]
pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 412,” was error. Brown, 2021 WL 3626397, at *19. As the
AFCCA’s opinion makes clear, Brown litigated this issue extensively before the military
judge presiding over the court-martial. See id. at *19–20. Next, Brown raised this
argument before the AFCCA, and that court rejected it in a fulsome discussion. See id. at
*19–21. And finally, Brown nowhere claims that he did not raise this issue before the
CAAF in his petition for review.4 Overall, the record shows that the military courts fully
and fairly considered this issue. For that reason, we cannot review it on the merits.
Dorrbecker, 173 F.4th at 147.
In sum, none of the issues Brown presents are jurisdictional, and the military courts
fully and fairly considered them all. We therefore “cannot review” Brown’s challenges,
and the district court’s judgment is affirmed. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4 Brown filed part of his petition for review to the CAAF under seal.

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