United States v. Pearson

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-60911
Summary Calendar

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Michael Wayne Pearson,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:18-CR-250-1

Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Michael Wayne Pearson was convicted by a jury of knowingly making
a false statement in connection with an acquisition or attempted acquisition
of a firearm from a federally licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(6) and knowingly making a false statement to a federally licensed

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 28, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 19-60911
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firearms dealer with respect to the information required to be kept in the
records of a federally licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(A). Pearson was sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment and
three years of supervised release. Pearson now appeals his conviction,
arguing that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s guilty verdict.
Because Pearson properly preserved this issue, we review the
preserved claim of error de novo. See United States v. Carbins, 882 F.3d 557,
562-63 (5th Cir. 2018). Under the de novo standard of review, we review
whether “a rational jury could have found that the evidence established the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 563 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The jury has the “sole authority to
weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”
United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We must “view all evidence, whether
circumstantial or direct, in the light most favorable to the government, with
all reasonable inferences and credibility choices to be made in support of the
jury’s verdict.” United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 600 (5th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, our inquiry
upon review is “limited to whether the jury’s verdict was reasonable, not
whether we believe it to be correct.” Id. at 601 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Pearson argues that the Government did not present sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that he had knowledge of his prior
commitment order to a mental institution when he attempted to acquire a
firearm from a federally licensed firearms dealer on July 24, 2018. We have
stated that “[t]he rationality of inferences ultimately rest on common sense”
and that “[t]his ordinarily is a quintessential jury question.” United States v.
Chapman, 7 F.3d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1993). Additionally, we have acknowledged
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that even if a defendant presents evidence of a good faith lack of knowledge
in making a false statement, “[p]roof of knowingly making a false statement
is necessarily circumstantial in the great majority of [these] cases.” United
States v. Garcia, 479 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1973). A review of the record
indicates that a rational jury could infer from the Government’s evidence that
Pearson had knowledge of his prior commitment order when he attempted to
acquire the firearm. Although the testimonies of the Government’s
witnesses and of Pearson himself at the trial did not reveal much information
establishing Pearson’s knowledge, the Government’s exhibits did contain
circumstantial evidence sufficient for a rational jury to infer that Pearson had
knowledge of his prior commitment order. The Government’s exhibits
included the commitment order that was entered against Pearson by the
Rankin County Chancery Court on March 21, 2018, a few months prior to his
attempted acquisition of a firearm. The order by itself, on its face, could lead
a rational jury to infer that Pearson had knowledge of his prior commitment,
as it stated that Pearson had consulted his legal counsel and decided to waive
a formal hearing with the court’s approval regarding the commitment. With
this evidence, along with the Government’s other exhibits and witness
testimonies, a rational jury could infer that Pearson had knowledge of his
prior commitment order when he attempted to acquire a firearm.
While Pearson presented significant evidence of a good faith lack of
knowledge of his prior commitment through his testimony at trial, we are
ultimately highly deferential to the jury’s findings and our inquiry on review
is limited. See Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 600-01. Determinations of witness
credibility and weight of the evidence are within the jury’s sole authority, and
the jury chose to assign great weight to the Government’s exhibits and
believe the Government’s witnesses over Pearson. See Grant, 683 F.3d at
642.
Accordingly, Pearson’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
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