Kimberly Kubas v. 331B, LLC, d/b/a Rockwell Fitness

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1802
KIMBERLY KUBAS,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
331B, LLC, d/b/a Rockwell Fitness,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Erin Aslan, Magistrate Judge. (1:20-cv-02456-EA)
Submitted: December 31, 2025 Decided: March 18, 2026
Before RICHARDSON, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: T. Lee Beeman, Jr., BUCKEL, LEVASSEUR, PILLAI & BEEMAN, LLC,
Cumberland, Maryland, for Appellant. Sundeep Hora, ALDERMAN, DEVORSETZ &
HORA PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Appellant 331B, LLC, appeals the magistrate judge’s order granting in part and
denying in part Appellee Kimberly Kubas’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs after the
jury returned a verdict for Kubas on her employment retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.*
Kubas requested $260,572.50 in attorney’s fees and $11,139.09 in costs. The magistrate
judge awarded Kubas $91,320.00 in attorney’s fees and $7,705.38 in costs. On appeal, the
Appellant contends that the magistrate judge erred in awarding attorney’s fees.
We review the magistrate judge’s fee award for abuse of discretion. See De Paredes
v. Zen Nails Studio, 134 F.4th 750, 753 (4th Cir. 2025). “The essential goal in shifting fees
(to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection, and the
determination of fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Id. (citation
modified). “The district court—not the appellate court—has close and intimate knowledge
of the efforts expended and the value of the services rendered, and appellate courts must
give substantial deference to these determinations.” Id. (citation modified).
“The proper calculation of an attorney’s fee award involves a three-step process.”
McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013). “First, the court must ‘determine the
lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable
rate.’” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009)).
* The parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).

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“To ascertain what is reasonable in terms of hours expended and the rate charged,” the
court must apply the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488
F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), as adopted in Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216,
226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978). McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88 & n.5. Second, “the court must subtract
fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones.” Id. at 88 (citation
modified). Third, “the court should award some percentage of the remaining amount,
depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff.” Id. (citation modified).
On appeal, the Appellant does not challenge the magistrate judge’s analysis of the
first two steps but contends that the magistrate judge erred at step three by not further
reducing or eliminating the attorney’s fee award. In applying the third step of McAfee, “it
can be challenging to put a number on ‘success,’” because “[t]here is no ‘precise rule or
formula’ to aid the court in determining just how successful a plaintiff may have been.”
Jones v. Southpeak Interactive Corp. of Del., 777 F.3d 658, 676 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). Here, the magistrate judge determined
the damages award by the jury in this case was analogous to that in McAfee and therefore
reduced the lodestar amount of $228,300.00 by 60 percent to $91,320.00.
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, and we find no
error or abuse of discretion by the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge had close and
intimate knowledge of the efforts expended and the value of the services rendered, and we
must give substantial deference to these determinations. See De Paredes, 134 F.4th at 753.
Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s order. See Kubas v. 331B, LLC, No. 1:20-
cv-02456-EA (D. Md. July 19, 2024). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

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and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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