Denton v. Astrue

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
March 29, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-50448
Summary Calendar
_______________
CYNTHIA DENTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
m 1:04-CV-726
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The Commissioner of Social Security
denied Cynthia Denton’s claimfor disability in-
surance benefits. Because that decision is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and is in
accordance with law, we affirm.
I. * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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2
Denton filed an application for disability in-
surance benefits in 2003, alleging numerous
disabilities.1 The Commissioner denied her ap-
plication.
An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) heard
evidence from Denton, a medical expert, and
a vocational expert. He considered Denton’s
medical record and determined she was not
disabled. When the Appeals Council denied
Denton’s request for review, the ALJ’s
decision became the Commissioner’s final
decision for judicial review. Denton sued, and
the matter was referred by consent to a
magistrate judge, who, acting as the district
court, upheld the ALJ.
II.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to
deny social security benefits only to determine
whether the final decision is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and whether the proper legal
standards were used to evaluate the evidence.
Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir.
1999); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232,
236 (5th Cir. 1994). Denton urges that the
ALJ’s determination is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence and that the ALJ applied im-
proper legal standards.
Denton argues that the ALJ’s determination
that Denton could perform work as an office
helper, a mail clerk, and an assembler of small
products is not supported by substantial
evidence. Light work requires a good deal of
walking and standing, but Denton asserts she
cannot perform such work, because her knee
pain precludes her from walking and standing.
To buttress her argument, she contends that
the district court found that the light work she
could perform was limited by her inability to
walk and stand. Denton states that “the only
job the Court below found that would actually
not be precluded would be that of a small parts
assembler that would allow sitting through
most of the work day.”
The record contains substantial evidence
that Denton can walk, supporting the ALJ’s
determination that she could perform work as
an office helper, a mail clerk, and an assembler
of small products. Dr. Barbara Felkins
testified as a medical expert before the ALJ
and opined, based on Denton’s medical his-
torySSincluding the various “orthopedic type
complaints”SSthat Denton could perform light
work. Felkins’s testimony provides substantial
evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion that Denton
could walk or stand for six hours in an eight
hour day. Furthermore, the ALJ noted that
Denton’s medical records did not evince sig-
nificant problems walking, as demonstrated by
the fact that she was never prescribed a cane
despite her claim that she cannot walk because
of imbalance.2
The district court’s opinion does not
contradict this conclusion. The memorandum
opinion and order states that small parts as-
sembly is one example of work that Denton
1 The district court’s opinion extensively
details Denton’s medical history and alleged
limitations. Among other ailments, Denton states
she suffered from knee pain, earaches, migraines,
and a bipolar disorder.
2 Under the assumption that the only job
Denton can perform is a small parts assembler,
she posits that the Commissioner did not prove
there are jobs in the national economy in
significant numbers that she is able to perform.
Because substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s conclusion that she could perform multiple
jobs and not just the job of a small parts
assembler, Denton’s argument is inapposite.

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could perform, but the opinion does not say
this is the only work she could perform.3
Denton complains that the ALJ committed
legal error by not addressing whether she
could sustain a job over time. Because her ill-
nesses incapacitate her at various times, she
urges, she could not keep a job even if she ob-
tained one.
Contrary to Denton’s position, the ALJ did
address her ability to sustain employment, thus
applying the correct legal standard. The ALJ
specifically found that Denton “could sustain
the physical demands of light work,” and the
ALJ noted that there was no evidence to es-
tablish that Denton “would be absent over two
days a month or experience difficulties which
would further interfere with full-time work.”
These conclusions reflect consideration of
whether Denton could sustain employment.
Denton protests that the ALJ did not
properly evaluate the limitations imposed by
her mental illness in assessing her residual
functional capacity. Yet, the ALJ found that
Denton does not have debilitating mental
health impairment. Her impairments are only
mild and were corrected through medication.
The ALJ did not need to assess the limitations
caused by Denton’s alleged mental health im-
pairment because the ALJ found no such im-
pairment existed.4
Finally, Denton states that the ALJ failed to
evaluate the credibility of Denton’s testimony
to the ALJ in light of other evidence. A
review of the ALJ’s determination reveals
Denton’s position is meritless. The ALJ
applied the proper legal standard, noting that
he must consider “the extent to which
[symptoms, including pain,] can reasonably be
accepted as consistent with objective medical
evidence . . . .” The ALJ also considered the
credibility of Denton’s testimony using “an
evaluation of the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of that pain . . . .” The ALJ
3 The opinion states:
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ
failed to take her knee pain into account.
However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
suffered from severe knee pain within the
meaning of the regulations. The court notes
that the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be
able to perform a significant range of light
work, not all light work. The regulations
state that light work would include those jobs
that require “a good deal of walking or
standing.” However, by way of example, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff would be capable of
performing the job of small parts assembler.
Sparks, the vocational expert, testified that
the [sic] half of the assembler jobs in Texas
would require mostly sitting. As such, the
ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform a
significant range of light work is supported by
substantial evidence and Plaintiff’s argument
fails.
(Emphasis added; internal citations omitted.)
4 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945:
Your impairment(s), and any related
symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical
and mental limitations that affect what you
can do in a work setting. Your residual
functional capacity is the most you can still
do despite your limitations. We will assess
your residual functional capacity based on all
the relevant evidence in your case record.
This regulation demands an assessment of
residual functions only if the ALJ finds a
limitation. Without a limitation, there is no
assessment.

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applied the proper legal standard to evaluate
Denton’s testimony.
AFFIRMED.

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