United States of America v. Michael A. Nolan

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4357
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL A. NOLAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (3:24-cr-00179-RCY-1)
Submitted: June 1, 2026 Decided: June 23, 2026
Before BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Salvatore M. Mancina,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Joseph S. Camden, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Lindsey Halligan, United States Attorney, Todd W. Blanche, Deputy Attorney General,
Robert K. McBride, First Assistant United States Attorney, James Reed Sawyers, Assistant
United States Attorney, Patrick Joseph McGorman, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Michael A. Nolan pled guilty without a plea agreement to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced
Nolan to 63 months in prison. On appeal, Nolan raises constitutional challenges to his
firearms conviction, and he also challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Nolan first asserts that his conviction violates the Second Amendment and that
§ 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. However, Nolan
rightfully concedes that his constitutional challenges are foreclosed by circuit precedent.
See United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding that “Section
922(g)(1) is facially constitutional because it has a plainly legitimate sweep and may
constitutionally be applied in at least some set of circumstances” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 702 (4th Cir. 2024) (reaffirming this
court’s “precedent foreclosing as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(1)”), cert. denied,
145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that “[t]he existence of th[e] jurisdictional element, requiring the Government to show that
a nexus exists between the firearm and interstate commerce to obtain a conviction under
§ 922(g), . . . satisfies the minimal nexus required for the Commerce Clause”). We
therefore reject Nolan’s challenges to his § 922(g)(1) conviction.
Regarding Nolan’s sentence, we review the district court’s sentencing decision for
an abuse of discretion, which is limited to determining whether the sentence is reasonable.
See United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020); Gall v. United States, 552

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U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining
whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating
the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 212.
“In assessing whether a district court properly calculated the Guidelines range,
including its application of any sentencing enhancements, this [c]ourt reviews the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v.
Pena, 952 F.3d 503, 512 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the
clear error standard, we will only reverse if left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Nolan asserts that the district court misapplied Virginia law when it found that his
offense level should be increased four levels under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (2024), based on his possession of the firearm in connection with another
felony offense, to wit: shooting at an occupied dwelling, in violation of Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-279. Section 18.2-279 provides, in relevant part, that
If any person maliciously discharges a firearm within any building when
occupied by one or more persons in such a manner as to endanger the life or
lives of such person or persons, or maliciously shoots at, or maliciously
throws any missile at or against any dwelling house or other building when
occupied by one or more persons, whereby the life or lives of any such person
or persons may be put in peril, the person so offending is guilty of a Class 4
felony.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-279.

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The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that § 18.2-279 constitutes a “legislative
declaration that human lives may be endangered when a deadly weapon is maliciously
discharged at or against a building occupied by people.” Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 255
S.E.2d 506, 508 (Va. 1979). According to Virginia’s highest court, that “legislative
determination” in turn “relieves the Commonwealth of the burden of proving that human
life was, in fact, endangered.” Id. As the Virginia Supreme Court further explained years
later, “[a]ll the Commonwealth [i]s required to show [i]s that the discharge of the firearm
may have put [an occupant’s] life in peril.” Kirby v. Commonwealth, 570 S.E.2d 832, 835
(Va. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Edelstein v. Commonwealth, 910 S.E.2d 511, 518
(Va. Ct. App. 2025) (holding that “the mere possibility of ricocheting bullets supported the
jury’s finding that Edelstein’s discharge of his firearm within the confined area of the
bedroom and near [an occupant] could have placed her life in peril” (emphasis added)).
Since the Virginia Supreme Court’s holding—that, to establish a violation of § 18.2-279,
the Commonwealth need not prove “that human life was, in fact, endangered,” Dowdy, 255
S.E.2d at 508—remains good law, we conclude that the district court did not erroneously
apply that standard in this case.
Nolan nonetheless also asserts that, even if the district court applied the correct legal
standard in evaluating whether his conduct on the day of his arrest constituted a violation
of § 18.2-279, the court clearly erred in determining that the conduct could have
endangered the lives of any occupants. We have reviewed the evidence pertaining to
Nolan’s use of a firearm on the date of his arrest and conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in finding that Nolan’s conduct, at a minimum, “could” or “may have” “put in

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peril” the occupants of the apartment complex. See Edelstein, 910 S.E.2d at 517-18. We
therefore reject Nolan’s challenge to the legality of the imposed 63-month sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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