United States of America v. Legarius Deshawn Bonner

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4490
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEGARIUS DESHAWN BONNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:18-cr-00304-TDS-1)
Submitted: February 20, 2025 Decided: February 25, 2025
Before AGEE, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: John D. Bryson, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High
Point, North Carolina, for Appellant. Randall S. Galyon, Acting United States Attorney,
Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Legarius Deshawn Bonner pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In 2019, the district court sentenced Bonner to 37
months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. In 2024, the district
court revoked Bonner’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Bonner argues that the upward-variant revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436
(4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,
[we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable,” id., applying “the same procedural and substantive considerations that
guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture
than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370,
373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “[I]f a sentence is
either procedurally or substantively unreasonable,” we then address “whether the sentence
is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.”
Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United

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States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted). The district court must, at a minimum, explain the sentence
sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review, “with the assurance that the court
considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by [the defendant] with regard to
his sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks, emphasis, and brackets omitted). And where, as here, a court imposes a
sentence above the policy statement range, the court must explain why that sentence “better
serves the relevant sentencing [factors].” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 209 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing the upward-
variant, statutory maximum 24-month revocation sentence. The court considered the
relevant statutory factors, imposed a sentence within the statutory maximum, gave
sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision, and addressed Bonner’s arguments for a lower
sentence. We discern no error in the court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing

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factors. Accordingly, we conclude that the 24-month sentence is reasonable. We therefore
affirm the revocation judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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