McNeice v. GlobalSantaFe Drill

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
December 21, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-30651
Summary Calendar
_______________
ROBERT DONALD MCNEICE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
GLOBALSANTAFE DRILLING COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
m 6:04-CV-2322
__________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Robert McNeice appeals a summary judg-
ment in favor of GlobalSantaFe Drilling Com-
pany (“GlobalSantaFe”), dismissing his discrim-
ination claim under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (“ADA”). Because McNeice is unable
to show that he is a qualified individual with a
disability within the meaning of the ADA, we
affirm.
I.
McNeice has worked for GlobalSantaFe and
its predecessor companies since 1980. In 1999,
while employed as a Rig Engineer on an offshore
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be pub-
lished and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

-- 1 of 3 --

drilling rig,1 he suffered a heart attack and un-
derwent triple-bypass surgery. Three years la-
ter, he suffered further heart complications and
had a pacemaker and an Implantable Cardio-
verter Defibrillator (“ICD”)2 installed in his
chest. Three months thereafter, his doctor re-
leased him to return to work under instruction
to stay at least three to four feet away from
high-voltage equipment.
GlobalSantaFe conducted an investigation
to determine whether McNeice would be able
to return to work on the rig safely. After re-
questing information from the ICD’s manufac-
turer and conducting an assessment of the lev-
els of electromagnetic interference emitted at
the worksite, GlobalSantaFe discharged Mc-
Neice. In the termination letter, it indicated it
could not “be assured that the power sources
would not interfere with the proper funtioning
of [his] pacemaker.” McNeice vigorously con-
tests the outcome of the investigation and
maintains that the company misinterpreted its
own data in concluding that electromagnetic
interference on the rig could interfere with his
ICD.
McNeice sued, alleging that the company
had failed reasonably to accommodate him and
had discharged him for a perceived disability
as defined in the ADA. The company success-
fully moved for summary judgment on the
ground that McNeice was not a qualified indi-
vidual under the ADA because the company
did not perceive him as being disabled from a
broad class of jobs.
II.
We review a summary judgment de novo.
Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir.
2005). All justifiable inferences to be drawn
from the underlying facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Minter v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 423 F.3d 460, 465
(5th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropri-
ate where the record demonstrates that there is
no issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Martinez v. Bally’s La., Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476
(5th Cir. 2001).
The ADA prohibits an employer from
discriminating against a “qualified individual
with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The
statute defines disability to include one who is
regarded (even mistakenly) as having “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of the in-
dividual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Although
working is considered a major life activity, “[t]he
inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the ma-
jor life activity of working.”3
In Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117
F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997), we considered the
ADA claim of a storeroom operator in a welding
shop who was demoted after his employer de-
termined that he could no longer work as an op-
erator because of the risk of electrical interfer-
ence with his newly-installed pacemaker. The
plaintiff alleged that the only job that he was lim-
ited from performing was his previous one. We
concluded that because he “was substantially
limited by his alleged disability from performing
1 A Rig Engineer is responsible for maintaining
the electrical and mechanical equipment, including
high-powered electrical generators.
2 The ICD monitors McNeice’s heart and,
should he have an adverse event in which the pace-
maker fails to produce a reaction, delivers a shock
as would an external defibrillator.
3 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006). “[T]o be
substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, then, one must be precluded from more than
one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job
of choice.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 492 (1999).

-- 2 of 3 --

only a single, particular job, a jury could not
reasonably find that he has a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of
working.” Id. at 806.
Similarly, McNeice alleges only that Glo-
balSantaFe regarded him as disabled from per-
forming the job of Rig Engineer.4 It is undis-
puted that the company even considered him
qualified to perform the responsibilities of a
Rig Engineer in an onshore environment. Be-
cause the only job GlobalSantaFe regarded
McNeice as limited in performing was offshore
Rig Engineer, no reasonable jury could find
that the company regarded him as having a
substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working.
AFFIRMED.
4 GlobalSantaFe employs another person with
a pacemaker as barge master on the rig to which
McNeice was assigned.

-- 3 of 3 --